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This thesis concerns the role of the state in industrial development and structural transformation, 
in the context of multilateral restrictions on trade and investment policy space. More specifically, 
it examines the elimination of local content requirements (LCRs) in the automotive sector by 16 
developing countries, as required by the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures. My focus is on the complex, dynamic causal processes that govern the economic 
geography of production, trade and investment, and the implications of the elimination of LCRs 
on those processes.   
In order to explore this issue, I employ a mixed method approach to empirical impact evaluation. I 
examine how the elimination of LCRs has impacted a number of key variables relating to 
production, trade and investment, using two methodological tools: ‘difference-in-difference’ 
panel regression, and comparative case studies. Possibilities for empirical research emerged from 
a ‘natural experiment’ – in which a number of countries were exogenously compelled to remove 
LCRs – coupled with the passing of sufficient time to allow long term impacts to be realised.  This 
mixed approach entails progression from a simple panel regression model aimed at identifying 
and quantifying the ‘global’ impacts of the policy restriction on the 16 countries subject to the 
elimination of LCRs, to a more expansive treatment of the complex factors that determine case-
specific outcomes, and the mechanisms through which they operate, through historical 
institutionalist, comparative case studies.  
The key finding is that contrary to the more pessimistic expectations, liberalising countries 
appear, on balance, to have exhibited significantly improved industrial performance outcomes: 
controlling for relevant covariates, output levels have not fallen while exports have increased 
dramatically. However, the cases examined here had a number of strong advantages going into 
liberalisation, suggesting that positive outcomes may not be broadly generalisable. The benefits 
of integration into global networks are unevenly distributed across structurally diverse countries, 
while across the cases examined here, countries continue to pursue alternative means through 
which to promote domestic production, the effects of which are difficult to separate from wider 
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1.1 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This thesis concerns contemporary debates on the role of the state in industrial development and 
structural transformation, in the empirical context of developing countries’ automotive sectors. 
More specifically, I examine the impact of restrictions on a particular type of investment 
performance requirement, imposed through the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs Agreement) under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which 
prohibits local content requirements (LCRs). The purpose of LCRs is to constrain the activities of 
manufacturing firms with respect to intermediate input sourcing; historically they have been used 
most prominently in the automotive sector to encourage the establishment of ‘linkages’ between 
multinational vehicle assemblers and local suppliers of parts and components. The TRIMs 
Agreement has necessitated the elimination of such policies for all WTO members in which they 
were in force, within an externally imposed timescale.  
My research problem relates to the implications of the elimination of LCRs for industrial 
development; specifically, whether the elimination of LCRs has had significant, discernible effects 
on countries in which they were previously in force, and the nature of these effects, including 
whether they have varied between countries with different structural characteristics. This 
involves cross-national empirical comparison of industrial performance outcomes, and the causal 
mechanisms through which outcomes arise, as they have unfolded over the course of the 
elimination of LCRs. Before turning to my empirical strategy, I first discuss my motivations for 
carrying out this research. I then provide a brief overview of the background to debates around 
multilateral trade liberalisation and policy space. Having done so, I provide an overview of my 
research design and method, summarise my key findings, and then describe the structure of the 
remaining chapters of the thesis. 
1.2 MOTIVATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
The developmental implications of restrictions on LCRs are extremely contentious, with numerous 
arguments for and against. The core concerns are reflected in wider debates on interventionist 
trade and industrial policies and the developmental impacts of multilateral restrictions on ‘policy 
space’, to which I intend to contribute. The role of the state in industrial development is an 
immensely complex and contested issue which, at risk of over-simplification, can be characterised 
by two opposing perspectives: neoliberalism assumes that markets are generally efficient and that 
state interventions are likely to exacerbate distortions rather than correct them while 
structuralism assumes that market failures are pervasive and that the state can effectively 
intervene to improve welfare outcomes. These perspectives suggest opposing policy stances on 
the part of developing countries, with the former recommending a ‘neutral’ regime allowing the 
market forces of comparative advantage to reign free, and the latter a pragmatic combination of 
trade restrictions, investment performance requirements and other forms of industrial promotion 
targeted at specific activities in which market failures are seen to reside.  
In the context of these divergence perspectives on the value and effectiveness of government 
intervention, a large number of scholars (Chang, 2002; Wade, 2003; Lall, 2004; Gallagher (ed.), 
2005; Hamwey, 2005; Dicaprio and Gallaher 2006, UNCTAD 2006, Kumar and Gallagher, 2007; 
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Akyüz, 2009) have expressed concern that policy restrictions are reducing developing countries’ 
policy space in important ways.  
While the effects of policy restrictions emanating from the lending practices of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements may be 
extremely significant (Shadlen, 2005; Akyüz, 2007), multilateral trade rules are particularly 
interesting and important for several reasons. Unlike the lending practices of IFIs, multilateral 
rules are legally binding for all participants, albeit subject to some additional provisions for 
developing and least developed countries, which have arguably been fairly limited in scope; and 
they cover the vast majority of national economies in a common framework, unlike bilateral and 
regional agreements. This allows me to examine how the extent to which uniform restrictions 
vary across countries with different structural characteristics, which is an important concern of 
the thesis.  
My thesis comprises an empirical investigation into the validity of the structuralist concerns that is 
both substantively interesting and methodologically feasible. LCRs were a highly contentious topic 
within multilateral trade negotiations, and developing countries strongly resisted their prohibition 
in favour of continued flexibility to condition the activities of multinational corporations operating 
within their territories. However, the policies can also have distortive and damaging effects. 
Theoretically, the impacts of LCRs are ambiguous, and depend on numerous contextual factors 
relating to market structures and the presence of market failures in technological learning and 
technology transfer. Empirically, both positive and negative aspects of LCRs have been reported in 
the literature. In summary, the overall developmental implications of the prohibition of LCRs are 
ambiguous; there is a lack of systematic, cross-national empirical research, a gap which this thesis 
aims to fill. 
This debate has significant ‘real-world’ policy implications, as the international institutions that 
govern economic life hinge upon conclusions drawn in the academy. In such a context, the 
findings from my research may be more generally applicable to other policy instruments and 
other areas of multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiation. Although the policy instrument 
examined in this thesis has already been prohibited by the WTO, further negotiations on 
multilateral trade rules are ongoing, a more comprehensive regime on finance and investment is 
being mooted, and bilateral and regional agreements and institutions proliferate apace. In 
addition, this research coincides with a turn, among prominent institutions such as the World 
Bank, towards greater acceptance of an enhanced role for the state. As such, the issue of the 
impact of multilateral restrictions is both vital to the issues of global equality and justice, and of 
contemporary academic significance.  
An important factor motivating my interest in this area of research is methodological. Analysis of 
the implications of the elimination of LCRs is complicated by causal complexity. Industrial 
performance outcomes are naturally codetermined by numerous factors other than LCRs, which 
need to be adequately controlled or otherwise accounted for. Policies are likely to give rise to 
heterogeneous effects, depending upon their conjunction with wider contextual factors. 
Furthermore, the rationales for trade and industrial policies such as LCRs are that they give rise to 
non-linear, cumulative effects, the determination of which requires a dynamic framework of 
analysis. Decisions to implement and remove LCRs are likely to be ‘endogenous’ to the industrial 
performance outcomes on which they exert an effect. In this context, there are considerable 
difficulties isolating the impacts of policy changes; some scholars have even commented that the 
costs of policy space restrictions are impossible to quantify. However, the extension of 
multilateral rules of specific policy instruments that has occurred through the WTO (an 
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‘exogenous’ shock) provides an interesting opportunity for evaluating the impact of restrictions 
across a number of countries, using both variable- and case-oriented approaches to causal 
attribution. The contributions of each methodological approach to causal complexity, and the 
benefits of triangulating findings, justify my mixed-method research design, on which I elaborate 
presently.  
1.3 BACKGROUND: THE POLICY SPACE DEBATE 
WTO commitments certainly reduce de jure policy space, since they undoubtedly limit the legal 
autonomy of states to pursue certain development strategies, but policy space is more than just 
legal autonomy; it refers to “the effectiveness of national policy instruments in achieving national 
policy objectives” (Akyüz, 2007: 3).  
In the structuralist perspective barriers to structural transformation may be so pervasive that in 
the absence of policies aimed at overcoming them, industrial development is bound to stall. 
Mastery of new activities – especially those that are technologically advanced – is subject to costly 
and uncertain learning processes and interdependencies between firms, giving rise to infant 
industrial arguments.  The argument is that “rules and commitments, which in legal terms are 
equally binding for all countries, in economic terms might impose more binding constraints on 
developing than on developed countries, because of the differences in their respective structural 
features and levels of industrial development” (UNCTAD, 2006: XII). These structural features 
include the extent of market failures which potentially justify the restricted policies in the first 
place. If the multilateral restrictions prevent countries from pursuing developmentally useful 
interventions, then they may impose costs; the overall impact on de facto policy space is 
ambiguous.    
In contrast, neoliberals would argue that the de facto impact of trade policy restrictions is always 
to enhance policy space for development. This is so for two main reasons, relating to the main 
theoretical presuppositions of neoliberalism: that market failures are relatively insignificant in 
magnitude, and that even when market failures do arise, state intervention usually makes matters 
worse. If markets are efficient, i.e. there are no market failures, it can be demonstrated that free 
trade is unambiguously welfare enhancing, following the theory of comparative advantage1. In 
addition, to the extent that market failures reside in technological and capital markets, neoliberals 
tend to argue that these can be largely overcome through openness to foreign capital and 
technology in the form of FDI (Pack and Saggi, 2006). 
                                                          
1
 As a result of the elimination of trade barriers, resources will flow from import-competing sectors in which 
countries have a comparative disadvantage, to export sectors in which they have comparative advantage 
(WTO, 2008; Lin and Monga, 2010). It can be shown, under stringent assumptions of market efficiency and 
that are employed by mainstream static trade models, that trade liberalisation is unambiguously beneficial 
for all participants (e.g., Brown et al., 1995, 2002; World Bank, 1995; Francois et al., 1996, 2005). In this 
perspective, restrictions on trade policy are not a ‘cost’ in real economics; all concessions that countries 
make contribute to welfare improvements. “The effect of trade liberalization is to increase real GDP at 
world prices” (WTO, 2008: 64); and, more importantly, all countries gain. Liberalisation is even more 
beneficial for poorer countries with higher initial levels of protection; “countries that liberalize the most 
tend to gain the most. Indeed, in the literature, there is a strong positive relationship between own 
liberalization and estimated welfare gains” from liberalisation (Francois et al., 1996). The assumptions 
introduced as parameters in such models, and by extension their findings, have been robustly challenged by 
critics (e.g. Taylor and von Arnim, 2006; Wise and Gallagher, 2006; Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 2007). While 
some of the issues can in principle be addressed with modifications to the specifications and assumptions 
adopted, there remains a fundamental limitation in that “structural adjustment is a dynamic problem that is 
difficult to capture with static models” (De Cordoba et al., 2005: 67). 
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In the structuralist view, while FDI can help to overcome capability deficits, attracting and 
benefitting from FDI is far from easy, and requires the presence of local capabilities in the first 
place, since “technology-intensive and knowledge-augmenting investment flows seek out 
complementary assets in the recipient countries” (Narula and Dunning, 2000: 158). FDI can also 
give rise to a number of negative impacts arising from imperfect competition and the strategic 
behaviour of MNCs. Among the most important determinants of the developmental impacts of 
FDI are the extent to which MNCs transfer technology to subsidiaries and otherwise engage in 
linkages with the wider economy. Because these processes may be subject to market failures, the 
presence of FDI does not negate a role for the state in conditioning the operational behaviour of 
MNCs, such as through the use of policies such as LCRs.  
Therefore, to the extent that such market failures are accepted, neoliberals complement their 
welfare economic foundations with some political economy premises about the capabilities and 
motivations of states in practicing effective interventions (Chang, 2000). Such arguments are 
twofold, and relate to information and incentives. With respect to information, it is argued that 
states do not have the capacities to identify accurately the incidence and magnitude of market 
failures. Better to let the decentralised market mechanism to identify profitable opportunities 
than expect bureaucrats to ‘pick winners’. This argument is typified by Krugman (1983), Krueger 
(1990) and Pack and Saggi (2006). With respect to incentives, it is argued that conferring ‘rents’ 
alters the behaviour of economic agents. Firms engage in ‘rent-seeking’ activities, devoting efforts 
to securing government support rather than pursuing productivity improvements; there a danger 
that “once they are awarded the state-created rents, investors may have little incentive to raise 
productivity, as the market mechanism has been temporarily weakened” (Chang, 2006: 28) – 
giving rise to ‘infants that never grow up’. 
Most proponents of state intervention acknowledge the general validity of these concerns (e.g. 
Gallagher and Kumar, 2007). However, they emphasise case study evidence on newly 
industrialised developmental states (see Amsden, 1989 on Korea; Wade, 1990 on Taiwan) and 
specific policies targeted at market failures residing in technological capability accumulation (e.g. 
see Chang, 2005 on trade policy; Chang and Green, 2003 on investment restrictions and 
requirements; UNCTAD 2003b on technology policies) to show that industrial policies need not be 
damaging, and indeed have been highly successful in certain instances. Successes are less 
celebrated outside of East Asia, but numerous nevertheless; indeed as Rodrik (2004: 27) 
illustrates, “it is difficult to come up with any real winners in the developing world that are not a 
product of industrial policies of some sort”. Furthermore, as Chang (2002) convincingly 
demonstrates, even today’s high-income industrialised countries used a raft of interventionist 
measures to catch up with past technological leaders. As a result, structuralists have tended to 
see intervention as a necessary but insufficient condition for industrialisation in the developing 
world. For them, “past policy failure is not a reason for passive reliance on deficient markets but 
for improving government capabilities” (Lall, 2004: 2). Instead, they ask how some states have 
managed to intervene so much more successfully than others, in order to maximise the benefits 
of their integration into the global economy. In this regard, structuralists deviate substantially 
from the policy recommendations of neoliberals. Structuralists acknowledge the role of 
international integration in development strategies – especially through access to foreign markets 
– but argue that the impacts of liberalisation are systematically different for countries at different 
stages of development, and can potentially exacerbate processes of cumulative causation that 
disproportionately favour advantageous locations and ‘freeze’ economies into their existing 
comparative advantage. As a result, developing countries require additional flexibilities within 




1.3.1 The rationale for multilateral trade restrictions 
If the exploitation of comparative advantage were unambiguously beneficial, states could 
implement liberalisation unilaterally; we need to recognise additional justifications for 
multilateral policy restrictions. These benefits relate to the underlying principle of the WTO: that 
members commit to liberalise their trade regimes in return for reciprocal commitments by others. 
Therefore, in instances when states are faced with incentives to apply trade protection 
unilaterally – either because protection may enhance their overall welfare or because they are 
subject to political economy pressures to maintain protection even when it is welfare-reducing – 
multilateral liberalisation may be preferable to unilateral liberalisation. As a result, as Milner 
(2009: 128) points out: 
By lowering tariff and non-tariff import barriers or constraining the use of contingent 
protection instruments in export markets, WTO membership seeks to increase the scope and 
effectiveness of developing countries’ own reforms aimed at promoting exports. 
Firstly, mainstream trade theorists accept two instances in which trade protection may be welfare 
enhancing for the country applying protection, although these instances are deemed to occur 
fairly infrequently. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) propose a theory of trade negotiation in which 
trade protection may be subject to a ‘terms of trade’ externality for large economies. In the 
presence of such an externality, protection is inefficient from a global perspective, but some of 
the costs are shifted to foreign exporters, who receive a lower price for their goods. “This 
temptation to shift costs naturally leads governments to set unilateral tariffs that are higher than 
would be efficient” (ibid.: 216). Multilateral trade liberalisation is therefore a way of overcoming a 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ through legally binding commitments: “It is in each country’s interest to 
impose restrictions”, but in the absence of agreement, all countries “end up in a situation where 
their welfare is lower than if they applied free trade policies” (Hockman and Kostecki, 2001: 26). 
This outcome is important because it acknowledges the potential for domestic-welfare-enhancing 
trade policies while maintaining the justification for liberalisation. A similar finding emerges in the 
context of strategic trade arguments (discussed below). As Brander (1995: 66) notes, while 
strategic trade policy concerns generate “unilateral incentives for intervention… Even nationally 
successful strategic trade policies typically have a beggar-thy-neighbour aspect”. 
Secondly, WTO commitments serve as a ‘golden straightjacket’, a device for committing to good 
policies and providing insulation against domestic protectionist lobbies. According to the static 
version of the theory of comparative advantage which underpins neoclassical trade theory, the 
overall effects of liberalisation are unambiguously positive, as described above. The foundations 
of this conclusion are questionable, as I discuss presently; in any case, assuming that net benefits 
accrue to the liberalising country, there will still be some losers from liberalisation among import-
substituting industries. With unilateral liberalisation, the benefits fall to consumers, a large and 
diffuse group, while the costs fall on relatively concentrated and more easily organised import-
competing sectors. Consumers are unlikely to have sufficient incentive to organise coalitions and 
lobby government to reduce protection. In contrast, when liberalisation takes place in a reciprocal 
setting, benefits accrue to another relatively concentrated and well-organised group of potential 
exporters, who are able to more effectively balance the lobbying influence of the import-
competing sectors (Finger et al., 1999). Therefore, engagement in multilateral liberalisation tends 
to result in better domestic policies than may occur otherwise.   
This means that the impact of domestic policy restrictions must be weighed against the potential 
benefits of increased market access and the curtailment of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies 
abroad. The overall impact of multilateral rules on policy space is ambiguous: participants in 
multilateral trade liberalisation are subject to effects arising from their own liberalisation 
(equivalently ‘concessions’ or ‘commitments’), but also – and this is the rationale for multilateral 
rather than unilateral liberalisation – arising from increased market access opportunities for 
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exporters as a result of liberalisation abroad. The overall developmental impact of multilateral 
restrictions for each country thus depends on the substantive details of the concessions given and 
received.  
1.3.2 Adjustment costs and arguments in favour of deviations from free trade 
There should be no presumption that concessions given and received are equally distributed 
among participants in multilateral liberalisation. Concessions are also unevenly distributed across 
sectors, with those in which developing countries tend to specialise subject to fewer and less 
extensive commitments. Indeed, numerous accounts of negotiations in the Uruguay Round and 
subsequently have pointed to significant inequalities with respect to the distribution of 
concessions (Finger and Nogués, 2002). The TRIMs Agreement has had asymmetric effects in the 
sense that the prohibited policies, including LCRs, were only in force in a subset of countries, 
while all WTO member can potentially benefit from enhanced access to the newly liberalised 
markets.  
Furthermore, assuming that concessions are equivalent in magnitude (to the extent that such can 
be demonstrated, which is not straightforward), and assuming that the net effects are positive for 
each participant, this does not imply they are equal in their effects. In fact, there is no absolute 
certainty that the net effects of multilateral liberalisation are positive for all participants, since 
there may be significant costs associated with the process. The relative magnitude of both costs 
and benefits depends on the structural characteristics of individual countries in two respects: 
firstly, in terms of countries’ capacities to mitigate or absorb adjustment costs arising from their 
own commitments and (adjustment capacities) and benefit from foreign commitments through 
the expansion of exports (supply capacities); and secondly, in terms of the extent to which 
deviations from comparative advantage are necessary in order to promote activities with greater 
developmental value.  
It is well recognised that multilateral liberalisation has given rise to significant short and medium 
term adjustment costs2 (Bacchetta and Jansen, 2003; De Cordoba et al., 2005) and that capacities 
to mobilise resources towards exports and thus benefit from increased market access abroad are 
highly uneven (UNCTAD, 2005). The structural features that determine the costs and benefits of 
multilateral liberalisation is beneficial are likely to include, inter alia, labour market institutions 
(i.e. education and training), social safety nets, financial markets, transportation and utilities 
infrastructure, and macroeconomic fundamentals, all of which tend to be deficient in developing 
countries. Importantly, technological and innovative capabilities at the firm and national levels are 
also important in adjusting to competitive pressures, especially in valuable high-tech industrial 
activities, and are likely to be subject to profound market failures, as discussed in chapter 2 from 
the technological capability perspective.  
                                                          
2
 De Cordoba et al. (2005) define adjustment costs as costs of transferring resources from one sector to 
another, which may be incurred by private and public agents (p. 59). As Bacchetta and Jansen (2003) 
discuss, adjustment costs arise as a result of a wide range of economic phenomena, such as shifts in 
commodity prices, technological change, and policy factors such as trade liberalisation; in the case of the 
latter, adjustment costs arise in “industries in which foreign competitors are more efficient than domestic 
producers. When import barriers on the products of those industries are lowered, the foreign producers 
will be able to attract domestic consumers with lower prices. Domestic import competing firms in those 
markets will face downward pressures on sales and profits, which in turn can lead to pressure for lower 
wages, job losses and perhaps even company closures”. De Cordoba et al. (2005) distinguish privately-
incurred costs that are related to the productive factors of labour (e.g. opportunity cost of unemployed 
labour; obsolescence of skills; retraining costs) and capital (e.g. opportunity cost of under-utilised capital; 
transition costs of converting capital to alternative productive uses). Examples of costs borne by the public 
sector include the costs of shifting the tax revenue base; social safety net spending; the implementation 
costs of trade reform; and the costs of efforts to ensure macroeconomic stability. 
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Concerns about adjustment to the liberalised environment do not challenge the notion that 
multilateral trade policy restrictions enhance welfare in the long term, but rather raise questions 
about how quickly net benefits are accrued and how they are distributed among participants. 
They also raise some important questions regarding the manner in which liberalisation should 
proceed, and the policies and institutions which should be implemented and established in 
conjunction with liberalisation. There is consensus that issues of timing and sequencing are 
crucially important, as are safeguards and ‘special and differential’ provisions for developing 
countries.  
From the structuralist perspective, the presumption that trade liberalisation may only enhance 
national welfare is extremely simplistic and flawed. Adjustment costs may be far from negligible. 
Trade liberalisation may lead to imports expanding much faster than exports, giving rise to 
balance of payments difficulties and widespread unemployment. Through a vicious cycle of 
macroeconomic effects, the long term result of liberalisation can feasibly be lower levels of 
growth.  
Therefore, central contention of the structuralist perspective is that rapid liberalisation may give 
rise to vicious or virtuous circles of cumulative causation, depending on existing capabilities at the 
time of liberalisation:  
Given existing biases and asymmetries in international economic relations, moves towards a 
more open and integrated economic space are just as likely to reinforce as they are to 
diminish the gaps between developed and developing countries. In particular, the capacity to 
respond to liberalization favours the already developed countries, which, because of first-
mover advantages, economies of scale and learning capabilities, are able to acquire and 
reinforce dominant positions in developing country markets (Kozul-Wright and Rayment, 
2004: 4).  
There is tendency for the sectors in which developing countries have comparative advantage to 
exhibit declining terms of trade. In the early conceptions of the infant industrial arguments, such 
effects were associated with dependency upon standardised ‘commodities’. However, according 
to such theories, declining terms of trade are associated with any sectors in which barriers to 
entry are low. This leads to a ‘fallacy of composition’ in which specialisation in standardised, 
labour- and resource-intensive manufactures may have limited value added potential to the 
extent that many others simultaneously do the same. In contrast, technologically-advanced 
activities are associated with higher productivity but may be subject to two types of positive 
externality – dynamic learning externalities, technical externalities or ‘learning by doing’ within 
firms; and positive spillovers between firms and the wider economy. Thus, “specializing in some 
products will bring higher growth than specializing in others. In this setting, government policy 
has a potentially important positive role to play in shaping the production structure, assuming of 
course that it is appropriately targeted on the market failure in question” (Hausmann et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the nature of existing industrial structures determines the potential for ‘linkages’ 
between related activities; this corresponds to Wade’s concept of an “internally integrated” 
economy as one with a “dense set of input–output linkages between sectors” (2003: 635). 
Importantly, following comparative advantage with no concern for the potential for linkages may 
result in specialisation in activities which limit the prospects for further diversification and 
upgrading (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006). These ideas form the basis of justifications for LCRs, 
which are explored in greater depth in the next chapter.  
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1.4 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: THE TRIMS AGREEMENT AND THE ELIMINATION OF LCRS IN THE 
AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 
1.4.1 The TRIMs Agreement and the prohibition of LCRs 
The inclusion of TRIMs was one of the most controversial areas of negotiation in the Uruguay 
Round, with marked division between developed and developing countries (Croome, 1995). 
Developing countries were almost unanimous in opposition, defending their right to condition the 
entry and activities of foreign investors as non-negotiable, and considering it “important to 
maintain flexibility in their economic and development policies” (UNCTAD, 2000: 235).  
In the end, the Agreement achieved a fairly modest aim compared with some early proposals – 
which, including issues relating to entry, ownership, and non-trade operational issues like 
technology transfer – were “energetically resisted” (Low and Subramanian, 1995: 421). It covers a 
narrow subset of performance requirements, those pertaining explicitly to trade: discriminatory 
trade practices may not be imposed upon foreign investors as a condition of their market entry, 
regardless of whether they are mandatory or related to incentives. 
The illustrative list of TRIMs prohibited by the Agreement includes LCRs, trade balancing 
requirements and foreign exchange restrictions, as well as a number of similar but less familiar 
instruments (appendix 1). The effects of all TRIMs are assumed to be distortive without any 
requirement for positive proof. Article 5 of the Agreement specifies that prohibited TRIMs must 
be removed within a transition period of two years for developed countries, five years for 
developing countries, and 7 years for least developed countries. Members were required to notify 
full details of all TRIMs, and not to impose any new measures in the transition period.  
Criticism of and resistance to the TRIMs Agreement emerged based on a number of factors, 
relating both to short-term difficulties in adjustment and TRIMs’ long term developmental value. 
With respect to adjustment costs (discussed above), countries have argued that local firms need 
more time to adjust more gradually to liberalisation3. Notwithstanding the potential long-term 
value of global restrictions,   
In the short term, the elimination of some (TRIMs) may throw firms and employees in 
industries into an unsustainable position, possibly leading to economic disarray… To 
minimize the impact of such disruptions, a host country might want to establish a phase-out 
period and schedule for such domestic content requirements (UNCTAD, 2001a: 61).   
These concerns have been acknowledged in additional time scales for the removal of restricted 
policies. Developing countries were initially granted until 2000 to remove restricted TRIMs, and 
                                                          
3
 In the context of the present thesis, it would be valuable to explore these costs in greater detail, but in 
light of the multiplicity of factors contributing to structural adjustment, there are profound methodological 
difficulties in attributing adjustment costs to specific factors such as trade reform; a summary of the 
methodological issues associated with causal attribution in general is provided in chapter 4, while De 
Cordoba et al. (2005) discuss the issues in relation to adjustment costs more specifically. As the authors 
observe, one of the most significant difficulties pertains to the availability of reliable data aggregated at the 
national level and detailed at the appropriate sectoral level. The applied empirical literature has usually 
focused on unemployment, the largest and most ‘visible’ type of adjustment cost; these studies are 
reviewed in Bacchetta and Jansen (2003: 17-18). While UNIDO (2011b) provide data on employment and 
wage rates by industrial sector, they are largely incomplete, and insufficient for the purposes of the cross-
national quantitative and comparative case study analyses employed in this thesis. Instead, data on 
production, trade and investment patterns – which relate less directly to adjustment costs – are brought to 
bear in both stages of the empirical analysis, as discussed in chapters 4 to 6. 
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least-developed countries until 2002. In addition several countries have requested and were 
granted extensions to these deadlines, as discussed in chapter 3. Nevertheless, according to Wade 
(2003: 628),  
The time period has to do with administrative and legal handicaps in getting up to speed on 
TRIMS enforcement. It has nothing to do with the time needed to nurture infant industries, 
nothing to do with competitiveness. In this fundamental respect the TRIMS agreement 
narrows the scope of ‘special and differential treatment’ allowable for developing countries.   
Under such circumstances, the implications of Wade’s statement is that the prohibition of tools 
such as LCRs may have profound developmental implications for infant parts and components 
suppliers nurtured by local content requirements, and for the future capacities of countries to “to 
constrain the choices of companies operating in their territory” (Wade, 2003:  621) in ways that 
may be developmentally beneficial. Bello (2003: 16) has gone so far as to claim that in light of 
reliance of developing countries on FDI, the TRIMs agreement “practically eliminates the use of 
trade policy for national industrial development”. In the light of structuralist concerns about 
policy space restrictions, the prohibition of LCRs may have led, ceteris paribus, to further 
polarisation of industrial performance according to a process of ‘cumulative causation’: the 
proverbial ‘kicking away the ladder’.  
1.4.2 The elimination of LCRs in the automotive sector 
A number of studies conducted prior to and during the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
confirm the high incidence of TRIMs, although with widely varying methods and findings (UNCTC, 
1991). With respect to incidence of specific instruments, LCRs were by far the most prevalent, 
with about three quarters of developing countries and a third of developed countries sampled 
adopting them. In terms of sectoral incidence, the automotive sector has been most affected, 
followed by electronics and chemicals. The elimination of LCRs in the automotive sector provides 
an appropriate empirical context in which to examine debates around policy space restrictions for 
several reasons. Firstly, it is a high-tech sector dominated by large multinational firms, thus 
potentially exhibiting the types of market failures which give rise to structuralist arguments in 
favour of interventionist trade and industrial policies. Secondly, the use of automotive LCRs has 
been ubiquitous across the world, but especially in developing countries, to support the 
integration of intermediate suppliers and assemblers, suggesting that their developmental effects 
are certainly an important concern. Thirdly, conducting a ‘global’ comparative policy analysis is 
facilitated by the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement, which ensure that relevant policies are 
notified; in the absence of such provisions, compiling an exhaustive record of policy legislation 
would be prohibitively onerous. Thus, I am able to identify 16 countries which have recently 
eliminated automotive LCRs as a response to the TRIMs Agreement, thus enabling the systematic, 
cross-national comparison of outcomes across a large group of countries with quantitative 
statistical techniques. Fourthly, there is a large literature on the determinants of automotive 
sector development which I am able to draw on to inform the operationalisation of the key 
variables in my analysis – parts and component sector performance outcomes at the national 
level, and the complex causal conditions that determine them through the mechanisms of global 




1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
My review of the literature on the use of LCRs suggested that effects on industrial performance 
outcomes are complex and ambiguous, and depend on a number of contextual factors relating to 
the conditions under and the manner in which they are implemented.  
In reviewing the methods through which the effects of policy changes can be examined, I note 
that there are two broad empirical approaches to complexity: variable- and case-oriented 
research methods. The basic problem facing researchers in the context of causal complexity is 
that the counterfactual, what would have happened in the absence of the phenomenon under 
examination, cannot be observed. Variable- and case-oriented methods have different strengths 
for addressing different types of research question, justifying my decision to employ a ‘nested’ 
mixed method approach, in which the findings of panel regression built on and were 
complemented by a series of comparative, historical institutionalist case studies.  
Generally speaking, by exploiting the statistical properties of large numbers of observations when 
variables can be adequately quantified, variable-oriented methods are more capable of isolating 
the contribution of individual variables to outcomes, thus enabling generalisation about their 
average effects. This relates to my first research question, which addresses the issue of the nature 
and magnitude of the impacts of the elimination of LCRs within the countries in which they were 
previously in force by comparing changes in industrial performance outcomes in relation to a 
‘control group’, according to the ‘difference-in-difference’ approach. As mentioned previously, 
this approach was enabled by the natural experiment presented by the exogenous restriction of 
the elimination of LCRs, and by the availability of data on the use of LCRs in the automotive sector 
which facilitated the construction of a binary dummy variable for the ‘treatment’ of the 
elimination of LCRs. The construction of a panel dataset enabled me to control for time-invariant 
differences between countries as well as control for the effect of other time-varying covariates.   
In contrast, case-oriented methods allow the more holistic analysis of all of the complex causes 
that go into the determination of case-specific outcomes, and allow tracing of the mechanisms 
through which observed impacts arise. This is particularly important when crucial factors evade 
quantification, such as is generally the case with policy and institutional variables. In this sense, 
‘within-case’ methods such as typified by the historical institutionalist approach, offer a valuable 
alternative perspective to the causal complexity. At the same time, comparison across small 
numbers of cases can enable the idiosyncratic factors that lead to divergent outcomes from 
common policy changes. For these reasons, I complement my panel regression findings with a 
series of comparative, historical institutionalist case studies, in which I situate the elimination of 
LCRs within the broader context of policy and institutional reforms and the accompanying shifts in 
global value chain governance structures. The case study stage thus addresses complementary 
research questions regarding the extent to which LCRs may be subject to cumulative effects, the 
examination of which was not permitted in the panel regression stage; the extent to which 
divergent effects between cases can be observed through the operation of causal mechanisms; 
and the extent to which countries have mitigated the effects of liberalisation through continued 
protection and promotion of parts and components suppliers through alternative means.  
1.6 FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
To provide a brief preview of the findings of my analysis, my panel regression findings showed 
that although the elimination of LCRs is associated with a significant reduction in local content 
levels of the liberalising economies – that is, the proportion of local consumption supplied by 
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domestically-located firms – there has been no statistically significant reduction in total output, 
controlling for relevant covariates. More importantly, the countries eliminating LCRs have 
exhibited large increases in export performance indicators, with no statistically significant 
reductions in trade balances overall, although import levels have also increased. These empirical 
results suggest that the elimination of LCRs has been an important causal influence on the 
improvement of industrial performance outcomes within the countries in which they were 
previously in force.  
The case studies supplement this finding in a number of ways. Most importantly, they situate the 
improvement of performance outcomes in the context of the causal mechanisms of the ongoing 
restructuring of global value chains, in which the liberalised economies feature more prominently 
in the strategic decisions of lead firm assemblers and global suppliers as they consider locations in 
which to establish production. Thus, improvements measured by macro-indicators of industrial 
performance mask important effects relating to the denationalisation of parts and components 
production within all of the cases examined here. These mechanisms also suggest explanations for 
the divergence of parts and components sector performance across structurally diverse cases, as 
suppliers are permitted greater latitude to supply foreign markets from the most advantageous 
locations. In some cases, it appears that LCRs had been implemented with some positive effects 
on investment inflows and technological cooperation between assemblers and suppliers. Finally, 
the case studies suggest that generalisations regarding positive effects of the elimination of LCRs 
must be approached with caution, in the light of wider policy and institutional developments from 
which they are impossible to distinguish.  
The main limitations of the analysis relate to the inherent difficulties establishing causation in the 
context of profound causal complexity. The strategy I have pursued has gone some considerable 
way to illuminating the nature of the impacts of the elimination of LCRs on numerous aspects of 
industrial performance, but the crucial causal mechanisms were examined at a high level of 
aggregation, incorporating mainly secondary data sources, in order to permit systematic, cross-
national comparison. A significant limitation relates to the lack of primary data on micro-level 
causal mechanisms, through individual firm-level decisions on sourcing strategies, upgrading, and 
technological cooperation between firms, how these have been affected by greater flexibility 
afforded by the prohibition of LCRs, and how varied policy and institutional factors in different 
locations determine the distribution of opportunities different countries have to pursue higher 
levels of integration into global production networks. Detailed qualitative data are required to 
supplement my findings in order to fully explain performance outcomes in light of these 
important phenomena.  
1.7 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I review the literature on the 
effects of LCRs. Findings that the empirical and theoretical literatures are ambiguous, I synthesise 
existing conceptual and theoretical frameworks to argue that the effects of LCRs vary in 
accordance with contextual factors, including industrial capabilities within the wider economy, 
the prospects for market size, and wider policies and institutions. Because the elimination of LCRs 
may in principle give rise to positive or negative dynamic effects, I argue that the lack of 
systematic, cross-national empirical work into this area is an important gap in the literature.  
In chapter 3, I present the empirical context in which my research is situated, the elimination of 
LCRs within the automotive sector. The chapter adopts the global value chain approach as a 
framework for examining the factors affecting the economic geography of production, trade and 
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investment within the automotive sector as it pertains to two stages of fragmented production: 
the manufacture of parts and components by the supply sector, and the manufacture of vehicles 
by the assembly sector. This chapter serves two main purposes in the context of the thesis. Firstly, 
it allows for a further examination of the empirical literature on the impacts of LCRs. Secondly, it 
serves as the basis for the operationalisation of the important concepts and theories as they apply 
to the subsequent empirical analysis.       
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological options available for assessing the substantive questions 
with which I am concerned. After reviewing the relative strengths and weaknesses of variable- 
and case-oriented methods for addressing different types of research problem, I justify and 
describe my mixed method approach, before specifying the substantive research questions I 
address in each stage. I also specify methodological research questions that emerge from a 
consideration of the utility of my mixed method approach to impact evaluation in the context of 
causal complexity. Finally, I specify questions that arise in considering the wider implications of 
the thesis as a whole.   
Chapters 5 and 6 present the empirical work of the thesis, relating to the panel regression and 
comparative case study stages respectively. In the first stages of chapter 5, I attend to the 
specification of the regression model. I then operationalise the variables incorporated into the 
analysis, before presenting the empirical estimation results and discussing their substantive 
implications. In chapter 6, I provide more specific detail on the purpose and goals of my case 
studies with respect to their application to complementary research questions, in light of the 
findings of the first stage of my analysis. I describe the case selection strategy through which I 
arrive at three paired comparisons: Malaysia and Thailand, Argentina and Brazil, and China and 
India. Finally, I compare the elimination of LCRs within each pair, highlighting similarities and 
differences with respect to the causal mechanisms operating within each country.  
In chapter 7, I provide my response to the research questions specified in chapter 4. I synthesise 
the findings from the case studies by comparing the three pairs of cases, with the goal of enabling 
wider generalisation of my findings. I consider the substantive implications of both stages of my 
research with respect to my research questions, and consider the limitations of my findings, and 
of my methodological approach. To conclude the thesis I contemplate the broader theoretical 




2 LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL AND 
THEORETICAL LITERATURE ON THEIR EFFECTS 
2.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the broad empirical context of policy space restrictions with 
respect to the multilateral trade system, and explored two contrasting perspectives on the ‘policy 
space debate’. I introduced the rationales for unilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation, and 
reported that the neoliberal argument – that multilateral rules restricting interventionist trade 
policies are necessarily welfare-enhancing for all participants – has been robustly challenged by 
structuralist accounts, which allow for pervasive adjustment costs associated with trade 
liberalisation as well as market failures barring entry into the most valuable activities. I suggested 
that the implications of the TRIMs Agreement, and more specifically the elimination of LCRs, 
present an interesting opportunity to conduct empirical, comparative analysis into the impacts of 
policy space restrictions.  
In the present chapter, I explore existing literature regarding the effects of LCRs, which suggests 
that the effects are ambiguous, and that the effects arising from multilateral restrictions on LCRs 
is worthy of empirical examination. The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I provide 
some basic definitions, situate LCRs in relation to other trade and industrial policy instruments, 
and identify the rationales for implementing such policies. In section 2.3, I provide an overview of 
the debates surrounding the developmental impacts of LCRs, and the factors that determine 
whether they give rise to positive or negative impacts. In section 2.4, I review studies that 
specifically analyse the effects of LCRs, both theoretically and empirically. Finding the direct 
evidence inconclusive, I turn to the indirect evidence on the determinants of the effects of trade 
and investment policies more generally through two conceptual and theoretical perspectives. In 
section 2.5, I explore the implications of the technological capabilities approach for the analysis of 
infant industrial policies and the potential for states to shape outcomes through the use of 
investment performance requirements. Section 2.6 provides a summary of the substantive 
implications of my literature review. I summarise the existing evidence before synthesising the 
insights on the theoretical determinants of the effectiveness of LCRs in promoting industrial 
performance improvements in a coherent framework. Finally, I describe an important gap for 
empirical, comparative analysis of the elimination of LCRs on industrial performance outcomes.   
2.2 DEFINING, SITUATING AND JUSTIFYING LCRS AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT 
2.2.1 Definition of LCRs 
LCRs basically stipulate that a proportion of the inputs of a firm or sector must be sourced 
domestically (i.e. not imported). They can take a number of forms, from quantitative restrictions 
or prohibitions on the importation of certain inputs (also known as ‘mandatory deletion lists’, 
where parts or components are deleted from lists of permissible imports) to the stipulation of 
minimum percentages of total inputs – by value or in terms of physical content – which must be 
sourced from local suppliers. The policies have been applied in countries of all levels of 
development, although perhaps more prominently in newly industrialised developing countries. 
The actual incidence of LCRs, and the manner in which they have been implemented and designed 
in practice, is discussed below. In principle, the provisions of LCRs can apply to foreign 
corporations explicitly, or to all locally-based firms. They are usually applied selectively in specific 
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industrial sectors, which are seen as. LCRs, like other performance requirements, may be 
mandatory or attached to incentives. Such incentives can take the form of preferential fiscal 
treatment or direct subsidies to the party subject to the requirement.  
At this point it is useful to introduce the agents involved in LCRs – manufacturing firms and the 
state – and some terminology. LCRs affect different firms in different ways. In the first place, the 
industry in which LCRs are imposed must incorporate ‘upstream’ firms supplying inputs to firms 
‘downstream’ in a fragmented production process. Usually, inputs are manufactured intermediate 
goods, but they could also be commodities; often, and most pertinently to this thesis, firms 
subject to LCRs are multinational manufacturers of high-tech final goods. Thus, firms can be seen 
to belong to the final good, terminal or assembly subsectors, and the intermediate, parts and 
components or supply subsectors, respectively; and they can be foreign or local, or joint ventures 
between foreign and local capital.  
LCRs by their very nature have implications for foreign countries in which potential exporters of 
intermediate goods to the terminal sector firms are located, as well as for the multinationals 
potentially subject to LCRs. We must distinguish national and global welfare, to the extent that 
host countries can, in principle, enhance their own welfare at the expense of others via ‘rent-
shifting’. We assume, notwithstanding the potential for corruption and political capture, that the 
goal of the state is to enhance national welfare, while the purported goal of multilateral 
restrictions on LCRs is to enhance global welfare through the more extensive exploitation of 
comparative advantage and the curtailment of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ protectionism, regardless 
of the extent to which individual countries or producers experience adjustment costs relating to 
competitive threats to specific sectors and activities.  
2.2.2 Policy objectives 
Before turning to the literature on the effects of LCRs, it is first necessary to expand upon the 
various formal and implicit policy objectives, and the economic principles behind them. At this 
stage, we are not concerned with the feasibility of these goals, which is discussed in the following 
sections.  
In the most basic sense, LCRs are aimed at achieving a specified level of local intermediate 
production. However, LCRs must be considered in the context of wider goals in order to explain 
their emergence and evaluate their effectiveness more thoroughly. LCRs are aimed at promoting 
industrialisation by deepening supply networks and upgrading suppliers’ capabilities. This relates 
to economic theories in which the development of technological capabilities and the generation 
of linkages between firms is subject to positive externalities and market failures and that in the 
absence of state intervention, outcomes may be suboptimal from the perspective of total societal 
welfare. This connects with concerns tariff-jumping FDI in fragmented industries might lead to 
‘screwdriver’ operations or ‘enclaves’ characterised by minimal industrial development. 
LCRs have been used in diverse industries, but none so extensively as the automotive sector, in 
which they were usually “designed to discourage transnational corporations from simply making 
the country an assembly point for imported components and force them to build up or stimulate 
the development of component and parts suppliers that would eventually become the core of an 
integrated industry” (Bello, 2003). The characteristics of this sector, and the role of LCRs therein, 
are described in chapter 3, while the remainder of this chapter treats LCRs more generically.  
I identify two main areas of market failure that serve to justify LCRs; following UNCTC (1991) I 
distinguish arguments relating to rent-shifting in the presence of imperfect competition from 
those of the ‘infant industry’ type in the presence of scale economies and ‘learning by doing’ 
within firms. To these arguments can be added those relating to the promotion of linkages 
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between (foreign and domestic) firms in the context of coordination failures and technological 
spillovers, which have been largely neglected in the applied literature4.   
2.2.3 Situating LCRs as a policy instrument 
To overcome these market failures, LCRs can be seen as working through two separate 
‘mechanisms’. The first is simply by conferring protective rents on intermediate goods producers, 
LCRs operate as a form of trade policy. The second is that in implementing LCRs, states engage in 
a process of bargaining with MNCs, thus conditioning their strategic and operational behaviour; in 
this sense, LCRs are a form of investment performance requirement.  
Situating LCRs in relation to other policy classifications is not simply a semantic venture. Much of 
the theoretical and empirical evidence presented in this chapter pertains to wider classifications 
of policy instruments – partly as a result of the paucity of direct theoretical and empirical 
evidence on LCRs per se – and yet remains highly relevant to my understanding of the impacts of 
LCRs. Thus, situating LCRs as a policy instrument is also an exercise in establishing the parameters 
of the literature review that follows. In this context, other policies are relevant when determining 
and evaluating the impacts of LCRs, for two reasons. Firstly, they provide indirect evidence on the 
utility of LCRs due to their substantive similarities, especially in the absence of direct evidence. 
Evidence on the impacts of other policies for achieving industrialisation and development goals 
more generally therefore contributes to my substantive literature review. Secondly, other policies 
must be recognised in the models and analytical frameworks that inform subsequent empirical 
chapters, as factors that confound industrial performance outcomes independently as well as in 
conjunction with LCRs.  
2.2.3.1 LCRs as a form of trade protection 
LCRs work by affecting the relative prices of domestic and foreign goods for final-good-producing 
firms. As noted by Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), LCRs “force multinationals to buy local 
inputs just as protection induces domestic consumers (and firms) to buy from local producers”. In 
this sense, LCRs can be considered as a form of protective trade policy targeted at intermediate 
goods sectors. The theoretical determinants of the effects of infant industrial protection are 
discussed in section 2.5, below.  
Equivalence and distinctions between LCRs, tariffs and subsidies 
Analysis of the welfare implications of trade policy usually imply that regardless of the 
justification, lump-sum transfers and direct subsidies targeted at specific market failures are 
preferable to trade protection. This is the case because protection is “too far removed from the 
market failure to be effective” (Kumar and Gallagher, 2007: 11) and distorts firms’ decisions in 
ways that are unrelated to the justification for the policy – i.e. they have consumption as well as 
production effects (Mussa, 1984). Indeed, as the following analysis shows, there are many ways in 
which trade protection may give rise to impacts contrary to those intended. Nevertheless, 
protection may be preferable to subsidies for the simple reason that in the context of inadequate 
revenue collection systems, it provides an effective and potentially progressive means through 
which to confer rents (see Chang, 2005).  
As WTO/UNCTAD (2002) notes, the implications of LCRs and tariffs are similar in that both act by 
imposing a cost penalty on imported intermediate goods. In the case of LCRs, “the higher the 
proportion of components that is required to be sourced domestically, the closer their average 
per unit cost will be to the prevailing domestic price” (ibid.: 22). The effect on intermediate 
output can be replicated by a uniform tariff on imports at a level that imposes an equivalent 
                                                          
4
 An exception is Veloso (2001), whose research I describe below. This neglect relates to methodological 
prioritisation accorded to “mathematically tractable equilibrium” in the neoclassical framework (Toner, 
1999) frameworks within neoclassical economics as well as difficulties observing spillovers empirically. 
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alignment of average world and domestic prices. However, as Veloso (2001) demonstrates5, the 
welfare effects will be inferior in the case of the latter: since the gap between the domestic and 
world price varies across the range of intermediate goods, there is divergence between the cost 
penalty implied by tariffs and LCRs (ibid.: section 3.3.1). The intuitive reasoning behind this 
findings is that “by imposing the standard and leaving the component sourcing decision to (the 
assembler), the government knows that it is in the firm’s best interest to reach the desired level 
of domestic purchases with minimal sourcing cost”. In principle, it is possible for the state to 
impose varying tariff levels on different intermediate goods. However, this would require a high 
informational burden on the government, beyond that required to set a required local content 
ratio. Mussa (1984) comes to the same conclusion regarding the preference of LCRs over tariffs, 
based on the superiority of an ‘all-or-nothing’ penalty for non-compliance under LCRs. This 
“generates no additional distortion by forcing a divergence between true social production cost 
(with the distorted choice of inputs) and the price producers must charge” (p. 9), something 
which cannot be said for the tariff equivalent. 
2.2.3.2 LCRs as performance requirement 
Following Veloso (2001), to analyse LCRs simply as a form of trade protection is misleading. LCRs 
also have additional features relating to the specific channels of FDI-led development, technology 
transfer and linkages, and an important role in state-MNC bargaining. Although both intermediate 
and final-goods firms can be foreign or local, some of the goals of LCRs are more sensible in the 
context of a terminal subsector characterised by foreign presence and imperfect competition.  
Such situations often result in a process of bargaining between the state and (potential) investing 
firms, in which the former aim to redistribute a proportion of the MNCs’ rents throughout the 
domestic economy. In this context, LCRs fulfil the function of an investment performance 
requirement (IPR). Such policies may be valuable in the presence of two conditions: when MNC 
operations in developing countries involve the accrual of rents (arising from their exploitation of 
imperfectly competitive market structures, often in combination with protection in the domestic 
market), and when their strategies conflict with developmental goals “for example with regard to 
sourcing behaviour and reallocation of profits through transfer pricing practices” (UNCTAD, 
2003b). 
As I describe in section 2.5, states’ bargaining power arises from location-specific advantages such 
as the domestic market, cheap labour, natural resources, and technological capabilities, access to 
which it may deny foreign investors. LCRs can be imposed on specific investments, firms, and 
sectors on an ad hoc basis. IPRs thus allow states to screen and condition the entry of foreign 
firms, short of denying entry entirely. 
The efficacy of these types of policy depends upon the extent to and manner in which they affect 
the activities of investing firms. As a result, the effects of LCRs can also include outcomes relating 
to inward FDI and the establishment of linkages. Importantly, the effect of policies is likely to 
depend upon the characteristics of and motivation for investment, and the characteristics of host 
countries and local firms, which vary significantly between different sectors.  
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELIMINATION OF LCRS 
It is clear that despite the theoretical justifications for implementing LCRs as mentioned above, 
their effects are far from certain. In the first place, they are only justified in the presence of at 
least one of the market failures listed above. The nature and magnitude of market failures in the 
                                                          
5
 Mussa (1984) and Hollander (1987) draw similar conclusions; Vousden (1987) finds that the preferable 
instrument depends upon the market structure in the intermediate sector and the elasticity of demand for 
intermediates.    
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countries and sectors in which LCRs have been and could feasibly be implemented, as an empirical 
matter, are therefore of central importance. Furthermore, as suggested above, the 
implementation of trade and industrial policies such as LCRs are subject to state failures in terms 
of capacities to ‘pick winners’ and discipline effectively the recipients of rents. The capacities of 
states to carry out such interventions effectively is an empirical matter, on which existing 
evidence is fairly inconclusive. Finally, assuming that states may in principle overcome these 
implementation problems to enhance their own welfare, such interventions are subject to 
beggar-thy-neighbour effects that render them suboptimal from a global point of view. 
2.3.1 Sources of evidence on the impacts of the elimination of LCRs 
Evidence on the effectiveness of LCRs takes a number of forms. Most fundamentally, there is a 
distinction between formal theoretical modelling and applied empirical research, but we can also 
differentiate what I regard as direct and indirect forms of evidence. My substantive interest is in 
the elimination of LCRs as a result of exogenous policy space restrictions. The utility of evidence 
from formal theoretical models is limited, as I discuss below. There is an important substantive 
gap in the literature for systematic empirical research into the effects of the elimination of LCRs, 
which is the gap this thesis aims to fill. Of course, evidence regarding the effects of implementing 
such policies provides important indirect evidence of the costs and benefits of their restriction, 
but here too, direct and systematic comparative empirical research is lacking. As a result, broader 
categories of policy instruments (i.e. trade policies and investment performance requirements) 
and the liberalisation thereof provide a useful context that indirectly informs the conceptual and 
theoretical framework I develop in the course of the chapter.  
Ultimately, the evidence on the impacts of LCRs is highly ambiguous, but the literature does 
permit a number of insights about the determinants of their effects. Before turning to specific 
forms of direct and indirect evidence, I first examine potential sources of contention, in terms of 
theoretical arguments for and against LCRs from the host country and global perspectives. The 
following is largely based on UNCTC’s (1991) review of the evidence on TRIMs conducted in the 
midst of the Uruguay Round negotiations that lead to the establishment of the WTO.  
2.3.2 Strategic trade theory, imperfect competition and rent-shifting 
Strategic trade theories initially emerged as an attempt to explain the empirical phenomenon of 
intra-industry trade, taking place between similarly endowed countries via large powerful firms, 
which diverged from the predictions of comparative advantage and the framework of perfect 
competition that characterised neoclassical trade theory (WTO, 2008). The crucial contribution of 
strategic trade theories relates to the incorporation of market imperfections and barriers to entry 
arising from increasing returns to scale6. The key point, as Brander (1995) notes, is “that strategic 
relationships between firms introduce additional motives for trade policy, over and above (those) 
that arise in all market structures”. Further theoretical developments in the strategic trade 
literature pertain to the attainment of agglomeration economies arising from the incorporation of 
intermediate inputs in manufacturing (e.g. Krugman and Venables, 1995). These agglomeration 
economies, also known as external economies of scale, pertain to reductions in costs that occur 
when economic activity takes place in geographic proximity to related activity. Because the 
manufacturing sector is a source of its own demand, firms are subject to “forward and backward 
linkages in the manufacturing sector” (WTO, 2008: 89).  
                                                          
6
 Increasing returns to scale can be easily observed in the real world. The phenomena can arise from a 
number of sources, but basically can be seen as a reduction in average costs that arise from increasing 
output in the presence of fixed costs (WTO, 2008: 43) as well as the more efficient exploitation of the 
division of labour within individual firms (Thirlwall, 2006: 83). 
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The implications of strategic trade theory are that “for rent-shifting to be feasible, one only need 
assume the presence of imperfect competition in the industries in which international trade and 
investment take place, generating oligopoly rents for firms in those industries” (UNCTC, 1991: 36). 
Because of their market power, multinational assemblers may have some flexibility regarding 
strategic and operational matters, with multiple potential sites of production and sourcing 
options. As Moran (1998) conclusively demonstrates, this is a reasonable assumption for sectors 
in which FDI is most prominent, and those in which policies such as LCRs have been implemented. 
Insights from the strategic trade literature thus provides two insights: that governments can use 
trade policies firstly to shift rents from foreign oligopolists to domestic tax authorities; and 
secondly, in relation to the effects of LCRs, that they can encourage the establishment of 
domestic intermediate production facilities (and thus, shift rents to domestic producers).  
In cases where manufacturing takes place in multiple stages, foreign firms in the terminal sector 
(in which market power resides) can exercise market power over local suppliers (as well as local 
consumers), pushing up consumer prices, driving down the price of intermediate inputs and 
resulting in suboptimal output levels. In principle, LCRs can transfer a proportion of the foreign 
firm’s rents to local suppliers to correct the distortion and enhance host country welfare.  
The specific circumstances in which a rent-shifting trade policy correction leads to improved 
welfare are discussed in greater depth in the analysis of formal theoretical models below; suffice 
to say here that they are fairly limited but importantly, are not the sole justification for LCRs. In 
the presence of technological market failures, “trade protection takes on a much more important 
role than mere rent-shifting” (ibid.). Not only that, but as Krugman (1987) observes, “policies to 
promote sectors yielding external economies need not affect other countries adversely”: thus, 
under plausible circumstances in which learning and the establishment of linkages are 
characterised by market failures, LCRs can enhance not only domestic but also global welfare. 
2.3.3 Market failures in technological development 
The infant industrial argument holds that in industries in which scale and learning are crucial to 
the attainment of efficient production processes, new firms face huge disadvantages with respect 
to established firms. Protection is a means through which to provide local firms “preferential 
opportunity to reap the benefits of economies of scale, to create or refine technologies associated 
with large production runs and to work their way along the experience curve of managing large 
operations, while denying this opportunity to external firms” (UNCTC, 1991: 38). Substantial costs 
and high levels of uncertainty associated with technological accumulation is hampered by 
imperfect information and failures in credit markets. LCRs are thus intended to enable the more 
efficient utilisation of scale and provide additional rents to suppliers in order to overcome costs 
and uncertainties of investing in new and advanced technologies.  
Market failures in learning within firms are further exacerbated by interdependence in firms’ 
production, investment and learning decisions. The interdependence of terminal and supply 
sectors can motivate the deliberate transfer of technology from one to the other, since 
assemblers will benefit from both the presence and the more efficient operation of suppliers (and 
vice versa), but there are a number of circumstances in which markets will fail to promote 
linkages at socially optimal levels. In the first place, the coordination of activities between 
manufacturing firms is subject to coordination failure. Faced with imperfect information and in 
the presence of scale economies and costly and uncertain learning processes, there is a ‘chicken 
and egg’ type problem: “new activities are hard to develop unless their suppliers are present, but 
why would the suppliers exist if they have nobody to sell to” (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006: 8). 
Furthermore, technology transfer is subject to many important benefits which cannot be 
internalised by the proprietor of the technology in question; thus, technological leaders may not 
cooperate with other firms even if such arrangements were, from the perspective of society as a 
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whole, more efficient. In both cases, LCRs can help to ensure that technology transfer and the 
integration of intermediate and terminal sector firms reaches a more socially desirable level. 
2.3.4 Suboptimal learning environments and rent-seeking behaviour 
The most fundamental objections to LCRs relate to the difficulties actualising dynamic learning 
and scale economies, and fostering linkages and technology transfer in practice. Rent-shifting may 
lead to reductions in consumer welfare and, perversely, negative effects on local intermediate 
suppliers as well; it may exacerbate imperfect market structures and the malign effects arising 
therefrom. Thus, “improperly constructed public policies can have a disproportionately malign 
impact on trade and investment” (UNCTC, 1991: 36).  
A number of scholars acknowledge the potential for host economies to implement domestic-
welfare-enhancing interventions in the presence of increasing returns to scale, but critique “the 
new interventionism” based on “judgements about the politics of trade policy” (Krugman, 1987: 
139) which echo the concerns about information and incentives discussed above: strategic trade 
policies are theoretical plausible but highly difficult to implement effectively in practice. Such 
objections point to suboptimal learning environments in developing countries arising from, inter 
alia, the limited scale of domestic markets7; insufficient technological capabilities within the local 
economy8; and reluctance on the part of multinationals to engage in meaningful technological 
cooperation with local firms, as a result of the first two issues but also due to strategic 
motivations. As Moran (1998: 43) notes,  
Domestic content requirements have an adverse impact not because [markets] already 
function perfectly on their own, but because attempts to ‘improve’ the functioning of 
markets […] generate technical, economic, managerial, and political-economy problems for 
the investors and for the host country. These problems interact in a perverse manner and 
tend to reinforce each other towards inefficiency and stasis.  
In these conditions protection serves to insulate firms from the competitive pressures that drive 
upgrading and discourages technology transfer. Both foreign and local firms become centred on 
“trying to offset high inefficiency through compensation from artificial profits in the protected 
markets” (UNCTC, 1991).  
In addition, they are characterised by a prisoner’s dilemma: “if all follow their own self-interests 
instead of cooperating to stabilize individual behaviour, they will all end up worse off” (ibid.: 42). 
Finally, it is argued that in playing the strategic trade game, smaller and poorer countries are 
inherently disadvantaged compared to countries with larger markets, larger and more competent 
firms, and greater fiscal capacities to subsidise industry. In short, developing countries “do not 
have the resources to compete with developed countries in the struggle for international 
investment and often are driven to make poor policy choices in the effort to try. This not only 
results in economic inefficiencies but also generates a perverse political-economic dynamic as 
well: firms and workers with protected positions utilize what economic and political clout they 
                                                          
7
 The argument notes that infant industrial considerations require “a domestic market large enough to 
allow exploitation of the economies of scale inherent in the industry. In the case of most developing 
countries, a protected domestic market is likely to be small relative to the minimum efficient size of 
production, let alone in comparison with any massive economies of scale realizable only if the firm 
reconfigures itself to serve global markets” (UNCTC, 1991: 40).    
8
 As Narula and Dunning (2000: 161) put it, LCRs “do not, by themselves, result in backward linkages, 
because learning requires domestic firms with the appropriate skills to internalize them, and the conditions 
which make this necessary”. It is  
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have to slow down or prevent efforts to liberalize trade and investment flows” (Moran, 1998: 
102). As a result, multilateral restrictions on strategic trade policies may benefit developing 
countries disproportionately.   
These objections are largely based on the empirical literature on LCRs and other forms of 
protection, as well as theoretical concerns about state capacities to design policies and discipline 
rent-seeking behaviour effectively. However, it is worth noting that the empirical record is mixed, 
based on a rather limited number of direct studies but also more extensive empirical work on 
similar types of policy intervention. In addition, the theoretical case for LCRs, the circumstances in 
which they may be effective, and the way that these circumstances pertain to countries at 
different stages of development, are also highly ambiguous.  
2.4 DIRECT EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF LCRS 
2.4.1 Theoretical models 
Numerous studies have assessed the impacts of LCRs through formal economic modelling, with 
findings heavily dependent upon assumptions and specifications; “with regard to their welfare 
impact, theoretical models produce different results depending on the model specifications and 
on whether one is considering world welfare, that of the home country or that of the host” 
(UNCTAD, 2003a: 7-8). One of the most profound points of contention is simply the ways in which 
markets are most usefully characterised with respect to competitive structures and the presence 
of market failures. This has led to an abundance of theoretical models analysing LCRs under 
different market structures and, far less commonly, models that incorporate dynamic effects and 
externalities.   
The most basic models assume perfect competition in both sectors, along the lines of standard 
neoclassical trade theory. According to Balasubramanyam (1991), naïve models with no domestic 
protection to the final-goods sector posit that LCRs reduce domestic production of the final good, 
transfer producer surplus from domestic to foreign firms, and unambiguously reduce host country 
as well as global welfare. In this framework, LCRs are only feasible in the context of trade 
protection in the terminal sector, since otherwise, “imports of finished products will increase and 
undermine the effectiveness of the LCR” (WTO/UNCTAD, 2002: 22). As a result, the impacts of 
LCRs and tariffs on final goods are often considered in combination.  
Of course, in the neoclassical framework, the induced protection of the terminal sector also 
distorts prices and further reduces welfare; the ‘first best’ solution is free trade. However, as 
UNCTC (1991) correctly observes, the industries in which LCRs are usually implemented are far 
from perfectly competitive, and are instead dominated by foreign oligopolists (see Moran, 1998: 
21-23) for an empirical examination of market structures in sectors in which FDI occur). In this 
context, the goal of LCRs from a host country perspective is to “extract the maximum possible 
share of the gains from FDI” (Balsubramanyam, 1991).  
Thus, LCRs can feasibly enhance national welfare at the expense of foreign firms and countries 
with two complications:  
a) that final goods firms would need to be provided with additional incentives (i.e. protection) to 
remain in the market; and  
b) that rent-shifting within imperfectly competitive markets give rise to additional distortions,  
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both of which need to be considered in terms of their welfare effects. Thus, much of this 
literature is highly critical of LCRs, viewing them as a form of protection motivated by rent-shifting 
which distort prices and reduces welfare globally and, more often than not, nationally as well. In 
the absence of dynamic market failures, LCRs are simply an additional cost to input users, which is 
only in certain limited circumstances absorbed by foreign firms and is otherwise transferred to 
consumers and domestic producers. This leads Greenaway (1992: 151) to conclude that “there 
must be a strong presumption that (the effect) is welfare reducing”.  
However, it is important to note that under plausible assumptions, even some of these studies 
have shown LCRs “to have favourable developmental effects and to be welfare improving for host 
countries” (Kumar, 2005: 186) due to rent-shifting effects. Furthermore, to the extent that some 
studies (Balasubramanyam, 1991; Veloso, 2001) acknowledge dynamic learning and inter-firm 
spillovers, the welfare implications – both nationally and globally – are ambiguous but much more 
likely to be positive.  
The early contribution of Grossman (1981) “embodies the critical intuition that has been used to 
explore this issue in most of the subsequent literature” (Veloso, 2001). Grossman (1981) 
demonstrates that in the presence of a domestic intermediate sector characterised by high costs, 
LCRs have a welfare reducing impact. LCRs are seen to benefit input suppliers at the expense of 
final goods producers and consumers, both of which pay higher prices. Impacts on the trade 
balance and levels of domestic value-added are ambiguous, and depend upon the relative 
elasticities of demand for inputs and final goods and thus the extent to which the LCR leads to a 
reduction in local production of the final good. The perverse outcome is therefore that LCRs 
aimed at raising domestic intermediate producer surplus, output and exports “may have quite the 
opposite effect” quite aside from the wider welfare implications (p. 589).  
Subsequent models have usually involved the incorporation of different market structures in the 
terminal and intermediate sectors, and alternative configurations of the determinants of demand 
for inputs. Hollander (1987) assumes the presence of a foreign monopolist in the terminal sector 
and posits the existence of multiple inputs, and finds that it is possible to design local content 
policies to induce an increase in the output and range of intermediate goods produced locally; 
domestic welfare effects are ambiguous. Davidson et al. (1985) consider the context of a foreign 
duopoly. They report a loss of consumer surplus, the effect of which on national welfare is offset 
by shifting rents from foreign to domestic producers, leading to ambiguous overall effects on 
national welfare; global welfare and output decline. Richardson (1991) also constructs a model 
with two final-good-producing firms – one foreign, one domestic – but posits that their market 
power is in relation to suppliers, rather that consumers (i.e., is duopsonistic). It is further assumed 
that the domestic assembler can only source inputs domestically, whereas the foreign firm can 
import them. Perversely, Richardson finds that LCRs “may raise the foreign firm’s profits in this 
duopsony setting by committing it to use more of the domestic input, thus pushing up its price 
and leading the domestic firm to contract” (1991: 144).  
Turning to models that incorporate alternative market structures in the intermediate sector, 
Krishna and Itoh (1988) analyse the effects of a duopoly in the intermediate sector in the context 
of strategic behaviour. Interestingly, they find that LCRs can have welfare implications even if they 
are set below the binding level (i.e. assemblers already choose to exceed the specified local 
content level) by affecting firms’ strategic interactions. In addition, depending upon the degree of 
substitution between intermediates, prices may fall in response to the LCR. They conclude that, 
although welfare impacts are ambiguous, the “likelihood of welfare improvements through such 
policies does not seem very great”, due to the potential for large cost distortions in the terminal 
22 
 
sector, as well as the diversion of resources due to lobbying in the presence of protective rents 
(1988: 123). Beghin and Sumner (1992) investigate the situation of a ‘bilateral monopoly’, with a 
domestic intermediate cartel and an import-competing final good monopolist. They find that an 
LCR is a potentially efficient way to shift rents from foreign to domestic producers. Belderbos and 
Sleuwaegen (1997) present a model of monopolistic competition in both subsectors, with findings 
similar to the welfare implications of Grossman’s (1981) model.  
Some of the later models explore welfare implications in the context of dynamic employment 
effects and a more nuanced treatment of foreign investment. Lahiri and Ono (1998) explore an 
oligopolistic final good sector in which foreign and domestic firms are present, to argue that LCRs 
can be used to enhance the domestic employment effects of FDI. Similarly, Yu and Chao (1998) 
show that LCRs can enhance domestic welfare if targeted at an intermediate (rural) sector in 
which unemployment is more prevalent compared to the terminal (urban) sector. Richardson 
(1993) explicitly considers LCRs in a general equilibrium framework in which the ‘second best’ 
context of an incentive to final good production – usually in the form of tariffs on final goods – is 
recognised, and is assumed to fully mitigate any impacts of the LCR on final goods output. Besides 
the incorporation of a tariff on final goods, Richardson (1993) considers the possibility that foreign 
final-good-producing firms can displace domestic demand for intermediates, and that foreign 
firms can invest in the intermediate as well as the final good sector. The author argues that these 
features in combination – which are empirically plausible – mitigate the negative welfare impacts 
of LCRs. Specifically, the model demonstrates that the LCR can induce inward investment in the 
intermediate sector, enhancing welfare overall. This is an important issue, since LCRs had 
previously been assumed to discourage FDI, when in fact this may only apply to the terminal 
sector (and even then, effects may be offset through other incentives).  
Balasubramanyam (1991) distinguishes the static cost of protection from the dynamic benefits 
arising from the promotion of supplier capabilities. This study recognises, but does not formally 
model, the market failures that reinforce the rationale for LCRs additional to the potential for 
rent-shifting: 
Promotion of local supplier capabilities involves identification of the existence of prospective 
suppliers of inputs, their development through the provision of technology and know-how, 
and the provision of an assured market. In many cases local input-supplying industries may 
not exist because of the absence of an assured market for their products. Local content 
requirements force foreign firms to identify nascent local capabilities and provide them with 
the know-how and technology (p. 1219).   
In contrast to this, Mussa (1984) discusses potential negative dynamic effects. Relaxing the 
assumption of perfect substitution between foreign and domestic inputs as well as exploring 
imperfectly competitive market structures, Mussa (1984) shows that the overall impact on 
domestic intermediate production depends upon the degree of substitutability between domestic 
and foreign inputs, especially in relation to the costs of technological improvement. In light of this 
substitutability, LCRs introduce a potentially damaging distortion into firms’ innovative strategies. 
As Mussa (1984) puts it, “diminished incentives for improvements in technical efficiency that save 
on domestic inputs provide a serious argument against use of content protection”. This 
contention relates to dynamic effects in the presence of rent-seeking behaviour that supplement 
the static effects. The latter point to the enhancement of suppliers’ market power and surplus 
amidst an overall reduction in societal welfare.   
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Veloso (2001) marks a significant departure from previous studies, deriving a formal model to 
account for learning externalities and/or coordination failures which are not accounted for by 
foreign investors or local firms. The author is critical of existing theoretical studies, which he 
argues are characterised by frameworks which have “assured that performance standards in their 
very nature could lead to no other outcome except distortion” (ibid.: 29). Thus – notwithstanding 
the ambiguous welfare findings of several models – LCRs are usually seen to reduce consumer 
surplus and introduce additional costly distortions into the economy, without any guarantee of 
enhanced intermediate output or domestic surplus. In contrast, Veloso (2001) shows that LCRs 
will enhance welfare unambiguously when empirically feasible externalities are present in the 
model.  
In summary, it is worth quoting UNCTC’s (1991: 36) observation that 
under assumptions of imperfect competition, the outcome from public intervention cannot 
be assumed to be automatically undesirable or distortionary, but neither can it be assumed 
to be beneficial or welfare enhancing. There is no substitute for detailed analysis of the 
conditions for and nature of each kind of intervention. 
Bearing in mind the ambiguity of the theoretical evidence, I now turn to the implications of 
empirical work on the effects of LCRs.  
2.4.2 Empirical research 
Given their substantive importance, it is perhaps surprising that there is little systematic empirical 
evidence on the incidence and impacts of LCRs, and indeed investment performance 
requirements more generally. According to UNCTAD (2001a), empirical analysis of the latter is 
limited by a number of methodological difficulties. Policies are inevitably implemented in the 
context of “a larger framework of investment incentives and disincentives in which their effects 
may be difficult to distinguish from those of other measures”, there is little in the way of 
systematic data on the incidence of such measures, and theories that underlie empirical 
assessments are complicated by the presence of heterogeneity at the country level (p. 59). These 
limitations guide my own research design and methodology as I seek to carry out systematic 
comparative research.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of sources of empirical evidence on the effects of LCRs, which 
broadly fall into the categories of quantitative and case studies. The most important dependent 
variables – following the goals of LCRs, discussed above – have included production, trade and 
inward investment in the intermediate and terminal sectors, as well as productivity, technology 
transfer and sectoral growth rates. In this section, I summarise the general evidence in order to 
illustrate that the empirical evidence on the effects of LCRs per se is sufficiently ambiguous to 
warrant further investigation, before turning to sector-specific evidence on the automotive sector 
in chapter 3.  
2.4.2.1 Quantitative studies 
Early sources of evidence, based on surveys of firms subject to investment performance 
requirements and countries implementing them, are summarised in UNCTC (1991) and 
WTO/UNCTAD (2002). Their findings can be summarised as follows. A survey of foreign 
subsidiaries of US firms conducted in 1977 found that 6% were “subject to” TRIMs, while a 1988 
survey found that 58% of investment was actually “covered” by TRIMs. UNCTC (1991) explain this 
discrepancy with the fact that the majority of TRIMs were reported as “discretionary and 
negotiable” (ibid.: 29), were not always enforced, or may be redundant to the extent that once 
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they have ‘worked’ – i.e. the requirements have been satisfied – TRIMs do “not require the 
investor to undertake actions the parent firm… is not planning to undertake anyway” (ibid.: 30). 
As a result, the surveys confirm, firstly, that LCRs appear to have had very little impact on firm 
decisions, at least in terms of discouraging investment: “Foreign investors are not ‘jerked around’ 
in conspicuous ways as the neo-classical paradigm would suggest” (ibid.: 54). As summarised by 
WTO/UNCTAD (2002: 25-6),  
most respondents… indicated that the existence of performance requirements was only a 
minor factor in their decision about where to invest and produce, and the existence of 
performance requirements did not in themselves prompt investors to consider moving their 
production elsewhere. 
Secondly, the surveys “suggest that the aggregate trade impact of performance requirements has 
been relatively small” (ibid.: 24). In some cases, investing firms have reported that TRIMs 
(including LCRs, and accompanied by investment incentives such as trade protection) “allowed 
foreign firms a greater presence than would have been the case with an open market” (UNCTC, 
1991: 47). In others, “TRIMs did not require investors to alter their patterns of purchases or sales 
significantly to meet the requirements” (ibid.: 50). These findings seem to contradict theoretical 
expectations that LCRs have systematically damaging effects, and suggest that LCRs may be used 
to ‘speed up’ the search for local suppliers in the presence of the ‘rigidities’ of exit and start-up 
costs (ibid.: 55). Thus, the early surveys of firm responses point to the need for more 
comprehensive empirical work into the effects of LCRs on trade and investment flows as well as 
the efficiency of their implications for resource allocation.   
Econometric studies on the effects of LCRs are fairly few and far between. Beghin and Lovell 
(1993) and Beghin et al. (1997) examine the impacts of LCRs on the Australian and US tobacco 
industries respectively. The authors show that imported tobacco fell significantly alongside slight 
drops in output, findings consistent with rent-seeking behaviour by domestic producers. In any 
case, tobacco production is an industrial sector in which the broader policy goals of LCRs are 
unlikely to be actualised. Using firm-level data on Japanese and US subsidiaries, Hackett and 
Srinivasan (1998) showed that less restrictive local content regimes were associated with 
significantly higher flows of Japanese FDI, with insignificant effects on US FDI. The explanation 
posited by the authors relates to differences in supply structures, and thus the costs of switching 
suppliers, between Japanese and US multinationals. Kokko and Blomstrom (1995) use data from 
US subsidiaries to show that the imposition of IPRs has negative effects on technology transfer to 
subsidiaries. However, the explanatory variable incorporated numerous separate IPRs, and so is 
not specific to LCRs. Additionally, the dependent variable was a measure of formal technology 
transfer, which may be less relevant in the context of informal knowledge spillovers (which are 
also very difficult to measure directly).  
In a similar vein, Kumar (1994) regresses the export orientation of US subsidiaries on a host of 
country characteristics (based on Dunning’s advantage framework, discussed below), one of 
which includes the ‘intensity of performance requirements’, including LCRs. The 1994 study finds 
no significant effects of performance requirements on the incidence of exports back to the US. 
Subsequent studies by the same author – Kumar (2000, 2001) conducted a series of quantitative 
studies utilising a large firm-level dataset on Japanese and US manufacturing subsidiaries – show 
that performance requirements have the general effect of discouraging investment. More 
importantly, however, the same studies have involved analysis of the quality of FDI flows, in terms 
of the extent of localisation, the technology intensity of activities, export orientation, and 
innovation. The important finding is that LCRs are positively and significantly associated with the 
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incorporation of local value-added into manufacturing activities, and thus, “those that enter are 
likely to contribute to host country industrialization” (Kumar, 2000: 464); LCRs are “effective in 
improving the quality parameters they intend to achieve” (Kumar, 2001: 44).  
2.4.2.2 Case studies 
In a similar vein to the theoretical studies, the findings of which are inconclusive in terms of their 
public policy implications, the case study evidence seems to “cluster at two extremes. Failures are 
associated with sub-optimal economic size and shelter from competition, with subsidies to make 
up for permanent high costs. Successes are associated with full utilization of economies of scale 
and ultimate subjection of the project to competition” (Veloso, 2001). Moran (1992) concurs that 
evidence “support(s) the view that TRIMs, like other public-sector interventions in imperfect 
markets, enhance resource allocation if they help all potentially comparable locales utilize foreign 
investment to penetrate global markets, but detract if they merely insulate high-cost operations 
from competition”9. Similarly, UNCTC (1991: 57) observes that “import substitution projects 
subject to TRIMs are more likely to fall into the category of economic failures than export-
oriented projects”.  
In the negative cluster, Moran (1998: chapter 4) provides evidence of some of the more malign 
effects of LCRs, citing instances in which LCRs were not amenable to the achievement of efficient 
levels of scale, especially in the automotive industry, in which investments were largely motivated 
by import-competing and characterised by strategy concerns in the presence of oligopoly. In 
particular, Moran (1998: 43-44) distinguishes the effects of limited scale in the domestic market 
from lags in the introduction of advanced technology that arise as a result of rent-seeking 
behaviour by foreign assemblers. However, as I discuss more extensively in chapter 3, it is difficult 
to isolate the effects of LCRs from that of the suboptimal, protected environment in which they 
were implemented.   
More positive evidence is reported in Kumar (2005) in the cases of the automotive sectors of 
Brazil, Mexico and Thailand, and UNCTC (1991) in the cases of the chemical and computer 
industries. In line with rapid market growth in which scale economies could realistically be 
achieved, LCRs have on occasion fitted the scenario “in which a fear-of-loss coupled with a 
promise-of-gain can propel a transnational corporation out of a sticky pattern of operations” 
(ibid.: 59). I examine the secondary literature on the effects of LCRs in the automotive sector in 
more detail in my empirical chapters; suffice to say here that, as WTO/UNCTAD (2002: 23) 
acknowledges, while case study evidence is useful in some respects, “in most instances the 
conclusions drawn have not been supported through systematic cross-country analysis”. Thus, 
substantively and methodologically speaking, it is clear that there is an important gap for 
comparative analysis into the impacts of the elimination of LCRs, from an empirical perspective. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I introduce and justify the conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
that inform my subsequent empirical analysis.  
2.5 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
2.5.1 The technological capability approach 
In traditional neoclassical trade theory, technology is seen as exogenous; innovation and 
technological development are ‘assumed away’ (Lall, 2004). However, as noted by Chang, “this is 
                                                          
9
 Moran (1998) is generally more sanguine about export requirements, which, in his view, are more likely to 
lead to the integration of local subsidiaries into parent firms’ global production networks.  
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assuming away the very thing that makes some countries developed and others not – namely, 
their differential abilities to develop and use technologies, or what are known as ‘technological 
capabilities’” (Chang and Lin, 2009). 
In the first place, firms in developing countries do not tend to be the originators of technology, 
and indeed tend to be deficient in innovative capabilities. This implies that developing countries 
must import technologies from abroad. However, most technology is controlled by MNCs who 
“seek to exploit their proprietary technologies in commercial technology markets for maximum 
gain” (UNCTAD, 2001b: 90). “The result is a gap between the technology developed and owned by 
firms in developed countries and that which can be obtained and utilized by developing 
countries” (ibid.: 1). While MNCs may transfer technology through the establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries and through their linkages with the wider economy, there are limitations to the 
feasibility of industrialisation based purely on openness to FDI, as discussed below.  
Assuming the technology is available, its mastery still requires costly learning beyond the price 
paid to the originator. Such technology may be formal and codified but also comprises significant 
tacit elements. Even if the codified technology (e.g. blueprints) is fairly unsophisticated, successful 
mastery requires firms to invest in “new skills, routines, and technical and organizational 
information” of a tacit nature in order to work out how best to translate the codified information 
into efficient productive activities (Lall, 2004). To the extent that capital equipment and 
organisational capacity require ‘lumpy’ fixed investments (as they will for manufacturing 
activities), learning is also subject to economies of scale. 
The tacit nature of technology gives rise to some profound implications for industrial 
development. As Pack and Westphal (1986) demonstrate, firms do not face perfect information 
about the nature of the learning process, or of the alternative technologies available to 
themselves and other firms. This relates to a further point, that processes of learning involve 
“fundamental uncertainty (and not just calculable risk)… unless you actually enter the industry 
and develop it, it is impossible to know how long it will take for the country to acquire the 
necessary technological capabilities to become internationally competitive” (Chang and Lin, 2009: 
19). This may make investment via financial markets prohibitively expensive, especially in 
developing countries, “where credit and insurance markets are particularly imperfect” (Chang and 
Cheema, 2001: 19).   
The costly and uncertain nature of learning is further exacerbated by interdependence in firms’ 
production, investment and learning decisions. Successful learning outcomes depend upon the 
extent to which complementary skills and resources are available, either within the firm or within 
the wider economy. These factors comprise technological capabilities at the firm and national 
levels, respectively10.  
More advanced, innovative activities require considerable investment in human and physical 
capital as well as the establishment of dense linkages with external agents, including firms 
involved in upstream or downstream stages of fragmented production, and inputs such as 
research bodies, standards and metrology, and training institutions which have public goods 
characteristics and/or for which market are incomplete.  
Factors both internal and external to the firm thus assume great importance in the acquisition of 
capabilities. Internally, larger and more profitable firms are better able to overcome the inherent 
costs and uncertainties of learning that small ones. Externally, learning requires access to 
                                                          
10
 Technological capabilities at the firm-level can be simply defined as the skills and resources that enable 
firms to create, use and adapt technology effectively in production. National capabilities are simply an 
aggregation of physical and human capital and technological effort (such as expenditure on R&D), 
embodied in both private and public organisations. See Lall (1992).  
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complementary sources of technology and the inputs required to use them effectively. It is 
therefore crucial to note that investments in technological capabilities have impacts beyond the 
boundaries of firms which cannot be internalised, leading to suboptimum private investment in 
learning. As Lall and Teubal (1998: 1374) recognise,  
Learning is invariably characterized by externalities, spillovers and deliberate (often 
nonmarket) exchanges of information and skills. This results in collective learning of 
technology and routines in networks of related activities. So dense and crucial are these 
linkages that it seems a misnomer to call them “externalities” at all.  
There are two main types of externality: coordination failures and information spillovers 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006). In the case of coordination failures, to the extent that learning 
must occur simultaneously in multiple firms (i.e. in the case of fragmented production processes), 
it may be a halting and difficult process”. Firms (and workers) face decisions whether to invest in a 
specialised technology (or skill), the return on which depends on the simultaneous presence of 
demand and the supply of complementary skills and technology. In such circumstances, “the 
economy may get stuck in a low-income, low-tech equilibrium even though the high-tech sector is 
viable” (Rodrik, 1996). The interdependence between firms can also motivate the deliberate 
transfer of technology from one to the other. 
Information spillovers can occur for two main reasons: imitation or reverse engineering of 
technology (demonstration effects); and labour market mobility. In the first case, firms exposed to 
technology upgrade their own, giving rise to benefits not factored by the technology user (who 
indeed may face enhanced competition as a result). In an extension to this idea, again taking the 
broad view of technology, ‘self-discovery’ – i.e. learning what activities one can profitably 
undertake in a given economic context – is limited because “the initial entrepreneur who makes 
the ‘discovery’ can capture only a small part of the social value that this knowledge generates”, 
while bearing all of the risk (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003: 4). Labour market spillovers occur as 
workers can transfer their accrued tacit knowledge of productive processes to other firms. This 
weakens the incentives for firms to invest in training and skills development, since they are not 
able to internalise the benefits.   
The structuralist response to multiple market failures in technological development involves a 
controversial approach to the issue of incentives, from which are derived two main policy 
implications, relating to the use of trade policy for infant industrial purposes, and investment 
performance requirements for conditioning the activities of foreign firms. With respect to FDI, 
while it acknowledged that foreign capital and technology have a crucial role in developing 
countries in light of the deficits described above, FDI-led growth is subject to “basic paradox: with 
weak local capabilities, industrialisation has to be more dependent on FDI. However, FDI cannot 
drive industrial growth without local capabilities” (Lall and Narula, 2004: 457). In this regard, as 
Lall (1992) argues, it is essential that firms are subject to an incentive structure that balances 
competitive pressures with the accrual of sufficient profits or ‘rents’ for the requisite investments 
in technological upgrading to be made. Thus, while competitive pressures can drive technological 
effort, they can be a double-edged sword, and stifle upgrading. A temporary deviation from 
competition, in the guise of infant industrial protection, may be desirable.   
2.5.2 Infant industrial protection and capability development 
Infant industrial protection is a means through which to provide local firms “preferential 
opportunity to reap the benefits of economies of scale, to create or refine technologies associated 
with large production runs and to work their way along the experience curve of managing large 
operations, while denying this opportunity to external firms” (UNCTC, 1991: 38). Indeed, as 
Shafaeddin (2003: 18) notes, export expansion has been ultimate goal of infant industrial 
protection since its theoretical conception; protection should be phased out as firms move rapidly 
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down their cost curves, until the sector is competitive without support, at which point new 
activities may be identified and promoted. 
This characterisation of the ideal sequencing of protection and liberalisation differs from the 
recommendations of rapid ‘across the board’ liberalisation as well as of uniform and/or 
permanent protection. The approach is both time-bound and selective. According to Akyüz’ 
(2005a: 22) model, countries should implement protection based on feasibility of closing the gap 
between local and foreign productive capabilities, starting in sectors in which dynamic learning 
and spillovers are most likely to arise in relation to current activities. In the words of Hausmann 
and Rodrik (2006: 25), a country’s existing industrial structure shapes future opportunities for 
diversification: 
New activities… need to exploit existing capabilities, by which we mean the markets, physical 
and human assets, norms and institutions that were developed and accumulated for other 
pre-existing activities. These capabilities will be useful to the extent that they are similar to 
the needs of the new activity in question.  
Targeting industries in which existing capabilities are sufficiently close to technological leaders 
reduces the level (and cost) of protection required to enable local firms to compete, and ensures 
that learning processes are shorter and easier to master. In the context of such market failures, 
the very basis for trade protection is to “strategically violate (comparative advantage) knowing 
that this will result in a loss of current income but… can put the country on a higher growth 
trajectory in the medium to long run” (Chang 2006: 34). Chang supposes  
some kind of inverted-U-shaped relationship between an economy’s deviation from 
comparative advantage and its growth rate. If it deviates too little, it may be efficient in the 
short run, but its long-term growth is slowed down, as it is not upgrading. Up to a point, 
therefore, increasing deviation from comparative advantage will accelerate growth. After a 
point, negative effects of protection (for example, excessive learning costs, rent-seeking) may 
overwhelm the acceleration in productivity growth that the ‘infant’ industries generate, 
resulting in negative growth overall (Chang and Lin, 2009: 14-15). 
For neoliberals, distorting prices with selective trade policies is a highly dangerous developmental 
strategy. Political economy arguments noted previously (rent-seeking and incapacity to pick 
winners) are used to justify neoliberals’ preference for open and sectorally-neutral trade policies. 
For structuralists on the other hand, sectorally neutral policy “makes little sense when learning 
processes and externalities differ by technology, as they inevitably do” (Lall, 2004: 11). 
Furthermore, from the structuralist perspective it is “important to reiterate that infant industry 
protection is only part of industrial policy, and by itself can be harmful and ineffective” (ibid.: 13). 
As suggested in Schmitz’s (2007) framework, import substitution policies often failed in Latin 
America because ‘support’ was not adequately offset by ‘challenge’, either in the form of market 
competition or state performance requirements; as Bruton (1998: 903) demonstrates, “the 
principle reason for the failure of import substitution was that, as practiced, it created an 
environment that discourages learning”. This suggests that trade policies have divergent impacts 
depending upon their conjunction with other conditions. If they are implemented in conjunction 
with competitive pressures as well as policies and institutions that encourage rapid learning, then 
in principle, infant industrial strategies may give rise to virtuous, cumulative processes of scale, 
learning and agglomeration to enable an inefficient industry to upgrade rapidly and permit 
gradual liberalisation with minimal adjustment costs. 
In this sense, proponents of the technological capability approach acknowledge the potential 
benefits of multilateral liberalisation, provided sufficient flexibility is maintained. As Lall (2004: 27) 
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acknowledges, multilateral constraints “may prevent the more egregious forms of intervention 
that led in the past to inefficiency, rent-seeking and technological sloth. They are also beneficial to 
countries that have already developed strong capabilities behind protective barriers and should 
exploit them in competitive production”. 
Empirical research has failed to find convincing evidence that trade liberalisation systematically 
improves economic performance, or conversely, that trade protection is necessarily damaging. 
Early country case studies (e.g. Little et al., 1970; Krueger, 1975) have exposed the excessive costs 
of high levels of trade protection. These excessive costs are hardly disputed, but neither do they 
make an unambiguous case that protection per se is damaging. Perhaps the most substantial 
refutation comes from evidence from East Asia. While they have been deemed ‘liberal’ and 
‘outward-oriented’ (Balassa et al., 1982), the evidence suggests, on the contrary, that infant 
industrial protection, of a highly selective and discretionary form, has featured heavily in their 
success (Wade, 2005; Chang, 2006); for example, the globally-competitive Korean steel and 
automotive sectors were both fostered under substantial levels of protection from imports. More 
generally, referring to the diverse subjects of Chenery et al.’s (1986) study, Ocampo and Taylor 
(1998: 1542) point out that “at the sectoral level export expansion was almost uniformly 
preceded by a phase of successful import substitution”.     
Turning to liberalisation, the evidence is similarly mixed. At the country level, the case study 
evidence in favour of liberalisation often turns out to confirm the benefits of a sequenced and 
pragmatic approach to trade reform; in the view of Chang (2005: 88) it is consistent with “the 
well-established historical pattern… that trade liberalization is better seen as the outcome of 
development, rather than its prerequisite”.  
There is little doubt that numerous countries throughout the developing world have had 
excessively restrictive trade regimes, the liberalisation of which has usually included the beneficial 
effects of competition and the availability of high-tech consumer and capital goods (Dornbusch, 
1992). On the other hand, rapid liberalisation has also given rise to significant adjustment costs 
and structural problems; indeed, UNCTAD (2006: 150) have declared that “the liberalization 
strategy is generally judged disappointing”. As Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004: 15) note, “the 
trade performance of the developing countries after the liberalization of the 1980s has been 
highly uneven, and generally accompanied by a deterioration in their trade balances”. Case 
studies appear to confirm that in countries in which capabilities are least developed, such as in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, rapid and wholesale liberalisation has contributed to deindustrialisation – 
measured as the contribution of manufacturing value added (MVA) to GDP – as well as in relation 
to specific sectors (Shafaeddin, 2005; Khor and Goh, 2006).  
Of course, case study evidence “cannot confidently be generalised” (Winters, 2004: F4) and is 
open to interpretation with respect to the contribution of trade protection and liberalisation 
versus other context-specific factors. Turning to more systematic quantitative analysis, while it is 
fairly uncontroversial from cross-sectional studies that more open economies perform better, the 
direction of causality is unclear: strong performance “would allow imports to be liberalised 
without generating adverse effects” (Akyüz, 2005b: 18). The more robust panel data analyses 
have presented mixed results. Greenaway et al. (2002) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) find 
evidence of significant, positive effects on growth; these findings are refuted by Sarkar and 
Bhattacharyya (2005) who employ time-series (cointegration) analysis for India and Korea. Santos-
Paulino and Thirwall (2004) find that liberalisation caused the deterioration of liberalising 
countries’ trade balances; Kassim (2013) finds the same for Africa, but their findings are disputed 
by Wu and Zeng (2008). 
Perhaps the most appropriate conclusion is as suggested by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001: 266) that 
the relationship between liberalisation and economic performance “is a contingent one, 
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dependent on a host of country and external characteristics”. The problem, methodologically 
speaking, is that the motivations and capacities of states to implement trade protection 
effectively may vary systematically between countries, in ways that are not possible to 
operationalise in quantitative models. Trade policies have given rise to virtuous, cumulative 
effects by encouraging the attainment of more efficient levels of scale and the formations of 
industrial agglomerations – thus permitting firms to thrive under more competitive liberal 
environments – just as they have given rise to vicious cycles of subscale operations, technological 
sloth, and rent-seeking – thus making adjustment to liberalisation all the more costly.  
In any case, to the extent that the weight of evidence suggests overall gains from liberalisation, as 
suggested by Winters (2004), this finding is only weakly relevant, since the thesis is not concerned 
with the case for economy-wide trade liberalisation vis-à-vis wholesale protectionism in general, 
but in relation to sector-specific and time-bound deviations from free trade, the empirical 
literature on which is clustered around two extremes, neither of which prove definitive. 
Furthermore, while LCRs have characteristics of trade policies, they have additional specific 
features relating to state-MNC bargaining aimed at encouraging the establishment of linkages 
between foreign and local firms, as discussed in the next section.   
2.5.3 FDI-led development, advantages, and investment performance requirements 
Proponents of the technological capability approach are typically less sanguine than neoliberals 
regarding the prospects of FDI to promote industrial development. FDI can have a number of 
beneficial effects on a host country, as well as potential costs; as Moran (1998) discusses in a 
comprehensive review11.  
However, some of the most important and most controversial implications of FDI relate to the 
nature of technological spillovers arising from its presence. While it is clearly acknowledged that 
FDI may be essential to develop capabilities in high tech industries, attracting it is not easy in the 
first place, and the developmental impact depends, inter alia, upon the motivations and strategies 
of investing firms, the nature of linkages in the activity in which investment takes place, and local 
absorptive capacities at the firm and national level (Lall and Narula, 2004). There are two channels 
through which the wider domestic economy can benefit from FDI in terms of technological 
capabilities: through deliberate ‘transfer’ through market mechanisms and non-deliberate 
                                                          
11
 In short, FDI can enhance consumer welfare in much the same way as imports by introducing a wider 
range of goods available at a lower cost; it can contribute to the capital stock in economies where capital is 
scarce; it may contribute to demand for local goods, services, and labour; and there may be positive 
dynamic effects arising from enhanced competition on domestic firms. These positive impacts may be 
offset – to a greater or lesser degree – if FDI gives rise to transfer pricing, repatriation of profits, restrictions 
on exports of subsidiaries for strategic reasons, crowding out of domestic investment, and foreign influence 
over domestic political processes (Chang and Green, 2003). These negative impacts are associated with the 
prevalence of FDI in sectors characterised by imperfect competition (Moran, 1998: 23), which enables 
MNCs to extract rents from local economies. As Cowling and Tomlinson (2011: 836) observe, “an 
asymmetry of power exists between transnationals and nations (and regions), deriving from the former’s 
transnationality; in this respect, the strategic decisions made in the interests of transnationals are often 
unlikely to be compatible with the long term requirements of communities”. One of the ways that firms are 
able to exploit this asymmetry of power is through strategic behaviours which may be termed ‘divide and 
rule’: the MNC uses the credible threat of relocation to demand concessions with respect to “measures 
such as investment subsidies, infrastructural support, employment legislation and tax regimes that will 
affect the transnational’s profitability” while minimising tax liabilities transfer pricing (ibid.). This tendency 
has been exacerbated as a result of ‘globalisation’ – as shorthand for the technological developments and 
an increasingly liberal global policy environment – through which “the competences of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are becoming increasingly mobile and knowledge-intensive [...] [and] [...] the balance in 
bargaining power has shifted in favour of the MNE” (Narula and Dunning, 2000: 141; see also Dicken, 2003).     
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‘diffusion’ through the externalities described above. This is highly relevant with respect to the 
implications of LCRs, since their justification derives in part from expectations that technology 
transfer and more intensive learning will result from suppliers’ interactions with MNCs in the 
assembly sector.  
A useful first step in analysing the technological implications of FDI is to examine why it should 
occur at all. Following Markusen (1995), three conditions must pertain in order for FDI to be 
feasible and desirable from the perspective of a foreign investing firm: the firm must have an 
advantage in relation to local firms, local production must be preferential to export, and there 
must be a reason to keep production in house rather than, for example, licensing production to 
another firm. Thus, FDI is seen to arise as the result of the interplay of three sets of ‘advantages’ – 
ownership advantages of MNCs, ownership advantages of domestic firms, and location-specific 
advantages of countries – which forms the basis of Dunning’s (1998) theoretical framework12 and 
guides the following discussion.  
Firm-specific ownership advantages are assets to which one firm has access and to which 
competing firms do not. There may be many sources of such advantages – which may or may not 
be related to multinationality – including proprietary technology, economies of scale and scope in 
production, and distribution and marketing networks. All of these advantages serve as barriers to 
entry and upgrading by competitors.  
Country-specific locational advantages are the factors which motivate local production on the 
part of the MNC. These factors are grouped around three main motivations: access to natural 
resources; access to (protected) markets; and productive efficiency gains. The advantages 
required to attract market- and efficiency-seeking FDI can be shaped by deliberate state action. As 
UNCTAD (2000) points out, MNCs tend to favour environments in which they are free to operate 
in the most profitable manner. However, it does not follow that a laissez-faire policy environment 
is necessarily most amenable to the attraction and exploitation of FDI from a host country 
perspective. Because MNCs often operate in imperfectly competitive conditions characterised by 
economies of scale, they are able to obtain oligopoly rents, and have considerable flexibility 
regarding strategic and operational matters. As a result, while states want to attract FDI precisely 
because of the technology it embodies, technological superiority also grants MNCs a wide choice 
of locations and the capacities to internalise learning processes and exploit asymmetrical market 
structures in their favour.  
There are a number of policy instruments aimed at enhancing the quantity and quality of FDI 
flows. In a comprehensive review, UNCTAD (1996) distinguishes those relating to admission and 
establishment; those relating to ownership and control; those relating to operations (i.e. 
performance requirements); incentives; and investment-related trade measures (i.e. trade 
policies that affect flows of FDI).  
Historically, the location-specific advantage that has been most widely used to attract high-tech 
FDI into developing countries – in which productive capabilities are relatively deficient – has been 
the host country’s protected domestic market, of which each country has unique possession. The 
ability to deny foreign investors market access has also provided some leverage to host countries 
and enabled the imposition of performance requirements (UNCTAD, 2003a: 33). 
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It is important to note however, that even with high levels of protection, without complementary 
locational capabilities at the national level, inflows of high-tech FDI may be extremely limited 
(Narula and Dunning, 2000: 160). Transplanting advanced technologies may not be feasible due to 
the paucity of national technological capabilities, for example with respect to skilled labour, 
infrastructure and institutions. Furthermore, although by definition FDI involves technology 
transfer from an MNC to a foreign subsidiary, the nature of the transfer varies with the 
motivation for investment. As UNCTAD (2000) observes, 
There is an important distinction between investors producing solely for domestic 
consumption in the host country and investors using the host country as a site (integrated 
into the global sourcing network of the parents) from which to strengthen their larger 
competitive position in world markets… there is evidence of a dynamic “integration effect” 
which provides newer technology, more rapid technological upgrading, best management 
practices and high industry standards.  
As such, while trade protection can provide incentives for inward FDI that may not otherwise 
occur, it may lead to the ‘wrong kind’ of FDI if investment is motivated purely by access to the 
protected market, and not used as a basis on which to reduce costs. In such instances, MNCs may 
limit the sophistication of technological activity within subsidiaries deliberately in order to exploit 
obsolete technologies in less competitive market conditions. On the other hand, many developing 
countries lack the advantages required to attract efficiency-seeking FDI in high-tech, oligopolistic 
sectors such as automotives; trade protection appears to have been the only feasible option. It 
should also be noted that FDI projects initially geared towards rent-seeking within a protected 
domestic market may subsequently be upgraded – by the very same companies – into the ‘right 
kind’ of export-oriented facilities, provided that the requisite capabilities and advantages for 
efficient manufacturing exist, a point acknowledged in Moran’s (1998) review of the empirical 
evidence.     
2.5.3.1 Investment performance requirements and state-MNC bargaining 
From the perspective of the host country, IPRs (of which LCRs are only one specific type) give 
valued flexibility in negotiating with MNCs. The mechanisms through which bargains are manifest 
are the range of policies affecting the profitability of strategic decisions on the part of the 
investing firm. IPRs typically appear in conjunction with other categories of host country measure, 
including trade protection and other incentives for production in the terminal sector, entry 
restrictions, other operational measures, and wider policies and institutions affecting 
technological learning.  
Adherence to IPRs may be rewarded with additional fiscal incentives (or alternatively, non-
compliance may be subject to fiscal penalties such as tariff surcharges). Thus, the conjunction of 
IPRs and other investment incentives, including access to the protected domestic  
may allow a bargain to be struck in which an incentive with high value to the investor and 
low marginal cost to the host country... is traded for a performance requirement of low 
marginal cost to the investor but high real or perceived value to the host country (UNCTAD, 
2000: 246). 
Thus, in cases where FDI has been subject to various forms of incentive – including access to 
protected domestic markets – IPRs can be seen as integral to a process of bargaining between 
states and MNCs (Ramamurti, 2001; Kumar, 2001) and as ‘reciprocal control mechanisms’ 
(Amsden, 2003). Importantly, operational measures “present many points of contact with 
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measures meant to regulate the entry and establishment of FDI” and “can constitute 
preconditions for the investment being allowed in the first instance” (UNCTAD, 2001a: 56). As 
such, this opens the possibility that IPRs can be “used as screening mechanisms” in the 
understanding “that it was part of the objective of the government to ‘weed out’ investments 
that would not benefit the development of the local industry” (Veloso, 2001: 36). In this context, 
IPRs are seen as having a useful development role; it is “difficult to see how host countries that 
have FDI can tap its potential fully without using time-honoured strategies like local content 
rules” (Lall, 2004: 25).  
As previously mentioned, FDI is motivated by different locational advantages. As a result, some 
countries are in favourable bargaining positions, and may be able to extract some meaningful 
concessions in order to shape investors’ strategic decisions in their favour. In countries with weak 
bargaining positions, stringent investment rules are likely to be rejected by MNCs, and are more 
likely to have perverse effects such as discouraging efficient scale or appropriate use of 
technology. Indeed, the patchy evidence on IPRs (UNCTAD, 2001a; 2003a) suggests that their 
effects are mixed, and depend upon numerous factors including “the clarity of objectives, the 
capability of the governments to implement various policies, absorptive capacity in terms of skills 
of the workforce and strength of domestic enterprises, and the extent to which the measures are 
compatible with other industrial and trade policies” (UNCTAD, 2003a: 33). In addition, “the ability 
of a country to use certain requirements depends on its economic importance, mainly in terms of 
market size” (ibid.). Ultimately, countries often face a delicate balancing act in weighing the 
potential benefits that can be attained from the imposition of performance requirements against 
the risk of deterring FDI, or of reducing the quality of the FDI that is attracted” (ibid.: 34).  
2.5.3.2 LCRs and assembler-supplier linkages 
When MNCs operate within fragmented production processes that characteristic most 
manufacturing activities, their efficiency depends partly upon the competitiveness of local supply 
networks. Following UNCTAD (2001c: 133) there are three options for sourcing intermediate 
goods: importation, in-house production, or local sourcing. Linkages arise when independent 
firms interact with one another in a specific way: they go “beyond arm’s length, one-off relations 
and involve longer term relations between firms” (ibid.: 127). Because they involve the transfer 
and diffusion of technology, they are one of the main channels through which local economies 
benefit from FDI; vertically linked firms often need to coordinate their activities through the 
continuous mutual exchange of information (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2005: 1326). Although foreign 
assemblers may prefer local sourcing for logistical reasons, they are only likely to engage in 
technical assistance “when it can be expected to yield a return within a reasonable time… even 
when domestic suppliers are contracted, they are not necessarily given technical assistance” 
(ibid.: 1327). The benefits of investing in linkages with local firms are often so clear that no 
government intervention is required. However, in the presence of the technological market 
failures described above, 
markets may fail to create efficient linkages, raising the cost to both parties of entering into 
long-term supply relationships and reducing the ability of domestic firms to become 
competitive suppliers. Failures can arise at several levels. TNCs may be unaware of potential 
suppliers, or may find it too costly to locate or deal with them. They may be reluctant to 
invest in building local capabilities because the benefits leak out to other buyers. Local 
capabilities may be too far below the levels needed to make it feasible for TNCs to invest in 




In addition, in the presence of imperfectly competitive markets, foreign firm can exercise 
monopsonistic power over local suppliers, driving down prices and resulting in suboptimal output 
levels (UNCTC, 1991: 37). For strategic reasons, MNCs may be reluctant to transfer proprietary 
technology to local firms or may want to exploit existing sourcing networks (i.e. those in their 
home region) more fully, thus deliberately overlooking and indeed restricting local opportunities 
for intermediate production – even when local firms could, in principle, achieve the requisite 
levels of price and quality. FDI-led development has, for these reasons, often resulted in 
‘enclaves’ exhibiting high import propensities and generating few linkages with upstream local 
firms (Wade, 2010). 
The framework developed above alerts us to potential divergence between socially- and privately-
optimal levels of intermediate production and extensiveness of linkages in the context of FDI. The 
framework thus justifies, in principle, the imposition of LCRs to overcome this divergence. To the 
extent that LCRs overcome coordination failures in the establishment of linkages and promote the 
arrangement of more efficient local supply networks, they may represent a low marginal cost to 
the assembler in the short terms, and in the long term, may give rise to marginal benefits. This 
depends ultimately on the capabilities of local firms and within the wider economy. Of course, as 
suggested above, LCRs “do not, by themselves, result in backward linkages, because learning 
requires domestic firms with the appropriate skills to internalize them, and the conditions which 
make this necessary” (Narula and Dunning, 2000: 161).  
2.5.3.3 Ambiguous effects of LCRs on FDI-led development 
By construction, LCRs raise costs for MNCs engaged in assembly operations, at least in the short 
term. If LCRs serve to protect costly intermediate firms with no prospect that they will become 
internationally competitive, then they impose a heavy and permanent cost on assemblers. Again, 
it may be that rents from the protected market still enable profitable assembly operations, but 
these will be oriented mainly towards domestic demand, and MNCs will only engage in linkages 
with local firms to the extent required in order to fulfil the LCR. As a result, suppliers – operating 
at far below global standards of price and quality – are unlikely to become integrated into global 
supply networks.  
On the other hand, to the extent that LCRs overcome coordination failures in the establishment of 
linkages and promote the arrangement of more efficient local supply networks, they may 
represent a low marginal cost to the assembler in the short terms, and in the long term, may give 
rise to marginal benefits. This depends ultimately on the capabilities of local firms and within the 
wider economy, and also the nature of other locational advantages; even if the LCR is costly to the 
assembler, this disincentive may be mitigated by access to a (potentially) large market, which 
ceteris paribus will permit greater scale and more efficient production to be achieved in both the 
assembly and supply sectors – therefore implying that profits will be higher in both sectors – and 
will encourage MNCs to integrate production into their wider networks. In such a scenario, 
assemblers are more likely to transfer competent suppliers with appropriate technology.   
At the same time, LCRs enhance location-specific advantages for the attraction of market-seeking 
FDI in the intermediate sector. This potentially important point has been neglected in much of the 
literature; LCRs are considered as a tool to extract concessions from mobile foreign assemblers, 
the technological assets of which may diffuse to local suppliers. This scenario may approximate 
the circumstances in which LCRs were initially implemented in the automotive sector, but 
increasingly appears outdated; global suppliers operate with similar levels of scale, geographical 
reach, and technological assets, as I describe in chapter 3. As a result of these changes in the 
35 
 
‘governance’ of automotive value chains, assemblers are not the only means through which 
developing countries can access advanced technology and thus promote the efficiency of their 
supply industries. To the extent that countries may have serious difficulties attracting FDI in the 
absence of protection, LCRs may help to overcome the costs and uncertainties of the 
establishment of foreign subsidiaries in the intermediate sector. 
Thus, the elimination of LCRs has restricted two important mechanisms of FDI-led development: 
LCRs as a form of direct protection used to attract multinational market-seeking investment in the 
supply sector; and LCRs as a means with which to extract concessions from MNCs in the assembly 
sector, in conjunction with other incentives.  
Ramamurti (2001) argues that the multilateral liberalisation of TRIMs has reduced states’ 
bargaining power vis-à-vis foreign capital by constraining the scope of ‘micro’ negotiations 
between the state and individual firms. The distributional effect of this phenomenon is inherently 
ambiguous, although it is likely to be experienced asymmetrically across countries with different 
locational advantages. In the first place, more advantageous locations are less likely to exhibit the 
types of market failures that require correction in the first place. Secondly, they are more likely to 
thrive in the more liberal environment, since both market- and efficiency-seeking FDI may be 
diverted from less advantageous locations. The ability to confer artificial (policy) rents is being 
eroded as a source of bargaining strength while advantages based on market size and production 
costs are becoming more important, with “far-reaching consequences, particularly for industries 
not yet able to compete in world markets” (Narula and Dunning, 2000: 159). 
On the other hand, countries with weak bargaining positions are less likely to be able to extract 
meaningful concessions from MNCs anyway; and in many cases, are likely to lack the state 
capacities to effectively design policies in order to overcome rent-seeking lobbies (see Benhassine 
and Raballand, 2009). From this perspective, multilateral restrictions are more beneficial to 
weaker countries, who are undoubtedly “on an unequal footing in playing the game of strategic 
trade” (UNCTC, 1991: 40). There is an apparent paradox: “in poor country contexts where 
interventions are probably needed most the conditions under which these can be implemented 
successfully are lacking… there is no way to say ex ante” how the costs and benefits of multilateral 
restrictions on LCRs balance out, in terms of their distribution across structurally diverse countries 
(Benhassine and Raballand, 2009: 306). 
2.6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, GAPS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS 
2.6.1 Overview of the existing literature 
The theoretical literature on the impacts of LCRs is mixed. In some instances, LCRs can be 
effective in correcting distortions arising from imperfectly competitive markets and external 
effects arising from technological learning and the establishment of linkages; in others, LCRs 
exacerbate distortions, reduce welfare, and lead to the perverse outcomes in which local 
intermediate production is lower than in the absence of the policies.  
Empirical evidence on the implementation of LCRs confirm that they have given rise to positive or 
negative effects, depending on the circumstances in which they have been implemented. The 
evidence suggests that market failures are pervasive in high-tech and productively-fragmented 
activities, but that industrial policies, including LCRs, are often unsuccessful. The contribution of 
specific structural conditions and policy design features to the effects of LCRs, how rarely these 
occur, and the likelihood that government intervention can improve matters, are all highly 
36 
 
contested. Short of a “micro-level, cost-benefit examination” of each and every intervention 
(UNCTAD, 2001a: 59), the impacts of LCRs, and thus the potential cost of their removal, appear 
inherently ambiguous. But this conclusion leaves an important substantive gap in the literature 
for the concerned public policy analyst: the implications of eliminating the flexibility of (especially 
developing) countries to implement such policies, and how the costs and benefits tend to vary in 
different circumstances, in relation to capabilities, advantages, and market structures that permit 
the improvement of outcomes in the presence of market failures. 
2.6.1.1 Market failures 
The desirability and effectiveness of LCRs are seen to depend upon the magnitude of market 
failures in terms of  
 imperfectly competitive markets (which provide a rationale for LCRs based on rent-shifting 
arguments); 
 costs and uncertainty associated with dynamic ‘learning-by-doing’ and increasing returns to 
scale in domestic firms and with multinational suppliers engaging in FDI in new locations 
(which provides a rationale for LCRs as temporary trade protection);  
 spillovers and coordination failures associated with technology transfer between assemblers 
and suppliers (which provides a basis for LCRs to encourage backwards linkages).  
In short, market failures of these types may lead to underinvestment and suboptimal output 
levels in the supply sector, the correction of which may result in welfare improvement, both 
domestically and globally. However, the extent to which LCRs correct or exacerbate market 
failures is highly variable, and depends upon a host of structural characteristics (capabilities and 
advantages) at the firm and country level, the manner in which the policy is designed and 
implemented, and its conjunction with wider policies and institutions.  
2.6.1.2 Static and dynamic effects on industrial performance 
In order to fully examination the mechanisms of causation, the static and dynamic (or short- and 
long-term) effects of LCRs on industrial performance must be distinguished. Turning to static 
effects first, for a given level of exogenously-determined demand and abstracting from the 
decisions of assemblers to produce in the domestic market, LCRs would be expected to increase 
production in the intermediate sector, whether via local firms or FDI. Local intermediates would 
displace a proportion of imports. The impact on export performance, and hence overall trade 
balance, would be ambiguous. On the one hand, suppliers would face greater incentives – via 
protective rents – to produce for the domestic market, and would tend to shift from exporting to 
import-substituting production. On the other hand, the increase in output could lead to greater 
utilisation of scale, increased productive efficiency, and higher export levels.  
Of course, there are good reasons to assume that LCRs would actually affect the level of demand 
for domestic inputs via effects on the assembly sector. Assembly firms required to purchase local 
content would bear an additional cost, and would be discouraged from domestic production and 
investment, although this cost could potentially be offset by rents by other incentives and 
strategic advantages associated with investment (WTO/UNCTAD, 2002: 24).  
However, even with these compensations, finished automotive products would be more 
expensive, reducing domestic demand and foreign exports. The impact of these demand-side 
considerations would be to reduce intermediate output, potentially leading to diseconomies of 
scale, reduced productive efficiency, and lower intermediate exports. As a result, even the static 
effects of LCRs on production, investment and trade are ambiguous, and depend upon the relative 
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elasticities of demand for intermediate and final goods, market structures in each sector, and the 
conjunction of LCRs with other conditions affecting the performance of the terminal sector.  
Turning to dynamic effects, in the familiar infant industry argument, protected firms may engage 
in ‘learning by doing’ – essentially benefitting from a series of dynamic technical spillovers. Under 
such conditions, LCRs should encourage upgrading and capability development; over the course of 
the policy’s implementation, firms should travel down their long term cost curve, leading to an 
increase in output and a shift from import-substituting to export-oriented production. Rents 
arising from the protected market and increased revenue from foreign sales could be reinvested 
to further upgrade technology, diversify output, and reduce costs. In addition, other firms – both 
producing finished goods and parts and components – will be attracted to the location, further 
contributing to a virtuous process of positive feedback through the establishment of inter-firm 
linkages and generating technological and labour market spillovers. Faced with LCRs, assemblers 
may be more inclined to transfer technology, in order to upgrade local firms’ or subsidiaries’ 
production systems and thus reduce their own supply costs. 
A more pessimistic picture of the dynamic impacts of LCRs can also be envisaged. In the negative 
scenario, firms engage in rent-seeking behaviour, devoting themselves wholly to supplying the 
protected market; shielded from foreign competition, they fail to make sufficient investments in 
technology or achieve the requisite scale to become internationally competitive. Therefore, if 
“the costs of local production of components remain high behind the protection of the LCR, the 
risk is that the entire domestic industry, including the production of finished goods, will remain 
uncompetitive” (WTO/UNCTAD, 2002: 22). Assembly firms may leave the industry, and domestic 
demand will drop due to prohibitive costs. LCRs may discourage transfer technology, or may 
encourage the transfer of suboptimal technology, due to the small scale of the market that 
suppliers serve. The result is a vicious circle of technological retardation, sub-scale production, 
increased pressure from import competition, and reduced export levels.  
As such, as observed by WTO/UNCTAD (2002), dynamic effects of LCRs are “more speculative”, 
because they depend upon the nature and magnitude of market failures in technological 
capabilities, as well as the strategic decisions of MNCs with respect to production and sourcing, 
which are characterised by stickiness, imperfect information and substantial costs. Both of these 
determinants – market failures and firm strategies – are critically related to the concepts of 
capabilities and advantages, which vary at the country and firm levels, and provide an explanatory 
framework for interpreting the likely implications of the elimination of LCRs.  
2.6.2 Conceptual and theoretical framework: the impacts of LCRs in the presence of cumulative 
and conjunctive causation 
The framework developed in the course of this chapter suggests that LCRs should be 
implemented only in specific circumstances: in the presence of imperfectly competitive market 
structures, in which assemblers accrue oligopoly rents, and when market failures prevent the 
emergence of competitive suppliers. Furthermore, the effectiveness of LCRs will depend upon 
capabilities and advantages of local firms and in the wider economy; if technological capabilities 
are strong, and the prospects for demand are good, then MNCs will be less reluctant to transfer 
technology and local firms will be more capable of rapidly moving up learning curves to produce 
intermediate goods more efficiently, thus giving rise to virtuous circles of cumulative causation. 
The conceptual and theoretical framework underlying my approach is depicted in figure 2-1, 
below.  
In the conceptual and theoretical framework developed here, I have identified three main factors 
in conjunction with which the effects of the implementation and elimination of LCRs on industrial 
performance outcomes are determined. These factors, and their influence on industrial 
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performance outcomes, are summarised below. In combination, these factors determine whether 
the context for the implementation of LCRs is advantageous or disadvantageous, and thus how 
the causal mechanisms of firm-level responses to the local content regime inform industrial 
performance outcomes. The framework shows the mechanisms through which the 
implementation of LCRs may give rise to virtuous or vicious cycles of causation.  
2.6.2.1 National capabilities 
Capabilities are crucial for technological learning as well as absorption of foreign technology. 
Obviously, domestic firm-level intermediate sector capabilities are likely to be deficient almost by 
definition, since otherwise LCRs would be redundant. If they are too distant from the 
technological frontier, then assemblers – on which the domestic firms may be reliant for 
technology – will be neither willing nor able to assist them to achieve productive efficiency. 
Furthermore, assuming that global suppliers can respond to the rents afforded by LCRs to 
establish local production facilities, they would still require the presence of complementary skills 
and resources in the wider economy. Therefore if national capabilities – i.e. skilled labour, 
technological institutions and infrastructure – are also deficient, neither domestic nor foreign 
intermediate firms would be able to achieve efficient production runs, regardless of protective 
rents. Just as importantly, multinational assemblers might be reluctant to establish full-scale and 
technologically up-to-date plants unless they were able to produce vehicles of the requisite price 
and quality demanded to achieve international competitiveness. Instead, both assemblers and 
suppliers would reorient their strategies towards maximising their rents in the protected domestic 
market. The strong presence of capabilities, on the other hand, increases the returns and reduces 
the costs of learning, technological absorption, and technology transfer. As a result, LCRs are likely 
to be effective in instances where there are ‘latent’ capabilities close to those prevailing in 
globally-competitive firms which are prevented from emerging due to market failures, and thus 
when capabilities can feasibly be acquired within a reasonable timescale and at reasonable cost. 
2.6.2.2 National market size  
In addition, if the stringent scale requirements in the sector are ignored, LCRs are unlikely to lead 
to the emergence of a competitive supply sector, but instead, exacerbate inefficiency. Another 
major determinant of whether effects are positive or negative, and whether efficient 
intermediate production can emerge, therefore, relates to scale – especially to the extent that 
technological capabilities are subject to market failures exacerbated by internal and external 
economies of scale. The attainment of efficient levels of scale may be feasible if suppliers are able 
to orient towards export markets, as mentioned above. However, domestic market size is very 
likely to be an important determinant of the scale of plants. For a start, transport and logistical 
costs provide some ‘natural’ protection for domestic production. Furthermore, in many cases in 
which LCRs are applicable, domestic production of the final good itself will be motivated by access 
to a protected domestic market.  
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Since demand for intermediates is derived from final good demand, larger volumes of final good 
production permit more efficient realisation of scale economies. The smaller the market, the 
greater the cost penalties for suboptimal levels of scale, and the more assemblers have to be 
compensated via protection and subsidisation to ensure that domestic production remains 
feasible. Of course, if markets were sufficiently large to permit efficient levels of scale, the need 
for protection would largely disappear. As with technological capabilities, the market size 
commensurate with the effective use of LCRs is such that some protection is required to 
overcome market failures and make domestic production (more) feasible in the short term, but 
with sufficient potential for growth that efficient levels of scale may be achieved fairly quickly, in 
line with dynamic learning processes within and between firms.  
2.6.2.3 Policies and institutions 
As noted above, LCRs are but one policy affecting the operational decisions of firms; the impact of 
LCRs is likely to be codetermined by how the combine with other policies and institutions that 
affect the profitability of different operational decisions. It is difficult to know, based on the 
limited evidence available, precisely which policies should be introduced alongside LCRs in order 
to maximise their beneficial effects; in any case, this is likely to vary with the context in which 
interventions are taking place, such as the nature of market failures and governance structures in 
specific sectors, and the latent capabilities and advantages in the wider economy. Nevertheless, 
one cannot avoid the conclusion that if the wider policy and institutional regime is heavily and 
permanently biased against export-oriented production and/or foreign investment – and does not 
adequately incentivise technological capability development through a competitive environment 
– then LCRs are likely to interact with these conditions perversely. On the other hand, if LCRs are 
introduced as part of a broader drive to achieve upgrading within a process of sequenced trade 
protection in which local and foreign firms are encouraged to integrate in wider global networks 
of production then arguably, they are more likely to be effective.   
2.6.2.4 Causal mechanisms  
The causal mechanisms through which capabilities and advantages interact to determine 
industrial performance outcomes are the strategic decisions of MNC lead firms, MNC parts 
suppliers, and local firms. These mechanisms include decisions pertaining to the economic 
geography of production, trade and investment, such as on: 
 the location of investments (including acquisitions of and mergers with local firms); 
 the transfer and licensing of technology; 
 the nature of activities or tasks (e.g. marketing, manufacture, research and development);  
 whether to produce for the domestic or export market; and 
 intra-firm trade and sourcing of inputs. 
The distribution of advantages within and between MNCs and states forms the context under 
which such decisions are made, the extent to which states can extract concessions without 
deterring investors, and the extent to which trade protection and investment restrictions give rise 
to virtuous or vicious cycles of industrial development.  
2.6.3 A gap for empirical research into the impacts of the elimination of LCRs on industrial 
performance outcomes 
As a result of the complex determinants of the effects of the use of LCRs, and how they pertain to 
countries with different capabilities and advantages, the effects of eliminating LCRs are similarly 
ambiguous. So far, I have examined the effects of the prohibition of LCRs indirectly, by 
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investigating literature on the observed effects of their implementation and the theoretical 
determinants of their effectiveness, under the assumption that prohibition proscribes those 
impacts, whether positive or negative. Apart from the fact that the theoretical and empirical 
record are ambiguous, as summarised above, this strategy does not permit investigation of the 
process of liberalisation itself. In this context, one of the crucial determinants of the impact is the 
extent to which the countries (and firms) involved were prepared for adjustment to a more liberal 
environment, and thus the sequencing of liberalisation with respect to their advantages and 
capabilities. Nor does my the analysis based on the existing literature allow for the multilateral 
nature of the restriction, to the extent that liberalising countries have simultaneously been 
exposed to reciprocal liberalisation in trade competitors.  
I have thus identified a gap for applied empirical work into the causal effects of the elimination of 
LCRs on the countries that were compelled to remove them as a result of the exogenous 
restriction on policy space. In this regard, there are two potential sources of inequality arising 
from the elimination of LCRs, into which empirical examination are both warranted and feasible.  
There are two main ways which the elimination of LCRs affects countries: the effects of domestic 
liberalisation (i.e. elimination of LCRs in countries in which they are in force) and the effects of 
liberalisation abroad. There is the inequality arising from the nature of the rules, since some 
countries have had to eliminate LCRs as a result of the TRIMs Agreement while in others the 
prohibited instrument was not in force. Eliminating a potentially developmentally-useful policy, 
even if it may give rise to negative effects in some (or even most) circumstances, 
disproportionately constrains the policy space of countries which are most extensively affected by 
the types of market failures described above. On the other hand, if one accepts that such policies 
are more systematically misused in countries in which market failures are pervasive and in which 
capabilities and advantages are weakest, then de jure policy restriction may actually expand 
development policy space. As a result, the nature and extent of the inequality between the two 
groups are ambiguous. Therefore, my preliminary enquiry relates to an examination of the 
presence, nature and extent of divergent impacts, over time and between these two groups. 
The second source of inequality relates to the divergent structural characteristics in the countries 
subject to policy space restrictions. Countries with existing capabilities and advantages at the time 
of liberalisation will be better placed to cope with the increased import competition, attract 
efficiency seeking FDI, and expand output and exports. Relatedly, the effects of the elimination of 
LCRs will be experienced asymmetrically by firms with diverse capabilities and advantages. 
Countries populated by firms in which capabilities are lacking may experience adverse effects as 
measured by macro-level performance indicators, unless liberalisation is accompanied by rapid 
upgrading within local firms and/or inward investment by larger, more capable suppliers. The 
conceptual and theoretical framework developed in the course of the present and previous 
chapters suggests that one of the crucial determinants of the impact is the extent to which the 
countries (and firms) involved were prepared for adjustment to a more liberal environment, and 
thus the timing and sequencing of liberalisation with respect to their advantages and capabilities. 
In order to examine the nature of these divergent impacts, it is thus necessary to compare the 
effects of liberalisation across structurally-diverse countries within the group of countries that 
have been compelled to remove their LCRs. 
The ways in which the nature of these inequalities can be feasibly examined through empirical 
work, is the subject of the following chapters. First, I examine the empirical context in which LCRs 
have been most prominently used: the automotive parts and components sector.  
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As I have argued, the precise nature of the effect of LCRs and their elimination will depend upon 
the technological and logistical characteristics of productive processes, and the extent to which 
technology transfer is feasible and desirable, which vary according to the sector in which LCRs are 
targeted. In this context, the global value chain (GVC) approach contributes an important 
analytical framework for analysing the effects of the elimination of LCRs empirically, by analysing 
the organisational structures of multi-stage production systems and the phenomenon of 
productive fragmentation, and their implications for industrial development outcomes. This is the 




3 EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF LCRS IN THE GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE 
VALUE CHAIN  
3.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In the previous chapter, I examined the literature surrounding the purpose and implications of 
LCRs generically. I argued that the effects of LCRs would depend on the nature of technological 
accumulation and linkages, which, I suggested, varied with the structural characteristics of 
individual countries, including the capabilities, advantages and wider policies and institutions 
affecting production and consumption, as well as the idiosyncratic, ‘techno-economic’ features 
and market structures of specific sectors which determine the nature of linkages and distribution 
of capabilities and advantages among firms in the intermediate and terminal sectors.  
In terms of the prohibition of LCRs, I hypothesised that effects on individual countries would 
depend upon whether exogenous rules restrictions required LCRs to be eliminated or not, as well 
as the aforementioned factors. The conceptual and theoretical framework adopted explicitly 
incorporates complex (conjunctive and cumulative) processes of causation, such that the effects 
of liberalisation are codetermined by the timing and sequencing of the policy change with respect 
to the accumulation of capabilities and the establishment of linkages arising in the period of 
protection.  
As I have already acknowledged, the precise nature of these dynamics are likely to be highly 
specific to individual sectors. In a review of the evidence for investment performance 
requirements, UNCTAD (2001a: 59) acknowledge that existing empirical analysis is limited 
because measures are “are applied in different industries, where their influence varies greatly”. In 
such a context, comparing the effects of the elimination of LCRs in more than one sector is like 
comparing apples and oranges. However, as LCRs were used overwhelmingly in the automotive 
sector to support domestic intermediate goods producers, and because it is possible to identify 
instances in which this is the case, I am able to isolate the impact of the elimination of LCRs on 
performance outcomes in this narrow subsector, in which there are (relatively) few confounding 
factors, compared to the determinants of industrial performance more broadly or across multiple 
sectors. Therefore, the empirical setting13 in which I examine the effects of the elimination of LCRs 
is the automotive sector, with my operationalisation of performance outcomes restricted to the 
parts and components subsector.   
The present chapter therefore applies my generic conceptual and theoretical framework to the 
concrete circumstances of the automotive parts and components sector, in which LCRs have been 
historically pervasive. The chapter has two important functions in the thesis, empirical and 
analytical. Empirically, the chapter serves to summarise the insights of existing secondary 
literature on the role of the state in shaping the development of the automotive sector, especially 
in emerging markets, and with a particular focus on the role of LCRs in promoting the emergence 
of domestic supply sectors. Since the existing literature does not settle the important questions I 
                                                          
13
 The process of identifying an appropriate empirical setting is analogous to case study selection as 
described in some of the methodological literature (e.g. Rohlfing, 2012), but I avoid this term to avoid 
confusion with subsequent discussion of variable- and case-oriented research, in which I position countries 
as cases. Another way of looking at this is in terms of different stages of empirical analysis – panel 
regression and country case studies – ‘nested’ within an overarching case study of the prohibition and 
elimination of LCRs in the global automotive sector. 
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have set out to address, partly due to methodological difficulties, the chapter also serves as a 
basis for the operationalisation of the conceptual and theoretical framework that pertains to the 
subsequent empirical analysis.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I summarise the key features of the global 
value chain approach. In section 3.3, I provide an overview of the factors driving automotive parts 
and components sectoral development in different locations and highlight the key features of 
automotive governance structures. In section 3.4 I provide an historical overview of the 
ascendancy of the core ‘triad’ regions of production, and the geographic spread of production to 
emerging regions. Section 3.5 assess the effects of automotive trade policies generally, and of 
LCRs specifically, arguing that they have ultimately been mixed. I conclude that there is an 
opportunity for systematic, cross-national research into the elimination of LCRs, provided that it is 
possible to operationalise factors affecting the economic geography of production, trade and 
investment of the parts and components sector, both independently and in conjunction with 
LCRs. In section 3.5.4, I identify the countries for which the TRIMs agreement has necessitated the 
elimination of LCRs previously applied in the automotive sector. Section 3.6 provides an overview 
of capabilities, advantages, and policies and institutions, as well as the evolving features of 
automotive governance, that codetermine industrial performance outcomes at the country level. 
3.2 THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN APPROACH 
Before turning to the specificity of the automotive sector and the determinants of national parts 
and components performance outcomes, I briefly outline the core concepts of the GVC approach 
in a generic manner.  
3.2.1 Governance and the role of lead firms 
The most important concept is governance, which describes the nature of linkages between 
different stages in a value chain. Governance has characteristics relating to organisation of 
linkages between different activities, the distribution of ownership-specific advantages, market 
power and rents across firms, and the geographical location of activities, all of which are 
interrelated. Although I am essentially concerned with performance in different geographical 
locations (in relation to the use and elimination of LCRs), these characteristics are all relevant to 
the extent that they affect the feasibility of supply, the relative advantages of local and 
multinational firms, and the manner in which suppliers are integrated into wider production 
systems, across different localities.  
Organisationally, governance is concerned by how the activities that comprise the value chain are 
linked – whether they are carried out by different firms or internalised vertically, and the nature 
of the linkages between firms and subsidiaries in terms of how activities are coordinated. These 
organisational characteristics are related to the distribution of capabilities and advantages across 
different actors within the value chain. A main concern of the GVC approach is how governance 
structures reflect asymmetries in firms’ capacities to accrue value within different functions: 
‘rents’ accrue at different stages of the chain, when there are high barriers to entry as a result of 
capability requirement or “whenever non-competitive structures emerge and the balance of 
power is unevenly distributed among actors” (Pietrobelli, 2007: 10). The approach is thus 
congruent with the technological capability approach, which usually implicitly adopted as the 
conceptual and theoretical basis of GVC analysis (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Humphrey, 2004; 
Gereffi et al., 2005; Pietrobelli, 2007).   
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Thus, ownership-specific advantages – in terms of capabilities and market power – determine the 
extent to which firms are able to exclude other actors from valuable activities and coordinate 
governance structures in order to maximise their own share of total rents. Those in a dominant 
position are termed ‘lead’ firms, in the sense that they coordinate the activities of subordinate 
upstream and/or downstream firms.  According to Sturgeon’s (2001: 11) definition, lead firms are 
distinguished by their initiation of the “flow of resources and information through the value chain 
by developing and marketing final products” and suppliers are “connected to those activities that 
arise as a response to the impetus of lead firms” (ibid.).  
The GVC approach has thus illuminated the numerous ways in which lead firms are able to 
coordinate supply through different modes of governance, ranging from ‘arms-length’ 
relationships with independent firms, via contractual and cooperative relationships with 
independent firms and joint ventures, to fully ‘in-house’ production. In his early formulations, 
Gereffi (1999) distinguished buyer-driven sectors such as apparel – in which lead firms acquired 
advantages in design, marketing, branding and sales, but outsourced labour intensive and low-
value productive activities – and producer-driven sectors such as automotives, in which lead firms 
established advantages through barriers to entry into productive activities arising from the 
sophistication of proprietary technology and the exploitation of scale economies. The extent to 
which suppliers are able to capture rents within the value chain depends on their capabilities and 
advantages in relation to those of lead firms; their relationships with lead firms can be 
distinguished based on the nature of power asymmetries and have been labelled as hierarchical, 
captive, relational, modular, and market forms of governance (Gereffi et al., 2005). Besides the 
distribution of advantages between lead firms and suppliers, the organisational features of 
governance depend upon the idiosyncratic features of the value chain, in terms of the complexity 
of technology and the extent to which it may be codified (ibid.), and risks involved with the 
dissipation of technological advantages.  
3.2.2 Location-specific determinants of the economic geography of production, trade and 
investment 
Geographically, activities are distributed according to the interplay of location-specific economic, 
technical and logistical (market) factors on the one hand and policy, institutional and political 
(non-market) factors on the other. As such, the GVC approach is congruent with historical 
institutionalist approach to causal explanation, discussed in the following chapter as I consider my 
methodological options, to the extent that “institutions – labor unions, industry associations, legal 
and cultural norms, industry specific standards and conventions, etc. – matter. The rules set by 
states and multilateral organizations matter” (Sturgeon et al., 2008: 298). Furthermore, the 
processes of cumulative causation and positive feedback, and an understanding of the ways in 
which history shapes future configurations of industrial structures, feature heavily in the GVC 
approach: “events are almost always, to some degree, constrained by path dependence and 
determined by feedback loops of both the positive and negative kind” (ibid.). 
The geographic nature of linkages in multi-stage industries is characterised by two (apparently) 
conflicting market forces: clustering (i.e. exploitation of agglomeration economies in single 
locations) and fragmentation (i.e. task-based specialisation enabling exploitation of differential 
relative cost structures in different locations) (WTO, 2008) which vary by location as well as by 
activity. Factors that drive clustering include significant transport and logistical costs, the presence 
of specialised labour markets and the pertinence of exchanges of tacit knowledge linking different 
stages of production (Sturgeon et al., 2009: 299). To the extent that these factors are prevalent, 
they suggest that suppliers will be located in close proximity to assemblers (and by extension, to 
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sources of demand). On the other hand, fragmentation is driven by “new transport and 
communication technologies that cut the costs of international integration” and facilitated by 
trade and investment liberalisation (Lall et al., 2004: 3). Fragmentation permits intermediate 
production to be carried out in the most advantageous locations, for example in relation to lower 
labour costs or existing capabilities, and the actualisation of internal scale economies, rather than 
in close proximity to firms engaged in upstream and downstream activities. The feasibility of 
intermediate fragmentation depends, inter alia, upon the extent to which technological 
specifications and other communications may be codified and transferred to distant locations, 
and the value to weight ratio of the product in question.  
The opportunities for agglomeration and geographical fragmentation depend upon conditions of 
supply and demand in specific locations – what I have termed location-specific advantages – as 
well as non-market factors. To the extent that agglomeration economies are prevalent, there will 
be a tendency for suppliers to locate close to assemblers; a critically important advantage in 
relation to supply performance, therefore, is terminal sector production (and by extension, 
determinants thereof, including domestic and regional demand and policies and institutions that 
provide incentives for assemblers to serve local markets through FDI). At the same time, to the 
extent that fragmentation is feasible, there will be a tendency for suppliers to locate in the most 
cost-effective locations; the most critically important advantage in this regard is the existence of 
industrial or productive capabilities (and determinants thereof), which allow firms to reap internal 
economies of scale and supply multiple locations at distance. Of course, to the extent that the 
two sets of advantages reinforce one another, the emergence of integrated domestic market- and 
export-oriented production hubs is feasible; indeed, a number of emerging markets are attractive 
precisely because they offer the combination of rapid demand growth and lower operating costs. 
Furthermore, as Sturgeon et al. (2009: 302) observe, “local and distant linkages are not mutually 
exclusive, but part of a nested and increasingly integrated spatial economy that involves cohesion 
at all spatial scales, local, national, continental and global”.  
This statement connects profoundly to the ‘nested’ nature of automotive value chain governance, 
as I describe in section 3.6 below, which has also arisen in response to non-market determinants. 
Besides emphasising policies at the national level (of which tariffs on final goods and LCRs are 
prevalent examples), policy and institutional factors also pertain at the sub-national and regional 
(supra-national) levels. Thus, the GVC approach provides a nuanced account of contemporary 
industrial development by situating the overarching processes of globalisation and the strategies 
of lead firms and suppliers within local and regional specificities.  
3.3 DYNAMICS AND DRIVERS OF AUTOMOTIVE PARTS AND COMPONENTS PERFORMANCE: THE 
AUTOMOTIVE VALUE CHAIN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Factors ‘driving’ the process of automotive industrialisation in developing countries can be 
characterised in a number of ways; I borrow from Humphrey et al. (2000) and Wad (2009). 
Humphrey et al. (2000: 13) identify three main sets of factors: the strategies of the leading 
automotive companies, policies adopted by governments, and the specific features of demand 
and production in emerging markets. Wad (2009: 175) suggests a similar set of explanatory 
factors – strategies of lead firms and suppliers, automotive policy regimes, and the “overall 
political economy” – emphasising their complex and ‘multileveled’ interaction.  
Combining these schemes with the generic framework outlined in chapter 2, it is apparent there 
are three main areas of locational advantage at the country level which affect automotive sector 
development in emerging markets: market size, growth and potential; industrial (and/or 
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technological) capabilities; and the policy and institutional environment. In addition and relating 
to these factors are the idiosyncratic features of value chain governance and market structures, 
and the capabilities and advantages of assemblers and suppliers, both local and multinational.  
3.3.1 Governance features of the automotive value chain 
The automotive sector governance has traditionally been characterised by a tiered system in 
which producers of finished vehicles – variously termed ‘assemblers’, ‘automakers’, or ‘original 
equipment manufacturers’ (OEMs) – act as ‘lead firms’ and use their market power and 
proprietary technology to coordinate the activities of subordinate parts and components 
suppliers. OEMs have established complex networks of supply, incorporating in-house production 
through subsidiaries and various forms of joint venture with independent capital, relationships 
with independent suppliers forged in their home country or region, and independent local 
suppliers in the host countries in which they operate.  
Independent suppliers, which are typically referred to as belonging to first, second or lower tiers 
based on the nature of their relationship to the assemblers and their degree of technological 
competence, “have historically provided parts and sub-assemblies according to the design 
specifications spelled out by the OEM” (Sturgeon, 2001: 11). The starting point for our analysis, 
therefore, is that parts and components production has historically emerged as a subordinate 
activity that has been controlled by vehicle manufacturers in their role as lead firms. Performance 
of the parts and components subsector in developing countries is intimately linked to the manner 
in which supply firms are positioned in fragmented production processes and wider (regional and 
global) strategies of lead firms14 based in the triad regions (North America, Europe and Japan).  
As discussed below, more competent independent suppliers are assuming greater levels of 
responsibility and engaging in more advanced and valuable activities.  Indeed, the entire 
automotive value chain is in the midst of profound change. Global competition, technological 
change and trade and investment liberalisation have driven consolidation in both the terminal 
and supply sectors, threatening less capable firms. At the same time, emerging markets have 
become vastly more significant, strategically speaking, to lead firms and suppliers alike. The most 
capable suppliers have established a global presence, following assemblers to rapidly growing 
emerging markets, and outsourcing aspects of production to areas with lower operating costs. 
I will argue that the impact of these trends, in conjunction with the elimination of LCRs, is both to 
exacerbate threats and enhance opportunities for the establishment of competitive parts and 
                                                          
14
 The types of governance that have emerged have had firm-specific characteristics (Veloso and Kumar, 
2002) as well as varying with the region of the lead firm’s origin (Wad, 2008), and changing over time. These 
governance structures have reflected the historical conditions in which lead firms have sought to capture 
value. Specifically, US firms have historically integrated supply systems in hierarchical and market-based 
governance systems in order to exploit their market power as buyers of parts and components in arms-
length relationships, while maintaining the most important and technologically sophisticated aspects of 
production in house. European automakers, which emerged in the conditions of smaller, nationally 
fragmented markets, have similarly exercised tight control over suppliers but have also engaged in more 
relational, horizontal forms of governance in which suppliers have developed their own, independent 
capabilities and serve numerous customers; this has enabled greater economies of scale in production than 
if suppliers served individual OEMs. Finally, Japanese firms have engaged in more cooperative and long-
term relationships with suppliers (ibid.: 55-56). The difference between Japanese and Western governance 
structures, in terms of “the form and practice of relationships” has historically been the most significant 
(Maxton and Wormald, 1998: 97). Regardless of the specific governance structures, it is undoubtedly the 
case that “their huge purchasing power means that each lead firm can force suppliers to accommodate its 
idiosyncratic standards, information systems, and business practices” (Sturgeon et al., 2008: 308). 
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components industries depending upon structural characteristics – capabilities and advantages – 
at the national level. However, the precise nature of the impact of the elimination of LCRs 
requires systematic, cross-national comparison controlling for the myriad determinants of the 
economic geography of production, trade and investment in the parts and components sector.   
3.3.1.1 Economic and technical determinants of automotive value chain governance structures 
One of the distinctive features of the automotive sector is “its extremely concentrated firm 
structure: a small number of giant companies exert an extraordinary amount of power over 
smaller firms” (Sturgeon et al., 2009: 9). The high degree of concentration is unsurprising given 
the economies of scale that characterise production in the industry. Husan (1997) documents the 
sources of scale economies and estimates the magnitude of cost penalties incurred when 
operating below ‘minimum efficient scale’. For assembly, empirical estimates of minimum 
efficient levels of scale range from around 100,000 to 300,000 units per annum; in combination 
with the scale requirements for steel forging, pressing and powertrain manufacture (i.e. 
manufacture of the largest, most important components), which are retained in-house, only a 
small number of firms achieve minimum efficient scales (in 1997, Ford and GM in the US, Toyota 
and Nissan in Japan, and VW, Fiat and PSA in Europe). The author suggests that minimum efficient 
scales are likely to have increased over time as production processes become more capital and 
technology intensive. The cost penalties that arise from sub-scale production are high; for 
example, operating at 10% of the minimum efficient scale incurs a penalty estimated at around 
35% (ibid.: 41).  
As previously discussed, the economic geography of governance structures is characterised by 
tendencies towards agglomeration and fragmentation. Logistical and transport costs have always 
provided strong techno-economic incentives for production near to sources of demand, to 
upstream and downstream firms within fragmented production processes, and to complementary 
inputs in the production process, which include capabilities in local firms and in the wider 
economy. For this reason, even in the absence of trade and industrial policies such as tariffs on 
finished vehicles and LCRs, manufacturers may still face incentives to assemble complete vehicles 
close to their final markets and incorporate a high proportion of local content, especially of larger 
parts15. Coupled with the phenomenon of scale and agglomeration economies, this “reinforces 
the disadvantage experienced by relatively small manufacturers in ‘low-demand, low-output 
regions” (Husan, 1997). In addition, there are external or agglomeration economies that emerge 
from the close proximity of different stages of production, that permit more efficient linkages to 
be formed through the provision of direct technical assistance to address quality issues and the 
synchronisation of assemblers’ and suppliers’ production schedules (Humphrey and Salerno, 
2000: 158-9). Local sourcing thus “allow for closer monitoring and give a larger flexibility in 
changing specifications and developing new inputs” (Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2005: 1327).  
At the same time, this tendency for suppliers to cluster in close proximity to assembly plants will 
be diminished in the case of parts with high value to weight ratios, such as electronic 
components, to the extent that alternative locations provide opportunities to reduce unit 
                                                          
15
 Whether parts can be feasibly imported, or whether they must be produced close to the point of 
assembly, depends on their logistical features as well as their technological and scale requirements in 
comparison to local capabilities. According to Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck (2011), “bulky, heavy, and 
model-specific parts-production [is located] close to final assembly plants to assure timely delivery (for 
example, engines, transmission, seats and other interior parts), and lighter, more generic parts [are] 
produced at a distance to take advantage of scale economies and low labour costs (for example, tyres, 
batteries, wire harnesses)”. 
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production costs – for example as a result of superior productive capabilities or cheaper labour – 
and attain greater scale by orienting production towards external markets. Trends towards 
productive fragmentation are enhanced by falling transport costs, technological advances that 
allow linkages to be coordinated at distance, and trade liberalisation.   
Of course, vehicles are typically composed of thousands of parts and components, each with 
varying degrees of technological complexity and efficient levels of productive scale. Some of these 
activities are fairly unsophisticated, with low barriers to entry and low value added and others 
may be more limited in terms of the requirements for efficient levels of scale. As Doner (1991: 
224-225) reports, 
The technological and financial requirements for local entry into and/or control of assembly 
activities are significantly greater than those for parts production… Breaking into assembly 
often mean entering at the top floor. By contrast, local firms can begin the manufacture of 
auto parts and components requiring less capital and advanced technology. 
Thus, the features of the automotive sector may provide an opportunity for smaller firms to 
engage in production of parts and components in which scale and capability requirements are less 
stringent. Indeed, this is the rationale for the use of LCRs to overcome market failures that 
prevent the emergence of competitive suppliers where such is feasible; as WTO/UNCTAD (2002: 
20) notes, the automotive sector “uses a relatively large proportion of low technology 
components, offering the possibility even at an early stage of industrial development of extending 
the import substitution process backwards from finished products into various linkage activities 
geared towards the supply of components”. Of course, as discussed extensively in the preceding 
chapter, mandating a level of local content does not mean that suppliers will achieve efficient 
levels of production as a result. Ultimately, the effects of LCRs depend upon the location-specific 
characteristics that influence geographic patterns of production, trade and investment more 
generally.   
As Sturgeon and Lester (2004) observe, the locational determinants of automotive production 
have changed over time, and have included factors that are technical and economic, and policy, 
institutional and political factors. The main driver of offshore production, historically speaking, 
has been the prevalence of significant import barriers (including LCRs) at the national level that 
have forced firms headquartered in the US, Europe and Japan to establish assembly operations, 
and then later to establish local networks of supply, in each country in which they operate. In 
more recent years – from the 1980s onwards – the motivation to locate in proximity to dynamic 
sources of demand has been complemented by intensified pressure to reduce operating costs by 
locating in lower wage areas (Sturgeon and Florida, 2000: 12). It should also be noted that 
notwithstanding this motivation to relocate in lower wage countries, large multinational 
automotive firms operating in multiple location are able to engage in ‘divide and rule’ strategies 
vis-à-vis wage bargaining16. 
                                                          
16
 As discussed in section 2.5.3, it is commonly recognised that the transnational mobility of TNCs confers 
the latter with advantages in bargaining with governments with respect to taxes, subsidies and regulations, 
as discussed by Dicken (2003). Coffey and Tomlinson (2006) describe an analogous situation in which TNCs 
maintain advantages vis-à-vis labour, applying downward pressures on wages through the maintenance of 
multiple alternative locations of production. As with the strategic behaviour described in relation to the 
advantages conferred by transnationality, the threat of relocation thus mitigates against union activity and 
wage bargaining.     
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In summary, trends towards global liberalisation coupled with regional integration have led to the 
idiosyncratic ‘nested’ structure of the automotive sector, and the emergence of governance 
structures with strongly regional characteristics, alongside global-scale, national and local 
elements as well (Sturgeon et al., 2009: 7), as depicted in figure 3-1, below. The next sections 
provide an overview of the main factors driving the geographic expansion of the automotive 
sector and determining location-specific industrial performance outcomes, with a particular focus 
on trade policy and the role of LCRs.    
3.4 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE VALUE CHAIN 
3.4.1 The emergence of the ‘triad’ of leading automotive producing regions 
The global automotive sector is dominated by multinational firms originating in North America, 
Western Europe, and East Asia (Japan and Korea). Independent local firms and joint ventures are 
also present in emerging markets, but with some partial exceptions, their activities are largely 
confined to serving domestic markets. Because of the huge economies of scale and technological 
capability requirements present in the sector, value chain governance must be understood in the 
context of the advantages and strategies of the most powerful lead firms as they have sought to 
penetrate foreign markets, constrained by national and regional automotive policies.  
Figure 3-1: The ‘nested’ structure of the automotive value chain.  
 
Source: Sturgeon et al., 2009.  
In the initial stages of the industry, vehicles were expensive, custom-made and produced in small 
volumes. Production was most efficiently located near sources of demand and, on the supply side, 
firms required technically-skilled labour and specialised inputs; these conditions only existed in 
the US and Europe (Sturgeon and Florida, 2000: 21). The automotive sector was characterised by 
a large number of firms producing small volumes of vehicles. The development of mass 
production techniques, originally in the US, enabled car manufacturers to separate components 
production and assembly into a number of repetitive tasks, increase productivity, and produce far 
greater volumes of vehicles (Maxton and Wormald, 1998: 68). This consolidated market power in 
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the hands of a small number of firms due to economies of scale. As a result, the number of US 
firms declined from 88 in 1921 to 12 in 1941; by 1930 Ford, General Motors and Chrysler 
accounted for 90% of US production (Jenkins, 1987: 13). These conglomerates engaged in vertical 
integration of the entire value chain, from design, through all aspects of production, to sales and 
marketing. In the governance structure that emerged, “design control rested primarily with the 
vehicle manufacturer, who contracted for supply on an arms-length, competitive basis”, while 
maintaining the most valuable and sophisticated parts and components production in-house via 
the establishment of supply subsidiaries and acquisitions of independent parts and components 
firms (Maxton and Wormald, 1998: 96).  
The competitive advantage of the major US firms was viewed as a threat to European producers, 
leading to heavily protectionist trade policies that drastically reduced imports. This period also 
saw the first stages of international expansion of capital through FDI, which still characterises the 
automotive sector to this day: significant trade barriers coupled with high transport costs have 
ensured that local production by subsidiaries, rather than exports of vehicles, has been the most 
prevalent mode of market penetration. Ford and General Motors began to undertake significant 
investments, especially in Europe and Canada, which were the most significant markets outside of 
the US at that time, but they also established assembly plants in Latin America, South Africa, 
India, Malalysia, Australia and Japan ((Sturgeon and Florida, 2000: 24-25). In the pre-war period, it 
has been estimated that 80% of global production was either located in the US or pertained to US 
subsidiaries abroad (Jenkins, 1987: 16). 
The two American giants were the only automakers with significant foreign presence until after 
World War II, but in the coming years, European companies (in Britain, France, Germany and Italy) 
started to emulate the mass production techniques that were pioneered in the US, leading to a 
similar pattern of firm consolidation and the division of parts and components production 
between in-house and external suppliers. As mentioned in footnote 14 above, the smaller scale of 
the European producers led to a more horizontal form of governance in which suppliers attained 
greater economies of scale by serving multiple OEMs. At this stage, the main European markets 
sought to promote their own national champion firms – e.g. Morris, Renault, Volkswagen and Fiat 
respectively in Britain, France, Germany and Italy – as well as being host to US subsidiaries and 
joint ventures. From the late 1950s onwards, in line with the post-war economic resurgence, a 
number of larger European firms began to export and invest abroad, both in other European 
countries and in the Americas (Sturgeon and Florida, 2000: 31-32). US firms continued to 
penetrate the European market through capital expansion and local production, while the 
segregated nature of the European markets was diminished by the establishment of free trade in 
vehicles within the EEC; both trends lead to an intensification of pressures which granted 
competitive advantages to larger manufacturers and resulted in further concentration of market 
structures. 
The success of the European automakers was closely followed by that of Japan. Like in Europe, 
the growth of Japanese automakers was facilitated by high levels of trade protection17. Unlike in 
Europe, the Japanese automotive sector emerged in the 1960s almost entirely independent of 
foreign capital. The simultaneous growth of domestic demand, indigenous technological 
capability development, and the consolidation of firms under the direction of the interventionist 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, allowed Japanese conglomerates to rapidly increase 
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 Doner et al. (2006a: 13) write that “the common assertion that government policy had little effect on the 
development of the automobile industry… is flatly wrong… (It was) indispensable for the industry to build 
the economies of scale necessary to compete internationally”. 
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production and exports. “Motor vehicle production in Japan soared from a negligible 300,000 
units in 1960 to nearly eleven million units in 1982, growing both on the strength of Japan’s 
largely protected domestic market of about five million units and exports of about six million 
units” (Sturgeon and Florida, 2000: 35), making Japanese firms an exception to the rule that 
automakers largely sought to penetrate foreign markets through FDI. Indeed, so successful were 
the Japanese exporters that the US and Europe imposed discriminatory quotas and ‘voluntary’ 
export restraints, pushing Japanese firms to increase levels of outward FDI from the 1980s 
onwards. Japanese productive techniques and supply chain management strategies have also had 
a profound impact on the nature of the global automotive sector.  
3.4.2 The emergence of automotive production outside the triad 
In the mid-twentieth century, there began a period of intense competition as US and European 
automotive firms began to pursue truly global strategies18, followed by the Japanese in the 1970s 
and ‘80s. The dominance of the triad established during this period continues to structure the 
industry today, with only Korean firms emerging as a significant global threat19. 
Although the strategies of the established triad producers were predominantly focused within 
their own domestic or regional markets20, they also sought to expand into the other regional 
centres as well as capture shares of small but highly promising emerging markets, as determined 
by factors such as income levels, population, and the quality and coverage of road networks. As 
mentioned previously, by the 1960s American and European firms had already established 
subsidiaries a number of emerging markets, chiefly in Latin American. Other developing regions 
either had negligible domestic industries or imported all of their consumption: the ASEAN region 
did not attempt to develop indigenous automotive manufacturing capabilities until the 1960s 
(Doner, 1991: 33); the automotive sector in the former Soviet Union was subject to the dictates of 
a centrally planned economy, with very low levels of private vehicle ownership; and the Chinese, 
Indian, African and Middle Eastern economies were still characterised by extremely low per capita 
income levels. Over the coming years, automotive production continued to spread, with the 
number of countries with assembly plants doubling from 42 in 1960 to 86 in 1976; the total 
number of assembly plants increased from 170 to 600 during the same period (Jenkins, 1987: 
43)21.  A significant feature of the automotive industrialisation strategies of the ‘latecomers’ was 
that even though they were relatively insignificant in terms of sales “most automakers were 
unwilling to forego new investments and cede markets to their competitors” (Sturgeon and 
Florida, 2000: 32). 
Summarising the common features of emerging markets’ automotive industrialisation strategies, 
Abrenica (1998: 22) observes that they consist 
of several strands: a tariff differential between [finished vehicles and parts] to encourage 
local assembly; LCRs to support parts manufacturing; restrictions on entry and limitations on 
model changes to prevent market fragmentation; and export promotion.  
                                                          
18
 As discussed further below, the establishment of the North American and European networks has been 
strengthened by regional integration in NAFTA and the EU, respectively. 
19
 Korean OEMs emerged under highly protected conditions; for analysis of the Korean experience, see 
Ravenhill, 2001.  
20
 This pattern continues, albeit to a lesser extent, today; see UNIDO, 2003 and Sturgeon and Memedovic, 
2009 for details.  
21
 As Sturgeon and Florida (2000: 34) observe, “during the 1960s and 1970s a regional pattern emerged 
with most new assembly plants established by American and European automakers were located in Latin 
America and most plants by Japanese firms were located in Asia”. 
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The approach to FDI and ownership was less uniform. In light of the dearth of indigenous 
technological capabilities, most emerging regions were reliant on foreign capital and technology 
to a greater or lesser degree. Competition between triad automakers provided some leverage to 
demand the establishment of joint ventures, especially in the supply sector. Some countries (such 
as Brazil) permitted wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries and did not seek to restrict FDI, while 
others (such as India) were more openly hostile, severely restricting foreign equity involvement 
and attempting to elicit the licensing of technology to local firms instead (Humphrey and Salerno, 
2000).  
In addition, most countries have pursued a sequenced approach to trade policy (Abrenica, 1998). 
In the first (assembly) stage, they have applied high levels of protection on finished vehicles. 
Because of the high rates of protection and captive markets, investments in sub-scale assembly 
operations were still profitable; OEMs were able to retain activities in which scale and 
technological capability requirements were most stringent in established locations in their home 
region, while decentralising assembly and the manufacture of less sophisticated, high weight-to-
value parts and components (such as tyres and radiators) to the host economy.  
Thus, early investments were mostly ‘screwdriver’ assembly operations, importing completely 
knocked down (CKD) or semi-knocked down (SKD) kits in order to reduce shipping costs and, later, 
to obtain tariff advantages granted to goods destined for local assembly vis-à-vis finished vehicles 
(Jenkins, 1987: 18). In other words, the use of high tariffs on finished vehicles, coupled with 
supply and demand conditions in the host countries, led to assembly operations with high import 
propensity and low levels of domestic value added22. There was a perception that the strategic 
interests of the automakers were limiting technology transfer and the opportunities for 
integration of local firms into their global networks for strategic reasons. For example, as Moran 
(1998: chapter 5) notes in relation to Latin America, 
automobile firms initially considered the idea of creating a competitive automotive industry 
in Mexico and Brazil completely far-fetched (…) Such characterizations persisted as long as 
sub-scale plants… were the predominant form of production (…) In each country, however, as 
the size of the domestic market began to be large enough to support plants with full 
economies of scale, costs and quality… began to rival or surpass home-country alternatives 
(…) The notable features of this period was in fact a stout resistance that the parent 
companies… mounted against the host-country desire for exports.  
These concerns were accompanied by growing sectoral trade deficits; as Jenkins (1987: 42) 
observes, “production was almost exclusively intended for the domestic market and the 
integration of the local subsidiaries into the international operations of the parent companies was 
purely as a market for imported parts and components”. These problems have been the impetus 
to the second stage of automotive sector development: ‘localisation’, or the promotion of 
integrated manufacturing systems beyond vehicle assembly, became the overarching goal. To this 
end, countries have imposed various investment performance requirements on the automotive 
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 Sturgeon and Florida (2000: 26) claim that even prior to localisation policies, there was an incremental 
tendency for assemblers to source inputs locally. For example, in the early stages of expansion through FDI, 
US assemblers “began to source parts and materials locally, both from outside suppliers and through the 
build-up of internal capabilities… Often portrayed as ‘mere’ assembly plants with no backward linkages to 
host economies, and therefore indistinguishable from finished vehicle exports, increased local sourcing over 
time is the norm. Moreover, CKD assembly provides an initial base of activity that provides opportunities 
for local players that would not otherwise exist” (Sturgeon and Florida, 2000: 26). Nevertheless, the 
assembly of knocked down kits led to industrialisation that was unquestionably of a fairly shallow form in 
many developing country contexts. 
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assemblers in order to encourage (or stipulate) the use of local content as well as integration into 
export activities23. According to Humphrey et al. (2000), this phase began in the early 1960s in 
Latin America and India, and in the 1970s in Southeast Asia.  
Historically, LCRs have been used extensively in developed and developing countries alike, 
although they have been more prominent in the latter, as shown in Table 3-1 below24. Countries 
that have used LCRs more or less extensively comprise the majority of automotive producers. 
However, developed countries have not implemented LCRs in the post-WTO environment, and 
they appear to have used them more sparingly in relation to individual investment projects (see 
Kumar, 2005, for the cases of Italy, the UK and the US with respect to Japanese automotive 
investments).  
Table 3-1: List of countries in which LCRs have historically been implemented, by development status 
Developing countries Developed countries 
Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Peru, Romania, 
Russia, South Africa, Taiwan Province of China, 
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, and Yugoslavia 
Australia, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the US 
Sources: WTO/UNCTAD (2002) Jenkins (1987: Table 3.3), Subramanian and Low (1995), Kumar (2005) and primary and secondary 
sources encountered in the course of my own research, as described in section 3.5.4. This list is not exhaustive; it is likely that unlisted 
countries have also implemented LCRs prior to 1995, at which point data have become more readily available as a result of notification 
requirements and review mechanisms imposed by the WTO. 
As I discussed in general terms in chapter 2, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of LCRs in 
the automotive sector is mixed; strong conclusions are limited by a paucity of systematic cross-
national research and profound methodological difficulties relating to causal attribution. There 
are numerous automotive sector case studies, but studies on the parts and components sector at 
which LCRs are targeted are lacking, perhaps as a result of a lack of fine-grained sectorally-
disaggregated data, and comprehensive data on the use of such policies (the present thesis 
utilises new sources of data to overcome these methodological challenges). Perhaps more 
importantly, LCRs have been analysed as part of a package of measures, not individually; and 
there have been no attempts to account for capabilities and advantages as contextual factors 
confounding their impacts.  
Indeed, much of the negative empirical evidence cited in the literature pertains to the 1960s and 
‘70s – an era in which LCRs were usually implemented in the context of prohibitively-high tariffs 
and/or outright bans on vehicle imports and severe restrictions on foreign investment and 
ownership – and relates to circumstances in which there were excessively large gaps between the 
technological capabilities of local and foreign investing firms and in which domestic markets were 
severely limited in size and medium-term potential for growth, especially in comparison with 
rapidly growing markets in the industrialised triad economies. As discussed in the previous 
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 Export performance requirements are not analysed here, but they have arguably been another important 
factor in the determination of the productive location, and performance, of automotive FDI.  
24
 Data have been obtained from a review by WTO/UNCTAD (2002) and supplemented by data in Jenkins 
(1987: Table 3.3), Subramanian and Low (1995), Kumar (2005) and primary and secondary sources 
encountered in the course of my own research, as described in section 3.5.4. This list is not exhaustive; it is 
likely that unlisted countries have also implemented LCRs prior to 1995, at which point data have become 




chapter, these circumstances are not ideally suited to rapid technological upgrading and the 
establishment of efficient linkages arising from the implementation of LCRs.  
3.5 ASSESSMENT OF AUTOMOTIVE TRADE POLICIES 
3.5.1 Evidence on the effects of import-substitution 
Referring to developing countries generically, Abrenica (1998: 22) pronounces that “there is 
consensus that the long period of protection created vested interests, but neither a competitive 
industry nor the promised externalities”. As Doner et al. (2006b) observe, in many cases, markets 
were not large enough to elicit the requisite scale investment to achieve efficient levels of price or 
quality for individual models. The position of developing countries in lead firms’ strategies was 
such that subsidiaries were often used as an outlet for outdated technology (Sturgeon and 
Florida, 2000: 33). The strategic interests of lead firms – with large investments in production 
elsewhere – were served by restricting exports, ensuring that production was geared entirely to 
the limited domestic market, and clashed with host country objectives (UNCTC, 1991: 40-41). 
Furthermore,  
competition to control the local market usually resulted in a large number of firms entering 
the industry with a consequent fragmentation of the market and lower levels of 
concentration than were found in the larger markets where the industry was well-
established… as a result… production runs for individual companies were low and costs 
correspondingly higher (Jenkins, 1987: 42).  
In order to ensure greater scale economies in production, host countries often became more 
restrictive in permitting entry to foreign automakers (Abrenica, 1998); however, this has had the 
perverse effect of enhancing the market power of those permitted entry. In both cases, the size of 
the domestic market has severely restricted the feasibility of efficient automotive production in 
most developing countries. However, although Doner et al. (2006a) note that with the exceptions 
of Japan and Korea, “the vast majority of attempts by late-developers to build national auto 
industries through protection and promotion have failed”, the establishment of world-class 
national champions as the sole criterion for effective trade policy may be setting the bar too high; 
the pertinent question is what would have happened in the absence of intervention. Looking at 
the inter-temporal evidence, the years following liberalisation of the most excessive forms of 
trade and investment protection (in the 1980s and 1990s have seen vast expansions in output, 
trade, and inward investment. On the face of it, the evidence appears straightforward: in many 
cases of heavy interventionism, trade performance has been weak, with sectoral trade deficits 
and limited exports, reflecting underlying technological weaknesses and imperfectly competitive 
market structures. Liberalisation has been a necessary catalyst for the competitive pressures that 
drive performance improvements, and emerging markets have become integrated into the 
networks of MNCs (Humphrey, 2003).  
On closer inspection, however, the evidence is not so conclusive. Firstly, automotive liberalisation 
across the emerging markets has coincided with the rapid expansion of demand in the same, from 
which it is difficult to isolate the impact on performance. Secondly, liberalisation itself has only 
been fairly partial; even after dramatic liberalisation of trade and investment policies 
“governments remained active promoters of the industry through investment incentives, local 
content requirements, export incentives, duty drawback schemes and tariffs” (ibid.: 121). Thirdly, 
the opportunities presented by liberalisation for integration into global production networks have 
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largely been limited to a subset of emerging markets; performance outcomes have been highly 
uneven.   
Furthermore, import-substitution era performance has been highly variable, “consistent with the 
developmental state approach to looking at industrialisation, with its emphasis on the 
effectiveness of state intervention in explaining differences in industrial performance” (Jenkins, 
1995: 641). While many of the heavily protected emerging markets did not achieve international 
competitiveness, it must be pointed out that they faced a profoundly difficult competitive and 
learning environment: “the problem was the creation of national industrial capability in a context 
of oligopolistic market structures” characterised by ‘stickiness’ of investment decisions and risk-
aversion on the part of investors and in which emerging markets were distinctly subordinate 
(Veloso, 2001: 154). It is entirely plausible that in the absence of intervention, these countries 
would have been entirely overlooked as productive locations; an important issue is the extent to 
which subsequent improvements in industrial performance were facilitated by a period of 
protection in which automotive production became thoroughly embedded in emerging markets’ 
economies, against the possibility that protection gave rise to ‘vicious’ processes of technological 
retardation and rent-seeking behaviour. Although this counterfactual is impossible to observe, it 
is clearly the case that protection encouraged significant investments in productive capacity, 
which, as sunk costs, would have shaped future patterns of production and investment in the 
more liberal environment. Arguably, a combination of heavily protectionist policies, and the 
exertions of states in bargaining with powerful multinationals through the use of performance 
requirements have led to the emergence of national automotive production networks with high 
levels of local content in Latin America (Jenkins, 1987; Bennett and Sharpe, 1990), Southeast Asia 
(Doner, 1991), India (Kim, 2004; Nag, 2011), and South Africa (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000). In this 
sense, the evidence for the long term effects of protection with high static costs is ultimately 
ambiguous, under the assumption that large scale automotive production in emerging markets 
may otherwise never have occurred. Indeed, every significant automotive producer since the 
early consolidation of the US market has emerged under heavily protected conditions.  
3.5.2 Evidence on the impacts of LCRs 
Turning from the evidence regarding state intervention more generally to that on LCRs more 
particularly, the evidence is again ambiguous. The conclusion of Moran’s (1998) review is that 
most commonly, LCRs have exacerbated the inefficiency of local assemblers, deterred the transfer 
of technology to suppliers, and exacerbated rent-seeking in both subsectors. These findings are 
mainly based on microeconomic simulations within static frameworks, and have focused on the 
combined impacts of protective policies, rather than LCRs per se. Case studies that have found 
significantly negative results have been carried out for Australia (Pursell, 2001), India (Krueger, 
1975), and Latin America (Munk, 1969). Pursell (2001: 3) concludes that multilateral restriction of 
LCRs “is a useful external counterweight to the influence of domestic lobbies and populist 
arguments, which in Australia and elsewhere have made local content schemes politically difficult 
to oppose, and once established, even more difficult to remove”. In a survey of 16 countries, Bale 
and Walters (1986) found that even fairly modest content requirements generated large price 
differentials due to subscale production facilities.  
In most instances in which LCRs have been examined in developing countries, local technological 
and innovative capabilities were weak. In such circumstances, LCRs appear to have been set at 
excessively high levels, given the gaps in price and quality between local and established 
suppliers. This capability gap, as well as the differences in the size of local firms and foreign OEMs 
and the presence of a captive terminal market, has enabled OEMs to accrue rents at the expense 
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of suppliers as well as local consumers (Jenkins, 1987). Lead firms had more established supply 
networks in their home regions, and were reluctant to engage in technology transfer to local 
suppliers except to the extent required to fulfil their own price and quality requirements, which 
were less rigorous as a result of artificial protective rents and lack of domestic competition.  
Thus where high degrees of trade protection led to the ‘artificial’ segmentation of the automotive 
sector along national lines and distorted competitive pressures, LCRs contributed to this effect. 
Restrictive FDI policies may also have exacerbated the inefficiency of the parts and components 
sectors. In general, LCRs were intended to encourage local content through any means: either 
encouraging MNCs to establish linkages with local firms, to establish local in-house production 
facilities, or bring their existing suppliers with them to the new markets. However, in some cases 
(e.g. in India; see Kim, 2004), trade policy was used in conjunction with restrictions on ownership 
in the supply sector to encourage the participation of domestic capital through licensing 
arrangements and joint ventures; these restrictions may have further discouraged the utilisation 
and transfer of the most up-to-date technology. These equity and operating restrictions are not a 
crucial feature of LCRs, but they nevertheless confound their outcomes.  
Turning to evidence of positive effects, Veloso (2001) and Kumar (2005) note that case studies 
provide numerous examples of countries in which the implementation of LCRs and other 
performance requirements have contributed to the emergence of competitive local suppliers and 
joint ventures in countries that are wholly or mostly reliant on foreign capital; these have included 
Brazil (Shapiro, 1994), Mexico (Bennett and Sharpe, 1990), Taiwan (Gee, 1997), and Thailand 
(Moran, 1998; Natsuda and Thoburn, 2013). More recently, China and India have provided further 
evidence of rapid upgrading in the presence of LCRs (see Sutton, 2005). Further details of some of 
these cases are presented in chapter 6. In terms of firm-level evidence, Humphrey and Salerno 
(2000) provide the example of the Brazilian firm Freios Varga, which was incorporated into VW’s 
production systems, supplied with technology, and eventually developed its own design and 
engineering capabilities, under stringent LCRs. In addition, LCRs have provided incentives for 
OEMs to establish in-house parts and components subsidiaries, engage in joint ventures, and 
more recently, to encourage their existing suppliers to follow them to new markets via direct 
investments. In Thailand, first-tier Japanese suppliers followed their OEM partners to produce for 
the domestic and regional market (Natsuda and Thoburn, 2013). These mechanisms do not 
promote local supply firms per se, but they still increase the proportion of local intermediates 
produced domestically, present opportunities for spillovers to local firms within lower tiers of 
supply, and thus potentially offer better opportunities for the integration of emerging markets 
into global production networks. The issues are explored further in the context of the emergence 
of truly global suppliers and the phenomenon of ‘follow-sourcing’, as discussed in section 3.6.1 
below, and in the case studies in chapter 6.   
To conclude, as Veloso (2001: 38) notes in a summary of the evidence,  
virtually all the detailed microeconomic studies describe static scenarios of price distortion 
and transfer of surplus from consumers to producers, eventually with deadweight losses. 
Nevertheless, none of these seems to incorporate issues related to external effects and 
spillovers. Longer-term industry assessments, albeit with no quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis, seem to indicate that the impact can go either way depending on particular 
conditions of the investment and local market. 
In the circumstances of excessively protective trade and investment regimes, saddling investors 
with additional restrictions by mandating a level of local content beyond the capabilities of local 
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suppliers to deliver has undoubtedly contributed to the inefficiency of the sector as a whole. In 
circumstances in which latent local capabilities were sufficiently strong, in which the competitive 
environment has encouraged rather than discouraged investment and technological upgrading, 
and in which the domestic market has provided a basis for the attainment of reasonable levels of 
scale, LCRs have clearly contributed to the establishment of efficient local supply networks that 
have subsequently matured and become integrated into export markets.  
Even where suppliers failed to achieve international competitiveness, and the higher cost of 
intermediate goods has imposed a heavy burden on downstream producers and consumers, LCRs 
may still have been worthwhile in the long run. This may be the case to the extent that they have 
laid the foundations of local capabilities and logistical networks on which to subsequently build in 
the context of wider liberalisation and as other conditions for efficient manufacturing improve. In 
other words, we need to account for their dynamic effects, notwithstanding that LCRs have often 
been costly in static terms. LCRs have altered the ‘arbitrariness’ of production, trade and 
investment patterns in the intermediate sector, with consequences that are impossible to 
precisely determine. In addition, LCRs may have given rise to technological spillovers and wider 
benefits to the domestic economy, which are extremely difficult to trace.  
3.5.3 Methodological limitations of the existing evidence and implications for analysis 
The problem is the lack of a counterfactual; as Rodrik (2007: 14) puts it in his assessment of the 
evidence for and against industrial policy more generally, neither the positive cases “nor the 
horror stories settle the case”. As a result of these methodological difficulties, it is possible to 
argue that successful cases were the result of other favourable conditions, and that performance 
would have been even stronger in the absence of LCRs. At the same time, in the unsuccessful 
cases, one could argue that poor performance outcomes arose as a result of high levels of 
protection and incorrectly designed (i.e. overly stringent) LCRs, and that furthermore, in the 
absence of such policies, local supply networks would not have emerged at all.  
From the available evidence, it is very difficult to separate the effects of LCRs per se from the 
myriad of other policies and institutions that have been employed concurrently, from 
idiosyncratic features of design and implementation, and from market conditions – in relation to 
the opportunities for the attainment of scale economies, and the presence of domestic 
capabilities for technological learning and absorption – that vary with each specific local context 
in which LCRs are embedded. Thus, we cannot “identify the specific effects of individual 
performance requirements, since the measures are often applied in combination” 
(WTO/UNCTAD, 2002: 23), with wider restrictions on trade and investment but also, for example, 
with export performance, technology transfer and R&D requirements. Secondly, we cannot 
separate the observed outcomes from the wider context in which LCRs were employed. In 
actuality, the conditions under which automotive production is feasible – in terms of the supply 
and demand conditions – have only more recently emerged in many developing regions; 
throughout the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s, income levels, and thus demand for cars, as well as 
manufacturing capabilities, were severely limited in many of the countries implementing LCRs; 
these highly suboptimal conditions are likely to have ensured underwhelming results. In this 
context, it is interesting to consider the effects of LCRs under more appropriate conditions with 
respect to the feasibility of automotive sector growth in emerging regions which enhance the 
likely success of policies aimed at encouraging local content. These conditions have emerged, in 
the past two of three decades, simultaneously with the imposition of multilateral restrictions on 
LCRs as well as wider processes of liberalisation, regionalisation, and capability development – 
giving rise to an opportunity for systematic comparative analysis, provided that the core 
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determinants of parts and performance outcomes can be adequately operationalised at the 
country level. 
In order to make valid inferences, we need comprehensive cross-national data on 
 the implementation and elimination of LCRs;  
 intermediate sector performance outcomes; and 
 factors that codetermine outcomes – independently and in conjunction with the 
implementation and elimination of LCRs. 
Temporally, in order to compare performance outcome pre- and post-elimination of LCRs, I am 
concerned with the years following the establishment of the WTO, for two main reasons, relating 
to practical issues of data availability as well as more substantive concerns. In the case of data 
availability, prior to members’ trade and industrial policies being reviewed through WTO 
mechanisms, it may be difficult or impossible to attain comprehensive data on the utilisation of 
LCRs; certainly, this would involve consultation of national archive data which would be difficult to 
access. These data sources are described below. In terms of the substantive justification for my 
focus on the post-WTO era, this provides an interesting opportunity to examine compare 
industrial performance outcomes in the manner of a natural experiment, as I discuss in the 
following chapter; and the post-WTO period also coincides with the emergence of favourable 
conditions of supply and demand in emerging markets, such that analysis of this period offers a 
significant departure from studies analysing LCRs in previous time periods. In addition, most the 
trade and production data which serve as indicators of industrial performance in the automotive 
parts and components sector, as well as wider contributory factors such as market size on which 
my analysis is based, are only in a comprehensive format from around 1995, as discussed in 
section of chapter. 
3.5.4 The implementation and elimination of LCRs in the automotive sector 
Comprehensive data on the implementation and elimination of LCRs in the automotive sector are 
available from 1995 for all WTO members, as a result of the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement. 
Data are available from four main sources: members’ notifications of their use of restricted 
TRIMs, requests for extensions to the phase-out period for restricted TRIMs, dispute cases 
involving prohibited TRIMs, and accession documents for countries joining the WTO subsequent 
to its establishment in 1995.  
3.5.4.1 Notifications of restricted TRIMs 
The primary sources of data on the implementation of LCRs are notifications submitted by each 
country as part of the requirements of the TRIMs Agreement. Notifications were required to be 
submitted within 90 days of the establishment of the WTO in January 1995. However, a number 
of countries made delayed notifications, for various reasons (e.g. Chile had originally notified the 
relevant measures as a subsidy under separate notification procedures). Accordingly, I have 
collated TRIMs notified and detailed in the TRIMs committee Annual Report dated November 
1996 (WTO document G/L/133).  
I examined these notifications individually to determine whether they pertained to the 
automotive sector. These notifications are shown in table 3-2, below.  
On examination of the TRIMs at hand, I discovered that a number were discontinued shortly after 
the notification (South Africa), some were based on regional rather than domestic content 




3.5.4.2 Extension requests 
The second source of data on LCRs is provided by extension requests. Although there was a 
standard 5 year phase-in period (7 years for least-developed countries), many developing 
countries took advantage of provisions to request more time to eliminate their TRIMs.  
Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement states that extensions may be granted to the transition period 
for developing countries which “demonstrate particular difficulties in implementing the provisions 
of this Agreement”. Initial requests, made before the end of 1999, were granted a standard 
addition two year extension until the end of 2001; the council of trade in goods permitted 
countries granted such extensions to make an additional two year extension request.   
See table 3-3, below, for details of extension requests submitted pertaining to the use of LCRs in 
the automotive sector. Colombia and Thailand also applied for extensions to the phase out 
period, but these were unrelated to their automotive sector policies; see WTO documents 
G/C/W/169 for Colombia and G/C/W/169 for Thailand.   
3.5.4.3 Dispute cases 
The third important source of data on TRIMs comes from cases that have been brought to the 
WTO’s dispute settlement body. There are a number of countries that did not notify TRIMs but 
who were taken to dispute panels and found to be using prohibited TRIMs, including LCRs; Brazil, 
Indonesia and India are in this category. In addition, China was involved in a TRIMs automotive 
dispute in 2006; although LCRs were withdrawn in 2000, China was found to have reintroduced a 
number of prohibited measures relating to the redefinition of ‘knocked down’ kits as finished 
vehicles25.  
Table 3-2: Notifications of TRIMs relating to the automotive sector 
Notifying country Document code(s) Nature of TRIM 




Local content; export 
Colombia
26
 G/TRIMS/N/1/COL/1 Local / regional content 
Ecuador
27
 G/TRIMS/N/1/ECU/1 Local / regional content 
                                                          
25
 According to China’s 2006 Trade Policy Review (WT/TPR/S/161: p. 202), preferential tariff rates granted 
on the basis of local content ratios were phased out by 2000. As mentioned above, a dispute panel ruled in 
2006 that China had implemented a number of TRIMs-inconsistent policies in 2004-5. Thus, China 
continued to implement prohibited policies for some time after the formal elimination of LCRs. They were 
forced to remove these following dispute proceedings (DS339, DS340, and DS342) and did so in August 
2009 (China TPR, 2012: 119). The measures in question aimed to reclassify parts (namely, ‘knocked-down’ 
kits) as complete vehicles for the purposes of customs tariffs, if they have the “essential character of a 
motor vehicle”. Although these measures have much the same rationale as the policies examined in this 
thesis, due to their narrower focus on knocked-down kits specifically, and because they do not limit parts 
imports quantitatively but rather subject them to higher tariffs (i.e. the rate attached to finished vehicles) I 
have decided to consider that the elimination of LCRs by 2001, prior to China’s accession to the WTO, is the 
more pertinent policy shift, and so I have not included this data in the construction of the main dummy 
variable. Nevertheless, policies such as these clearly contribute to the climate of protection and promotion 
maintained by the Chinese government in various ways, as I discuss in the comparative case study of China 
and India in chapter 6. 
26
 The original local content provisions were subsumed by regional content policies in the context of the 
Andean Pact as of 1995, and as such the measures are separate from LCRs as defined in this study. As the 
Columbian notification reports, the “policy was made more flexible in the regional context of the Andean 
Pact, which requires that assembling enterprises include a minimum content of materials produced in the 

















Pakistan G/TRIMS/N/1/PAK/1 Local content 
Philippines G/TRIMS/N/1/PHL/1 
Local content; foreign exchange 
balancing 
Romania G/TRIMS/N/1/ROM/1 Local content 
South Africa
29
 G/TRIMS/N/1/ZAF/1 Local content 
Thailand G/TRIMS/N/1/THA/1 Local content 
Uruguay G/TRIMS/N/1/URY/1 Export 
Venezuela
30
 G/TRIMS/N/1/VEN/1 Local / regional content 
Source: WTO, document codes as detailed above. 
Table 3-3: Automotive TRIMs extension requests 
Country Document code(s) 
Argentina G/C/W/176; G/L/460; G/L/497 
Malaysia G/C/W/174; G/L/462; G/L/499 
Mexico G/C/W/171; G/L/463; G/L/500 
Pakistan G/C/W/173; G/L/466; G/L/501  
Philippines G/L/325; G/L/464; G/L/502 
Romania G/C/W/175; G/C/W/290; G/L/465 
Source: WTO, document codes as detailed above. 
3.5.4.4 Accession protocols 
Another source of data used to construct the TRIMs policy dummy is provided by WTO accession 
protocols. A number of countries were not WTO Members at the time of the establishment of the 
organisation. On accession, countries had to sign a protocol establishing the nature of their 
commitments arising from WTO membership31. These documents specify what types of WTO-
inconsistent TRIMs were in force prior to accession, and when they would be eliminated. 
Countries were also required to address existing Members’ questions regarding any concerns that 
prohibited were in force, and commit to remove them in a specified timescale. I have consulted 
these accession protocols and have identified that prohibited TRIMs (more specifically LCRs) were 
in force in the following countries prior to their accession: China, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), 
Russia32, the Ukraine, and Vietnam.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
27
 As footnote 26, above.  
28
 Indonesia subsequently withdrew the portion of the notification pertaining to the automotive sector, but 
the measures were brought to the dispute settlement body, as described below.  
29
 These measures were withdrawn later in the same year.    
30
 As footnote 26, above.  
31
 The text of each protocol is available is available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm, accessed 25/1/15.  
32
 Russia implemented local content rules in 2005, acceded to the WTO in 2012, had not eliminated LCRs at 
the time of writing, and is therefore not covered by the data I analyse in the present study. The working 
party report on Russia’s accession (WT/ACC/RUS/70 WT/MIN(11)/2) states that LCRs were implemented in 
2005 and are due to run until 2018 (pp. 275-9). 
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3.5.4.5 Consolidated data on the implementation and elimination of automotive LCRs in the post-
WTO era 
Consolidating data from this range of qualitative sources, I have identified 17 countries which 
have implemented LCRs since the establishment of the WTO and the years in which the policies 
were last in force: these data are presented in table 3-4. Sources are detailed in appendix 2.   
Table 3-4: Countries that eliminated TRIMs-prohibited policies in the automotive sector, post-1995, with start and end 
dates 
Country 
Start date of LCRs, 
where specified in 
notifications and/or 
secondary literature33 
Finish date (last year 
LCRs still in force) Type of TRIM(s) in force 
Nature of LCR (i.e. 
mandatory requirement 
or fiscal incentive34), 
where specified 
Argentina 1979 2003 Local content; trade 
balancing 
Fiscal incentive: tariff 
reductions 
Brazil 1995 1999 Local content; trade 
balancing; export 
Fiscal incentive: tariff 
reductions 
Chile 1985 1998 Local content; export 
Fiscal incentives: tariff 
reductions and tax 
credits 
China 1994 2000 Local content Mandatory requirement 




granting of import 
license 
Indonesia 1993 2000 ‘Deletion lists’; local 
content 
Fiscal incentives: 
exemption from tax and 
tariff reductions  
Malaysia 1991 2003 Local content 
Discretionary 
investment incentives: 
recipients of Pioneer 
Status or Investment Tax 
Allowance subject to 
LCRs 
Mexico 1990 2003 Local value added; trade 
balancing 
Mandatory requirement 
Pakistan 1987 2006 




Fiscal incentives: tariff 
reductions 
Philippines 1987 2004 Local content; foreign 
exchange balancing 
Attached to incentives 
associated with various 
‘development programs’ 




attached to fiscal 
incentives 
South Africa 1989 1995 Local content - 
Taiwan 1979 2001 Local content Mandatory 
Thailand 1975 2000 Local content Fiscal incentives 
Ukraine 1997 2001 Local content 
Fiscal incentives: 
exemption from tax and 
tariff reductions 
Vietnam 1987 2006 Local content; export - 
                                                          
33
 LCRs implemented under different legislation may have been in force prior to this date; the dates 
provided here are the first years in which LCRs were definitely in force, as verified by the author in 
consultation with the data described above.  
34
 This distinction is not always clear cut, even if countries provide accurate information; this is because the 
measures may not be mandatory in the technical sense, but may be taken into consideration in the 
determination of discretionary decisions (for example with respect to licensing) and are therefore ‘de facto’ 
mandatory for a firm to be able to operate.     
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The 16 countries that are relevant to an empirical examination of the elimination of LCRs in the 
automotive sector in the post-WTO period, therefore, are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Ukraine, and Vietnam.  
3.6 FACTORS DRIVING THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF PRODUCTION, TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
IN THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 
3.6.1 Recent developments in value chain governance 
We now turn to an examination of the context in which the elimination of LCRs has occurred. The 
competitive environment has changed profoundly in recent years, with huge implications for the 
opportunities of suppliers in emerging markets to enter the production systems of the triad 
OEMs. These changes have related to factors internal to governance structures and the 
capabilities and advantages in different locations, all of which are interdependent. This “morass of 
influences, tendencies and causes that structure empirical outcomes” results in a “rich and roiling 
stew of causation and outcome” (Sturgeon et al., 2008) from which the impacts of LCRs must be 
isolated.  
3.6.1.1 Competitive pressure and consolidation in the automotive value chain  
At the level of value chain governance, Japanese success, which emerged as a result of 
revolutionary ‘lean manufacturing’ techniques pioneered by Toyota (Womack et al., 1990) has 
had far-reaching implications for the global competitive environment35. Faced with a threat to 
their established markets, OEMs in these regions have intensified efforts to expand to new 
markets; thus, “Japanese vehicle manufacturers have triggered the shift from national and 
regional… to global oligopoly” and contributed to circumstances of “gross over-supply” (Maxton 
and Wormald, 1998: 143).  
Additional pressures have emerged in light of increasingly complex technologies and diversity of 
consumer demand. OEMs have had to create a wider range of products, with increasingly 
stringent environmental and safety features, while at the same time lowering costs simply to be 
able to maintain market shares.  
Together, these factors driven two major phenomena: firstly, consolidation in both the assembly 
and parts subsectors, as firms seek to capitalise from greater economies of scale and scope, and 
relatedly, more effective exploitation of common ‘platforms’ and designs, to which variations are 
made according to consumer preferences in specific locations. Secondly, automakers have 
responded to technological and competitive pressures as well as opportunities to capture value in 
non-manufacturing activities and by outsourcing a larger proportion of manufacturing activity to 
suppliers. By concentrating on “design, brand management and customer relationship, 
assemblers have clearly set a strategic direction toward capturing more of the section of the value 
chain that links them to the final customer, including dealerships and services” (Veloso and 
Kumar, 2002: 50).  
Mapping ownership patterns and consolidation in the automotive value chain is not a 
straightforward endeavour because since the initial internationalisation of the sector through 
foreign investment by the American giants, the sector has been characterised by complex 
                                                          
35
 For example, “in the US, domestic automakers have lost more than 20 percent market share to Japanese 
and Korean automakers in the past two decades… Europe has experienced a similar trend” (Veloso and 
Kumar, 2002: 2). 
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arrangements encompassing joint ventures, state ownership, wholly-owned subsidiaries and 
different forms of strategic cooperation and equity investment.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that there has been a long term and increasing trend towards 
consolidation in the OEM segment of the value chain, picking up momentum in the 1990s (KPMG, 
2010). Besides market factors, consolidation has been driven by changes in the global policy 
environment: for example, regional integration, especially within Europe, that has eroded the 
domination of smaller firms within protected domestic home markets; the opening of Eastern 
European markets to competition after the fall of the Soviet Union (ibid.); and wider processes of 
global trade and investment liberalisation.  
Of the top 50 automakers in 2008, 42 were passenger car manufacturers36; taking into account 
“equitable interest complexities… the number is reduced to 32” (KPMG, 2010: 15). Of these, 13 
can be considered truly ‘global’, while the remaining 19 are still strongly dependent on national 
markets (ibid.)37. The 13 global automakers, as of 2008, were: BMW; Daimler (Mercedes); Fiat-
Chrysler; Ford; Fuji (Suburu); GM; Honda; Hyundai; Mitsubishi; PSA (Peugeot-Citroen); Renault-
Nissan; Toyota; and VW.  
Many of the 13 global conglomerates have consolidated their market power by acquiring 
struggling brands – BMW with Rover and Rolls-Royce; Ford with Jaguar, Land Rover and Volvo; 
GM with Daewoo and Saab; Hyundai with Kia; and VW with Audi, Seat and Skoda38 – while others 
have been involved in high profile mergers of ‘equal partners’ (Fiat-Chrysler, Peugeot-Citroen and 
Renault-Nissan). In addition, a number of firms have substantial equity holdings in or have 
entered into joint ventures with other OEMs in specific markets. All of them have substantial 
foreign investments, both as wholly-owned subsidiaries and in various forms of joint ventures 
with local capital and other automakers.  
3.6.1.2 Developments in supply chain governance 
In line with the developments described above, the nature of assembler-supplier relationships has 
changed in several significant ways. As suggested above, assemblers have transferred significant 
design responsibilities and activities relating to the coordination of subordinate suppliers to 
competent first-tier suppliers in an effort to reduce costs. In line with their own global platforms, 
assemblers have also required suppliers to follow them to new markets; a global presence has 
become a prerequisite for first tier suppliers of the major automakers (Humphrey and Salerno, 
2000; Sturgeon and van Bieselbroeck, 2011).  
The emulation of Japanese-style supplier relationships is an important driving force behind the 
global tendency to delegate design and engineering responsibilities to first tier suppliers. 
Traditionally, Western OEMs would carry out innovative and design activities in house, and 
provide first tier suppliers with technological specifications for individual parts (Sturgeon, 2001: 
15). First tier suppliers would source sub-components from second tier suppliers, who would in 
turn source raw materials from third and lower tier suppliers (Veloso and Kumar, 2002). It became 
apparent that Western vehicle manufacturers, simultaneously engaging with in-house parts and 
                                                          
36
 The industry is differentiated in terms of vehicle segment, with firms variously specialising in passenger 
vehicles, motorcycles, and commercial vehicles such as trucks and buses.  
37
 Some of the more successful Chinese and Indian firms have also acquired flailing foreign brands to obtain 
advanced engineering and design expertise; “emerging market companies are using their financial muscle 
to make strategic and/or opportunistic cross-border acquisitions” (KPMG, 2009).    
38
 Some of these brands have subsequently been discontinued (as in the case of Rover, Daewoo and Saab) 
or resold, as in the case of Jaguar and Land Rover to Tata Motors by Ford.   
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components subsidiaries and independent suppliers at ‘arms-length’, “attempted to relate to too 
many firms directly”, thus making it difficult to “sustain relationships of sufficient density and 
quality” (Maxton and Wormald, 1998: 97). This pressure has led to various attempts to streamline 
the supply chain by delegating responsibilities to two types of supplier: modular suppliers39 which 
typically specialise in the design and manufacture of entire systems, rather than individual parts; 
and systems integrators, which oversea and coordinate the activities of subordinate suppliers 
according to designs specified by the OEM (Veloso and Kumar, 2002; Doran, 2004). In line with 
this process, the internal components-related activities of the largest Western OEMs have been 
carved into separate firms which compete for contracts to produce modules for other lead firms 
(Humphrey and Salerno, 2000: 156).  
These factors are leading the global supply sector to a similar pattern of consolidation and 
concentration as the assembly sector; in fact, they have consolidated the position of global 
suppliers, who operate at similar scale to the global assemblers and with similar geographic reach 
to the largest multinational assemblers.  
Such developments in supply chain governance have been ongoing for a long period of time, and 
have substantially altered the distribution of manufacturing value-added between assemblers and 
suppliers. According to Maxton and Wormald (2004), suppliers’ share of value has increased from 
25% in 1955 to 75% in 1995, with assemblers accounting for the remaining shares. Suppliers 
based in emerging markets face genuine opportunities as OEMs seek to “increase local parts 
production to avoid foreign exchange fluctuations, meet short delivery times, adapt to local 
demand, and make use of cheaper local inputs” (Doner et al., 2004: 159).  
However, the trends also impose steeper entry barriers: additional capability requirements, and 
the threat of ‘follow-sourcing’, present a severe challenges to the ranks of small, domestically-
oriented firms that have been fostered under the protection of policies such as LCRs; there is a 
risk of denationalisation and migration of existing production facilities to more advantageous 
locations. Although they have led to the intermediates sector capturing an increasing proportion 
of total automotive value-added, the criteria for becoming a first-tier supplier have become vastly 
more stringent. Only countries which have the requisite location-specific advantages to attract 
global firms and/or enable upgrading within locally-owned firms are likely to become integrated 
into global supply networks.  
3.6.2 Location-specific advantages in emerging markets 
Clearly, the location-specific advantages that countries can “offer to foreign automakers and to 
first-tier global suppliers vary significantly”. As I have posited in my conceptual and theoretical 
framework, these factors influence the impacts of both the implementation and elimination of 
LCRs.  
Location-specific advantages in the automotive parts and components sector relate to the 
attractiveness and stability of the business and investment environment, which can be seen as 
comprising three interrelated elements:  
                                                          
39
 According to Doran (2004: 103), “Perhaps the most tangible representation of the modular approach is 
the ‘Smart’ car collaboration… Whilst a typical car is likely to necessitate the coordination of around 100 
first tier suppliers, the Smart car collaboration has been engineered and designed using 25 module 
suppliers. The benefits of this approach are clear: less direct suppliers to deal with, lower costs to the OEM 
and less risk and less investment (particularly of capital assets). The module supplier benefits in terms of 
increased responsibility, greater involvement in the development and design process and the possibility of a 
higher proportion of value creation activity”.    
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 size, rate of growth and growth potential of national and regional markets for motor 
vehicles;  
 local manufacturing and technological capabilities  
 policies and institutions relating to trade and investment generally and the automotive 
sector specifically. 
Eyes have turned to emerging markets as the most important sources of growth in demand, 
following stagnation in mature markets; meanwhile, many of the same markets have witnessed 
remarkable transformations on the supply side, and are becoming desirable based on efficiency-
seeking criteria. At the same time, there have been important policy and institutional 
developments at global and regional level: increased openness to trade and investment (of which 
the elimination of LCRs is an example) and the proliferation of regional and bilateral trade and 
investment agreements. This is not to downplay the continued role of national policies and 
institutions, which is still substantial. The resulting complexity greatly complicates the evaluation 
of the elimination of LCRs.  
Continued use of high tariffs in the terminal sector coupled with political pressure have given rise 
to a persistent tendency for producers to ‘build where they sell’ and establish production facilities 
in emerging markets. States still legally impose a variety of performance requirements on 
investments, and continue to shape local content decisions informally and via ‘under-the-counter’ 
means (the results of which have occasionally been subject to WTO dispute settlement 
procedures). Additionally, in the context of regional integration, high common external tariffs, 
rules of origin and regional content requirements serve as partial substitutes for national 
protective policies, with similar effects. All of these factors shape industrial performance and the 
strategic decisions of multinational and domestically-oriented firms. In this regard, it is important 
to see that emerging markets follow a variety of strategic regional institutional ‘configurations’, 
which are related to their national market size and proximity to wider regional markets, among 
other factors. This complexity greatly complicates the evaluation of the elimination of LCRs.  
3.6.2.1 Shift in demand towards emerging regions 
Perhaps the most profound shake-up in the automotive sector in the past two to three decades 
has been the shift in demand from the mature to emerging markets, as shown in table 3-5. The 
increases in global vehicle sales since 1990 have come predominantly from emerging markets, 
including those in which LCRs have been utilised in the post-WTO period; indeed, China, India, 
ASEAN and Mercosur have all recorded impressive average annual growth rates compared to the 
mature triad markets. In absolute terms, emerging markets accounted for the majority of global 
vehicles sales by 2013. Of course, there is substantial variation between countries in terms of the 
size, growth and potential of emerging markets. As Sturgeon and van Bieselbroeck (2011) 
document, the “industry’s growth in the developing world has been limited to a specific subset of 
countries”. The size and potential of the domestic market, as well as geographical proximity and 
access to wider markets, inform each country’s strategic approach to automotive policy, as 




Table 3-5: Vehicle sales in thousands of units, percentage of world sales (in parentheses), and average annual growth 
rates: selected years 
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Source: author's calculations based on UNIDO (2003: 3) for 1990 and 1997, OICA (2015) for 2005 and 2013. 
Enhanced manufacturing capabilities in emerging markets 
Following Doner et al. (2006b), capabilities that affect the development of automotive sector are 
comprised of a combination of “skilled and flexible workers, and high levels of engineering 
talent”, capital availability, and “high quality infrastructure, especially ports, highways, and 
telecommunications, speedy customs clearance, and streamlined regulatory approvals”. 
Furthermore, the “auto industry is still fairly labor intensive, so wage levels are significant”.  
In this context, it is clear to see that many of the most important emerging markets are attractive 
locations not only based on their large, rapidly growing markets but also as a result of “a huge 
surplus of low-cost but skilled labour … Countries like Brazil, China and India have attracted large 
FDI flows to supply local markets and to export back to developed countries” (Sturgeon et al., 
2009: 9; my emphasis). As UNIDO (2011a: table 8.1) demonstrates, developing countries have 
captured an increasing share of world manufacturing value added over the past 25 years, their 
share rising from 21% in 1990 to 36% in 2010; the trend is even more pronounced with respect to 
manufactured exports (ibid.: chapter 9). Within this overall picture however, “there are sharp 
variations in manufacturing performance among developing economies and regions” (ibid.: 142), 
with the East Asia region, and especially China, accounting for the lion’s share of developing 
countries’ increased share of global MVA and manufactured exports.  
3.6.2.2 Policies and institutions affecting automotive sector development in emerging markets 
Most of the protected emerging markets had considerable trade deficits in their automotive 
sectors in the early 1990s. States became acutely aware that strong forms of import substitution 
and nationalist industrial policies had failed to result in mature and competitive automotive 
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sectors (although, as I have just described, the role of individual policies is hard to determine, and 
both high levels of trade protection for finished vehicles and LCRs appear to have had mixed 
results). On the whole, the emerging market economies have responded in two ways. Firstly, they 
have reduced extremely high tariff levels and eliminated severe restrictions on the activities of 
foreign firms. Secondly, and relatedly, a number of emerging economies have moved further 
towards regional integration. However, these overall trends mask a considerable degree of 
heterogeneity across emerging markets, including those which I have identified as having 
eliminated LCRs in the post-WTO era.  
Trade policy 
It is widely known that globally, levels of protection have fallen rapidly since the early 1990s, both 
for finished vehicles and for parts, as shown in tables 3-6 and 3-7, below. As well as a reduction in 
tariffs, an equally significant development has been the phasing out of import quotas under the 
auspices of the WTO. Thus, the focus on tariff levels masks reductions in protection afforded by 
quotas and import restrictions.  
Table 3-6: Applied tariffs, %, simple average, vehicles (ISIC 341) 
 Early 1990s  
(1990 unless otherwise 
specified) 
Mid 1990s  
(1995 unless otherwise 
specified) 
Early 2000s  
(2000 unless otherwise 
specified) 
2005 
All countries   22 17 14 13 
All high-income  9 4 4 3 
Low and middle income  41 22 18 16 
ASEAN 37 23 28 20 
China 82 (1992 data) 48 (1996 data) 45 20 
EU 21 2 9 8 
India 132 37 (1997 data) 72 (2001 data) 51 
Mercosur 63 17 19 18 
NAFTA 2 7 7 7 
Source: WITS (2015). 
Table 3-7: Applied tariffs, simple average, parts and components (ISIC 343) 
 Early 1990s  
(1990 unless otherwise 
specified) 
Mid 1990s  
(1995 unless otherwise 
specified) 
Early 2000s  
(2000 unless otherwise 
specified) 
2005 
All countries   17 13 11 9 
All high-income  3 2 3 3 
Low and middle income  31 17 15 11 
ASEAN 37 24 18 13 
China 53 (1992 data) 29 (1996 data) 26 11 
EU 5 5 3 5 
India 44 36 (1997 data) 35 (2001 data) 15 
Mercosur 35 15 16 13 
NAFTA 1 5 5 4 
Source: WITS (2015). 
Some additional observations are pertinent here. Firstly, on average, tariffs for finished vehicles 
are substantially higher than for parts and components. As a result, it should be recognised that 
nominal tariff rates, as discussed here, significantly understate effective rates of protection for 
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the assembly sector40. Notwithstanding the significance of effective protection as the most 
appropriate measure of protection of the final goods (vehicle) sector, nominal tariff rates are 
adequate for descriptive and comparative purposes considering that we are not substantively 
concerned with rates of protection prevailing in the assembly sector per se in this thesis, but 
rather the elimination of a specific form of non-tariff barrier pertaining to the parts and 
components sector.  
Secondly, for both product groups, substantial levels of protection persist, on average, in low and 
middle income countries as a group. At the same time, these countries have experienced more 
significant absolute reductions in tariff levels. Thirdly, tariffs have not been reduced consistently 
across time. Indeed, in some regions, tariff data show an initial increase in rates in the years 
leading up to and immediately following the establishment of the WTO which can be partly 
explained as a consequence of the ‘tariffication’ of import regimes, as well as the intensification 
                                                          
40
 Measuring the protective effects of tariffs and non-tariff barriers is not straightforward. There are several 
main reasons for this. Firstly, different forms of protection need to be transformed into one uniform, 
comparable measure (i.e. ‘tariff equivalent’). In principle, this is a straightforward endeavour, in which the 
tariff equivalent of a non-tariff barrier is defined as the percentage difference between the world price and 
the domestic price of the restricted import. In practice, the measurement of tariff equivalents is 
confounded by stringent data requirements on the price effects of different forms of intervention, and valid 
comparison between tariffs and tariff equivalents is conceptually problematic, as documented by Krugman 
(1993: 140). However, as Krugman (ibid.) notes, “despite these problems, the measurement of protection is 
a useful exercise, giving at least a rough idea of the quantitative importance” of different forms of trade 
policy.  
An even more profound difficulty is that ‘nominal’ tariff rates and tariff equivalents may be misleading with 
respect to the amount of protection conferred on different stages of fragmented production processes. 
Protection on value-added at different stages of fragmented manufacturing processes “will depend not only 
on any interventions which affect the price of the final good produced, but also by any interventions which 
affect the price paid for inputs into the production process” (Greenaway and Milner, 1993: 78). In other 
words, nominal protection is measured as the effect of the policy measure on the price of gross output, 
whereas effective protection is calculated as the price effect of the policy measure on domestic value 
added. Thus, in contrast to nominal protection, effective protection more accurately reflects the extent to 
which protective measures allow domestic costs within different industrial activities to exceed world costs.  
The essential insight of the theory of effective protection is that, in industries in which intermediate inputs 
contribute a large proportion of the value-added embodied in the final product, nominal and effective rates 
of protection can diverge significantly; relatively low nominal tariff rates on final goods provide effective 
rates of protection many degrees of magnitude higher on assembly activities. This phenomenon is 
particularly acute in the automotive sector, in which the structure of protection usually follows a pattern of 
tariff escalation, with higher nominal tariff rates for complete vehicles than for parts and components used 
in their assembly.  
To understand the implications of the theory of effective protection, consider Krugman’s (1993: 141) 
hypothetical (but plausible) example. A vehicle costs $10000 at world prices, of which $8000 represents the 
value of manufacturing intermediate inputs, and $2000 represents the value of assembly tasks. In a 
potential importing country, the cost of assembling the same vehicle from imported parts is $4000. By 
imposing a 20% tariff on the imported vehicles but permitting duty free imports of parts, the price of 
imported vehicles rises to $12000, which permits the assembler to compete with imports despite costs that 
are twice those of foreign assembler; the effective rate of protection on value added in the assembly sector 
is thus 100%.  
The same example can be used to demonstrate that rates of protection on the inputs used to produce a 
good enter into the determination of effective protection rates. Again, following Krugman (ibid.), “a 5 
percent tariff on imported automobile parts, other things being equal, would reduce the margin on which 
domestic assemblers can work from $2000 to $1600, that is, it would amount to a negative 20 percent rate 
of effective protection”. This obviously applies to the tariff equivalent of measures such as LCRs as well as 
tariffs on intermediate goods: “overall, assessing effective protection thus requires measuring tariff 
equivalents not only on an industry’s outputs but also on all its inputs” (ibid.). 
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of efforts to promote domestic production, as discussed below. It may also be the case that low 
tariffs mask considerable protection through non-tariff barriers, for example discretionary import 
licensing procedures and quantitative import restrictions imposed for balance of payments 
purposes.  
Investment restrictions  
As Dunning (1998) discusses, the characterisation of state-MNC relations in the developing world 
has gradually shifted from “uneasy, if not downright hostile” to “non-adversarial and cooperative” 
over the course of the past few decades. Although it is difficult to quantify this shift due to the 
nature of investment policies, it is suggested by the ratio of inward FDI to GDP, which has 
increased dramatically in the past three decades in both high- and low and middle-income 
countries, as shown in table 3-8, below.  
Table 3-8: Ratio of inward FDI to GDP, by income grouping: selected years 
 
High income Low & middle income 
1985 0.48 0.55 
1995 1.01 1.96 
2005 2.45 2.86 
Source: World Bank (2011). 
In addition, the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index quantifies equity restrictions and 
discretionary FDI screening mechanisms in individual sectors, but data are only available for a 
limited number of non-OECD countries; simple group-level averages of index values, as well as 
individual country data for Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia – all of the 
countries which have implemented LCRs in the post-WTO period and for which data are available, 
are provided in table 3-9, below.  
Table 3-9: OECD investment restrictiveness index, transport equipment sector: selected economies and years 
 
1997 2003 2006 2010 
OECD average 0.036 0.026 0.020 0.020 
Non-OECD average (countries for which 
data are available) 
0.211 0.121 0.091 0.061 
China (People's Republic of) 0.625 0.575 0.485 0.410 
India 0.350 0.080 0.000 0.000 
Indonesia 0.262 0.070 0.070 0.060 
Malaysia 0.360 0.100 0.100 0.000 
Source: OECD (2015). 
The data illustrate that with respect to equity restrictions in the transport equipment sector, 
policies discriminating against foreign investment have declined, but are still more prevalent in 
non-OECD countries compared to the OECD. There is a large amount of variation between 
countries, with Argentina and Brazil operating relatively open FDI regimes, while significant 
restrictions remain in China and Indonesia.  
Diversity of regional institutional configurations in emerging markets 
These trends suggest that while on average, countries accepted that their approaches had often 
discouraged investment and raised the costs of production excessively – especially in the context 
of small domestic markets – they wanted to continue to encourage assembly as well as more 
holistic integrated supply networks, rather than rely on market forces which had led, in the past, 
to import-intensive ‘enclaves’. As such, liberalisation has been cautious and partial: the 
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perception was that continued intervention – of a more ‘liberal’, subtle and pragmatic variety – 
was warranted, as reflected in states’ response to the TRIMs agreement. As Humphrey et al. 
(2000: 42) observe:  
Automotive industry trade regimes were significantly more open by the end of the 1990s. 
However, this in no way signified that governments in emerging markets had left the future 
of the motor industry in their countries to the play of market forces… governments still 
actively sought to promote domestic vehicle production with a significant degree of local 
content. 
One example of this is the fact that, at the time of the establishment of the WTO in 1995, all of 
the most important emerging automotive markets continued to implement LCRs.  
Although the emerging markets exhibit some common trends, they are by no means a 
homogenous group. As Humphrey et al. (2000: 6) suggest, in terms of policies and institutions 
driving the economic geography of production, trade and investment with respect to emerging 
markets, outcomes are defined by the interplay of three tendencies: 
1. Continuing protection of domestic markets. 
2. Increased liberalisation of automotive trade within regions, but possibly combined with 
continuing, or even increasing, barriers to inter-regional trade. 
3. Increased liberalisation of trade in vehicles and components between countries and 
regions in a global economy. 
The elimination of LCRs is an important example of tendency ‘3’, as defined above, that has 
occurred as a result of the exogenous restriction of the TRIMs Agreement. In the content of 
confounding policy and institutional factors, we are concerned with isolating the impacts arising 
from this specific form of global liberalisation.   
As documented in Humphrey et al. (2000) and Carrillo et al. (eds.) (2004), regional integration has 
had a profound influence in the development of the automotive industry. Indeed, vehicle 
manufacturers have been among the most important groups lobbying for regional integration. As 
noted by Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck (2011: 183), “regional organisation of vehicle production 
stands in stark contrast to other important high-volume, consumer-oriented manufacturing 
industries, especially apparel and electronics, which have developed global-scale patterns of 
integration that concentrate production for world markets in fewer locations”.  
Regional trade agreements such as the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN have enabled regional 
production networks to flourish, exploiting greater economies of scale and more extensive 
divisions of labour within larger protected markets41. As suggested above, regionalisation involves 
the free(r) movement of intra-regional trade, but features such as common external tariffs, ‘rules 
of origin’ and regional content policies provide protection from extra-regional imports. These 
agreements may be divided analytically into ‘core’ and ‘emerging’ regions. The EU and NAFTA are 
centred on vast, mature automotive markets in Western Europe and the United States 
respectively, and also comprise ‘peripheral’ countries which offer low-cost locations for 
assemblers producing for the regional market. In contrast, ASEAN and Mercosur are entirely 
comprised of developing countries of roughly equal income levels. 
However, not all countries have followed the regional route; and among those that have, the 
forms and implications of regional institutions have varied massively. Humphrey et al. (2000) 
identify three ‘configurations’ or combinations of the above tendencies empirically, which they 
                                                          
41
 Other agreements exist but have not led to nearly the same degree of intra-regional liberalisation in the 
automotive sector, and are thus disregarded from this discussion. See Carrillo et al., 2004.  
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define as Protected Autonomous Markets (PAMs), Emerging Regional Markets (ERMs), and 
Integrated Peripheral Markets (IPMs). The PAM strategy is most apparent in the cases of very 
large continental-sized markets, China and India. Other opportunities still remain for smaller 
countries, to the extent that they can position themselves competitively within a regional 
‘automotive space’. The IPM strategy involves serving as low cost hubs for producers in the three 
“mega regions – East Asia, North America and Europe” (ibid.) as in the case of Eastern European 
countries and Turkey integrating into EU networks, and Mexico in the case of NAFTA. Within 
ERMs, members strive to achieve dominant positions as regional hubs of production and trade, as 
previously nationally-based production systems are reoriented in the face of fragmentation and 
agglomeration within the larger market.    
In summary, the developments discussed in the context of the context of the preceding section 
comprise the complex determinants of automotive sector outcomes that must be considered in 
my research design and method, as I seek to isolate and examine the impacts of the elimination of 




4 A MIXED METHOD APPROACH TO EVALUATING THE IMPACTS OF THE 
ELIMINATION OF LCRS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR  
4.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In the previous chapter, I positioned the implementation and elimination of LCRs in the historical 
context of the global automotive sector, and identified the pertinent location-specific factors that 
influence the economic geography of production, trade and investment in the intermediate parts 
and components sector. Having determined whether TRIMs have necessitated the elimination of 
LCRs in specific countries’ automotive sectors, this opens up the possibility of empirical 
comparison of impacts in (at least) two ways: across time, i.e. before and after the imposed policy 
change; and across countries, i.e. those on which the restriction has imposed a policy change and 
those for which policy change was not required. A third source of comparison, again of theoretical 
interest, arises from the comparison of the experiences of structurally diverse countries and 
regions (with respect to the aforementioned locational advantages), within the group of countries 
subject to the exogenous restriction.    
Turning now to my selection of concrete methods, I review the strengths and weaknesses of case- 
and variable-oriented methods as they pertain to different aspects of my research problem and 
different forms of comparison. In doing so, I establish a strong case for conducting mixed methods 
research, incorporating ‘difference-in-difference’ panel regression and comparative case studies. 
This mixed, ‘nested’ approach entails progression from a simple, additive linear model aimed at 
identifying and quantifying the ‘global’ impacts of the policy restriction, to a more expansive 
treatment of the complex factors that determine case-specific outcomes, and the mechanisms 
through which they operate, through a comparative, historical institutionalist approach.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 states the research problem in generic terms as 
one of causal inference in the presence of complexity. I provide an overview of the main features 
of case- and variable-oriented approaches to causal inference, identifying the main strengths and 
weaknesses of each, and the contexts in which they are appropriate. In section 4.3 I conclude that 
both case-and variable-oriented approaches are pertinent with respect to my research problem, 
and justify a ‘nested’, mixed method approach to examining the effects of the elimination of LCRs. 
In sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, I expound on the specific tools I employ in each stage to address each 
research question, justifying and describing the features of a difference-in-difference panel 
regression model and historical institutionalist, comparative case studies. Section 4.3.3 provides a 
statement of my final research questions. 
4.2 CASE- AND VARIABLE-ORIENTED METHODS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR A MIXED-METHOD 
APPROACH 
4.2.1 Statement of the research problem as empirical impact evaluation 
My research is concerned with causal attribution and explanation relating to the impacts42 of the 
implementation and elimination of LCRs. My principal concerns are the questions of empirical 
                                                          
42
 ‘Impact’ has been defined by the OECD (cited by Stern et al., 2012: 6) as “positive and negative, primary 
and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended 
or unintended”. Impact may be seen as synonymous with ‘effect’ and ‘outcome’ in most respects, with 
‘impact’ emphasising the long term, comprehensive nature of the phenomena to be examined.   
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impact evaluation (Stern et al., 2012): whether interventions ‘work’ as intended (i.e. whether a 
specified impact arises), to what extent they work (i.e. the magnitude of the impact), for whom 
they work (i.e. differential impacts within and between groups), and (perhaps) how they work (i.e. 
the causal mechanisms through which impacts arise).  
All of these questions presuppose, and seek to examine, causal relationships between the policy 
interventions on one hand and impacts on the other; claims about causality thus assume that 
variables act systematically to produce regular outcome; following Gerring (2005: 169) “we strive 
for knowledge of the humanly created world that is systematic, empirical, falsifiable, replicable 
and, in some sense, ‘objective’”. To this extent, my approach is broadly positivist. The key 
methodological questions concern the extent to which we are able – in practice – to generate 
such knowledge, rather than whether such regularity really exists; and how best to do so, given 
the phenomena in question. 
One of the most important distinctions is between experimental and non-experimental (or 
observational) designs. ‘True’ experimental designs permit the researcher to determine the 
application of the treatment, and through random allocation of units of analysis into ‘treatment’ 
and ‘control’ groups, obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment’s impacts. Thus, randomised 
control trials are considered the ‘gold standard’ of impact evaluation methods. However, for 
reasons that should be obvious, the process of randomising a policy treatment is not feasible in 
the case of the elimination of LCRs; social scientists are frequently obliged to rely on observational 
data.   
Non-experimental designs comprise the remainder of impact evaluation methods. Within 
quantitative methods, there are a number of ways in which researchers can estimate the 
counterfactual when they are unable to manipulate the assignment of treatment and control 
groups. Quasi-experimental designs seek to replicate the ‘gold standard’ by estimating a 
counterfactual that approximates conditions prevalent in the treatment groups. Natural 
experiments exploit a serendipitous variation of exposure to treatment that arises from an 
exogenous source. Statistical designs aim to control for heterogeneity between treatment and 
control groups by including confounding covariates. Under certain circumstances – when specific 
assumptions regarding the exogeneity of placement into treatment and control groups hold – the 
coefficients on dummy variables indicating the presence of treatment enable causal inference 
based on the provision of unbiased estimates of ‘average treatment effects’. Elements of each of 
these designs feature in my own research design, as I discuss in greater depth in section 4.3.1 
below.  
Beyond quantitative approaches to impact evaluation, Stern et al. (2012) identify theory-based, 
case-based, participatory and synthesis (i.e. meta) evaluations. Case-based approaches examine 
individual phenomena in greater detail than that permitted by most quantitative analyses, 
allowing researchers to situate large numbers of variables in their wider context, and to examine 
causal mechanisms and processes. Advances in comparative case techniques also permit “new 
opportunities for causal analysis” in relation to causal attribution (ibid.: 27; see also Rohlfing, 
2012). 
Since my research questions are empirical in nature, I discount theory-based approaches, while 
participatory and meta analyses are not appropriate due to the type of impact I am examining and 
the lack of existing studies, respectively. Therefore, the remainder of this section will relate to 
non-experimental designs that are appropriate to my research problem. In particular, I contrast 
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the key features of quantitative (or ‘variable-oriented’) and qualitative (or ‘case-oriented’) 
approaches throughout43.  
According to the Collier and Brady, all studies based on observational data are faced with the 
same, fundamental methodological difficulty: that of eliminating rival explanations in the absence 
of a counterfactual. There are a number of discussions in the literature relating to the 
‘methodological divide’ between quantitative / variable-oriented and qualitative / case-oriented 
approaches (Collier and Brady, 2004; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006; Mahoney and Goertz, 2012; 
Shalev et al., 2007). While the differences between the schools may be exaggerated – for 
example, scholars such as King et al. (1994: 4) have posited that differences are “methodological 
and substantively unimportant” – following Mahoney and Goertz (2006: 228), I aim to present a 
stylised view of each and describe “dominant norms and practices”. 
Throughout the discussion, I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each approach for 
addressing different elements of my overall research problem. I conclude that case-oriented and 
variable-oriented methods may offer distinct and complementary insights into the evaluation of 
the impacts of the TRIMs agreement, justifying a mixed method, ‘nested’ approach. “Once we 
acknowledge that not all analytic goals can be achieved simultaneously… then it is easier to move 
toward a recognition that alternative methodological tools are relevant and appropriate, 
depending on the goals and context of the research” (Collier and Brady, 2004: 9). The 
appropriateness of each school of methods, and more specific methodological tools, depends 
upon how the associated norms and assumptions fit with the research problem at hand. In 
addition, because the following discussion serves to identify the generic limitations of case- and 
variable-oriented approaches, it frames my choice of specific methodological tools as I try to 
overcome and mitigate any limitations.   
4.2.2 Generic features of case- and variable-oriented analytical approaches 
4.2.2.1 Explanatory goal and basis for causal inference and  
One of the most fundamental differences between variable- and case-oriented methods relates to 
what they seek to explain. The aim of variable-oriented research is to estimate the average 
“effects-of-causes” across a population of cases; that is, the average causal contribution of each 
variable specified in the model to the outcome(s) of interest (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012. Thus, 
such approaches seek to simplify explanations by estimating the direction and magnitude of the 
most important or theoretically interesting causal factors, and relegating others to the error term. 
As Hsiao (2007: 8) puts it, “it is neither feasible nor desirable to include all the factors affecting 
the outcome (…) in a model specification, since the purpose of modelling is not to mimic reality 
but to capture the essential forces affecting the outcome. It is typical to leave out those factors 
which are believed to have insignificant impacts or are peculiar to certain individuals” (my 
emphasis). In contrast, case-oriented researchers generally seek to identify specific “causes-of-
effects”, starting with a given outcome or empirical ‘puzzle’ that requires explanation and 
                                                          
43
 In the following discussion, I use the terms variable- and case-oriented as opposed to quantitative and 
qualitative. Firstly, as argued by Garborino and Holland (2009) the latter two terms more appropriately 
refer to the type of data used, rather than the method of analysis. Case studies, which are broadly 
considered as ‘qualitative’ in terms of the method of analysis, may predominantly or wholly utilise 
quantitative data. Secondly, we are concerned solely with methods aiming to demonstrate some form of 
causal relationship, and therefore wish to avoid confusion with interpretivist, post-modern, or descriptive 
analyses which are perhaps more commonly associated with a ‘qualitative’ ontological and epistemological 
stance and for which causal inference is not the aim. 
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uncovering the wider context in which the outcome occurs; the aim is to fully identify the 
complex and idiosyncratic conditions that leads to each case-specific outcome.  
Another way of conceptualising this crucial difference between the two approaches is to 
distinguish the variable-oriented goal of causal attribution through the identification of statistical 
relationships between variables, with the case-oriented goal of causal explanation, which is 
associated with the identification of ‘causal mechanisms’, by which we mean “intervening 
processes through which causes exert their effects” (Mahoney and Goertz, 2012: 100). Within the 
case-oriented paradigm, “researchers carry out this assessment by attempting to observe 
mechanisms through process tracing… within-case analysis of specific cases and the effort to 
observe mechanisms go together quite naturally”. In the words of Hall (2006: 27-28), process 
tracing  
assumes that observations bearing on a theory’s predictions about the process whereby an 
outcome is caused provide as relevant a test of that theory as predictions about the 
correspondence between a few key causal variables and the outcomes they are supposed to 
produce.  
These forms of within-case analysis may be contrasted with variable-oriented approaches through 
which causal inferences are drawn from ‘cross-case’ analysis of associations between 
independent and dependent variables (‘causes’ and ‘effects’); the perspective is typified by Abell’s 
(2004, cited in Bennett and Elman, 2006: 458) observation that “we cannot… speak of causal 
explanations until we have located a secure generalization by comparing cases… and protected 
our conclusions against any chance or spurious associations”.  
According to George and Bennett (2005: 207), within-case analysis thus offers “an alternative way 
for making causal inferences” when controlled comparisons are not feasible. However, the 
differences should not be exaggerated; it can be argued that both within- and cross-case analysis 
operate on the basis of counterfactual or ‘difference making’ reasoning; outcomes – whether 
intervening processes and mechanisms or final effects – must be explained by differences in 
explanatory factors. Approaches to causal inference are all attempts to solve the counterfactual 
problem: that we cannot directly observe the outcome that would have occurred in the absence 
of the hypothesised cause (Collier and Brady, 2004: 25). The crucial difference is that in within-
case analysis, the counterfactual is often hypothetical or implicit. It should also be noted that, as 
discussed below, case-oriented approaches can also incorporate cross-case analysis when 
multiple cases are compared. 
4.2.2.2 Population of interest 
Thus, following Ragin (2000), it is understood that variable-oriented analyses assume causal 
homogeneity with a relatively large population of interest; cases are treated as part of a random 
sample within larger hypothetical population, and the significant differences between them are 
adequately captured by quantitative indicators, e.g. introduced as control variables. As Ragin 
notes, however, this assumption is often challenged from the alternative case-oriented 
perspective that units may vary in qualitative terms: that there may be differences in kind as well 
as in degree within a given population. It may be more appropriate under these circumstances to 
analyse more limited populations.  
Due these differences, there may be an inherent tension or trade-off between the identification 
of causal regularities, enabled by statistical analysis of a large population, and the exploration of 
diversity among cases which is enabled by focusing on a more limited subpopulation; the problem 
is striking a balance between the two goals.  
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Social scientists like to generalize about causes. If they can, they try to identify powerful 
generic causes that are relevant to broad populations… But there can be too much of a good 
thing. Social scientists’ preference for broad generalizations often leads them down a path of 
excessive abstraction and away from understanding diversity (Ragin, 2000: 88-93).  
The concerns of the researcher, in this context, include the extent to which the impacts arising 
from the elimination of LCRs are amenable to broad generalisation across a large (global) 
population characterised by causal homogeneity, and the extent to which they are best 
understood as embedded in the complex specificity of the contexts in which they occur.  
It seems evident that countries that implement LCRs are likely to have specific characteristics (i.e. 
an automotive sector dominated by foreign MNCs and an underdeveloped or uncompetitive 
supply sector) that means that their ‘path’ to improved industrial performance may follow a 
different ‘catch-up’ logic in which the impacts of specific policies is different from their impact in 
countries with more established automotive sectors. Whereas in the variable-oriented approach 
these might be viewed as differences in degree, sufficiently captured by variation in the level of 
covariates, in the case-oriented approach one might consider these to be differences in kind. As a 
result, the population of interest may be defined more narrowly.   
4.2.2.3 Data requirements 
In case-oriented research, entities are examined in their entirety, i.e. in their full context. This 
usually implies two related characteristics: the number of cases is small, and the number of 
variables is large. Case-oriented analyses may incorporate ‘thick’ data on all relevant concepts and 
variables of interest which may include institutional and historical detail not amenable for 
quantification and richer, often country-specific, sources of data. In turn, this permits the 
elaboration and exploration of an analytical framework of complex and conjunctive causation in 
which the context in which policies are embedded – and by extensive their timing and sequencing 
with respect to other causal conditions – plays an important part in the determination of their 
impacts, as discussed below. As already noted, case-oriented research also implies the analysis of 
data on intervening causal mechanisms and processes. As Hall (2006) explains, “the investigator 
should seek as large and diverse a set of observations as feasible from each case. Ceteris paribus, 
a theory that survives tests against more observations of different kinds is more likely to be valid 
than one tested against a smaller or more homogenous set of observations”.  
In variable-oriented research, on the other hand, cases are rendered invisible except for “as the 
source of a set of empirical observations on dependent and independent variables” (Shalev et al., 
2007: 263). The power of statistical tests rests on the number of cases (or, more accurately, of 
observations). These attributes have additional implications for the data requirements of each 
type of analysis. Variable-oriented analyses require a relatively limited number of indicators – i.e. 
those which exhibit significant effects on outcomes of interest – but they must be standardised 
for comparison across cases, precisely and quantitatively measured, and available across a larger 
population. The value of statistical models will therefore depend on how well conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks can be operationalised, for example in terms of the incorporation of 
appropriate control variables. In this regard, as Shalev observes, “macro-comparative research is 
also dogged by the ambiguity of many of the variables of interest and the difficulty of measuring 
them precisely” (Shalev et al., 2007: 266). This limits the number of sources of data that may be 
incorporated into analysis; the restriction may be particularly onerous when carrying out panel 
data analysis, as some relevant indicators may not be available for the full time period under 
investigation, although some missing data are acceptable provided there is no systematic bias 
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that may affect the estimation of parameters. The feasibility of variable-oriented approaches in 
the present context thus depends upon the availability of data through which to model the 
determinants of industrial performance outcomes, including the number of cases for which 
observations are available.  
4.2.2.4 Treatment of causal complexity and heterogeneity 
According to a number of commentators, one of the most important differences between 
variable- and case-oriented approaches is their treatment of causation (Mahoney and Goertz, 
2006; Shalev et al., 2007). While it is true that “both quantitative and qualitative researchers 
assume that causal patterns in the real world are in certain ways quite complex… the form of 
causal complexity varies across the quantitative and qualitative paradigms” (Goertz and Mahoney, 
2012: 56).  
Case-oriented approaches generally assume a view of causation in which necessary and sufficient 
causes are distinguished (Ragin, 2000)44. The criteria for identifying sufficient and necessary 
conditions are straightforward. In the case of sufficient conditions, all instances of the cause must 
lead to the effect; in the case of necessity, all instances of the effect must include the presence of 
the cause. In fact, there are few causes that are strictly sufficient and necessary for an effect to 
take place. Case-oriented scholars have developed the concepts of the INUS condition: an 
“insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions”. 
In other words, INUS conditions are those that are individually neither necessary nor sufficient to 
an effect to occur, but which are necessary parts of a conjunction of conditions, which may itself 
be sufficient for an effect to occur45. Such a view of causation relates to the idea of equifinality, 
that is, the possibility that there are multiple (but limited) “causal paths to the same outcome” 
(Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 232) as well as the conceptualisation of complexity in terms of 
‘conjunctional causation’. Following Rihoux (2006: 682), this implies that: 
1) most often, it is a combination of conditions (independent variables) that eventually 
produces a phenomenon – the outcome (dependent variable); 2) several different 
combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome; and 3) depending on the 
context, on the conjuncture, a given condition may very well have a different impact on the 
outcome. Thus different causal paths – each path being relevant, in a distinct way – may lead 
to the same outcome.  
Furthermore, in the presence of cumulative causation and positive feedback, it is commonly 
assumed in case-oriented research that variables may exhibit dynamic causal asymmetry: “the 
movement of a variable, say from presence to absence, does not have the same impact as moving 
in the other direction” (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012: 64), but rather, may give rise to irreversible 
                                                          
44
 In this view, X is a sufficient cause of Y to the extent that Y always occurs wherever X is present. Certainly, 
this could be considered a causal relationship. But we can also conceive of causes that are not sufficient, i.e. 
in which every instance of X does not necessarily lead to Y. Brady (2008) offers the example of the causes of 
a fire. “Striking a match, for example, may be necessary for it to light, but it may not light unless there is 
enough oxygen in the atmosphere. Is striking a match never a cause of a match lighting? This leads to an 
alternative definition in which “X is a cause of Y if and only if X is necessary for Y”. This definition of a 
necessary cause suggests that it must be present but will not always lead to the effect.   
45
 To illustrate, consider again the example of the causes of a fire, following Brady (2008), who hypotheses a 
scenario with two possible ways in which a fire may occur: through a combination of an electrical fault (A) 
heating a wooden framing (B) or a gas canister (C) exposed to an open flame (D). Such a scenario of INUS 
causes may be expressed through the following Boolean equation:  
Y (fire) = (A AND B) OR (C AND D) 
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outcomes by foreclosing (or reducing the likelihood of) other possibilities (causal paths) from 
occurring (Pierson, 2000: 251).   
In contrast, the perspective embodied in variable-oriented research such as multiple regression is 
(often) epitomised by assumptions about the linear additivity or marginality of causal effects 
(Shalev, 2007: 264; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 233). Linear additivity refers to an understanding 
of causation in which variables exert an independent and consistent effect across all cases, time 
periods and contexts, which is estimated under the assumption that other variables remain 
constant; coefficients are added to estimate the combined effect of multiple variables. 
Heterogeneity between cases is usually captured through the identification and inclusion of other 
control variables in the statistical model. In the terms of Goertz and Mahoney (2012), the 
relationship between the independent variable (the presence of LCRs) and the dependent variable 
(industrial performance outcome) implied by this model is characterised by ‘dynamic causal 
symmetry’. That is,  
with a fully symmetric causal effect, X will have the same effect on Y regardless of the 
direction of change. One can view this kind of causal symmetry in terms of a counterfactual: 
causal relationships are symmetric when they are counterfactually reversible. The effect on Y 
of a given change on X would disappear if X returned to its original value (ibid.: 64).  
Linear additivity has been heavily criticised as overly simplistic; “all too often general linear 
models have led to general linear reality, to a limited way of imagining the social process’’ 
(Abbott, 1998): linear additivity does not adequately capture the nature of the causal relationship 
where conjunctive and cumulative causation, and causal heterogeneity, are present46. For 
example, in the case of INUS conditions, it is a combination of causes that raises the probability of 
the event: the presence of each cause individually – holding others equal – would not do so, 
although general linear models would produce estimates to that effect47.  
Of course, quantitative statistical models can account for heterogeneous causal effects with the 
incorporation of interaction effects48 and multilevel models, and mechanisms of positive feedback 
may be incorporated as quadratic terms and lags. However, these techniques are often infeasible 
as a result of data requirements49. In any case, the crucial difference between the two approaches 
is that in case-oriented research, “one often focuses primarily on the impact of combinations of 
                                                          
46
 As noted in Shalev et al. (2007: 264) “Abbot notes the constricted theoretical scope of the notion of 
causality underlying linear models, which cannot recognize (or at least is unlikely to recognize) situations 
where the effect of any given causal variable is uneven, contradictory (dialectical), or part of a wider bundle 
of factors sharing an elective affinity”. 
47
 To continue the example above, the probability of a fire starting expressed in a linear additive model 
would be as follows: 
Y = β_1 A+β_2 B+β_3 C+β_4 D 
The coefficients would incorrectly imply that each INUS condition had an individual and independent causal 
effect on the outcome Y.   
48
 The equivalent of the equation in footnote 47 above can easily be expressed using statistical language in 
the following model: 
Y = β_1 A+β_2 B+β_3 C+β_4 D+(β_5 A*B)+ (β_6 C*D)+ε   
Here, we assume that a fire occurs once Y reaches a certain threshold; higher coefficients for each causal 
condition raise the probability of the event occurring. However, coefficients for β_1- β_4 would be correctly 
estimated as zero, to reflect the individual impact of each variable on the probability of fire occurring. 
49
 As Shalev et al. (2007: 264) observe, the problem is not that variable-oriented research “does not have or 
could not invent technologies for dealing with such complexities… The point is that because such 
techniques are either difficult to employ or impose a steep statistical penalty due to the ‘‘small-n problem’’, 
they are rarely or insufficiently used”.  
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variables and only occasionally focuses on the effects of individual variables… in the quantitative 
tradition, by contrast, one is more likely to be focused on estimating the effect of individual 
causes” (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 235). 
Clearly then, the utility of each approach for examining depends upon the extent to which the 
elimination of LCRs is usefully conceptualised as an independent, marginal cause, or in 
conjunction with conditions with which their effects are jointly determined. It also depends upon 
the necessity and feasibility of incorporating more advanced functional forms into the statistical 
model, given the availability of data.   
4.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR A MIXED METHOD, ‘NESTED’ APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
It is clear from the above discussion that both case- and variable-oriented methods have specific 
strengths and weaknesses for answering different types of research question and depending upon 
the availability of data. Our ability to carry out valid and reliable analyses, and the viability of each 
specific method, depend upon the practicalities of data availability as well as issues of 
conceptualisation and operationalisation with respect to the determinants of industrial 
performance. 
As summarised concisely by Khandker et al. (2010): 
Impact evaluations using quantitative data from statistically representative samples are 
better suited to assessing causality by using econometric methods or reaching generalizable 
conclusions. However, qualitative methods allow the in-depth study of selected issues, cases, 
or events… There are significant trade-offs in selecting one technique over another. 
The conceptual and theoretical framework developed during the course of the previous two 
chapters suggests that the elimination of LCRs may give rise to a common effect that can be 
inferred from cross-case comparison based on the association of this cause with industrial 
performance outcomes, subject to sufficient controls being introduced to capture heterogeneity 
at the country level. At the same time, the specific effects of LCRs (and their elimination) are likely 
to be contingent on wider contextual factors, such as the capabilities and advantages of each 
country, examination of which is facilitated through within-case analysis of causal mechanisms.  
Therefore, both the “effects-of-causes” and “causes of effects” explanatory goals are relevant in 
the context of my research problem. I am interested in estimating the average causal effect of the 
elimination of LCRs over the wider population through comparison between the countries in 
which the prohibition of LCRs required a domestic policy change and those in which it did not. I 
am also concerned with a more holistic understanding of the causal mechanisms contributing to 
this effect and the explanation of divergent outcomes within the narrower population of 
countries in which LCRs were in force prior to the TRIMs Agreement.  
The evaluation of the elimination of LCRs thus provides an interesting context in which to carry 
out – and also evaluate the utility of – mixed method research. There are a number of distinct 
methodological justifications for mixed method approaches to impact evaluation. Following 
Garborino and Holland (2009), quantitative and case study methods may be integrated for several 
reasons, each of which is pertinent to my own research design. Firstly, one method may be 
employed as a preliminary stage to another (principal) method. For example, quantitative 
research may be carried out in order to identify appropriate cases for comparison; or qualitative 
research may be used to inform the construction of a quantitative model, in terms of the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of covariates. Similarly, the first stage may be used to 
develop hypotheses to examine with further research.  
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Another reason to use mixed methods is the triangulation of findings. Triangulation aims to 
enhance the validity of findings by comparing data obtained from different sources (and 
potentially using different methods of data generation). As Bamberger observes, “when estimates 
from different sources converge and agree this increases the validity and credibility of findings or 
interpretation. When different estimates are not consistent, the researcher explores further to 
understand the reason for the inconsistencies” (2012: 4).  
A third justification is to use the different methods to explain or examine different aspects or sub-
questions of the research problem, or to build on the findings of one method with another, thus 
making the findings more comprehensive. As described above, a quantitative impact evaluation 
may address questions relating to the presence, direction and magnitude of a causal relationship, 
while qualitative methods may be used to examine the causal mechanisms and processes through 
which causation is manifest.  
I have elected to pursue a nested approach50 (following Lieberman, 2005), in which the 
advantages of each approach are not only combined, “but also there is a synergistic value” in the 
manner in which the stages of my research are sequenced; variable-oriented analysis feeds into 
my case studies by providing data on which to base my case selection, and, at the same time, the 
quantitative analysis leaves unanswered a number of complementary but distinct research 
questions. To the extent that both stages pertain to the same overarching research – assessing 
the developmental impacts of restrictions on policy space restrictions in the context of LCRs in the 
automotive sector – they also provide an opportunity to triangulate findings arising from different 
data sources and analytical frameworks.   
4.3.1 Variable-oriented / quantitative approach 
Large-n variable-oriented analysis is employed as the first stage to compare the aggregate impacts 
of the elimination of LCRs between countries based on whether LCRs were in force at the time the 
external policy restriction was imposed; the aim here is to “gain inferential leverage in addressing 
rival explanations” by maximising the number of observations (Collier and Brady, 2004: 11). As I 
acknowledge in the following sections, “behind the apparent precision of quantitative findings lie 
many potential problems concerning equivalence of cases, conceptualization and measurement, 
assumptions about the data, and choices about model specification such as which variables to 
include. The interpretability of quantitative findings is strongly constrained by the skill with which 
these problems are addressed” (Collier and Brady, 2004: 9-10). 
As succinctly summarised by Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001), Winters (2004), Akyüz (2005b) and 
Chang (2005), econometric work on causal relationships between trade policy and economic 
performance face a number of difficulties. These include problems measuring trade policy 
stances51 and conceptual problems relating to causal inference. The difficulties relating to 
                                                          
50
 This approach “combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation 
of one or more of the cases contained within the large sample” (Lieberman, 2005: 435-6). 
51
 A number of largely discredited studies (e.g. Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995) take trade openness 
(measured by the ratio of trade to GDP for example) as a proxy for trade policy, neglecting that trade 
openness is itself a consequence of strong economic performance as well as of the policy regime, and thus 
subject to intractable issues of endogeneity (Chang, 2005: 69). In other studies, the readily quantifiable 
nature of the main instrument of protection as well as the availability of fine-grained and comprehensive 
data, have led to protection and liberalisation being operationalised in terms of average tariff rates (Rodrik 
and Rodriguez, 2001: 262). However, as Wade (1993) convincingly demonstrates with respect to Taiwan, 
low average tariff rates can mask considerable variation, while gradual liberalisation is consistent with the 
rationale for infant industrial protection (as discussed below). Relatively low nominal tariff rates can also 
mask extremely high effective rates of protection for the assembly sector, as discussed in section 3.6.2.2 
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causality are more fundamental. There are major problems distinguishing correlation from 
causality, and determining the direction of the latter, where an association between liberalisation 
and improved performance is found (Akyüz, 2005). Ultimately, the statistical difficulties involved 
in causal inference are extremely difficult to overcome – especially so in cross-sectional regression 
– for several major (and related) reasons. Firstly, policy stance is partly determined by economic 
performance, leading to problems of selection bias and endogeneity; for example, trade and 
industrial policies by their very nature target less competitive sectors (Rodrik, 2005).  
More generally, statistical inference is only valid provided that “all units with the same value of 
the explanatory variables have the same expected value of the dependent variable” (King et al., 
1994: 91). If we accept the view that the relationship between the policy variable and economic 
performance varies qualitatively in conjunction with contextual factors (e.g. relating to 
institutional setting and technological capabilities) such that causal effects only pertain “to a 
particular domain of cases” (Collier and Brady, 2004: 29), then econometric analysis that does not 
account for this is flawed: in technical terms “the ‘homogeneity condition’ is violated, producing 
unstable parameters” (Chang, 2005: 69). Even when policies may be assumed to exhibit a 
consistent, homogenous effect across heterogeneous unit, there are many factors which co-
determine economic performance; as Akyüz (2005b: 18) puts it, “while trade policy itself has an 
independent influence on the chances of success of an industrialisation strategy, empirical 
techniques used cannot always separate its effects from those of a host of other factors”. My 
approach to overcome these methodological difficulties are outlined below, before more 
comprehensive discussion in chapter 5.  
4.3.1.1 Difference-in-difference panel regression  
I take advantage of the opportunity of a natural experiment in the form of an exogenous policy 
restriction to minimise the usual issues with respect to endogeneity of the decision to engage in 
liberalisation. As a result of the multilateral nature of TRIMs restrictions, in which countries were 
permitted a narrow timescale in which to remove prohibited policies, the elimination of LCRs was 
exogenously determined52 (although as discussed below, implementation in the first place was 
not, leading to the problems of selection bias).  
The problem of measuring trade policy stance has been simplified by the existence of 
comprehensive data on the incidence of LCRs in the post-WTO period, as discussed in section 
3.5.4, which permit the construction of a dummy variable, as discussed in section 5.4.1 of the 
following chapter, corresponding to instances in which LCRs were implemented in the automotive 
sector to support domestic intermediate goods producers. This allows the possibility of evaluating 
the impact of LCRs targeted at performance in this narrow subsector, in which there are 
(relatively) few confounding factors, compared to the determinants of industrial performance 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and footnote 40. Finally, a number of studies (e.g. Greenaway et al., 2002; Santos-Paulino and Thirwall, 
2004; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008) seek to pinpoint the timing of instances of liberalisation in time-series or 
panel models. These studies are more methodologically robust, and most closely relate to my own research 
design, but their results are still highly sensitive to the operationalisation of liberalisation episodes. 
52
 This is not usually the case, as policies are determined politically and will typically be phased out when 
they have achieved their aims, or because they are unsuccessful, for example – and will therefore be 
endogenously associated with the performance outcome. The exogeneity condition is not quite satisfied, 
since countries were able to request extensions and therefore didn’t eliminate LCRs simultaneously; this 
may bias the estimation of the post-treatment coefficient if governments have prolonged the use of LCRs 
such that they are endogenously related to performance outcomes, i.e. either because they wish to 
continue with the implementation of a successful policy or because the goals of the policy have not yet 
been achieved. However, extensions were strictly time-bound, and in addition, I control for pertinent 
covariates affecting performance outcomes, as discussed below.     
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more broadly. In other words, the policy impact is (more) likely to be large enough to show up 
against ‘noise’ in the data. 
Although there is some diversity in the specificity of design and implementation of LCRs, in 
practice they are similar enough to warrant the assumption of causal homogeneity: they have 
been used to promote import substitution (localisation) and, ultimately, export competitiveness 
in the parts and components subsector. This assumption is necessary in order to permit any 
generalisation about the effects of the implementation and elimination of LCRs per se, although I 
acknowledge that features of design – e.g. the proportion of local content required, the process 
of consultation through which the mandated proportion of local content was determined, 
whether LCRs were mandatory or attached to incentives, and the nature of incentives – are, in 
fact, subject to variation between different countries, as I discuss below.  
The construction of a dummy variable signifying the elimination of LCRs permits comparison of 
performance outcomes over time and across groups, according to the logic of the difference-in-
difference (DID) design, as explained below. In the most basic form of the DID design, there are 
two time periods under consideration: pre- and post-treatment. These correspond to the periods 
in which LCRs were permitted, and were practiced in a number of countries (pre-treatment) and 
in which LCRs were prohibited, and phased out (post-treatment). Treatment and control groups 
are based on the distinction between countries which were required to eliminate LCRs in 
intermediate goods in the post-treatment period, and those which were not. This simple heuristic 
framework thus permits comparison of performance outcomes between the two time periods 
and groups of countries. Performance outcomes must be amenable to quantitative measurement, 
such that we can identify whether they are positive or negative in the post-treatment period in 
relation to the pre-treatment time period, establishing the first difference in performance 
outcomes. The second difference – the DID – is simply the difference between the first differences 
of the treatment and control groups. The DID comparative framework is illustrated in figure 4-1 
below, for heuristic purposes. 
Figure 4-1: Difference-in-difference research design as a comparative framework 
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This design removes some sources of endogeneity and group-level heterogeneity, because we are 
effectively able to control for initial differences in performance outcomes between groups. The 
crucial assumption of this approach is that in the absence of the policy treatment, performance 
outcomes in both the treatment and control groups would have experienced the same trends 
over time. These issues are explored further in chapter 5, in which I generalise the DID approach 
to a panel data specification incorporating fixed country effects. To the extent that time trends 
are unlikely to have been homogenous across the treatment and control groups, the use of panel 
data permits me to operationalise the crucial time-varying determinants of industrial 
performance in the parts and components sector – industrial capabilities and market size – in 
order to control for these factors.  
Four main limitations of this variable-oriented approach motivate my decision to carry out 
complementary case-oriented research. Firstly, I wish to relax the assumption of causal 
homogeneity across the entire global population, which implies that the only pertinent difference 
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between the groups – other than that captured by industrial capabilities and market size 
covariates – pertains to the fact that the treatment group have undertaken policy reform, 
whereas the control group have not. As a result, the DID estimator is intended to capture a 
hypothetical causal effect applicable to the wider population of countries. In reality, there are 
likely to unobserved factors associated with the decision to implement such policies that suggest 
the existence of a qualitatively distinct subpopulation of LCR-users (as discussed below).  
Secondly, the idea that the elimination of LCRs would exert a homogenous effect, even across this 
narrower population, contradicts our understanding of most causal relationships as contingent on 
the interaction or conjunction of various conditions, and are subject to non-linear dynamics such 
as positive feedback mechanisms. While variable-oriented approaches necessarily simplify 
complex relationships, elements of these are perhaps best examined using alternative 
approaches. As the empirical evidence clearly demonstrates, motivations are not uniform across 
countries, which may have the characteristics of developmental or predatory states with 
implications for their capacities to resist protectionist pressures from domestic rent-seeking 
lobbies, design effective policies, and encourage technological accumulation more generally 
(Evans, 1995). More generally, the effects of LCRs and their elimination are expected to be 
contingent on their conjunction with a host of locational advantages. Although in principle, it may 
be feasible to model heterogeneous policy impacts using interaction terms and multilevel 
techniques, these techniques have considerable data requirements and due to the degrees of 
freedom problem, were not feasible in the present case.   
Thirdly, the DID approach does not permit exploration of the possibility that LCRs are subject to 
non-linear dynamics such as positive feedback mechanisms. The approach implicitly assumes 
dynamic causal symmetry. Performance outcomes are explicitly compared across the pre- and 
post-treatment periods; to the extent that the period in which LCRs were eliminated is 
characterised by a given change in performance outcomes – either positive or negative – the 
model posits that the outcomes that pertained during the period in which LCRs were in force 
were necessarily the converse. The logic of the case-oriented stage is different: while eliminating 
LCRs may have had a positive impact, LCRs may also have improved performance. Both policy 
stances (protection and liberalisation) are part of a sequenced strategy, the appropriateness of 
which is determined by causal conditions that pertain in each time period (consistent with the 
logic of infant industrial protection).  
Finally, in common with most variable-oriented approaches, the DID approach described here 
does not attend to causal explanation through the examination of causal mechanisms, but rather 
to causal attribution through statistical association. As such, without specification of the specific 
mechanism through which the observed association occurs, explanations are necessarily 
incomplete, particularly when more than one plausible narrative of causal mechanisms exists 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 225).  
4.3.2 Comparative case-oriented approach  
As a result of these limitations, my quantitative analysis feeds into small-n, case-oriented analysis. 
There are several ways in which the purpose and analytical logic of my case studies differ from 
those of the panel regression analysis.  
In this stage, it is not my intention to identify a general causal effect arising from the elimination 
of LCRs, which is facilitated, in the quantitative stage, by the statistical properties of the large 
sample size. Instead, I am interested in the examination of the causal mechanisms through which 
relationships between causes and outcomes are established – namely the activities, decisions and 
strategies of local and global firms in response to the advantages and policies in different 
countries – and the role of the implementation and elimination of LCRs therein. These causal 
85 
 
mechanisms are explored largely through the incorporation of richer, often country-specific 
sources of data, including secondary data sources.  
Besides permitting me to explore causal mechanisms, case studies allow more comprehensive 
operationalisation of location-specific advantages and policy factors that are either omitted from 
or are only partially captured by the DID approach described above. This opens up the possibility 
that the impacts of the implementation and liberalisation of LCRs have been confounded by wider 
policies affecting automotive sector development, including alternative policies promoting parts 
and components sector development. Thus, I am interested in examining causal conditions in 
their entirety and how they have combined to produce the observed industrial performance 
outcomes in different contexts. In turn, this facilitates the elaboration and exploration of an 
analytical framework of complex and conjunctive causation in which the context in which policies 
are embedded – and by extensive their timing and sequencing with respect to other causal 
conditions – plays an important part in the determination of their impacts. The most appropriate 
analytical framework for analysing these types of effects is historical institutionalism, and that is 
the approach I adopt here. 
4.3.2.1 Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism can be seen as an analytical approach rather than a specific method, 
the main features of which include the prioritisation of detailed, case-specific analysis; a particular 
focus on institutions, broadly understood as the formal and informal rules, organisational 
structures and norms that shape actors’ behaviour; the importance accorded to contextual 
factors shaping policy and institutional outcomes; and the importance accorded to temporal 
factors and dynamic, cumulative effects (Pierson, 2000; Leftwich, 2007; Steinmo, 2008). Historical 
institutionalism is closely associated with ‘process tracing’ and the examination of causal 
mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005).   
This approach relates to several of the core themes emerging from my literature review. Firstly, 
the institutional capacities and characteristics of the state are of crucial importance in 
determining industrial policy outcomes. Studies of the successful East Asian developmental states 
(Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990) have shown that effective intervention is possible, and have 
documented the conditions in which states have been able to simultaneously stimulate and 
discipline private capital; these conditions, relating to the ‘embeddedness’ of state actors within 
private capital, and the quality of the bureaucracy, have been explored in historical, comparative 
work by Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004). Historical institutionalism can thus be seen to contribute 
to an “increasingly sophisticated appreciation of institutions” that has “helped to shed light on 
key development puzzles, including the question of why similar policies in different countries 
often have quite different outcomes” (Doner et al. 2006b: 3).  
Secondly, the outcomes of LCRs are seen as dependent on the conjunction of implementation 
with other conditions besides the political character of the state: advantages and capabilities at 
the firm and national level, including policies and institutions relating to technological learning 
more broadly, and the strategic priorities and governance structures that are specific to individual 
firms and sectors. These conditions can include external factors such as the capabilities and 
advantages of alternative locations for production. Much of the existing research into automotive 
policy regimes and the dynamics of global automotive value chains, reviewed in the previous 
chapter, comes from a historical institutionalist perspective (e.g. Humphrey et al., 2000; Carrillo et 
al. (eds.), 2004; Doner et al., 2006a, 2006b; Sturgeon et al., 2008; Wad, 2008). Such a perspective 
permits the researcher to fully explore the complex interplay of lead firm strategies, supply and 
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demand conditions, and policy and institutional factors that contribute to specific patterns of 
production, trade and investment and which are unlikely to be captured by simpler 
methodological tools.  
The interaction of policies and institutions with wider contextual factors further implies “two 
types of historical contingency: temporal context (period effects) and time paths (particular 
historical sequences or cumulations)” (Shalev et al., 2007: 264). An historical orientation – beyond 
the trivial acknowledgement that social phenomena are affected by preceding circumstances and 
events – is justified. For example, the feasibility of local suppliers achieving efficient levels of 
production in relation to alternative sources of supply may change as a result of technological 
advances that permit coordination of productive activities over greater distances, including 
reductions in transport costs, and as geographically proximate locations develop their own supply 
capabilities. It is plausible that in one temporal context, LCRs would be an effective means 
through which states could alter arbitrary flows of investment in their favour; in a later period, 
having not been implemented in the previously favourable circumstances, LCRs may cease to be 
effective if, for example, an alternative location has become established as a competitive 
producer. Thus, “specific patterns of timing and sequencing matter”; widely divergent outcomes 
may arise as a result of positive feedback effects which foreclose other possibilities (paths) from 
occurring (Pierson, 2000: 251). Positive feedback occurs when constant returns to scale, 
agglomeration effects, and dynamic processes of learning lead to ‘stickiness’ of industrial 
locations; these phenomenon clearly pertain to industrial development and the impacts of 
industrial policies. Historical institutionalism thus takes seriously the notion that timing and 
sequencing of reform may be of crucial significance.  
Specifically, the historical institutionalist approach is congruent with a conceptual and theoretical 
framework in which the impact of the elimination of LCRs may be conditional on the impact of the 
implementation of LCRs and other policies in the previous time period; that the impact of LCRs 
elimination may be influenced by the cumulative impacts of the causal mechanisms for which 
LCRs provided an impetus, whether positive or negative. For example, in the case of the former, 
LCRs may have encouraged import-substituting inward investment that gave rise to subsequent 
improvements in performance through the mechanisms of technological learning and 
achievement of greater economies of scale. In the case of negative impacts, LCRs may have 
deterred investment such that even if the business environment improved post-liberalisation, 
existing capabilities were not sufficient to take advantage of the increased market opportunities 
and local firms eliminated by the influx of competition. 
4.3.2.2 Comparative strategy 
The other key feature of my case studies is their multi-case, comparative nature. Case studies 
need not be comparative. Within-case analysis does not rely on comparison, and can fruitfully be 
carried out for single cases. In other words, case study analysis would make a valuable 
contribution to my research question even if no explicit comparisons were made – by providing 
“an in-depth insight” (Rihoux, 2006: 680) into the relationships between causes and outcomes via 
causal mechanisms. However, comparison also facilitates the additional and “apparently 
contradictory” goals of generalisation and cross-case causal inference in the context of case-
oriented analysis (ibid.). 
Comparison can occur at two different levels, within- and cross-case, corresponding to whether 
cases are compared with respect to their mechanisms or their causal conditions (i.e. at the level 
of variables) respectively. Following Rohlfing (2012: 97): 
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In principle, comparisons can be made of the cross-case level, the within-case level, and both 
simultaneously… A within-case comparison is appropriate for discerning whether the causal 
mechanism and causal processes are similar in the two (or more) cases at hand. In a cross 
case comparison, on the other hand, one is determining the nature of the causal effect of a 
given cause.  
Both levels of comparison are interesting and important in relation to my research. All of the 
countries under examination here are considered as part of a causally homogenous population 
with respect to the impact of the elimination of LCRs, yet exhibit considerable diversity in terms of 
their structural characteristics. The question of interest is whether the causal mechanisms at hand 
– e.g. integration into global production networks of local and foreign firms, and firm-level 
decisions to engage in technology transfer and upgrading – are common to more than one case, 
regardless of the performance outcomes exhibited by each. Thus, the commonality of causal 
mechanisms and outcomes in the presence of the common policy space restriction is an 
important concern of my research, and therefore, within-case comparison is an important aspect 
of my case selection strategy. The purpose of multi-case analysis in this respect is what Yin (2014: 
43) calls “analytical generalization” through which we strive to “generalize a particular set of 
results to some broader theory”. In this regard, I am motivated by a concern to cover a range of 
diverse and substantively interesting cases, in order to enhance the scope for analytical 
generalisation in the presence of similar causal mechanisms. 
At the same time, to the extent that outcomes and indeed mechanisms vary across cases, these 
may provide insights into the divergent effects of LCRs with respect to their conjunction with 
wider structural factors at the cross-case level. There is considerable diversity across cases in ways 
that potentially influence industrial performance outcomes. In this respect, cross-case comparison 
can combine the strengths of within-case analysis, as described above, with causal attribution via 
‘difference making’. In this context, since the sub-population under examination have all 
implemented and eliminated LCRs, ‘difference makers’ are in terms of the wider location-specific 
characteristics which form the contexts in which reforms have occurred.  
Two basic comparative strategies for causal attribution are identified in the methodological 
literature, emanating from John Stuart Mill’s methods of difference and agreement (see, e.g., De 
Meur and Gottcheiner, 2009). The basic principle of the method of difference is to compare two 
cases that differ with regard to the outcome to be explained, and in one other respect, which is 
isolated as the cause. The intuitively appealing idea is that differences must explain differences; 
the only variable that differs must explain the outcome. The basic principle of the method of 
agreement is to compare two cases that have the same outcome, but differ in all relevant 
respects but one, which is isolated as the cause. The intuition here is the reverse of the method of 
difference: differences cannot explain similarities, so the variables that differ must be eliminated 
as possible causes of the effect. 
There are serious limitations to causal inference from small-n cross-case comparisons except in 
the unusual circumstance that the comparison is ‘ideal’53. However, these limitations can be 
                                                          
53
 Ideal comparisons are those which perfectly meet the criteria above, in that two cases are found which 
agree and differ in all theoretically relevant respects. In contrast, if a comparison is imperfect, the 
inferences that we are able to draw are indeterminate: more than one inference may be feasible (Rohlfing, 
2012: 98). Even in the context of an ideal comparison – which may be very difficult to find in an empirical 
reality characterised by few instances of a given phenomenon – Mill’s methods have been subject to much 
criticism. For a start, the causal inferences that arise are only valid in a highly limited set of circumstances. 
These circumstances include the fact that all relevant variables or conditions must be identified by the 
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attenuated by increasing the number of cases, restricting generalisations to narrower populations 
via ‘scoping conditions’, and thus making more conditional (contingent) generalisations (Rohlfing, 
2012). 
It should be mentioned, following Rihoux (2006) and other comparative methodologists, that case 
selection is ultimately the result of an iterative process between theoretical and empirical work. 
That is, theory guides case selection by presenting the empirical categories through which to view 
cases; and empirical examination of those cases presents the researcher with more detailed and 
(hopefully) valid measurement of the key variables – and thus feeds back into case selection. This 
implies that unlike in quantitative research, in which ‘selecting on Y variables’ is a source of bias, 
in case-oriented work, the researcher has to uncover the most pertinent aspects of diversity in 
causal conditions and identify positive and negative outcomes in order to select relevant cases 
(Mahoney and Goertz, 2012: 239-241).  
In this context, I collated a considerable amount of empirical data about my cases in the course of 
my review of the literature on the dynamics and drivers of the automotive sector, as well as 
through the construction of my panel dataset. In particular, chapter 3 serves to illustrate the 
pertinence of regional institutional configurations and market growth to industrial performance; 
and through examination of parts and components sectors outcomes over time within the group 
of countries that have eliminated LCRs, I have identified cases with divergent levels of 
performance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
researcher and specified with no measurement error, and that there are no interaction effects (or 
conjunctions) between those identified. Omitted variables and measurement error affect the validity of 
causal inferences from comparisons even before the addition of further complications (Rohlfing, 2012: 123). 
The researcher is faced with a trade-off, since increasing the number of variables (causes) increases the 
probability that the comparison is suboptimal (ibid.: 124). Perhaps more importantly – in light of the 
significance of complex causation and causal heterogeneity (i.e. the existence of different ‘paths’ to the 
same outcome for case-oriented researchers – causal inferences deriving from Mill’s methods assume no 
interaction effects. Allowing for the possibility of conjunctions drastically increases the number of plausible 
explanations: the variable that differs (agrees) may not be the only causal explanation if it is part of a 
conjunction of conditions that produce the effect. “It is important to note that these inferences rest on the 
implicit assumption that […] variables have a causal effect on their own… Once this assumption is relaxed 
and one allows for the presence of interaction effects, the picture gets more complex” (Rohlfing, 2012). This 
can be demonstrated in relation to the concept of the ‘property space’, defined as the “logically possible 
number of combinations of cross-case scores”.  
Consider the following example of an ideal method of difference. Three binary independent variables, X1, 
X2 and X3 are measured for two cases. X3 is observed to differ along with the outcome variable Y and is 
inferred to be its cause.  
Case X1 X2 X3 Y 
A 1 0 1 1 
B 1 0 0 0 
However, the data do not preclude that X3 is part of a causal conjunction with the other independent 
variables individually or together. Perhaps the outcome Y is produced when both X1 and X3 are present; 
this would not be apparent since X1 is present in both cases, and we would need to expand the comparison 
to include two cases without X1 in order to discount this possibility. The number of logically possible 
combinations of binary variables is 2C, where C indicates the number of causes. For the example above 
therefore, there are 8 possible combinations for causes, of which only two are compared. As Rohlfing 
(2012) notes, despite their obvious shortcomings, Mill’s methods are the best available for a two-case 
comparison; their problems “are not due to how the method of agreement and difference work, but 
because they rely on a small number of cases. This implies that the shortcomings of Mill’s methods are 
problems of small-n comparisons more generally” (p. 99). 
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In order to maximise the scope for causal inference, my approach has been to locate pairs of 
cases within each regional institutional configuration that can be characterised, as far as possible, 
as differing across a common, binary causal condition – location-specific advantages – and 
industrial performance outcomes. This strategy permits cross-case comparisons across two ‘axes’ 
or dimensions: within and between different regional institutional configurations. However, it 
should be noted that the pairwise comparisons are far from ‘ideal’ and that the main motivation 
for the case study stage of my research is to conduct within-case analysis across a sufficient 
number of diverse cases to permit some analytical generalisation.   
In sum, my case selection strategy reflects the following goals: 
 to cover the maximum feasible number of cases to allow analytical generalisation regarding 
the effects of the elimination of LCRs and the causal mechanisms through which these effects 
are manifest; and 
 to draw inferences about the impacts of interactions between location-specific advantages 
and the implementation and elimination of LCRs using the method of difference.  
4.3.3 Statement of research questions 
Each stage of the research thus addresses distinct sub-questions within my overarching research 
question. In the first stage, I specify a panel regression model in which I control for country fixed 
effects and introduce covariates on national industrial capabilities and market size. The primary 
research question pertaining to panel regression stage is:  
RQ 1. What is the nature and magnitude of the impact of the elimination of LCRs on quantitative 
indicators of industrial performance in the automotive parts and components sector? 
Specifically, I determine whether the elimination of LCRs has led to significant changes in 
indicators of local content, output, exports, imports, and trade balance, in countries which have 
eliminated LCRs compared to countries which have not.  
The case studies are ‘nested’ within the findings and ask supplementary questions regarding the 
narrower population of countries in which LCRs were exogenously restricted. They employ an 
historical institutionalist framework which permits examination of causal mechanisms and allows 
that the impacts of the elimination of LCRs are context dependent and subject to conjunctive 
causation and cumulative effects. The research questions pertaining to this stage are: 
RQ 2. To what extent and how have LCRs contributed to performance outcomes through the 
causal mechanisms of FDI and developments in value chain governance?  
RQ 2.1. To what extent and how have LCRs contributed to post-liberalisation performance 
outcomes through cumulative processes arising in the LCRs period?  
RQ 2.2. How have the contributions of LCRs differed according to the contexts in which they 
were implemented?  
RQ 3. To what extent and how has the elimination of LCRs contributed to performance outcomes 
through the causal mechanisms of FDI and developments in value chain governance?  
RQ 3.1. How have the contributions of the elimination of LCRs differed according to the 
contexts in which elimination occurred?  
RQ 3.2. To what extent has the elimination of LCRs precluded the promotion of local parts 
and components production through alternative policy instruments, and what are 
the implications for analyse of the elimination of LCRs?  
90 
 
The implications of my thesis are not solely substantive but also methodological. My research 
design is complicated by the difficulties involved in assessing the costs of lost policy space in the 
absence of a counterfactual and in the presence of profound methodological difficulties arising 
from causal complexity in the phenomena I am investigating. Each stage of the research dealt 
with these difficulties in different ways. I have thus identified a number of pertinent 
methodological research questions that arise from an evaluation of the contribution of the mixed 
method approach adopted here, and of each stage of the research design therein. The 
methodological contributions of my thesis relate to the following questions: 
RQ 4. To what extent has the mixed method approach adopted here been able to account 
effectively for the complex determinants of industrial performance outcomes in the context 
of restrictions on the use of LCRs? 
RQ 4.1. What are the relative contributions of case- and variable-oriented approaches in this 
regard? 
Finally, as I evaluate the implications of the thesis with respect to broader theoretical debates, I 
consider the extent to which the findings of my research support alternative positions on the 
utility of retaining ‘flexibility for development’ within international economic governance 
structures (broadly speaking, the structuralist perspective) against positions that suggest that 
policy space restrictions are necessarily welfare enhancing for all (broadly speaking, the neoliberal 
perspective).   
RQ 5. To what extent and how does the approach adopted here contribute to wider debates 
about the distribution of the costs and benefits of industrial policies and policy space 
restrictions more generally across structurally diverse countries? 
RQ 5.1. What are the implications of the thesis, if any, with respect to developing countries’ 
pursuit of interventionist trade and industrial policy, and their participation in 
multilateral negotiating fora? 






5 PANEL REGRESSION SPECIFICATION AND FINDINGS 
5.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In the previous chapter, I justified and described a mixed-method approach to analysing the 
impacts of the elimination of LCRs. The first stage I depicted the use of the ‘difference-in 
difference’ (DID) research design as a comparative strategy, enabling the comparison of industrial 
performance outcomes over the period in which LCRs were eliminated and between the groups 
affected by the prohibition of LCRs in different ways (i.e. based on whether or not the policies 
were previously in force).  This chapter provides much greater detail about the specification of the 
model, including the operationalisation of the key variables, in a more formal econometric 
setting. The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 5.2, I recap the logic of the DID model using 
panel data, and explain the specification of ‘fixed effects’ in order to account for time-invariant 
heterogeneity and global factors affecting performance outcomes. I also attend to my strategy for 
estimating robust standard errors in order to maximise the validity of my empirical results. In 
section 5.3, I provide a discussion of how the model’s result may be interpreted, and discuss the 
assumptions behind the interpretations, and point to potential limitations. In section 5.4, I 
describe the operationalisation of the variables used in the model. The construction of the post-
treatment dummy variables is described, before turning to the operationalisation of industrial 
performance indicators, and then to other covariates incorporated into the models. The section 
concludes with a short discussion of the data of which tables are provided in the appendices  
5.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
5.2.1 Impact evaluation in the presence of heterogeneity and selection bias   
As discussed in the previous chapter, quantitative impact evaluations are concerned with deriving 
causal inferences from associations between the independent variable – the policy ‘treatment’, 
indicated by the presence of a dummy variable – and the dependent variable industrial 
performance. In the context of an experimental research, randomisation of the treatment 
allocation ensures that there are no systematic differences between the treated and control 
groups with respect to other variables; “probability of assignment to treatment does not vary 
with potential outcomes” (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009: 7). In such a situation, we can simply 
compare the two groups after the treatment to estimate the policy impact. Obviously, LCRs were 
not randomly allocated and the population of cases (countries in the world) is characterised by a 
high degree of heterogeneity between cases. In the next sections I discuss the implications of 
country heterogeneity generally, and non-random allocation of treatment, known as selection 
bias, more specifically. The problem in both cases is seen to be one of unobserved variables.  
5.2.1.1 Heterogeneity 
We first consider a basic regression model for panel data: 
                 
Where     represents values of a continuous dependent variable   for individual   in time period 
 , from     to     cross-sectional units and from     to     time periods;   represents a 
common constant (intercept); the vector    
  represents the   th observation on   exogenous 
explanatory variables; and     is the idiosyncratic error term, containing the impacts of any 
omitted explanatory variables plus ‘white noise’.  
Following Hsiao (2007), we may distinguish between observed and unobserved explanatory 
variables with       and      , where     represents      vectors of observed and 
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    represents       vectors of unobserved explanatory variables respectively, and   and   are 
     and      vectors of constants.  
                        
Obviously, observed explanatory variables are simply introduced into the model as covariates. 
However, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity among the cross-sectional units, the 
parameters   and   are likely to be estimated inconsistently. Heterogeneity may be exhibited in 
the intercept or both intercept and slope. Even if only the intercepts are heterogeneous, bias in 
the slope coefficient   will arise (Hsiao 2007: 9).  
5.2.1.2 Selection bias  
An important manifestation of heterogeneity in the context of impact evaluation is selection bias 
in the allocation of treatment. Impact evaluation involves comparing treatment and control 
groups that are as similar as possible in every respect except the presence or absence of 
treatment, as well as observed factors that can be controlled for statistically. However, this is very 
difficult to achieve. Countries that implemented LCRs are likely to be systematically different from 
those which did not, as a result of both observed and unobserved factors.  
This problem is called selection bias, and relates to the endogenous nature of the decision to 
implement LCRs and in relation to the outcome variable, industrial performance. Endogeneity is 
the correlation of regressors with error disturbances, which essentially occurs when variables are 
jointly determined within a system. This deviates from the assumption of strict exogeneity which 
holds that regressors are independent (uncorrelated) with respect to the error    .  
As noted by Baltagi (2008), endogeneity of regressors is a serious problem in econometrics. 
Consider the simple model      . In order to establish the presence of a causal (as opposed 
to statistical) relationship running from   to  , we are assuming that   and   cause  ; that   and 
  are independent of one another; and that   does not cause    
If covariate   is jointly determined by an unobserved process   that also determines  , the 
estimated coefficient on   will be biased because it will combine the direct (via  ) and indirect 
(via   and relegated to the error  ) effects; we cannot know how much of the impact is really due 
to   and which to the unobserved ‘confounder’,  .  
Therefore, selection bias occurs when the allocation of the treatment (policy) is determined by 
processes   that also influence   – or by   itself. Turning to a concrete example, countries that 
implement LCRs might do so deliberately as a response to (unobserved) market failures, 
suggesting that industrial performance is systematically lower among such countries. In such a 
case, the estimated association between the policy and industrial performance would be biased 
downwards. The observed policy variable   may have a positive impact that is cancelled out by 
the unobserved   to produce a negative estimate of   when the true   is positive. Alternatively, 
states might be more likely to implement LCRs if policy-makers believe the prospects for industrial 
growth are strong, and/or if the state has the capacity and desire to practice interventionist 
industrial policy (i.e. is a ‘development state’) – both of which positively influence the impacts 
arising from the implementation of LCRs. Without reliable indicators of ‘market prospects’ or 
‘capacity to practice industrial policy’, the implication is that endogeneity would bias the 
association between LCRs and performance in the opposite direction, leading to an inflated 
estimate of  .  
One approach to eliminate endogeneity bias is to introduce variables that are correlated with   
but which could not plausibly influence  , known as ‘instrumental variables’ (for example, see 
Khandker et al., 2010: chapter 6). Unfortunately, valid instruments for the implementation of LCRs 
that are unrelated to industrial performance are impossible to find, a practical difficulty that is 
common in econometric work aimed at evaluating policy interventions, as discussed by Rodrik 
(2007: 20).   
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Selection bias is one manifestation of endogeneity involving the policy treatment variable. The 
possibility that covariates other that the policy variable are jointly determined within the system, 
and the implications, are considered below.  
5.2.2 Differences-in-differences and individual (fixed) effects 
Provided data on the factors affecting outcomes are available to introduce as statistical controls, 
endogeneity is not a problem. However, if the relevant factors are unobserved, estimates on the 
policy treatment will be biased, for the reasons discussed above.  
Difference-in-difference (hereafter, DID) approaches provide a potential solution to this problem. 
Following Petersen (2004), we may distinguish between explanatory variables that vary over time, 
such as income, and those which are constant, such as geographical location or colonial heritage. 
Provided that unobserved differences between groups are time-invariant, it is possible to 
estimate treatment effects net of initial differences, thus estimating the treatment effect as the 
difference (or change over time) in the difference between the treatment and control groups 
(thus, difference-in-difference).  
Thus, if selection bias is present, but the characteristics upon which selection is based are time-
invariant with respect to their influence on performance outcomes, the DID design completely 
removes the bias. DID can be applied provided there are two comparator groups in two time 
periods, but are also applicable to panel data models. Following Khandker et al. (2010), the fixed 
effects panel data model generalises the two-period DID model. As the authors observe, this 
generalisation “is particularly important for a model that controls not only for the unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity but also for heterogeneity in observed characteristics over a 
multiple-period setting” (p. 74). 
If unobserved variables are constant over time for a given cross-sectional unit, or constant across 
units for a given time period, we are able to expand the disturbance term,    , as follows: 
              
where    denotes unobservable, time-invariant individual-specific effects,    denotes time-
specific effects that are common to all cross-sectional units, and     denotes the remaining error 
(Baltagi 2008).  
To continue,    and    can be estimated as parameters in panel models by including dummy 
variables for each cross-sectional unit or time period, respectively, to give us the two way54 fixed 
effects model: 
                       
This model “is robust to some forms of endogeneity arising from unobservable group-specific 
heterogeneity” (Mora and Reggio, 2010). Specifically, fixed effects models permit the country-
specific, time-invariant element of the error term    to be correlated with covariates      This 
‘weak’ exogeneity may be contrasted with a stricter form demanded by the alternative ‘random 
effects’ model. Considering individual country effects as random, normally distributed attributes, 
random effects models relegate individual effects to a component of the error term. As a result, 
random effects models are more efficient provided that     is independent of   , as they require 
fewer parameters to be estimated; fixed effects are more appropriate if these assumptions don’t 
                                                          
54
 ‘Two way’ refers the inclusion of time and cross-sectional fixed effects, as opposed to models which 
incorporate cross-sectional effects only.  
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hold, as random effects become inconsistent. Application of the Hausman test55 show that fixed 
effects models are preferred for the models operationalised below.  
To complete the model, treatment effects are estimated by introducing a dummy variable for the 
post-treatment time period for treatment and control groups,    
        ; another for the 
treatment group across both time periods,    
         , and an interaction between the two, 
   
            , signifying the post-treatment effect on the treated. The symbols   and   are used 
here to denote the coefficients associated with the two post-treatment dummy 
variables.   
          is not estimated in the fixed effects model as it is collinear with the 
unobservable, time-invariant individual-specific effects   .  
The complete model, therefore, which I operationalise below, is as follows: 
                       
             
                 
Before turning to a broader discussion of the interpretation, assumptions and limitations of the 
fixed effect DID model, and the implications for my own research design and analysis, we first 
provide a short discussion of statistical inference and the estimation of standard errors.  
5.2.3 Statistical inference in the presence of non-stationarity and non-IID errors 
The process of estimating the parameters of a population from a sample is called statistical 
inference. Coefficients indicate the relationship between dependent and independent variables, 
and are estimated with varying degrees of certainty or precision which are denoted by the sample 
standard errors, t-statistics and p-values. These latter values convey the probability that the 
estimated coefficients would be observed, within the sample, if the estimated statistical 
relationship were in fact false, within the population.  
5.2.3.1 Autoregressive processes and non-stationarity in time-series data 
Like all analysis based on data with time-series components, the analysis of panel data such as 
described here is subject to potential complications arising from non-stationarity, particularly in 
the presence of unit roots. Time-series variables are stationary if they include a well-defined 
mean around which values fluctuate with constant, finite variance. Obviously, these conditions 
are unlikely to pertain to many time-series of ‘real’ economic variables. More commonly, 
variables will exhibit ‘trend-stationarity’, when removal of deterministic components of the 
variable such as a linear time trend reveals a stationary series. Stationary and trend-stationary 
series are ‘mean-reverting’; shocks to the process are transitory and their influence dies out as 
they move further into the past. 
More concerning from an econometric perspective are series that are characterised by a ‘random 
walk’ in which the effects of shocks in the process are permanent. Essentially, the presence of a 
unit root implies that the mean and variance of a time-series depends on the time period in which 
such values are measures.  
For illustration, consider an autoregressive process in which lagged values of the dependent 
variable       exert influence on current values    . Both stationary and trend-stationary pertain to 
situations in which the ‘characteristic polynomial’ of an autoregressive (AR(1)) process exceeds 
unity. Such time-series may be described as being integrated of order zero, I(0), denoting that 
they do not need to be differenced in order to exhibit stationarity.  
However, series in which the characteristic polynomial equals unity – i.e. those which contain a 
unit root56 – are by definition non-stationary but may be made stationary through a process of 
                                                          
55
 The null hypothesis is that the unique errors are uncorrelated with regressors, in which case the random 
effects model is preferred. See Hsiao, 2007: 50-51.  
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differencing. Such series are described as difference-stationary and integrated of order one (I(1)) 
if they require differencing once in order to induce stationarity.   
The distinction between trend- and difference-stationarity has important analytical implications, 
since the presence of unit roots can lead to spurious regression results in time-series analysis 
(Banerjee, 1999).  
There are a number of panel unit root tests, which extend standard tests for unit roots within 
individual time-series to multiple cross-sectional units (e.g. Hadri, 2000; Choi, 2001; Levin et al., 
2002; Im et al., 2003). This extension involves a number of complications, including the 
interpretation of the results in the event the null hypothesis is rejected, since the alternative can 
be a single common stationary root, heterogeneous stationary roots, or simply indicate that not 
all the panels contain unit roots (Breitung and Pesaran, 2005). Furthermore, it is rather difficult 
with time series of limited length (such as in the present analysis) to distinguish a permanent 
response to a shock implied by a unit root and a temporary response with a very high 
autoregressive coefficient. As Hall and Mairesse (2002: 452) observe, 
it seems fairly intuitive that, within the general class of models where heterogeneity is 
restricted to an individual fixed effect, the times series behaviour of an individual variable 
should often be well approximated either as an autoregressive process with a small positive 
coefficient and large fixed effects or as an autoregressive process with a near-unit root and 
negligible individual fixed effects.   
Thus, as Smith (2001: 5) notes, “all these tests have very low power (i.e. a low probability of 
rejecting the I(1), unit root, null) when in fact the process is stationary with a coefficient close to 
unity”.  
Most of the available tests for unit roots in panel data are only available for balanced panels 
without gaps in the data. The exceptions are variants of Fisher-type tests which conduct unit-root 
tests for each panel individually, and then combine the p-values from these tests to produce an 
overall test (Choi, 2001). Tests can accommodate panel-specific means (individual fixed effects) 
and time trends in the model of the data-generating process.  
Applying this approach using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), 
notwithstanding the low power of the tests, it is clear that the standard log-transformed variables 
may be non-stationary (I(1)): the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots cannot be 
rejected, as shown in appendix 28. However, when a linear time trend is incorporated into the 
tests, the null hypothesis is rejected in most cases. Given the low power of the tests, as described 
above, I conclude that the relevant variables are trend-stationary, and that the incorporation of 
two way fixed effects – i.e. including the incorporation of year-specific dummy variables, which is 
more flexible than the incorporation of a linear time trend – sufficiently acknowledges the time-
series characteristics of the dataset and the potential presence of unit roots for the purposes of 
this analysis.  
5.2.3.2 Non-IID errors and robust estimation 
As Cameron and Miller (2013) observe, much attention is paid in applied empirical work to 
obtaining unbiased coefficients, while less attention is paid to accurate statistical inference. In 
order to draw correct inferences from fixed effects models, the errors (denoted    ) that cannot 
be estimated as country- or time-period specific intercepts are usually assumed to be random and 
have identical probability distributions (i.e. ‘independent and identically distributed’, or IID). This 
is clearly violated in cases where errors are ‘clustered’ within specific cross-sectional units over 
                                                                                                                                                                                
56
 If the characteristic polynomial is less than unity, the series rapidly diverges towards + or - infinity. This 
behaviour is termed explosive and appears counter-intuitive to almost all real life situations; we assume for 
the present discussion that all roots are either equal to or exceed unity. 
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time (serial correlation) or within temporal units across panels (cross-sectional dependence, or 
CSD). A third violation occurs when errors vary with     – that is, are heteroskedastic. Failure to 
control for non-IID errors can lead to  
very misleadingly small standard errors, and consequent misleadingly narrow confidence 
intervals, large t-statistics and low p-values. It is not unusual to have applications where 
standard errors that control for within-cluster correlation are several times larger than 
default standard errors that ignore such correlation (Cameron and Miller, 2013: 4). 
That errors are likely to be clustered within cross-sectional units is one of the basic motivations 
for fixed effects panel models. Serial correlation of the error terms can arise if outcomes are 
affected directly by past values in the presence of an autoregressive process (called ‘true state 
dependence’) or it can occur due to the correlation of unobserved variables with the cross-
sectional units. Thus, while the incorporation of country intercepts (fixed effects) takes care of 
time-invariant clustering “they will not completely control for within-cluster error correlation... 
due to omitted factors that evolve progressively over time” (Cameron and Miller, 2013: 16-17). 
Drukker (2003) develops a test for serial correlation, which is (predictably) present in most of my 
model specifications, as reported in section 5.5. Fortunately, in short panel cases such as the 
present study, where the number of cross-sectional units is large relative to the number of time 
periods, Cameron and Trivedi (2010: 273) consider that it is sufficient to simply “obtain standard 
errors that control for serial correlation in the error term without explicitly stating a model for 
serial correlation”, which is the approach employed here57.  
As with serial correlation, simple forms of CSD – an unobserved effect common to all countries – 
can be sufficiently addressed by the incorporation of fixed effects (year dummies), which is my 
approach. The test to establish the presence of CSD, which follows Sarafidis and De Hoyos (2006), 
has been carried out where data allow. Although CSD is absent in my models, I repeated my 
analyses using Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) procedure for estimating CSD robust standard errors in 
fixed effects models. Because the coefficients are identical to the main specifications, with 
invariably smaller standard errors, I do not report the findings here. However, I also run additional 
specifications which allow for any unobserved region-specific year effects, for example relating to 
business cycle shocks and other demand-side factors that occur at the regional level. This 
additional specification guards against the possibility that the estimations are picking up regional 
trends common to the treatment group, which are mainly geographically concentrated in Asia. 
The addition of region-specific year effects does not significantly affect the overall findings 
relating to the impact of the elimination of LCRs.  
                                                          
57
 It should be noted here that there are a number of alternative approaches to the presence of serial 
correlation, some of which require more stringent assumptions about the causes of serial correlation. These 
approaches give rise to point estimates that are more efficient under certain circumstances but may also be 
biased. For example, feasible generalised least squares may be employed to account for serial correlation 
(and heteroskedasticity), but is inefficient in the presence of fixed effects, which – as noted above – 
characterise my models as identified through the use of the Hausman test. It is possible to incorporate 
autoregressive processes into the fixed effects model (following Bhargava et al., 1982 and Baltagi and Wu, 
1999); however, as discussed in Cameron and Trivedi (2010), the resulting model is more appropriate for 
long panels. Finally, where serial correlation of errors arises from true state dependence lags of the 
dependent variable should be incorporated as regressors, under which the fixed effects estimator becomes 
inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 293). In this instance, it may be necessary to consider dynamic 
models which incorporate lags such as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, the estimation 
strategy is complex and requires the satisfaction of stringent assumptions such as there be no 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors (other than those arising from the lagged dependent variable); 
for these reasons, such models are disregarded. 
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Finally, Greene (2000) develops a test which shows that heteroskedasticity is present in my 
models, as reported in section 5.5. Cluster robust standard error estimation controls for 
heteroskedasticity as well as serial correlation, so the presence of heteroscedasticity does not 
necessitate any further consideration.  
5.3 INTERPRETATION, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF DID / FIXED EFFECTS APPROACH  
To recap, DID estimators rely on the (implicit) comparison of “four different groups of objects” 
(Lechner, 2011): treatment and control groups, measured before and after the treatment. In the 
fixed effects panel model here, in which time-invariant variables (such as treatment and control 
group dummy variables) are collinear with the country fixed effects (as discussed above), we are 
essentially concerned with the coefficients for two dummy variables: a post-treatment dummy 
that applies to both treatment and control groups alike (   
        ); and one that is specific to the 
treatment group (   
    ).  
Clearly, a statistical relationship does not necessarily indicate a causal one – ‘correlation is not 
causation’, after all. However, one of the goals of the present research is precisely to generate 
causal inferences about the impacts of the elimination of LCRs. The estimated coefficient for 
   
            ,   is the main parameter of interest: the DID estimator, which conveys what is 
termed the ‘average treatment effect’ (ATE) within the impact evaluation literature (Khandker et 
al., 2010: 26). The ATE corresponds to the observed difference between the treatment and 
control groups with respect to changes in post-treatment outcomes. Thus, under certain stringent 
assumptions, the DID estimator “will indeed identify a mean causal effect” (Lechner, 2011). These 
include that treatments are completed represented; that there are no treatment spillovers (or 
‘interactions’) between members of the population; that treatment does not influence treated 
members in the pre-treatment period; and that treatment and control groups are subject to 
common trends in the absence of treatment, except to the extent that heterogeneity between 
groups is captured by the inclusion of exogenous explanatory variables. 
If these assumptions hold, the DID estimator should identify an effect that would pertain to the 
whole population in the counterfactual scenario that the latter were also subject to treatment. 
Thus, to the extent that     
             is statistically significant, we can be confident that there 
are causal effects associated with treatment.  
However, in the present case, the interpretation of the coefficients for    
         and   
             
is complicated by several main factors, relating to the basis of statistical inference with respect to 
sampling and population considerations, the presence of ‘spillover’ or general equilibrium effects 
of the treatment on the control group, and the validity of the parallel paths assumption.   
5.3.1 Statistical inference within a finite population 
The “textbook” approach to inference relies on the assumption that “the observed units are a 
random sample from a large population” (Abadie et al., 2014) which gives rise to sampling 
variation and uncertainty. For example, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009: 11) distinguish different 
types of average treatment effect, depending on whether we are concerned with extrapolating 
inferences to a wider population or simply with making inferences “conditional on the covariates 
in the sample”. This raises questions about the role of statistical inference when analysis includes 
an entire population (or close to it) such as all countries in the world.  
One interpretation is that we are interested in making inferences about an infinite hypothetical 
population such that we can still consider our ‘population’ as a sample thereof; although such an 
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interpretation has been criticised by scholars such as Frick (1998) as inconsistent with discussions 
of inference in many cases of applied research. Others emphasise uncertainty in the presence of 
measurement error, incomplete data, or the impact of unobserved random variation on 
outcomes of interest, in order to justify the use of inference across whole populations. This latter 
view is summarised by Abadie et al. (2014: 2) who make the case that  
statistics is fundamentally about drawing inferences with incomplete data. If the researcher 
sees all relevant data, there is no need for inference, since any question can be answered by 
simply doing calculations on the data. Outside of this polar case, it is important to be precise 
in what sense the data are incomplete. Often we can consider a population of units and a set 
of possible states of the world [my italics]. There is a set of variables that takes on different 
values for each unit depending on the state of the world. 
Thus, when addressing questions regarding the average causal effect of treatment on a 
population, the appropriate comparison is between outcomes for the whole population under 
counterfactual situations which we can never observe – one in which they were treated and 
another in the absence of treatment. Causal effects are estimated with uncertainty because “by 
definition we observe each physical unit at most once, either in the state where it is treated or the 
state where it is not, with the value of the outcome in the other state missing” (ibid.). The authors 
distinguish causal and descriptive estimands, where the latter may be measured with certainty in 
relation to questions such as whether there are significant differences “between the average 
outcome for countries with one set of institutions and the average outcome for countries with a 
different set of institutions”.  
Under alternative assumptions about the population and the nature of selection into the LCR 
treatment group, estimates for the coefficients     
             and    
         could be interpreted 
as descriptive estimands and measured without error. For example, following Ragin (2005), we 
might apply ‘scoping conditions’ such that the treatment and control groups comprise distinct 
sub-populations, in which LCRs or lack thereof could be considered as attributes; and the 
coefficients on     
             and    
          simply describe the difference in mean performance 
outcomes for each group. Under such an interpretation, coefficients may be meaningful even if 
they are not statistically significant, and even if – given the stringent assumptions required to 
enable causal inference – we cannot confidently say that they represent average treatment 
effects that can be generalised to the wider global population. 
5.3.2 Spillover and general equilibrium effects 
The second assumption required in order to draw causal inferences from the DID design is that, in 
the manner of an experimental research design, only one of the groups is actually affected by the 
policy reform ‘treatment’ the effects of which are being estimated. In actuality, this assumption is 
not in accordance with our theoretical expectations about the causal effects of policy space 
restrictions, which may also affect industrial performance outcomes in countries in which LCRs 
were not in force: both the treatment and control groups face a more liberal external 
environment for their exports, due to the elimination of LCRs in other countries. Because of the 
operation of causal mechanisms within an interdependent system, in which global firms are able 
to serve markets through investment and trade, policy changes in one location can easily affect 
performance outcomes in another; there is no basis for the assumption that liberalisation will 
only affect the liberalising countries themselves. On one hand, it could lead to enhanced 
investment, output and exports if assemblers in liberalising countries substitute local parts and 
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components for those from abroad. On the other, it might divert investment towards the 
liberalising economies, thus reducing output and exports elsewhere.  
There is no way to determine the direction or magnitude of these impacts a priori. As a result, the 
coefficient for the control group    
         may be of interest as well as    
            .  However, 
since the increase in market access is common to both groups, it is reasonable to expect that any 
global effects applying across the treatment and control groups are captured by the incorporation 
of year-specific effects    while    
             relates to the impact of internal liberalisation on 
performance outcomes. Increased market access is likely to take effect gradually as individual 
countries liberalise their local content regimes.  
5.3.3 Parallel paths and time-varying heterogeneity 
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the key assumption of our methodological 
approach is that the differences between treatment and control groups with respect to the 
dependent variable would remain constant in the absence of treatment: what Mora and Reggio 
(2012) call the ‘parallel paths’ assumption. In the presence of unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity associated with selection into the treatment group, the parallel paths assumption 
is violated.  
In evaluating the impact of the elimination of LCRs, we know already that there is a significant 
difference between the groups with respect to initial pre-treatment conditions – the 
implementation of LCRs in the pre-treatment period. The impacts of selection bias described 
above are therefore manifested in the pre-treatment period, making it more difficult to ascribe 
changes in performance to the treatment effect. This deviation can only be justified under the 
assumption that selection bias reflects time-invariant heterogeneity. If as a result of their 
alternative policy regimes the treatment and control groups were already following divergent 
(non-parallel) paths at the time of liberalisation, estimates of the direction and magnitude of 
treatment effects may be biased. Similarly, if there are other unobserved factors that are 
correlated with the implementation of LCRs and that affect industrial performance outcomes – for 
example, that the liberalising countries appeared poised to experience rapid growth, and that 
they featured heavily in the strategic decisions of the global automakers for this reason, as seems 
likely to have been the case – the DID estimator will be biased.  
In the models below, I introduce fixed year effects to account for common or global influences on 
performance outcomes, and I introduce covariates to estimate the influence of observable time-
varying characteristics. Put another way, the crucial assumption of the following analysis is that 
the impacts of the systematic diversity of policy and institutional regimes across treatment and 
control groups is adequately captured by the inclusion of    and time-varying control variables 
      (the operationalisation of which is discussed in the following chapter) such that 
    
             is an unbiased estimator of the impact of the policy change. Pre-liberalisation 
performance outcomes may vary between groups but are assumed to be stable in the absence of 
market growth, industrial capability development, and the policy and institutional variables 
operationalised below.  
5.4 DATA AND MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
5.4.1 Construction of the post-treatment dummy variables 
The underlying logic behind the D-in-D model is that comparisons are being made based on the 
temporal equivalence of each post-treatment dummy. Since the conditions of the natural 
experiment exploited here deviates from an experimental situation in which ‘treatments’ are 
implemented simultaneously – thus ensuring that    
         and    
             relate to 
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contemporaneous periods – particular attention must be paid to ensuring that    
         and 
   
             are appropriate comparators.  
The treatment group comprises the 16 countries identified in section 3.5.4 as having implemented 
LCRs in the post-WTO period. For these countries,    
               from the first full year in 
which LCRs were no longer in force, as illustrated in columns (3) and (4) of table 5-1, below. As 
shown, the years in which LCRs were eliminated in the treatment group range from 1996 to 2007. 
The temporal ‘mid-point’ for the elimination of LCRs, as indicated by the cumulative percentage of 
countries that have eliminated LCRs by each year, is 2002. Thus, for the treatment group 
   
            
             and for the control group,    
         = 1 if       , as illustrated in 
column (5) of table 5-1. This approach ensures that there are an almost equal number of data 
points in which    
               between 1995 and 2001 (14) as there are data points in which 
   
               between 2003 and 2011 (13). As a result, although    
         and    
             
do not pertain to precisely contemporaneous time periods, any bias arising from this is likely to be 
very minimal.   















   





   




Example   
         
(control group) 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 1 6.25 0 0 0 
1997 1 6.25 0 0 0 
1998 1 6.25 0 0 0 
1999 2 12.5 1 0 0 
2000 3 18.75 1 0 0 
2001 6 37.5 1 0 0 
2002 8 50 1 0 1 
2003 10 62.5 1 0 1 
2004 13 81.25 1 0 1 
2005 14 87.5 1 1 1 
2006 14 87.5 1 1 1 
2007 16 100 1 1 1 
2008 16 100 1 1 1 
2009 16 100 1 1 1 
2010 16 100 1 1 1 
2011 16 100 1 1 1 
 
5.4.2 Operationalising industrial performance in the automotive parts and components sector 
As previously discussed, the elimination of LCRs may have impacts on quantitative indicators of 
production, trade and investment at the national level; my goal is to ascertain the nature of these 
impacts. Following Doner et al. (2006b: 6-7), I acknowledge that “comparing auto parts industries 
is complicated by national differences in definition and coverage” and “provide an overview of 
standardized data” on performance outcomes, which are required for large-n variable-oriented 
analysis, as discussed in chapter 4.   
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To recap, LCRs are intended to stimulate technological upgrading and technology transfer, the 
ultimate goal of which is to increase productivity within the intermediate sector58. Following Yusuf 
et al. (2009), ‘dimensions’ of upgrading that may be measured for international comparison 
include increases in (a) exports, (b) local content, and (c) value-added, where  
(a) exports are a common proxy for competitiveness, since they require that producers are 
able to achieve levels of productive efficiency, quality and cost demanded on the world 
market, ceteris paribus;  
(b) local content at the national level measures intermediate output that is used or sold 
within the national economy. It is determined by subtracting imports from consumption 
of parts and components or (equivalently) by subtracting exports from output. Ceteris 
paribus, high levels of local content indicate that local producers are competitive in the 
presence of import competition; and 
(c) value-added is the proportion of output that is contributed by returns to labour and 
capital, and is closely associated with productivity.  
In addition, Doner et al. (2004) discuss the value of (d) trade balance as an indicator of industrial 
performance, where  
(d) trade balance relates to both (a) and (b) above, requires we also take into consideration 
combined changes in import and export propensity. Other things being equal, upgrading 
requires growth in exports and local production relative to imports.  
Another potential effect of LCRs relates to investment flows. Internationally-comparable data on 
FDI at the level of disaggregation required for this analysis are not available, although there are 
some limited data on gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), as described below. (FDI indicators 
feature in the following chapter, employing national and secondary sources of data for individual 
countries.)  
                                                          
58
 It should be noted at this stage that all of the performance measures employed in this thesis – that is, 
measures of parts and components sector performance – are limited as indicators of the effectiveness of 
automotive industrial policies and the performance of the automotive sector more broadly. Indeed, positive 
performance outcomes as reflected by the indicators employed here may coincide with negative 
performance outcomes for the vehicle assembly sector, and the failure of policies aimed at promoting the 
latter. Thus, the following analysis proceeds under that caveat that the choice of indicator reflects an 
implicit assumption that automotive policies are designed to enhance parts and components sector 
performance, such that if such an outcome is observed, policies are deemed to have been effective. 
However, it is clear that such an assumption is an oversimplification in practice. For example, the case of 
the Philippines is instructive. Despite exhibiting extremely rapid and sustained growth in output and exports 
of parts and components, the assembly sector has performed badly, with demand served mainly through 
imports (UNCTAD, 2007). Thus, the Philippines have failed to establish a highly integrated automotive 
sector – integration being one of the characteristics which LCRs are designed to promote and which strong 
parts and components sector performance is supposed to reflect. A further limitation, again illustrated by 
the case of the Philippines, is that strong trade performance can mask substantial weaknesses in terms of 
indigenous technological capabilities if parts suppliers are engaged in labour-intensive ‘enclave’ production 
for global firms. In the case of the Philippines, as UNCTAD (2007: 104) note, “the few successful parts 
manufacturers are the selected in-house manufacturers of Japanese auto TNCs (based on their global and 
regional plans), and the global parts exporters, which are not necessarily tied to the local car assembly 
industry”. Indeed, as Aldaba (2007) finds, the imported content of exports from these enclaves remains 
very high, while local firms are significantly less competitive than the subsidiaries of their multinational 
counterparts. Strong trade performance, as measured by the indicators employed in the present analysis, 
tends to mask a more nuanced understanding of these complex phenomena.   
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Before proceeding to specify the indicators used in this analysis, we discuss the availability of data 
at the requisite level of disaggregation (to permit examination of outcomes in the intermediate 
sector at which LCRs have been targeted), and comprehensive coverage (to permit international 
comparison of outcomes across a sample large enough to permit statistical analysis).  
5.4.2.1 Production data 
Production data are classified in the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) scheme. 
The ISIC is based on classification of the activity, as opposed to the product, per se. The scheme 
differentiates between manufacture of motor vehicles (ISIC 341), manufacture of bodies 
(coachwork) for motor vehicles (ISIC 342), and manufacture of parts and accessories for motor 
vehicles and their engines (ISIC 343). Output data at the appropriate level of disaggregation are 
only available from 1995, and although data are not comprehensively available cross-nationally or 
inter-temporally, they cover a sufficiently large number of countries and years to permit statistical 
analysis with approximately 4-700 observations, depending on the indicator. Data are available 
from the UNIDO Industrial Supply and Demand and Industrial Statistics databases for apparent 
consumption, GFCF, output, and value-added (UNIDO, 2011b); as discussed above, these data 
permit the construction of an indicator of local content. Data for output, GFCF and value-added 
are highly correlated and give rise to highly similar estimation results, so I omit the latter two 
indicators from the present analysis; estimation results are reported in appendix 6.  
5.4.2.2 Trade data 
Trade flows are classified in two main schemes: the Harmonised System (HS) and the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC). Both offer the potential to distinguish trade in vehicles 
from trade in parts and components, and for the purposes of the current analysis, I use the SITC 
nomenclature. The SITC differentiates between vehicles (SITC 781-3), and other parts and 
components (SITC 784) including chassis (SITC 7841) and bodies (SITC 7842). These data are 
available from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS, 2015), from 1988, but are only 
comprehensively available, across the majority of countries, from 1995.  
5.4.3 The construction of performance indicators 
There are numerous ways in which to operationalise industrial performance, depending on the 
purpose of the indicator. One of the first issues concerns whether any change in industrial 
performance is better measured by change in the absolute level of performance indicators or by 
their growth rates over time. Levels and growth rates of variables both contribute insights into 
performance. However, given the characteristics of the fixed effect DID approach discussed 
above, it is appropriate to measure industrial performance as change in levels59: the shift 
associated with   
              . 
5.4.3.1 Transformations to reduce skewness 
Absolute levels are problematic for several reasons. Given country heterogeneity, absolute 
performance outcomes span an enormous range of values and the data are extremely skewed. It 
should also be noted that where data are reported in current USD, I have converted into constant 
USD by deflating the current value by the US price level index, following World Bank (2011) 
methodological guidance. This reduces skewness due to the compound impact of price inflation 
and enables meaningful comparisons of values across time. Nevertheless, constant dollar values 
                                                          
59
 An alternative to the fixed effects model with similar properties is the first difference estimator. This 
model regresses differenced values in order to remove time-invariant unobserved effects. However, this 
approach is less suitable when there are significant numbers of missing data points. See Angrist and Pischke 
(2008).   
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are still highly skewed across the panel. Taking the natural log of the data reduce this skewness 
considerably, and improve the fit of the model in most instances (Wooldridge, 2012). Log 
transformations also simplify the interpretation of the coefficients, as discussed in the findings 
section below. Log transformations are standard practice in most applied macroeconometric 
panel research, e.g. Santos-Paulino and Thirwall (2002).  
The indicators of parts and components performance derived so far are: 
I. Log parts and components local content, constant 1995 USD (ISIC 343); 
II. Log parts and component output, constant 1995 USD (ISIC 343); 
III. Log parts and components exports, constant 1995 USD (SITC 784); and 
IV. Log parts and components imports, constant 1995 USD (SITC 784).  
5.4.3.2 Ratio indicators 
It is also common practice in the literature to express industrial performance indicators as ratios 
of other values, for example the size of the automotive sector, GDP, or total trade. For example, 
local content can be expressed as a proportion of total intermediate consumption, or of total 
vehicle production, in order to enable comparison between countries of different sizes. More 
generally, country  ’s output ( ), exports ( ) and imports ( ) for a given sector   can be 
expressed as a proportion of the total for all sectors within the country, or as a proportion of the 
global total for the sector.  
In the first instance, we have an indicator of the importance of the sector relative to all activity in 
the country itself which can be denoted as: 
  
 




and is equivalent to parts and components sector output as a proportion of GDP. Following 
Overman, et al. (2001), this can be normalised by the global share of sector   in global economic 
activity, denoted thus:  
  
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
    
 
   
 
This ‘specialisation index’ is conceptually equivalent to the concept of ‘revealed comparative 
advantage’ (RCA) with respect to exports. Such measures take into account that countries have 
widely varying productivity levels by comparing sectoral performance in relation to their own 
economy; by construction, all countries specialise or exhibit a revealed comparative advantage in 
at least one industrial sector relative to other sectors. If one of these indices exceed unity, a 
country specialises in production or exhibits a comparative advantage in a given sector.   
In the second instance, we have an indicator of the magnitude of a country’s sectoral 
performance measure relative to the magnitude of the sector globally, which can be denoted – in 
the case of output – as  
  
 





and is equivalent to Narula and Wakelin’s (1998) conceptualisation of ‘absolute advantage’ which 
they employ as a proxy for competitiveness. This measure gives weight to larger and more 
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economically productive countries, and is useful for comparing the absolute magnitude of 
performance indicators in relation to other countries and across time. 
As Wooldridge (2012) notes, although both level and log forms are appropriate for variables 
measured as proportions or percentages. I have followed this tendency for the ratio variables 
described above as they are still highly skewed and due to the considerably improved fit of model 
specifications incorporating log variables. Thus, I derive the following ratio indicators: 
V. Log local content as a proportion of apparent consumption (ISIC 343);  
VI. Log output specialisation index (ISIC 343);  
VII. Log export specialisation / RCA index (SITC 784); and 
VIII. Log imports as a proportion of GDP (SITC 784).  
5.4.3.3 Trade balance 
The single exception to my use of log transformations relates to the indicator of trade balance. 
There are two distinct ways in which the concept of trade balance can be operationalised in 
empirical research. One is simply net exports (gross exports minus gross imports) for a given 
sector (or more commonly in applied research, for all traded goods). Net exports can obviously 
take a negative value. Since it is not possible to log transform negative values, this approach has 
not been possible for the trade balance variable. Hence, in order to facilitate the comparison of 
coefficients for countries of diverse size, I take net exports (exports minus imports) as a 
percentage of GDP.  
The second way in which trade balance may be operationalised relates to the ratio rather than 
the literal balance of exports and imports. This is important because it is plausible that the ratio of 
exports to imports might grow at the same time as a deterioration in net exports (or vice versa). 
For example, consider the scenario of a country which exports £1 million and imports £10 million. 
The country’s net exports stand at -£9 million and the ratio of exports to imports is 0.1: 1. Now 
assume that exports increase by 200% while imports increase by 50%: net exports deteriorate (to 
-£13 million) while the ratio of exports to imports improves (to 0.13: 1). There is no clear rationale 
for prioritising one indicator of the change in exports relative to imports over the other, so I 
include both.  
Upon inspection, the indicator exports: imports follows an extremely skewed distribution that 
encompasses a very large range of values, ranging from .0000429 to 186. It is also difficult to 
interpret. Consider the scenario of a country with exports of £10 million and imports of £10 
million: a ratio of 1: 1. If exports increase 10-fold, the ratio rises to 10: 1 (+9). If imports rise 10-
fold instead, the ratio falls to 0.1: 1 (-0.9). Equivalent (or opposite) developments in the 
relationship between exports and imports are accorded misleadingly imbalanced values.  
As an alternative, the values of exports: trade fall between 0 and 1 (by construction) and are much 
less skewed. Continuing the example above, the rise in exports would increase exports: imports + 
exports from 0.5 to 0.91 (+0.41) while the equivalent increase in imports would reduce the 
relevant value to 0.09 (-0.41).  
The final two indicators are thus: 
IX. Trade balance as a percentage of GDP (SITC 784); and 
X. Ratio of exports to total trade (SITC 784).  
5.4.4 Operationalising covariates to account for time-varying heterogeneity 
As discussed above, fixed effects control for the influence of unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity. The conceptual and theoretical framework developed in chapters 2 and 3 
identified three location-specific (i.e. country level) advantages which determine automotive 
industrial performance: market size; industrial capabilities; and the national policy and 
institutional regime. In order to be included in the model, covariates must be time-varying and 
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cover a significant proportion of the panel, in terms of the number of countries covered and the 
number of observations available per country. Given the difficulties quantifying policy and 
institutional factors, in the main models discussed in the findings below, it is assumed that 
covariates for market size and industrial capabilities adequately capture the influence of time-
varying factors on parts and components sector performance outcomes; aside from the policy 
under examination – LCRs – no further attempt is made to operationalise the time-varying 
impacts of policy and institutional heterogeneity. However, I also run additional models, the 
results of which are included in the appendices, incorporating policy variables for parts and 
components sector tariffs, and separate time trends for countries which are members of regional 
trade institutions with significantly lower intra-regional trade barriers in automotive products. For 
the most part, these latter variables do not produce significant coefficients; nor do they alter the 
most important findings in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients for the post-
treatment dummy variables. Finally, I construct a set of dummy variables to account for region-
specific year effects, in case the empirical results are biased by unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity at the regional level. Again, the estimation results are largely unaffected by the 
inclusion of these additional covariates.   
5.4.4.1 Market size 
There are two alternative sources of data for the market size covariate, both of which are based 
on production data, as opposed to automotive ownership, use, or sales. This is not ideal since 
issues of endogeneity, discussed above, are more likely to arise; vehicle production is likely to be 
jointly determined – to a greater extent than ownership or sales – by policy and institutional 
factors affecting parts supply (i.e. the policy treatment) and by the performance of the parts and 
component sector (i.e. the outcome variable). Unfortunately, such data are not available for the 
full panel, and would not permit the present research design. For example, sales data are 
available for most countries from the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs 
d’Automobiles (International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, hereafter referred to 
as OICA) from 2005. World Bank (2011) provides data for stocks of passenger cars and motor 
vehicles, but there are no data for the pre-treatment period.  
The two indicators used in the present analysis are OICA (2015) data on vehicle production, and 
UNIDO (2011b) data on total automotive output (ISIC 34). In order to reduce skewness, I 
transform these data to ratio form and take their natural logs, constructing the following 
indicators: 
I. Log vehicle production per capita; and 
II. Log automotive output as a proportion of GDP.  
The choice of indicator has implications relating the size and composition of the sample permitted 
by their inclusion. OICA production data are comprehensively available, from 1997, for only 35 
WTO members60 which may be classified as ‘major automotive producers’, as well as available in 
the form of estimated values, from 1999, for an additional 11 countries61. As shown in table 5-2 
below, the 35 countries for which OICA production figures are comprehensively available 
comprise 23% of the sample of 152 WTO members on which this analysis is based, and include the 
majority (75%) of the treatment group, excluding Chile, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.  
  
                                                          
60
 These are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, the US, and the UK.  
61
 These are: Chile, Colombia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Vietnam and Zimbabwe.  
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Table 5-2: Cross-tabulation of treatment status and OICA production data status 
  Treatment group Control group Total 
  No. Col. % Row % No. Col. % Row % No. Col. % Row % 
Limited vehicle production and / or 
missing vehicle production data 
4 25 3.4 113 83.1 96.6 117 77 100 
Major vehicle producer 12 75 34.3 23 16.9 65.7 35 23 100 
Total 16 100 10.5 136 100 89.5 152 100 100 
 
Although the UNIDO (2011b) data for total automotive output cover a greater number of data 
points, with almost twice the number of observations and more than twice the number of 
countries with data points, these data are, on average, available for fewer years for each country 
(the mean number of observations per country is 10.31 for automotive output compared with 
14.46 for the vehicle production data).   
Appendices 3 and 4 show mean performance outcomes for the main dependent variables, for 
countries grouped according to their mean production of motor vehicles per capita, and their 
mean automotive output as a percentage of GDP, respectively. Countries with higher average 
levels of both market size indicators exhibit higher levels of performance outcomes, strengthening 
the case for their incorporation in the regression models. The market size covariates are also 
highly significant in most of the regression estimations analysed below.  
Of course, the choice of indicator affects the nature of the comparison group. Compared with the 
wider sample of countries, countries with complete OICA data have significantly higher 
populations, incomes, levels of industrialisation and levels of motorisation – as shown in table 5-5 
– although they span a wide range in each of these characteristics. It must therefore be 
considered that the choice of data will affect the empirical results, since the control groups 
against which performance is compared exhibit non-trivial differences in fundamental 
characteristics. Although the OICA data is narrower, it can be argued that this is a more 
appropriate comparison group; my strategy, therefore, has been to run regressions using both 
samples – i.e. with and without the OICA vehicle production data. As discussed in section 3.6, for 
the most part findings are consistent between the two samples. 
5.4.4.2 Industrial capabilities 
There are numerous ways in which capabilities may be conceived and operationalised (for an 
extended discussion see UNIDO, 2011c). For the purpose of this study, I am interested in the 
measurement of capabilities at the national level of aggregation in a manner that enables 
international comparison. Thus, despite their difficulties and shortcomings (Ravallion, 2010) I have 
decided to use a ‘mash-up’ or composite indicator of industrial capabilities: the UNIDO 
Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index.  
One of the most crucial distinctions is between indicators of capabilities based on input (i.e. 
‘drivers’ of industrial competitiveness) and output (i.e. performance) variables (UNIDO, 2011c: 
16). Indeed, capabilities are closely bound up with industrial performance but are distinct. Input-
based indicators result from the identification, measurement, and aggregation of factors affecting 
industrial performance – for example the presence of innovation activity, the quality of 
infrastructure, and inflows of FDI. Output based measures, of which the CIP index is an example, 
are constructed from data on the magnitude and composition of manufactured production and 
trade. These data refer to the manufacturing sector generically, of which parts and components 
sector capabilities are one part. Thus, despite some overlap between this indicator and the 
dependent variables of parts and components sector performance (data on which will contribute 
to the CIP index score), I have opted to use this indicator due to its comprehensive country 
coverage and availability of multiple years of data.  
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There have been several revisions of the index, with additional indicators being incorporated with 
each revision, ensuring that different revisions are not comparable over time. I have elected to 
use data from the Industrial Development Scoreboard (UNIDO, 2007) which has data for the years 
1998 and 2003, thus covering the years during which LCRs were in effect and leading up to the 
period of liberalisation, and is thus relates to countries’ dynamic performance over that period. In 
order to extend the data series beyond the two years for which data are reported, I have imputed 
a linear interpolation of the missing data62.  
Appendix 5 shows mean performance outcomes for the main dependent variables, for countries 
grouped according to their mean CIP index score. Countries with higher average levels of 
industrial capabilities exhibit higher levels of performance outcomes, strengthening the case for 
their incorporation in the regression models. Like market size, the industrial capabilities indicator 
is also highly significant in most of the regression estimations analysed below.  
5.4.4.3 Additional specifications: additional policy and institutional covariates, and region-specific 
year effects 
As discussed above, the main models for which findings are discussed below assume that the 
market size and industrial capabilities indicators adequately capture time-varying heterogeneity 
with respect to policy and institutional factors. Introducing additional policy and institutional 
indicators is problematic since if other reforms have been carried out in a broadly simultaneous 
timescale to the elimination of LCRs, as is likely to have been the case with tariff reduction, they 
may confound the estimation of the effect of the elimination of LCRs; similarly, if they are 
systematic differences in their presence between the treatment and control groups. Nevertheless, 
I construct additional models in which I control for the potential presence of two time-varying 
policy and institutional factors: parts and components tariff levels, and a separate time trend for 
members of institutions with substantial reductions in intra-regional automotive trade barriers.    
Parts and components tariffs 
Data on the simple average rate of tariffs for ISIC 343 were obtained from the WITS database. 
Missing data points were imputed by first filling missing values forwards, and then backwards. 
That is, where data were missing I first assumed that tariffs would have remained at the level of 
their last reported value. Where data were missing and there were no previously reported values, 
I assumed that tariffs would have prevailed at the level of the next available reported value. 
Finally, I log-transformed the imputed values.  
Regional trade institutions 
As discussed in chapter 3, automotive production networks are characterised by the regional 
nature. I identify four institutions in which substantial intra-regional trade liberalisation in 
automotive products has been established, since it is plausible that membership of these 
institutions substantially impacts the performance outcomes described above over time; these 
are ASEAN, EU, Mercosur and NAFTA. A large number of the treatment group – 9 out of 16 – are 
members of such organisations. Because time-invariant dummy variables are collinear with 
country fixed effects, I interact the dummy with a linear time trend.   
                                                          
62
 This process simply connects the data points with a straight line. It is reasonable to assume that a long 
term process such as industrial capability development would follow a broadly constant trend over time – 
or at least, would follow such a trend sufficiently closely for the purposes of our model. In any case, this 
interpolation covers changing industrial capabilities through the time period in which we are most 
concerned in this analysis.  
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Region-specific year effects 
In order to construct a separate set of region-specific year effects, I interacted the categorical 
variable for geographical region, which divides countries into seven groups (East Asia and Pacific, 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North 
America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa) with the variable ‘year’.  
5.4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5-3 reports the values of skewness for variables with and without log transformations. All of 
the variables incorporated into the final analysis have skewness values that fall within or are only 
slightly outside what Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) regard as the acceptable range (plus or minus 
1.5). Table 5-4 reports basic statistics regarding the main dependent and independent variables 
and the number of available observations. Table 5-5 compares key variables across time, within 
the treatment and two control groups, using the untransformed data, and including some 
contextual structural characteristics not incorporated in the regression models. These data serve 
to illustrate the significant differences between the two alternative control groups discussed 
above, and also place the estimation results in context. The data show that although the group-
level means of most of the performance indicators have increased significantly between the two 
time periods for all groups. The next stage is to examine whether there are significant differences-
in-differences between the treatment and control groups, controlling for relevant covariates, 
country fixed effects, and common year effects.  




Local content, constant 1995 USD 3.75 -0.59 
Ratio of local content to apparent 
consumption 
0.49 -1.54 
Output, constant 1995 USD 4.34 -0.49 
Output specialisation index  3.02 -1.00 
Exports, constant 1995 USD 5.19 -1.54 
Export specialisation / RCA index 2.38 -0.23 
Imports, constant 1995 USD 5.62 0.13 
Imports as a percentage of GDP 2.78 -1.38 
Trade balance as a percentage of GDP -0.76 - 
Ratio of exports to total trade 0.99 - 
CIP index 0.98 - 
Vehicle production 3.14 -0.79 
Vehicle production per capita 1.32 -1.03 
Automotive output, constant 1995 USD 4.44 -0.28 
Automotive output as a percentage of GDP 1.47 -0.82 






Table 5-4: Descriptive statistical information for main variables 
 









      
   
        
 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 2582 152 16.99 
   
            
 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 2582 152 16.99 
Log vehicle production per 
capita 
-4.92 2.12 -12.77 -2.14 637 45 14.16 
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
-4.87 2.01 -12.00 -1.81 1032 98 10.53 
Interpolated CIP index 0.29 0.19 -0.08 0.97 1804 108 16.70 
Log parts and components 
tariffs 
11.58 9.96 0.00 73.24 2550 150 17.00 
Interaction of RTA dummy 
and linear time trend 
2.66 4.90 0 17 2584 152 17 
Dependent variables 
      
Log local content, constant 
1995 USD 
19.91 3.36 10.36 25.79 439 56 7.84 
Log local content as a 
proportion of app. cons. 
-1.31 1.07 -6.26 -0.01 439 56 7.84 
Log parts and components 
output, constant 1995 USD 
19.41 3.73 7.84 25.93 692 69 10.03 
Log output specialisation 
index 
-1.58 2.08 -9.30 2.21 691 68 10.16 
Log parts and components 
exports, constant 1995 USD 
15.36 4.33 3.68 24.34 2522 150 16.81 
Log export specialisation / 
RCA index 
-2.99 2.33 -10.14 1.31 2501 149 16.79 
Log parts and components 
imports, constant 1995 USD 
17.74 2.72 6.99 24.28 2549 150 16.99 
Log imports as a proportion 
of GDP 
-5.85 0.94 -14.28 -3.37 2508 148 16.95 
Trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
-0.21 0.34 -3.22 1.88 2482 148 16.77 
Ratio of exports to total 
trade 































Structural characteristics                 
Basic indicators                 
Population (millions) 221.20 240.53 45.51 48.35 15.51 17.42 35.60 39.58 
GDP (billions of constant 1995 
USD) 
250.3 405.2 1005.0 1201.0 189.9 231.9 195.9 249.5 
GDP per capita (thousands of 
constant 1995 USD) 
2.47 3.02 16.45 19.23 7.67 9.14 7.16 8.52 
Industrial capabilities indicators                 
CIP index 0.32 0.33 0.48 0.48 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.29 
MVA as a percentage of GDP 22.21 21.79 20.86 18.47 14.32 13.22 15.16 14.15 
FDI inflows as a percentage of 
GDP 
2.97 3.15 3.14 3.97 3.87 5.49 3.78 5.25 
Merchandise exports as a 
percentage of GDP 
0.29 0.34 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.32 
Automotive market indicators                 
Vehicle production, thousands of 
units 
559 1270 2042 1993 1728 1544 1327 1448 
Vehicle production, units per 
thousand persons 
5 8 39 41 33 32 24 24 
Automotive output, millions of 
constant 1995 USD 
11980 24360 59300 65820 19335 24269 18150 24280 
Automotive output as a 
percentage of GDP 
3.564 4.124 5.545 5.96 2.15 2.42 2.372 2.704 
Parts and components sector 
outcomes 
                
Absolute indicators (millions of 
constant 1995 USD) 
                
GFCF 139 238 1029 1026 574 540 526 504 
Local content 1984 10430 16110 16180 10388 9491 9024 9686 
Output 2321 9959 17070 20160 8625 9422 7786 9513 
Value added 934 2260 5946 6622 3379 3316 3017 3148 
Exports 608 1725 4815 7004 826 1200 803 1256 
Imports 996 1955 4350 6276 769 1110 793 1200 
Trade balance -388 -230 465 727 45 80 -1 46 
Ratio indicators         
Output per vehicles produced 
(thousand constant 1995 USD) 
5142 5166 5700 9217 5602 8773 5500 7725 
Output as a percentage of GDP 0.64 1.15 1.32 1.83 0.73 0.92 0.71 0.96 
Exports as a percentage of GDP 0.22 0.45 0.68 1.01 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.26 
Imports as a percentage of GDP 0.40 0.59 0.91 0.98 0.45 0.40 0.45 0.42 
Trade balance as a percentage of 
GDP 
-0.18 -0.14 -0.23 0.03 -0.29 -0.17 -0.28 -0.16 
Local content / apparent 
consumption 
0.54 0.58 0.46 0.43 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.39 
Output specialisation index 0.51 0.91 1.04 1.41 0.57 0.71 0.56 0.75 






5.5.1 Presentation of findings and interpretation of point estimates 
In the following sections, I discuss the estimation results for each dependent variable 
operationalised in section 5.4.3. Within each of local content (section 5.5.2), output (section 
5.5.3), exports (section 5.5.4), imports (section 5.5.5) and trade balance (section 5.5.6), I provide 
findings for two alternative indicators. In the cases of local content, output, exports and imports, 
these correspond to log transformed absolute indicators and log transformed ratio indicators. In 
the case of trade balance, the indicators are trade balance as a proportion of GDP and the ratio of 
exports to total trade.  
In each section, I provide a table of estimation results for models incorporating country and year 
fixed effects and cluster robust standard error estimation; these are referred to as the main 
specifications. Models (1) and (2) pertain to the narrower sample of large automotive producers 
and incorporate OICA data on log transformed vehicle production as a covariate for market size. 
Models (3) and (4) pertain to a wider sample and incorporate log automotive output as a 
covariate for market size.  For each dependent variable, I describe the models and summarise 
their overall fit and the direction and magnitude of the estimated impacts of covariates. 
I also provide a brief discussion of diagnostic tests, in order to justify the validity of my model 
specification. Specifically, I carry out the following diagnostic tests63: 
 The test for country-specific (random) effects is a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier 
test for significant differences between cross-sectional units, performed using the Stata 
command xttest0. The null hypothesis is that variances across entities is zero; p<0.05 
indicates that we reject the null and conclude that the random effects model is more 
appropriate than pooled OLS. The test is performed with the Stata command xttest0.  
 The test for fixed versus random effects is a Wald test for over-identification of additional 
restrictions in FE model; unlike the standard Hausman test, it extends to heteroskedastic- and 
cluster-robust model specifications. The null hypothesis is that the additional restrictions are 
not jointly significant and random effects are preferred. The test is performed through the 
user-written Stata programme xtoverid.  
 The test for joint significance of year-specific effects is a Wald test of the null hypothesis that 
year dummy coefficients are jointly equal to zero. It is performed by the Stata command 
testparm. 
 The test for heteroskedasticity calculates a modified Wald statistic for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals of fixed effects models, under the null hypothesis of 
homoskedastic errors, following Greene (2000). It is performed via the user-written Stata 
programme xttest3. 
                                                          
63
 I have also carried out joint tests for normality of residuals, which combines tests for skewness and 
kurtosis into an overall test statistic, under the null hypothesis that the residuals follow a normal 
distribution. Invariably, these tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of normality. It should be noted, 
however, following Gelman and Hill (2007), that a non-normal distribution of errors does not affect the 
parameter estimates in fixed effects models. Arguing that the normality is “generally the least important of 
all” linear regression assumptions, the authors do not recommend diagnostics of the normality of 
regression residuals (p. 46). Wooldridge (2012) concurs that although non-normality of the error is a 
“potentially serious problem... we can use central limit theorem” to conclude that estimators “are 
approximately normally distributed in large enough sample sizes” (pp. 173-4).  Furthermore, as Diehr and 
Lumley (2002) observe, “formal statistical tests for normality are especially undesirable as they will have 
low power in the small samples where the distribution matters and high power only in large samples where 
the distribution is unimportant”. As a result, I do not report the results of normality tests here.  
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 The test for serial correlation checks for the presence of serial correlation in residuals of linear 
panel data models by regressing first-differenced variables under the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation. The test is a user-written Stata programme xtserial (Drukker, 2003). 
I then briefly discuss estimation results for the same dependent variables but alternative model 
specifications, which are provided in the appendices. These are as described for the main 
specifications, but also incorporate the following additional features respectively: 
 Covariates for log parts and components tariffs and separate time trends for members of 
regional institutions with significantly reduced barriers to intra-regional trade 
 Region-specific year effects 
As discussed above, most of the dependent and independent variables are log transformations of 
continuous variables. A word needs to be said here about the interpretation of the point 
estimates when dependent variables take the log form.  
In the model                 , the coefficient   is interpreted as the proportional change in   
for a change in  . Thus, a 1% change in   yields a    change in  . For ease of exposition, we can 
multiply the coefficient by 100 to get the change in    as a percentage of any change in   
(Wooldridge, 2012: 190).  
In the interpretation of the coefficients on variables not expressed in log form, such as in the 
model             , a one unit increase in   yields an approximately        change in  . In 
fact, the exact % change in   with respect to   is given by                       
According to Wooldridge (ibid.), a discrepancy arises for large values of  , as the approximate 
percentage change falls between the exact value pertaining to a unitary increase in   and that 
pertaining to a unitary decrease in  .  
Moving to the interpretation of the dummy variables, this implies that the interpretation of   in 
the in the model                     depends on whether the dummy moves from zero to 
one or from one to zero. As an approximation, “the coefficient on a dummy variable, when 
multiplied by 100, is interpreted as the percentage difference in  , holding all other factors 
constant” (Wooldridge, 2012: 232). More exactly, if   switches from 0 to 1, the % impact of the 
policy change on   is  
                
and if  switches from 1 to 0, the % impact of the policy change on   is  
                 
The difference depends upon which ‘state’ of   is considered to be the base group from which 
the percentage change is calculated. In most cases, the approximation           suffices, 




5.5.2 Local content 
Estimation results for models with local content dependent variables are summarised in table 5-6, 
below. As demonstrated by high R2 values, the models offer good explanatory power for the 
determination of log local content, although the explanatory power of the log local content ratio 
is much weaker. In three of the models – (1), (3) and (4) – the market size covariate is highly 
significantly associated with local content, although the industrial capabilities covariate is 
insignificant in all models, suggesting that high levels of local content can be obtained without 
strong capabilities in the presence of protective policies.  
Turning to diagnostics (details of which are described in section 5.5.1, above), highly significant 
test results for country-specific effects, fixed vs. random effects, and joint significance of year 
dummies confirm the appropriateness of the two-way fixed effects model vis-à-vis alternative 
specifications. Post-estimation analysis of regression residuals confirms the presence of serial 
correlated and heteroskedastic error terms, justifying the use of cluster-robust standard errors.  
The key finding is that the elimination of LCRs has had a significant and negative impact on local 
content in three of the four models, while in model (2) the coefficient for  
   
             is negative but not significant. In terms of the size of this impact, point estimates of 
around -.4 indicate an approximate reduction of local content by around 40% in the post-
treatment period relative to pre-treatment outcomes which is consistent across both samples. 
The point estimate for model (4) indicates that for the wider sample, there has been an 
approximate reduction of 28% in the ratio of local content to apparent consumption associated 
with the elimination of LCRs.  
Turning to the alternative specifications presented in appendices 7 and 8, these findings are 
broadly consistent with the main specification. In the specifications incorporating log tariffs and 
separate time trends for countries with significant regional trade institutions, point estimates for 
   
             remain negative at a high level of statistical significance for models (3) and (4). The 
coefficient loses significance for model (1), but remains negative. Interestingly, neither of the 
additional covariates are statistically significant in these models. Finally, in the specifications 
incorporating region-specific year effects, the signs and significance levels of the coefficients for 
   
             are very similar to those presented in table 5-6.     
In sum, the findings are consistent with expectations that LCRs promote the use of local parts and 
components in assembly compared to imported parts and components, and that eliminating 
these policies will have reduced the importance of locally-manufactured parts and components 
within the production networks of domestic assemblers, vis-à-vis imports. This is an important 
finding as it suggests that LCRs have promoted the integration of local suppliers in national 
automotive value chains, and the elimination of LCRs has led to a reduction in local content and a 
consequent increase in imports. Taking local content as an indicator of industrial performance, 
this finding appears, at face value, to suggest that the elimination of LCRs has had negative 
consequences. However, as discussed below, this finding must be considered in light of findings 
for alternative indicators, which invite an alternative perspective on the developmental value of 




Table 5-6: Estimation results: local content dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard 
errors 
 
Large automotive producers 
Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable Log local content 
Log local content / 
apparent 
consumption 
Log local content  
Log local content / 
apparent 
consumption 
Independent variable point 
estimates and standard errors 
        
   
        
  0.00724 -0.0995 0.254 0.0694 
  (0.132) (0.0937) (0.186) (0.0861) 
   
            
  -0.425* -0.169 -0.409*** -0.277*** 
  (0.238) (0.169) (0.122) (0.101) 
Log vehicle production per 
capita 
1.012*** 0.242     
  (0.236) (0.159)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
    1.225*** 0.731*** 
      (0.126) (0.207) 
Interpolated CIP index 5.220 2.615 2.541 0.135 
  (3.106) (2.214) (1.942) (1.279) 
Diagnostic statistics 
    
Observations 257 257 431 431 
Number of countries 27 27 53 53 
Mean observations per 
country 
9.52 9.52 8.13 8.13 
R-squared 0.63 0.15 0.64 0.32 
Test for country-specific 
(random) effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for fixed vs. random 
effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for joint significance of 
year-specific effects 
[0.0000] [0.0144] [0.0012] [0.0539] 
Test for heteroskedasticity [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for serial correlation [0.0170] [0.0661] [0.0092] [0.0261] 
Notes: Point estimates are reported without parentheses; *** signifies p<0.01, ** signifies p<0.05, and * signifies p<0.1. Standard 





Estimation results for models with output dependent variables are summarised in table 5-7, 
below. The four models offer good explanatory potential with R2 values ranging from .45 to .66. In 
all the models, market size and industrial capability covariates are positively and highly 
significantly associated with output indicators, in line with theoretical expectations.  
Turning to diagnostics, as above, highly significant test results confirm the appropriateness of the 
two-way fixed effects model incorporating cluster-robust standard errors vis-à-vis alternative 
specifications.  
The important finding here is that in contrast to the findings pertaining to local content, the 
elimination of LCRs has had no statistically significant impact on output among countries 
eliminating LCRs that is distinguishable to the impact experienced within the wider population.  
Turning to the alternative model specifications presented in appendices 9 and 10, the general 
thrust of this finding is confirmed, although some specifications point to the presence of small but 
statistically significant negative effects on output indicators. In the specifications with the 
additional policy and institutional covariates the coefficients are insignificant, and inconsistent in 
terms of their signs. Finally, in the specifications incorporating region-specific year effects 
coefficients for    
             are negative in all models, but only significantly so in model (2). 
Therefore, it is unlikely, depending upon the validity of the various specifications examined here, 
that the elimination of LCRs has had a negative impact on output, controlling for other factors.  
This finding reflects the fact that the impact of the elimination of LCRs on output appears to 
depend on the magnitude of two conflicting phenomena: on the one hand, liberalisation of LCRs 
threatens uncompetitive import-substituting firms by permitting assemblers to source parts and 
components from abroad; on the other, it encourages export-oriented production and investment 
of both parts and components and finished vehicles by reducing the costs of inputs and providing 
greater opportunities to access foreign markets. The net impact of these changes is that there 
appears to be no significant impact on output arising from the elimination of LCRs. Thus, although 
local content levels have fallen significantly, any consequent impact on the magnitude of parts 
production overall must have been counterbalanced by increases in export orientation. This result 
– which is substantiated in subsequent sections for the dependent variables exports, imports and 
trade balance – appears to offer an important refutation of the contention that the elimination of 
LCRs would lead to the widespread substitution of inefficient domestic supply networks with 






Table 5-7: Estimation results: output dependent variables: fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors 
 
Large automotive producers 
Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  






Independent variable point 
estimates and standard errors     
   
        
  -0.148* -0.241* 0.110 0.0192 
  (0.0778) (0.118) (0.182) (0.130) 
   
            
  -0.0212 0.0395 -0.188 -0.112 
  (0.149) (0.162) (0.189) (0.163) 
Log vehicle production per 
capita 
0.599*** 0.368***     
  (0.124) (0.105)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
    0.718*** 0.673*** 
      (0.136) (0.127) 
Interpolated CIP index 7.171** 5.682*** 1.483 0.228 
  (2.675) (2.058) (1.406) (1.233) 
Diagnostic statistics 
    
Observations 334 334 662 662 
Number of countries 31 31 64 64 
Mean observations per 
country 
10.77 10.77 10.34 10.34 
R-squared 0.66 0.56 0.51 0.45 
Test for country-specific 
(random) effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for fixed vs. random 
effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for joint significance of 
year-specific effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for heteroskedasticity [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for serial correlation [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes: Point estimates are reported without parentheses; *** signifies p<0.01, ** signifies p<0.05, and * signifies p<0.1. Standard 






Estimation results for models with export performance dependent variables are summarised in 
table 5-8, below. The models for the export indicators offer good explanatory power for the 
smaller sample of large automotive producers but explain far less of the variation in models (3) 
and (4), perhaps reflecting the greater potential for measurement error, and the statistically 
insignificant association between market size and export performance, within the larger sample. 
In all four models across both samples, industrial capabilities are highly significantly associated 
with export performance, in line with theoretical expectations.    
Again, as for the local content and export dependent variable models, highly significant test 
results confirm the appropriateness of the two-way fixed effects model incorporating cluster-
robust standard errors vis-à-vis alternative specifications, although we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of serial correlation in models (3) and (4).  
Despite the low R2 values in models (3) and (4), it is remarkable that the    
             coefficient 
is positive and highly significant across all four models. Coefficients represent an approximately 
40-65% increase in export indicators in the post-treatment period, for the treatment group 
relative to the control group. These findings are borne out in the alternative specifications, the 
results of which are summarised in appendices 11 and 12, which show highly significant positive 
effects on exports, of similar magnitudes to those in table 5-8, across all models. There is no 
doubt that export performance outcomes indicate significant improvements in the 
competitiveness of parts and components sectors in countries in which LCRs have been 
eliminated, providing explanation for the findings discussed in the previous sections, that local 
content has fallen with no corresponding reduction in output overall. This finding is also borne out 
in relation to the point estimates for the models featuring import dependent variables, which are 





Table 5-8: Estimation results: export dependent variables: fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors 
 
Large automotive producers 
Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  








Independent variable point 
estimates and standard errors     
   
        
  -0.103 -0.0994 -0.286 -0.234 
  (0.126) (0.115) (0.178) (0.168) 
   
            
  0.393** 0.447*** 0.645*** 0.509*** 
  (0.151) (0.125) (0.199) (0.177) 
Log vehicle production per 
capita 
0.448*** 0.164***     
  (0.0807) (0.0467)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
    0.0365 -0.0332 
      (0.101) (0.0992) 
Interpolated CIP index 7.311*** 5.851*** 7.364** 6.620** 
  (1.319) (0.894) (3.214) (2.962) 
Diagnostic statistics 
    
Observations 480 480 973 969 
Number of countries 32 32 90 90 
Mean observations per 
country 
15 15 10.81 10.77 
R-squared 0.80 0.54 0.37 0.15 
Test for country-specific 
(random) effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for fixed vs. random 
effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for joint significance of 
year-specific effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0105] 
Test for heteroskedasticity [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for serial correlation [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.4966] [0.5143] 
Notes: Point estimates are reported without parentheses; *** signifies p<0.01, ** signifies p<0.05, and * signifies p<0.1. Standard 





Estimation results for models with import dependent variables are summarised in table 5-9, 
below. Again, the reduced sample of models (1) and (2) offers better explanatory potential as 
indicated by the higher R2 values. It is also interesting to note that in models (1) and (2), there is a 
stronger relationship between vehicle production and imports than between vehicle production 
and exports. This is theoretically consistent: since exports depend strongly on foreign markets, 
they are expected to correlate more weakly with the domestic market. Conversely, the 
relationship between industrial capabilities and imports is weaker than between industrial 
capabilities and exports; again, consistent with theoretical expectations, since exports require a 
degree of technological competence in local firms that is not required to enable imports. Once 
again, diagnostic tests confirm the appropriateness of the models against alternative 
specifications.  
The key finding is that the point estimates for    
             suggest an association between the 
elimination of LCRs and imports that is smaller in magnitude, and less certain, compared to the 
findings for exports. In the models with the smaller sample, coefficients are insignificant while in 
the wider sample, they are significant and positive but considerably smaller than the point 
estimates from the equivalent export models, at .44 and .41 compared with .65 and .51.  
The findings are confirmed in the alternative specifications, results of which are summarised in 
appendices 13 and 14. In specifications incorporating additional policy and institutional 
covariates, coefficients have the same signs and similar magnitudes and significance levels as in 
table 5-9; interestingly, the coefficients for the tariff level covariate are insignificant. In the 
specifications incorporating region-specific year effects, coefficients on    
             are larger 
than reported in table 5-9, and are significant in model (1), but in all cases except model (4) – 
which has a very low R2 value – coefficients are lower than the corresponding coefficients for the 
export dependent variable models.    
These findings provide tentative support for the contention that the elimination of LCRs has had a 
positive impact on trade performance, enhancing exports more than imports; this is examined 




Table 5-9: Estimation results: import dependent variables: fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors 
 
Large automotive producers 
Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable Log imports 
Log imports as a 
proportion of GDP 
Log imports 
Log imports as a 
proportion of GDP 
Independent variable point 
estimates and standard errors     
   
        
  0.0774 0.0571 -0.168 -0.200** 
  (0.119) (0.0972) (0.104) (0.0884) 
   
            
  0.111 0.162 0.441** 0.412*** 
  (0.188) (0.160) (0.186) (0.148) 
Log vehicle production per 
capita 
0.582*** 0.341***     
  (0.0780) (0.0523)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
    0.0673 0.0623 
      (0.0710) (0.0654) 
Interpolated CIP index 1.534 0.197 3.015** 1.481 
  (1.279) (1.133) (1.446) (1.271) 
Diagnostic statistics 
    
Observations 480 480 977 977 
Number of countries 32 32 91 91 
Mean observations per 
country 
15 15 10.74 10.74 
R-squared 0.82 0.47 0.42 0.11 
Test for country-specific 
(random) effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for fixed vs. random 
effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for joint significance of 
year-specific effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] 
Test for heteroskedasticity [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for serial correlation [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes: Point estimates are reported without parentheses; *** signifies p<0.01, ** signifies p<0.05, and * signifies p<0.1. Standard 





5.5.6 Trade balance 
Table 5-10 shows estimation results for the main specifications for the trade balance dependent 
variables. These models have much lower R2 values, ranging from .11 to .43, compared to the 
previous dependent variables, reflecting the greater theoretical ambiguity regarding determinants 
of trade balance indicators over time. The coefficient for market size is insignificant in all of these 
models; as demand increases, it can be supplied either via imports or via domestic producers 
which may also export abroad. There is therefore no significant uniform relationship between 
market size and trade balance indicators across the samples analysed here. However, industrial 
capabilities are positively and significantly associated with net exports as a percentage of GDP and 
exports as a proportion of total trade.   
As for the results discussed in the previous four sections, diagnostic statistics strongly confirm the 
appropriateness of the fixed effect model and the incorporation of cluster-robust standard errors, 
although in model (2) we reject the joint significance of year dummies at the 10% level.  
Turning to the coefficient on    
             the findings reflect an ambiguous relationship between 
the elimination of LCRs and trade balance indicators measured by net exports as a proportion of 
GDP and by exports as a proportion of total trade. As discussed in section 5.4.3 above, it is 
possible for net exports to fall while the ratio of exports to trade rises within individual countries, 
and this is what appears to have occurred. Coefficients for the former indicator are negative, 
although statistically insignificant, whereas coefficients for the latter are positive and significant at 
the 5% level for model (2) and the 10% level for model (4).  
Turning to the alternative specifications reported in appendices 15 and 16, in specifications 
incorporating the additional policy and institutional covariates, and the region-specific year 
effects, the relationship between    
             and the ratio of exports to total trade becomes 
less significance in model (2) and becomes insignificant in model (4).  
From these results, it is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions about the relative impacts of 
the elimination of LCRs on import and export growth; exports have risen more rapidly in 
proportional terms, but from a low base, such that imports appear to have increased more rapidly 
in absolute terms. However, the latter effect is statistically insignificant. The overall interpretation 




Table 5-10: Estimation results: trade balance and export ratio dependent variables: fixed effects with cluster robust 
standard errors 
 
Large automotive producers 
Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable 
Trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
Exports as a 
proportion of trade 
Trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
Exports as a 
proportion of trade 
Independent variable point 
estimates and standard errors     
   
        
  0.0366 -0.0331 0.0378 -0.0231 
  (0.0838) (0.0453) (0.0627) (0.0361) 
   
            
  -0.0708 0.0580** -0.0597 0.0437* 
  (0.122) (0.0277) (0.0919) (0.0240) 
Log vehicle production per 
capita 
-0.124* -0.0327*     
  (0.0726) (0.0162)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
    0.00569 0.00510 
      (0.0214) (0.0119) 
Interpolated CIP index 5.466*** 1.296*** 2.004** 0.654* 
  (0.915) (0.206) (0.886) (0.376) 
Diagnostic statistics 
    
Observations 480 480 973 973 
Number of countries 32 32 90 90 
Mean observations per 
country 
15 15 10.81 10.81 
R-squared 0.43 0.32 0.16 0.11 
Test for country-specific 
(random) effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for fixed vs. random 
effects 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for joint significance of 
year-specific effects 
[0.0005] [0.2923] [0.0628] [0.0104] 
Test for heteroskedasticity [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Test for serial correlation [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0018] 
Notes: Point estimates are reported without parentheses; *** signifies p<0.01, ** signifies p<0.05, and * signifies p<0.1. Standard 




5.5.7 Summary and interpretation of findings 
Without question, the findings discussed in the preceding section suggest strongly that, 
controlling for theoretically relevant covariates and country fixed effects, the elimination of LCRs 
has been significantly associated with changes in industrial performance indicators in those 
countries where they were previously in force. The estimation results show that local content, 
both in absolute terms and as a proportion of apparent consumption, have fallen in the post-
treatment period. Output, in absolute terms and expressed as a proportion of GDP, has also 
fallen, but the reduction was statistically insignificant and smaller in magnitude. Exports, and to a 
lesser extent imports, have increased dramatically and significantly; the ratio of exports to total 
trade has increased, suggesting that exports have grown proportionally more than imports. The 
overall impact on trade performance as measured by net exports as a proportion of GDP is 
negative but insignificant.  
The implications of these findings are that the elimination of LCRs appears to have led to 
significant increases in trade openness with no corresponding reduction in production; contrary to 
pessimistic expectations, the liberalisation of LCRs is associated with greater integration of 
domestic production into global networks rather than the decimation of production and floods of 
imports into liberalising countries.  
While there is no doubt that parts and components suppliers are significantly more competitive 
on the world stage in the post-liberalisation environment, the findings actually leave a number of 
important unanswered questions in the context of my research goals. These relate to causal 
explanation and the causal mechanisms through which the observed impacts occur, the possibility 
that post-treatment performance improvements are partly determined by cumulative impacts 
arising from LCRs in the previous period, the possibility of time-varying heterogeneity between 
the treatment and control groups more generally, and the possibility that the impact of the 
elimination of LCRs may not be homogenous within the treatment group.  
In this stage of my research design, in which causal mechanisms are obscured by the variable-
oriented nature and goals of the analysis, it is impossible to distinguish between alternative 
interpretations. One mechanism is that the liberalisation of LCRs has altered the behaviour of 
existing local firms, reducing the opportunities for rent-seeking, encouraging export-oriented 
production, and providing incentives for product and process upgrading to cope with competitive 
pressures. An alternative and perhaps complementary explanation is that faced with import 
competition, local firms have left the market and been replaced with global suppliers with more 
extensive linkages with subsidiaries abroad and operating at more efficient levels of scale. The 
elimination of LCRs may have encouraged assembly production where previously it was 
discouraged, driving complementary investment in supply networks, or conversely it may have 
had little impact on assembler decisions. Likewise, the elimination of LCRs may have encouraged 
or discouraged technology transfer from automakers to local suppliers. The point is, based on the 
evidence here, which indicates (on balance) greater competitiveness, we are unable to explain the 
mechanisms behind this effect. Yet these questions have hugely important implications for our 
understanding of the developmental impacts of restrictions on policies such as LCRs.   
The examination of causal mechanisms can also help to clarify matters relating to the presence of 
causal relationships in instances when the assumptions required for causal inference from cross-
case, statistical analysis break down. Provided that the models are correctly specified and that the 
assumptions discussed in section 5.3 approximately pertain, we can interpret significant statistical 
associations as causal effects. One of the core assumptions is that treatment and control groups 
are subject to common time trends in the absence of treatment, except to the extent that factors 
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driving heterogeneity are incorporated into the analysis as covariates. However, if important 
time-varying factors are omitted, the interpretation of the DID estimator as a causal effect 
becomes problematic; and this is likely to be the case, since we know that the treatment and 
control groups differed in one crucial respect in the pre-treatment period: with respect to their 
use of LCRs. If LCRs give rise to time-varying heterogeneity between treatment and control 
groups, the observed performance outcomes in the post-treatment period would be influenced 
by the implementation of LCRs in the pre-treatment period. To turn from abstract to more 
concrete concerns, LCRs may have been crucial in establishing conditions under which the 
observed positive impacts of liberalisation were possible, by allowing firms to ‘learn by doing’ and 
providing scope for more efficient economies of scale by providing protected domestic market, as 
in the classic infant industrial logic. In this instance, it is impossible to infer from the findings that 
it would be beneficial if the treatment group had not implemented LCRs on the first place.  
More generally, the plausibility of other forms of time-varying heterogeneity complicate the 
interpretation of    
             as a causal effect. As discussed in chapter 3, emerging markets 
have become particularly important within the strategies of automotive lead firms in the past 20-
30 years, both as a result of their market size, growth and potential and as low cost 
manufacturing locations. The factors were introduced as covariates in the panel regression. 
However, interpretation of the DID estimator as causal effect requires that time-varying 
covariates are exogenous (or independent from one another). Market size and industrial 
capabilities are not strictly exogenous since they are influenced by policy and institutional factors, 
one of which includes the variable of interest here: the elimination of LCRs. To the extent that the 
latter serves to contribute towards a reduction in the price of vehicles, thus enhancing the size of 
the market, or influences the CIP score through an impact on industrial performance, the models 
developed here may understate any observed impacts of the elimination of LCRs on industrial 
performance outcomes. Perhaps more importantly, policy and institutional factors, also identified 
as crucially important in my review of the literature, were only fairly superficially operationalised 
for consideration in supplementary specifications. While the limited incorporation of policy and 
institutional variables into quantitative models is largely unavoidable, nevertheless, given the 
potential for the observed outcomes of the elimination of LCRs to be confounded by the adoption 
of alternative policies aimed at promoting domestic parts and components production, this may 
be a significant omission.   
Finally, the present chapter is based on the assumption of causal homogeneity with respect to the 
treatment effect. In fact, there are strong theoretical reasons, discussed in chapter 2, to assume 
that the elimination of LCRs would indeed lead to divergent effects, based on the interaction or 
conjunction of the policy change with varied location-specific advantages. Indeed, as I discuss in 
the following chapter, a comparison of descriptive statistics on performance outcomes in the pre- 
and post-treatment periods show considerable variation across the treatment group which 
suggests that the impacts of the elimination of LCRs may not have been uniform.  
These limitations have guided my choice of research questions and my decision to supplement 
the analysis above with historical institutionalist, comparative case studies, which comprise the 
following chapter.  
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6 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
6.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Having presented the findings from the panel regression analysis, in the present chapter I 
examine the elimination of LCRs from an alternative methodological perspective. The historical 
institutional perspective permits examination of the causal mechanisms through which 
relationships between causes and outcomes are established, namely the activities, decisions and 
strategies of local and global firms in response to the advantages and policies in different 
countries. Whereas the DID approach of the previous chapter assumed that any differences 
between countries were time-invariant, the case studies offer the potential for more 
comprehensive operationalisation of the complex policy and institutional factors that provide the 
context in which LCRs were implemented and eliminated. As a result, from this perspective, we 
are able better to examine and unpick the complex conjunctive and path dependent causal 
processes that influence industrial performance outcomes.  
In the quantitative stage, causal homogeneity was assumed across the broader global population, 
with heterogeneity captured by observed covariates. Here, we only apply the assumption of 
causal homogeneity across the smaller and arguably more homogenous population of LCR-users. 
However, as I discuss below, there is still a considerable degree of diversity within this population, 
the details of which inform my selection of cases. Looking at multiple cases also enables 
comparison of conjunctions of causal conditions that lead to different outcomes, and facilitates 
generalisation about the diverse impacts that arise when the implementation and elimination of 
LCRs occur in conjunction with different locations-specific advantages.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.2, I attend to the analytical strategy of the case 
studies. This involves recapping the conceptual and theoretical framework developed in chapter 2 
before describing the operationalisation of key variables. I then describe the goals of my case 
studies explicitly in relation to the research questions associated with this stage of the research. 
In section 6.2.4, I attend to the selection of cases, through which I identify three pairs of cases 
from separate regional institutional configurations, in order to facilitate comparison of outcomes 
according to the method of difference. This involves briefly reviewing trends in performance 
indicators over the post-WTO period, in which LCRs were eliminated. In section 6.2.5, having 
identified three pairs of case to examine, I describe the structure of each paired comparison. The 




6.2 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
6.2.1 Conceptual and theoretical framework 
To summarise the conceptual and theoretical framework adopted in the present analysis, as 
detailed more extensively in chapter 2, the impact of the implementation and elimination of LCRs 
on industrial performance is argued to be ambiguous, depending on the conjunction of each with 
a host of location-specific advantages. These advantages were defined as relating to market size, 
industrial capabilities, and the policy and institutional regime. LCRs may be justified in the 
presence of market failures in technological capability development and coordination failures that 
prevent the establishment of efficient linkages, leading to suboptimal parts and components 
outcomes in the absence of intervention. The static effects of LCRs are unambiguously 
distortionary and welfare-reducing, but considered in a dynamic framework, are more ambiguous.   
The presence of advantages determines the extent to which efforts to overcome these market 
failures are likely to be successful; to simplify, effective LCRs require that locally-based suppliers 
can rapidly upgrade their competences and achieve efficient levels of productive scale. This, in 
turn, hinges upon market and non-market conditions affecting assemblers and suppliers alike. 
Ceteris paribus, within advantageous locations LCRs are more likely to elicit favourable 
performance outcomes through the causal mechanisms of (import-competing) inward 
investment, the achievement of more efficient levels of scale, technological upgrading within 
suppliers and technology transfer between assemblers and suppliers.  
Similarly, advantageous locations are expected to be a favourable position with respect to their 
adjustment to the liberalisation of LCRs. This may be partly because of the more positive impacts 
of LCRs in the previous period in helping to overcome market failures, according to a logic of 
cumulative causation, but more generally, in the absence of trade restrictions, investment may be 
diverted from less-advantageous locations in which parts and component production had 
previously occurred as a result of LCRs.  
In sum, the conceptual and theoretical framework adopted here incorporates complex 
(cumulative and conjunctive) causation, in which the impacts of the implementation and 
elimination of LCRs may diverge according to the causal condition present in the contexts in which 
they occur. Impacts on industrial performance outcomes are manifested through the mechanisms 
of investment patterns and global value chain developments.  
6.2.2 Operationalisation of causes, mechanisms and outcomes 
In the previous chapter, I attended to the operationalisation of indicators of industrial 
performance and relevant covariates available in comprehensive, cross-national formats. To the 
extent that these indicators remain pertinent, I retain them for the present stage of my research. 
However, as discussed above, one of the core strengths of case-oriented approaches is the 
richness afforded by more comprehensive data. One aspect of this is the ability to examine and 
compare individual indicators over time, in order to see how outcomes play out in conjunction 
with specific causal conditions. Another is that examining individual cases in detail permits the 
incorporation of national data and secondary sources which are not available for large ‘n’ studies. 
This is crucially important, as data on causal mechanisms – investment patterns and 
developments in value chain governance structures – comprise the basis of my case studies’ 
contribution to the research problem. In the case of the latter, I rely heavily on secondary data 
sources encountered reviewing the academic literature.    
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6.2.2.1 Causes: location-specific advantages 
As discussed extensively in previous sections and chapters, location-specific advantages in the 
automotive parts and components sector relate to the attractiveness and stability of the business 
and investment environment, which can be seen as comprising three interrelated elements: 
market size, industrial capabilities, and the policy and institutional regime. The sources of data for 
market size and industrial capabilities broadly conform to the previous chapter, with the addition 
of some additional national and secondary sources of data. However, the operationalisation of 
the policy and institutional regime differs markedly and requires some explanation. In the 
historical institutionalist approach adopted here, I use primary and secondary sources to build up 
as comprehensive a picture as possible – given space restrictions – of policies and institutions 
affecting the automotive sector in the pre-WTO era and how they have evolved over time. Factors 
considered include formal policies such sector-specific tariffs, investment performance 
requirements, and fiscal policies, as well as more qualitative assessments of institutional 
characteristics, such as the nature of public-private partnerships. These causal conditions form 
the contexts in which the elimination of LCRs have occurred, and are called upon to explain the 
divergent performance outcomes and mechanisms observed to have arisen.  
6.2.2.2 Mechanisms: FDI and developments in value chain governance  
Data on the causal mechanisms through which industrial performance outcomes arise also come 
from a number of sources. One of the most important mechanisms, and one that assumes a 
central importance in my analysis, is foreign direct investment. FDI data are not available in a 
cross-national format at the requisite degree of sectoral disaggregation, so I have taken FDI data 
from a variety of national sources. Data pertaining to investment in the transport or automotive 
sectors generically are more widely available, and although these data do not differentiate the 
assembly and parts subsectors, they are nevertheless instructive of the strategies of MNCs – 
including lead firms and parts suppliers – in relation to locational advantages. These include the 
following:   
 Japanese FDI outflows, transport equipment (ASEAN-Japan Centre, 2015, Japanese Ministry of 
Finance 2015).  
 US FDI outflows, transport equipment (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). 
More detailed data on parts and component sector investment are available from national 
sources such as manufacturers associations, as well as from secondary sources. The secondary 
data include those on specific investments (or ‘waves’ of investment), but perhaps more 
importantly, allow us to build up a comprehensive picture of evolving governance structures, 
including: 
 relationships between assemblers and suppliers; 
 the level of integration of local firms into national, regional and global trade networks;  
 concentration and denationalisation of ownership;  
 technological capability development and technology transfer;  
 relocation of different value chain activities; and  
 differential capacities for firms to capture higher value activities.  
6.2.2.3 Outcomes: industrial performance in the parts and components sector 
Many of the concepts are simply operationalised following the specification of my panel model, as 
detailed in the previous chapter. However, as discussed above, one of the strengths of the 
present approach is the richness afforded by more comprehensive data, including those from 
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national sources. This is particularly important where UNIDO (2011) production data are missing. 
In any case, industrial performance as measured by these ‘macro’ data are only really significant 
for the case selection stage, in order to depict the extent to which paired cases are characterised 
by divergence; my substantive focus throughout the case studies is on the mechanisms described 
above, and the wider factors driving changes in governance structures.  
6.2.3 Goals of case studies with respect to research questions 
To recap, the research questions pertaining to this stage of the analysis were defined as follows: 
RQ 2. To what extent and how have LCRs contributed to performance outcomes through the 
causal mechanisms of FDI and developments in value chain governance?  
RQ 2.1. To what extent and how have LCRs contributed to post-liberalisation performance 
outcomes through cumulative processes arising in the LCRs period?  
RQ 2.2. How have the contributions of LCRs differed according to the contexts in which they 
were implemented?  
RQ 3. To what extent and how has the elimination of LCRs contributed to performance outcomes 
through the causal mechanisms of FDI and developments in value chain governance?  
RQ 3.1. How have the contributions of the elimination of LCRs differed according to the 
contexts in which elimination occurred?  
RQ 3.2. To what extent has the elimination of LCRs precluded the promotion of local parts 
and components production through alternative policy instruments, and what are 
the implications for analyse of the elimination of LCRs?  
As I discussed previously, and reflected in the research questions, the case studies incorporate 
within-case and comparative, cross-case elements of analysis. As the questions suggest, I am 
concerned with tracing performance outcomes and causal mechanisms in periods which 
correspond to the pre- and post-treatment periods defined in the previous chapter. However, 
whereas the panel ran from 1995-2011, the use of national and secondary data sources permit 
analysis of LCRs and parts and components sector outcomes in years prior to 1995.  
RQ2 pertains to the periods in which LCRs were in force. The overall aim is to examine the 
mechanisms through which LCRs have contributed to performance outcomes. RQ2.1 examines 
evidence for the presence of cumulative causation arising from the implementation of LCRs, 
whether positive or negative. In order to confirm the presence of ‘virtuous’ cumulative impacts, 
we are looking for evidence that firms have engaged in technological learning and achieved 
greater economies of scale as a result of LCRs, the effects of which continue to act subsequent to 
the elimination of LCRs, and that these positive impacts have outweighed any discouragement of 
investment in the terminal sector, reduced incentives to export (for parts and assembly sectors), 
and reorientation of productive and technological activity to maximise protective rents arising 
from the limited domestic market. In order to confirm the presence of ‘vicious’ cumulative effects 
in the negative cases, we are looking for evidence that the negative effects, described above, 
predominate, such that with the removal of protection such as LCRs, existing capabilities were 
insufficiently developed to enable firms to adjust to the influx of competition or take advantage of 
increased market access abroad.  
The sub-question is addressed with reference to a combination of primary data on performance 
outcomes and secondary data on causal mechanisms, sources of which are discussed below. The 
focus is primarily on within-case analysis. RQ2.2 has an explicitly comparative focus. Through 
within-case comparison, the aim is to identify similarities in the causal mechanisms at play in the 
relationship between LCRs and performance outcomes. Through cross-case comparison, the aim 
is to assess the extent to which diverse case-specific outcomes are determined by the conjunction 
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of LCRs with varied location-specific advantages. This involves comparison of market conditions, 
industrial capabilities, and wider policy and institutional environments prevailing during the 
period in which LCRs were in force.  
RQ 3 pertains to periods following the elimination of LCRs, and again, the aim is to examine the 
mechanisms through which the elimination of LCRs has contributed to performance outcomes, 
through an examination of a combination of primary and secondary data, especially in relation to 
investment patterns and development in value chain governance.  
RQ 3.1, like RQ2.3, is more explicitly comparative, the aim being to identify similarities and 
differences with respect to the causal mechanisms driving changes in performance outcomes that 
have occurred in conjunction with the elimination of LCRs. The identification of similarities 
permits analytical generalisation of within-case analysis, while the cross-case focus relates to the 
pairwise comparison of countries with largely similar structural characteristics, the divergent 
performance of which can be attributed to specific differences in location-specific advantages. 
Finally, RQ 3.2 considers the possibility that although the elimination of LCRs have been an 
historically important industrial policy instrument in the automotive sector, there are a number of 
different ways that governments can (and do) continue to promote local parts and component 
production, which need to be considered as influences on the causal mechanisms and 
performance outcomes under examination. These policies include tariffs applied at the national 
and regional levels, investment performance requirements not subject to discipline under the 
TRIMs Agreement, and content policies applied at the regional level, for example. In addition, 
local content policies may be applied informally in contravention to WTO rules. Therefore, it is 
essential to situate the elimination of LCRs in the wider policy and institutional context in which it 
has taken place in each case, in order to assess the significance of the policy shift. Again, this sub-
question has a within-case focus, and relies on analysis of secondary data on the strategic 
responses of lead firms and suppliers to government policies.  
6.2.4 Case selection and comparative approach 
Following the conceptual and theoretical framework developed in chapter 3, the role of regional 
trade agreements is so important in the determination of industrial performance in the 
automotive sector, that the comparison of countries from different regions or different types of 
regional institutional configuration is extremely problematic. To repeat, and at the risk of 
simplification, regional institutional configurations in the emerging markets examined here may 
be defined as integrated peripheral markets (IPMs), emerging regional markets (ERMs), or 
protected autonomous markets (PAMs). In addition, it could be argued that there are a number of 
countries in which the automotive sector is not subject to any substantial intra-regional trade 
integration nor substantial levels of trade protection (e.g., Chile and Ukraine) which we might 
term liberal markets.  
There may be important qualitative differences between these configurations in terms of their 
prospects for integration into global automotive production networks that have obvious 
implications for parts and components sector outcomes. In addition, to the extent that members 
of the same regional configuration are presented the same opportunities in terms of access to the 
regional market, comparison of performance outcomes between them is likely to facilitate the 
identification of pairs according to the method of difference.  
Among the population of 16 countries, there are two countries, Mexico and Romania, which are 
part of integrated peripheral markets (NAFTA and the EU, respectively). Emerging regional 
markets of account for a large number of the population – Argentina and Brazil in Mercosur; and 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam in ASEAN. The remaining countries 
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(Chile, China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Taiwan and Ukraine) are those in which automotive 
strategies are not characterised by their regional nature.  
The two countries within IPMs vary massively in terms of size, and additionally, occupy a 
qualitatively distinct institutional configurations (the EU and NAFTA), so I discount a paired case 
comparison between Mexico and Romania. On the other hand, the other categories of regional 
institutional configurations have at least two potential cases to examine, enabling pairwise 
comparisons within them.  
In order to identify potential suitable pairwise comparisons within the remaining regional 
configurations, I compare some basic indicators of structural characteristics – namely population, 
GDP, GDP per capita, mean CIP index, vehicle stock, number of vehicles per thousand persons, 
annual % growth in vehicle sales, and mean tariffs on vehicles – as well as indicators of 
performance outcomes. The latter are based on the ratio indicators of parts and components 
sector performance analysed in the previous chapter64. I compare the mean values of these 
indicators for the period 2002-2011, and the difference between these values and the mean 
values of the indicators for the period 1995-2001. In other words, I compare outcome levels in a 
period roughly equating to the post-treatment period, and their change from the pre-treatment 
period. These data are provided in appendices 17 and 18. Having identified three of potential 
pairs of cases within three separate regional institutional configurations, I now briefly review their 
performance indicators over time in order to clarify the extent to which the pairs and regions 
exhibit divergent outcomes following the elimination of LCRs.  
  
                                                          
64
 The indicators are the ratio of local content to apparent consumption, the output specialisation index, the 
export specialisation / RCA index, trade balance as a proportion of GDP, and the ratio of exports to trade.  
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6.2.4.1 ASEAN: Malaysia and Thailand 
Within ASEAN, Malaysia and Thailand are obvious candidates and most closely resemble an ideal 
typical comparison within my population of cases. The cases have similarly-sized markets and 
levels of industrial capabilities, but diverge significantly with respect to industrial performance 
outcomes, with Thailand more successful in all key aspects.  
Data on output and local content are not comprehensively available for Malaysia and Thailand. 
However, the data in table 6-1 clearly show a tendency towards divergence between the two 
countries in terms of local content and output. In Malaysia, there was only a modest increase in 
output between 2001 and 2006, and the ratio of local content to apparent consumption of parts 
and components fell dramatically. In Thailand, the decade 1996-2006 saw an approximately 150% 
increase in output, and the proportion of local content in consumption of parts and components 
increased from 55% to 73%.  




































1996 - - - - 5180 2810 55 2960 
2001 1000 696 71 824 - - - - 
2006 1660 767 47 1120 7640 5090 73 7460 
Source: author’s calculations based on UNIDO (2011) data. Data converted to constant USD using World Bank (2011) WDI exchange 
rate data and U.S. Bureau of Labor (2015) inflation data. 
Trade performance data exhibit a similar level of divergence. Both countries’ exports have 
increased in absolute terms, as shown in appendices 19 and 20, as well as in ratio indicators (RCA 
and as a proportion of world exports), but at very different rates, leading to a more pronounced 
divergence in performance outcomes by the end of the period under examination. In 1995, both 
countries only accounted for tiny proportions of global exports (0.07 and 0.12% for Malaysia and 
Thailand respectively). By 2011, the figure had grown by around three and a half times for 
Malaysia, but by over ten times for Thailand. Based on the revealed comparative advantage index, 
which indicates sectoral export performance in relation to the magnitude of total exports, again 
both countries have exhibited increases, but Thailand’s improvement has been much more 
pronounced and was already underway during the period in which LCRs were in effect, as shown 
in figure 6-1 below.   
Turning to trade balances, Malaysia has established increasingly large deficits in both the 
assembly and supply subsector. Thailand, which has been established as an assembly hub (as 
described below) opened up a deficit in parts and components trade – especially in the years 
immediately following LCR liberalisation – but this was turned into a surplus in the second half of 
the 2000s, and is dwarfed by a large surplus in vehicles, exports of which themselves include a 
high proportion of local content. Trade balance indicators for the parts and component sector are 




Figure 6-1: Revealed comparative advantage index, parts and components (SITC 784): Thailand and Malaysia, 1995-
2011. 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data.  
Figure 6-2: Trade balance indicators, parts and components sector (SITC 784): Malaysia and Thailand, 1995-2010 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) and World Bank (2011) data.  
It is instructive to compare Malaysia and Thailand in relation to intra- and extra-ASEAN trade. As 
shown in table 6-2, below, Malaysia relies more heavily on the protected ASEAN market than 
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Thailand for exports, which also serves global markets; Thailand also imports a much smaller 
proportion of its total imports from regional competitors, signifying its dominance of regional 
supply.  
Table 6-2: Percentage of intra-regional (ASEAN) trade in total trade, parts and components sector (ISIC 343): Malaysia 
and Thailand, selected years. 
  Malaysia   Thailand   
  
Proportion of intra-
regional exports in 
total exports 
Proportion of intra-
regional imports in 
total imports 
Proportion of intra-
regional exports in 
total exports 
Proportion of intra-
regional imports in 
total imports 
1995 60 9 33 4 
2000 40 18 25 8 
2005 46 56 35 14 
2010 46 46 38 16 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data.  
Thailand has taken advantage of regional integration to gain large trade surpluses in parts, as 
shown in figure 6-3 below, as well as vehicles, while Malaysia is relatively uncompetitive even in 
the protected regional market. 
Figure 6-3: Trade balance with ASEAN region, parts and components sector (ISIC 343): Malaysia and Thailand, 1995-
2010 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data. Data converted to constant USD using World Bank (2011) WDI exchange rate 






6.2.4.2 Mercosur: Argentina and Brazil 
Within Mercosur, Argentina and Brazil differ with respect to industrial capabilities and market 
size. Argentina is also a more mature market, with higher motorisation and income levels. They 
are also more closely matched in terms of key performance outcomes, but there are some clear 
signs that Brazil appears to be emerging as the dominant player in the regional market.  
In both countries, output fell considerably during the economic crises of 1997 – 2002, as shown in 
figure 6-4 below. These phenomena occurred in the temporal context of ongoing processes of 
liberalisation and regionalisation, as well as the periods in which prohibited LCRs were in force 
(1995 until the end of 1999 in Brazil; until 2004 in Argentina). Turning to local content as a 
proportion of apparent consumption, also shown in figure 6-4 below, this declined in both 
countries during the 1990s, during which time LCRs were in force. However, in Brazil the local 
content ratio has levelled off and indeed risen since 2002, while in Argentina, it has continued to 
decline during the same period after a brief period in which imports fell sharply during the severe 
recession.   
Figure 6-4: Output, millions of constant 1995 USD, and local content as a proportion of apparent consumption, %: 
Argentina and Brazil, 1993-2009 
 
Sources: author’s calculations based on CEP (2015) and Sindipeças / Abipeças (2011). Data converted to constant USD using U.S. 
Bureau of Labor (2015) CPI statistics. Note: Sindipeças / Abipeças (2011) sales data appear to include exports but not imports, and 
therefore are equivalent to output. Local content is calculated by subtracting exports from sales, and apparent consumption is 
calculated by adding imports to local content. 
As shown in appendices 21 and 22, in absolute and constant terms, both exports and imports 
have followed an upward trend, except during the periods of macroeconomic crisis. Data on 
country exports as a percentage of world exports, shows that globally, both countries are fairly 
small players, with Argentina accounting for between 0.28 and 0.48% of world exports, and Brazil 
between 1.01 and 1.57%. For both countries, these ratios dropped significantly during the period 
1999-2002 and have since risen. Figure 6-5 shows the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
index for both countries for the parts and components sector. The index initially exceeded unity, 
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indicating that the ratio of parts and components exports to total exports was higher than the 
ratio of global parts and components to total global exports. In other words, Argentina and Brazil 
were relatively specialised in this particular sector. Despite an overall decline, this figure has 
remained comparatively high. 
Figure 6-5: Revealed comparative advantage index, parts and components (SITC 784): Argentina and Brazil, 1995-2011. 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data. 
As shown in figure 6-6, below, trade balance statistics make clear that both countries have fared 
very differently in the post-LCRs era. Brazil has exhibited a consistently higher ratio of exports to 
total parts and components trade, and has achieved a trade surplus between 2001 and 2007, 
although it is difficult to separate this from the effects of currency devaluation during this period, 
which made Brazilian exports more competitive. As a proportion of GDP, trade balance has been 
consistently negative in Argentina, only reducing during the economic crisis of 2002, when 
domestic demand for imports collapsed.  
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Figure 6-6: Trade balance indicators, parts and components sector (SITC 784): Argentina and Brazil, 1995-2010 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) and World Bank (2011) data. 
Since within the countries of the Mercosur region a large proportion of trade is intra-regional – as 
shown in table 6-3, below – it is worth looking at intra-regional trade specifically for a more 
nuanced understanding of trade performance in Argentina and Brazil.  
Table 6-3: Percentage of intra-regional (Mercosur) trade in total trade, parts and components sector: Argentina and 






Exports Imports  Exports Imports 
1995 80 54 28 24 
2000 51 33 22 14 
2005 51 40 15 14 
2010 65 55 43 14 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data.  
For both countries, the regional market is a more important destination for exports than it is a 
source of imports. This suggests that opportunities afforded by the protected regional market are 
important in the context of Mercosur and domestic firms and subsidiaries take advantage of 
protection to engage in intra-regional trade; if exporting firms were competitive in global markets, 
we would not expect to see such a discrepancy.   
There are, however, differences between the two countries in this regard. Argentina has 
significantly higher levels of intra-regional imports and exports as proportions of their respective 
global totals than Brazil. As Laplane and Sarti (2004: 134) point out, it is to be expected, given 
their respective national market sizes, that “Argentina’s production and trade are more 
dependent upon the Brazilian market than the opposite… export growth was mostly linked to the 
opening up of the Brazilian market and resulted from the compensated trade requirements”. As a 
137 
 
result, Brazil does a far greater proportion of its trade with third parties. In a way, it could be said 
that Argentina is threatened by global and regional competitors, whereas for Brazil, the only real 
competitive threat has come from outside Mercosur.  
It is possible to witness this phenomenon in the data on intra-regional trade balances. Initially, a 
regional division of labour was established, in which Brazil exported parts and imported vehicles; 
but through the course of the 2000s, Argentina has opened up a trade deficit in both subsectors, 
despite efforts to establish balanced trade within the context of exceptions to intra-regional free 
trade. Data for the intra-regional trade balance in the parts and components sector are shown in 
figure 6-7, below. Argentina’s deficit was only temporarily reversed during its economic crisis, 
when – as discussed above – imports fell rapidly. Since then, the deficit has grown rapidly. In 
summary, the trade data suggest that Brazil has had more notable success in regional and global 
markets than Argentina; this pertains specifically to the parts and components subsector as well 
as the automotive sector more broadly.   
Figure 6-7: Trade balance with Mercosur region, parts and components sector (ISIC 343): Argentina and Brazil, 1993-
2010 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data. Data converted to constant USD using World Bank (2011) WDI exchange rate 









6.2.4.3 Protected autonomous markets: China and India 
Finally, the PAMs are a diverse group, within which the most obvious similarities are between the 
continentally-sized Asian giants China and India. China has a larger market and more advanced 
capabilities, and although performance outcomes are similar, based on the data presented above, 
further examination shows that China out-performs India in a number of respects. Humphrey et 
al. (2000) suggest that these countries have had the best chance of establishing independent 
automotive sector as a result of their immense (potential) markets and historic support for 
national automotive firms, which make them an interesting contrast with the previously discussed 
pairs, which have followed regional integration as a means to expand and preserve their 
automotive spaces (ibid.).  
As shown in figure 6-8, below, both China and India have exhibited remarkable rates of growth in 
output, both in the period prior to and post-elimination of LCRs; however, Chinese production 
levels have outstripped India performance by some magnitude. Throughout the period under 
examination, both countries have also retained very high local content ratios.  
Figure 6-8: Output, millions of constant 1995 USD, and local content as a proportion of apparent consumption, %: China 
and India, 1997-2009 
 
Source: Compiled by the author with data from UNIDO (2011) and Sutton (2005). Data converted to constant USD using World Bank 
(2011) WDI exchange rate data and U.S. Bureau of Labor (2015) inflation data. Note: data for available for China in 2002.  
As shown for the parts and components subsector in appendices 23 and 24, imports and exports 
have both increased across all automotive subsectors – in some cases dramatically. Looking more 
specifically at export performance indicators for the parts and components sector, in absolute 
terms, China has performed much more successfully than India since 1995, as shown in figure 6-9 
below. In 1995, China accounted for 0.34% of total global parts exports classification, while India 
captured 0.25%. While the shares of each have grown, China now accounts for almost 6% of 
global parts exports in comparison to India with less than 1%. Similarly, the revealed comparative 
advantage index (which normalises sectoral exports by total merchandise exports) shows that 
while both countries are more specialised in parts and components exports than they were in 
139 
 
1995, China has exhibited a more rapid and remarkable transformation than India, which had a 
much higher RCA to begin with. It is also notable that between 1995 and 2001, the period during 
which LCRs were in effect, saw the Chinese RCA index rise from 0.11 to 0.23, whereas India’s fell. 
Indian export performance growth has only really started since the elimination of LCRs, whereas 
China’s improvement is apparent from 1995, although more rapid since 2002-3.   
Figure 6-9: parts and components exports as a percentage of world exports (SITC 784): China and India, 1995-2011. 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data. 
Turning to data on trade balances, which take into account changes in exports and imports, China 
has developed a trade deficit for the automotive sector as a whole exceeding 7 billion USD in 
constant 1995 terms, whereas India has a surplus of approximately 1 billion. China and India 
specialise in exporting different ‘segments’ of the automotive sector. In China, exports of finished 
vehicles are negligible in comparison to imports, and to exports of parts. The converse is true in 
India, which maintains a trade surplus in vehicles but towards the end of the 2000s, has 




Figure 6-10: Revealed comparative advantage index, parts and components (SITC 784): China and India, 1995-2011. 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) data. 
 
Figure 6-11: Trade balance indicators, parts and components sector (SITC 784): China and India, 1995-2010 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on WITS (2015) and World Bank (2011) data. 
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To summarise, both China and India have exhibited impressive rates of growth in production and 
trade; high local content ratios have been maintained and export performance indicators have 
improved in both cases. There are significant differences in the magnitude of production levels 
and trade flows, reflecting the relative size of each market – China has rapidly become the largest 
automotive market in the world by a long distance, while India’s market is still limited at 
approximately one fifth the size. China’s recent parts and component sector trade performance 
has been impressive in relation to India’s, although it must be noted that India has achieved some 
success exporting vehicles, whereas China’s huge assembly sector is devoted almost entirely to 
servicing the domestic market; China has also developed a large trade deficit in vehicles.   
6.2.5 Structure of paired comparisons 
My case selection process has led to the identification of three pairs of cases: Argentina and 
Brazil, China and India, and Malaysia and Thailand. As well as providing opportunities for paired 
comparisons based on the method of difference – and thus, identify ‘difference-makers’ that 
interact with LCR liberalisation to produce divergent impacts – my selections are justified in two 
further ways. Firstly, I am minded to cover a number of cases, in order to enhance analytical 
generalisation about the impacts of the elimination of LCRs across the wider population and also 
to enhance the opportunities for obtaining secondary data pertaining directly to my research 
questions. Secondly, the strategy enables me to identify similarities and differences in the causal 
mechanisms that exist across a wide variety of regional institutional configurations, and the 
opportunities that exist for promotion of localisation and integration into global production 
networks within each of them. The remainder of the chapter comprises the three paired case-
studies. Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 cover Malaysia and Thailand, Argentina and Brazil, and China 
and India, respectively.  
The structure of each paired case comparison is as follows. After briefly introducing the logic of 
examining each pair and the implications of each, I provide a broad historical overview of the 
automotive sector, outlining the policies and institutions that have served to foster domestic 
parts and components production, and influenced performance outcomes in terms of trade, 
investment, ownership and governance structures. This leads onto an examination of the context 
in which LCRs have been embedded in the post-1995 period, leading up to their elimination under 
WTO rules. I explore secondary data sources on their effects on governance structures and 
performance outcomes. In the following section, I describe the manner in which LCRs have been 
phased out, including a detailed examination of mitigating factors influencing performance 
outcomes. In the next section, I examine the causal mechanisms through which performance 
outcomes are manifest, namely the patterns of FDI and value chain governance structures that 
have emerged in response to the developments described in previous sections, in which the 
implementation and elimination of LCRs are situated. A final section concludes and addresses my 
research questions in the case of each paired comparison, which are then synthesised in the 





6.3 MALAYSIA AND THAILAND 
6.3.1 Overview 
As discussed previously, the comparison between Malaysia and Thailand provides the best 
opportunity to compare the implementation and elimination of LCRs in conjunction with 
divergent conditions according to the logic of the method of difference. It could be argued that 
Malaysia and Thailand have offered similar potential as automotive markets for several decades. 
As ‘second-tier Tigers’, rates of economic growth have been high (if volatile) since the 1960s. 
Malaysia is richer, with per capita incomes between around one and a half and two times larger, 
according to World Bank (2011) data. In terms of population, Thailand is approximate twice the 
size of Malaysia, and indeed GDP in absolute terms is of roughly equal magnitude. Turning to 
domestic automotive demand, Malaysia’s market is more mature, with 289 motor vehicles per 
thousand people in 2005, compared to 146 in Thailand (World Bank, 2011); differences in vehicle 
ownership were already established by the early 1990s (Doner, 1991). Therefore, Malaysia’s 
smaller population and high initial levels of motorisation suggest less scope for growth, and 
indeed, average sales growth rates reflect this.  Nevertheless, the countries have been (until 
recently) remarkably well-matched in terms of their overall size and potential, a fact aided by 
their geographic proximity and status as partners in the ASEAN regional project.  
Amidst these considerable similarities, however, Malaysia and Thailand have diverged with 
respect to policies affecting local and foreign automakers, with the result that Thailand has 
emerged as a regional and global commercial vehicle hub for MNCs that have largely eschewed 
investment in Malaysia. This has had knock-on effects for suppliers, and for the effectiveness of 
policies designed to encourage local supply. 
Thus, throughout the 1990s, LCRs in Thailand have not discouraged MNCs, which have been keen 
to establish assembly operations in pursuit of protective rents in the rapidly growing domestic 
market for pick-up trucks as well as access to the forthcoming ASEAN free trade area; and indeed, 
have encouraged a wave of Japanese suppliers to invest heavily in the parts and components 
sector. Upgrading and technology transfer were necessitated by the orientation of assemblers 
towards export markets, which was assisted, in turn, by a slowdown in domestic demand that 
occurred as a result of the Asian financial crisis. In contrast, where LCRs were implemented in 
conjunction with policies favouring uncompetitive national assemblers, as in Malaysia, they 
merely served to insulate parts suppliers from competition while circumventing technology 
transfer from MNCs.  
Arguably then, LCRs have had divergent and cumulative effects, which have determined the 
context in which subsequent elimination of LCRs took place. Malaysia has been compelled to 
liberalise its uncompetitive parts sector at a time when neighbouring Thailand is well established 
as the favoured destination. In fact, Malaysia has resisted liberalisation and has continued to 
protect the automotive sector through a variety of means; but it seems that the establishment of 
a competitive parts and components sector has been foreclosed, at least for the foreseeable 
future, and the inefficient network of suppliers that have been fostered under LCRs continue to 





6.3.2 Localisation policies in the historical context of automotive sector development 
6.3.2.1 Import substitution and the role of Japanese FDI: 1960s – 1980s 
In both Malaysia and Thailand, the automotive industry first emerged as a result of concerted 
industrial policies in the 1960s (Busser, 2008; Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2010). The strategy for 
both countries was to court chiefly Japanese carmakers – noted for their preference for serving 
foreign markets through exports rather than FDI and local production – in order to access 
technological know-how. By 1984, Japanese firms held a combined market share of approximately 
80% and 90% in Malaysia and Thailand respectively as shown in table 6-4, below.  
Table 6-4: Share of automotive market by firm, percent: Malaysia and Thailand, 1984. 
 
Malaysia Thailand 
Toyota  20.7 29.2 
Nissan 25.4 24.1 
Mitsubishi 8.1 5.2 
Mazda 9.6 7.3 
Isuzu 9.2 17.7 
Daihatsu 4.7 1.5 
Susuki - 1.2 
Hino 1.2 3.4 
Japanese total 80.5 90.1 
GM 2.8 - 
Ford 6.9 2.7 
Mercedes 4.2 1.2 
British Leyland 4.3 - 
Fiat 3.1 - 
Peugeot 1.1 - 
Misc. 6.5 6 
Non-Japanese total 19.5 9.9 
Source: adapted from Doner, 1991: tables 3.12 and 3.15.  
From the outset, a progressive strategy of localisation was initiated. Initially, prohibitively high 
tariffs on fully built vehicles were used. The second phase of localisation began in the 1970s as a 
response to high import propensities and a lack of integration between component 
manufacturers and assemblers in the context of low or negative effective rates of protection for 
intermediates. Local content and trade balancing requirements, mandatory deletion provisions 
and other measures were introduced. In Malaysia, local content requirements were raised from 
10% in 1970 to 35% by 1982. Similarly, Thailand increased the requirement from 15-25% 
(dependent on vehicle type) in 1971 to 50% in 1978 (Doner, 1991).  
Under import substitution, automotive production rose steadily in both countries: to over 




Table 6-5: Vehicle production (passenger cars and commercial vehicles), thousands of units: Malaysia and Thailand, 
selected years. 
 Malaysia Thailand 
1965 - 10 
1967 1.2 12.7 
1969 25 11.7 
1971 - 14.8 
1973 50.4 27.4 
1975 - 31 
1977 - 65.9 
1979 88.6 88.8 
1981 111.5 86.5 
1983 133.3 108.8 
1985 124 81.8 
1987 - 97.8 
Source: adapted from Doner, 1991: table 3.10.   
By the early 1980s, a degree of local content had been achieved. In Thailand, localisation policies 
were “moderately successful” (Doner, 1991: 47): the level of local content rising from 6-15% in 
1973, to 25% in 1977, and 30-35% in 1980. Furthermore, unlike in the assembly sector, ownership 
was dominated during this period by local capital. Local parts and components firms at this stage 
even dominated the first tier original equipment supply chain in Thailand (ibid.). However, even 
this achievement “must be tempered by the high imported content of auto parts made in 
Thailand, estimated at roughly 60 percent in the early 1980s” (ibid.).  
In Malaysia, localisation was arguably less of a success: Doner (ibid.: 50) reports local content 
ratios of 8% in 1978 rising to 18% by 1982. In addition, while the majority of parts firms were 
locally owned, they were dominated by the country’s ethnic minority Chinese and Indian 
populations – an imbalance which the government subsequently sought to address in favour of 
the indigenous Malay population. This policy goal coloured the subsequent drive towards 
automotive nationalism, discussed in the following section.  
To summarise, growth in production of vehicles and parts must be seen in the context of a largely 
fragmented industry structure that had failed to achieve international competitiveness in either 
country by the early 1980s. Local content rates were still low and indeed local parts and 
components were themselves highly import dependent. Exports were negligible until the mid-
1980s and significant trade deficits were maintained throughout this period.  
6.3.2.2 Divergence of national policy and institutional regimes: 1980s – mid-1990s 
By the early 1980s, it had become clear that both countries had failed to achieve the objectives to 
which they had aspired. Local production had come at the cost of inefficiency which kept 
automotive products expensive and relatively poor quality; protection served to furnish foreign 
assemblers with rents; and trade performance was poor. A major issue for both countries was the 
need for rationalisation, since both countries were characterised by large number of assemblers 
producing relatively small volumes (Doner, 1991).  
At this juncture, both countries continued with a broad strategy of import substitution which 
included the expanded use of LCRs, as well as prohibitively high tariffs and imports restrictions on 
finished vehicles and restrictions on foreign equity, throughout the 1980s. However, while the 
Malaysian government embarked on an ambitious attempt to produce a ‘national car’, the Thai 
government shelved plans to do the same in the early 1980s.  
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Thailand applied significant levels of trade protection on finished vehicles; a ban on passenger car 
imports was imposed from 1978 to 1991 while finished vehicle imports that were permitted were 
subject to tariffs ranging from 180-300%. By the late-1980s, LCRs were set at 54% for passenger 
cars; at the same time, assemblers of commercial vehicles – including the popular one-ton pick-up 
truck – were required to use locally-manufactured diesel engines, the producers of which were 
limited to three companies in order to promote the achievement of scale economies (Athukorala 
and Kohpaiboon, 2010: 3-4). Thus, by the mid-1980s, the dominant themes of subsequent Thai 
automotive strategy had begun to emerge: ownership restrictions were phased out65 and inward 
FDI in the parts and components sector, especially from Japanese assemblers, began to be 
encouraged; and the commercial vehicle (specifically, pick-up) subsector began to be targeted for 
special incentives (Natsuda and Thoburn, 2013).  
In Malaysia, localisation policies were advanced with 1980’s Mandatory Deletion Programme 
(MDP), which prohibited “local car producers, or franchisors from importing all automotive parts 
and components listed as ‘mandatory deleted components’ for use in local automotive assembly” 
(Rosli and Kari, 2008: 106). Levels of tariff protection were also high for finished vehicles, although 
not as high as in Thailand. However, in contrast to Thailand’s reliance on private capital and 
especially Japanese FDI, in 1983, Malaysia announced the National Car Project, which formed a 
joint venture – Proton – between the state-owned Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia 
(HICOM) and Mitsubishi. Natsuda et al. (2013) describe the Malaysian strategy as one of 
‘industrial nationalism’. As noted by Ravenhill and Doner (2008), the ambitious rationale for the 
project was the “radical rationalization of what had been a highly fragmented production 
structure” – the production of one model for the national market allowing the requisite levels of 
scale and efficiency. Proton also introduced the Vendor Development Program (VDP) to provide 
technological assistance to suppliers, which were rationalised to maximise economies of scale. In 
addition to Malaysia heavily discriminatory tariffs, the government has “provided a number of 
generous incentives under the Promotion of Investment Act” including tax breaks for firms with 
‘pioneer status’ and fiscal rebates on capital investment expenditure (Rosli and Kari, 2008: 105).  
In the early 1990s, Thailand began to deregulate and liberalise the automotive sector, by 
abolishing restrictions on domestic production of specified series and models in 1990, and 
drastically reducing tariffs for built-up and knocked-down vehicles in the following year66. 
Crucially, tariffs for knocked down kits for local assembly were reduced to 2%, although LCRs were 
maintain (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2010: 26). At the same time, discretionary fiscal policy was 
used to promote production of pick-up trucks as a ‘product champion’67; specifically, the rates of 
excise tax applicable to pick-up trucks in 1992 was reduced to 3-10%, in comparison to 41.8% for 
large passenger cars (ibid.: 28). These policies encouraged waves of investment and contributed 
to the emergence of Thailand as a global and regional production hub, as I show below.   
In contrast, Malaysia did not significantly reduce rates of tariff protection on vehicles and knocked 
down units, and indeed increased them for some vehicle types (Natsuda et al., 2013: 133). 
Malaysia expanded its ‘national champion’ strategy, launching the second National Car Project – 
Perodua – in 1993, and a third, Malaysian Truck and Bus (MTB), the following year. These new 
projects were subject to the same provisions regarding localisation as Proton. The intention was 
                                                          
65
 Board of Industry (BOI) incentives initially required majority local equity except in areas with “no 
indigenous capacity” (Doner 1991: 46). 
66
 For example, tariffs were reduced from 300 to 68% for vehicles exceeding 2,400cc engine, and from 112 
to 42% for knocked down kits of the same.  
67
 Since 2007 the Thai government has promoted the ‘Eco Car’ as its second product champion (Natsuda 
and Thoburn, 2013).  
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that the new projects “would be able to utilise Proton’s vendor networks”, thus reducing the 
“cost of parts procurement by achieving economies of scale” (ibid.: 16).  
In both countries, but especially in Thailand, sales increased rapidly between 1980 and 1995, as 
shown in table 6-6 below (data are not available for production, but, in light of the prohibitively 
high trade barriers, would be similar). 
Table 6-6: Vehicle sales, thousands of units: Malaysia and Thailand, selected years 
 
Malaysia Thailand 
1980 101 89 
1985 107 86 
1990 186 304 
1995 285 572 
Source: Athukorala and kohpaiboom (2010: 35) 
By the early 1990s, Malaysian sales came to be dominated by national brands while sales in 
Thailand maintained a predominantly Japanese character68. By the mid- to late-1980s, Proton had 
had a degree of success; the Saga model had come to dominate sales of the sedan subsector. 
Furthermore, local content was higher than previous Malaysian-assembled vehicles (Doner, 1991: 
53) and continued to rise throughout the 1980s and ‘90s: from 18% in 1985 to 80% in 1992 (Rosli 
and Kari, 2008: 108).  
However, sales were artificially inflated and “depended crucially on government support though 
tariff protection, and other preferential treatments, including periodic capital injection on 
concessionary terms” (Athukorala and Kohpaiboom, 2010: 18). Thus, “state protection effectively 
reduced competitive pressure on local producers” (Natsuda et al., 2013: 114), delaying and 
discouraging technological upgrading, and thereby prolonging the conditions in which rent-
seeking lobbies have thrived. The VDP, an essential component of upgrading suppliers in the 
context of LCRs “placed a burden on Proton, resulting in higher cost and poorer quality products” 
(ibid.: 20-21). According to Wad and Govindaraju (2011: 166), whereas supplier upgrading should 
take place in the context of technology transfer from highly capable OEMs, in the Malaysian can 
an “infant OEM had to upgrade itself while upgrading its suppliers, too”.  
Vehicle production and local content levels also rose through the 1980s in Thailand, to what is 
acknowledged to be the highest level of local content in the region by 1991 (Doner, 1991: 47). 
Whereas Malaysia’s projects were almost entirely destined for the domestic market69, Japanese 
automakers in receipt of incentives to produce one-ton pick-ups (namely Toyota, Nissan and 
Isuzu) “set up production plants in Thailand to produce for the global market” in line with 
“beginning of the structural shift in global auto industry” (Athukorala and Kohpaiboom, 2010: 13).  
As a result, another pattern that began to emerge during this period pertains to export 
performance. From a low base, Thailand witnessed some modest growth in exports, while exports 
of both Malaysian vehicles and parts were disappointing (see table 6-7, below).  
  
                                                          
68
 As discussed below, these patterns endure today, with national brands still accounting for over half of 
vehicles sales in Malaysia (Natsuda and Thoburn, 2014: 1362). 
69
 This was a result of intense oligopolistic competition and stringent quality standards in the global vehicle 
market –which Proton could simply not achieve – as well as the strategic interests of the project’s Japanese 
joint venture partners, Mitsubishi, who sought to restrict exports that might jeopardise the company’s own 
global sales. See, e.g., Athukorala and Kohpaiboom (2010: 19).  
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Table 6-7: Auto parts exports, millions of USD: Malaysia and Thailand, 1979-86. 
 
Malaysia Thailand 
1979 3.2 8.4 
1980 2.7 9.8 
1981 3.8 8.5 
1982 5.4 8.6 
1983 6.8 8.1 
1984 4.3 9.7 
1985 4.3 11.6 
1986 3.6 15.0 
Source: Doner, 1991: 45. 
According to Techakanont (2011), one of the major reasons that auto sales and production grew 
so significantly in Thailand from the 1980s was a gradual appreciation of the Yen enticed Japanese 
investors to seek investment projects abroad. Farrell and Findlay (2001: 23) add that during the 
1990s “the increasing exchange rate cost of imports from Japan” was an important contributory 
factor – alongside LCRs – to “a series of investments in the ASEAN region from Japanese parts and 
components manufacturers who relocated part of their output to the region to assist their OEM 
partners”. The interesting point is that of the pair of countries examined here, almost all of the 
investment flowed into Thailand. The influx of Japanese capital into the assembly sector 
benefitted a swath of Thai-owned suppliers, who were able to move into the production of 
increasingly sophisticated parts as a result of protection afforded by LCRs (Doner, 1991: 49). 
Clearly, the contexts in which local content rules were implemented have been fundamentally 
important in determining their outcomes. Despite similar market conditions, LCRs have been 
situated in markedly different policy and institutional environments, leading to significantly 
divergent performance outcomes.  
6.3.3 The elimination of LCRs and other drivers of parts and components sector performance in 
the post-WTO era 
6.3.3.1 LCRs in the context of liberalisation, regional integration, and the Asian financial crisis: mid-
1990s – 2000s 
At the start of the 1990s, both Malaysia and Thailand still pursued significantly protectionist 
automotive regimes including localisation policies to support parts and components 
manufacturers, but pressures towards liberalisation were beginning to mount. Global value chain 
governance structures were in the midst of transformation, as discussed in chapter 3; and moves 
towards multilateral liberalisation and regional integration were also underway. By the early 
1990s, it had become clear that the prohibition of TRIMs was likely to feature in the new global 
trade rules. Therefore, in the early 1990s, significant challenges were looming on the horizon. 
Each country’s strategic approach to these upcoming challenges and opportunities, of which the 
elimination of LCRs were an important part, varied significantly. An overview of the main policy 
developments – within each country individually as well as common regional developments – is 
provided in appendix 25, which is based on the following discussion.   
Upon joining the WTO in 1995, both countries notified prohibited LCRs as required by the 
provisions of the TRIMs agreement. As developing countries, both were permitted to make use of 
the five-year phase out period for existing TRIMs, in which they continued with policies adopted 
previously.  
The Malaysian government had already progressively expanded the MDP’s deletion list, and 
introduced, in 1992, the Local Material Content Policy, which entailed a progressive increase in 
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local content each year, and was attached to tax incentives (Rosli and Kari, 2008: 106). For small 
passenger vehicles, the required local content ratio was set to increase annually from 30% in 1992 
to 60% in 1996; the rates were slightly lower for larger vehicles.   
Thailand’s localisation policy required similar ratios, set at 54% for passenger cars and 70% for 
diesel engines. In 1992, the policy was extended due to requests by producers (Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboom, 2010: 4). However, the targets were realistic and did not overly constrain vehicle 
manufacturers, as the “Thai authorities adopted a consensual approach to setting LCR target in 
consultation with automakers” (ibid.: 12). 
At the same time as the multilateral negotiations were taking place, in response to the small scale 
and fragmented nature of national markets in the ASEAN region, Japanese firms began to press 
for increased regional cooperation, “seeking to increase their economies of scale through mass 
production in different ASEAN countries, followed by intra-regional trade” (Farrell and Findlay, 
2001: 9-10). Indeed, as Wad (ibid: 185) observes, the ASEAN market “has scale when it is fully 
integrated into a free trade area… With auto AFTA on the horizon in the early twenty-first century 
automobile MNCs” ‘lined up’ to improve their market share.  
The first attempt at regional integration was the Industrial Complementation Scheme, which 
mooted the ambitious goal of an ‘ASEAN car’ but which was not enforced, due to national 
protectionist pressures (Shimizu 1999). The Brand to Brand Complementation (BBC) scheme of 
1987, and its successor, the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) scheme of 1996 attempted to 
establish a regional division of labour but was limited by states’ “adherence to maintaining 
national interests” (Yoshimatsu 1999, Yoshimatsu 2002); Malaysia’s continued commitment to 
automotive nationalism being the most important case in point, as discussed below.  
Despite these setbacks, enhanced regional integration – as an alternative to complete 
liberalisation – had long been a practical inevitability. In 1992, ASEAN members agreed to 
establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) – adopting a common effective preferential tariff 
(CEPT) of between 0 and 5% between members but no common external tariff (CET) – with full 
implementation of zero intra-regional tariffs due by 2010. However, countries were able to detail 
‘sensitive’ items to be temporarily excluded from intra-regional tariff reductions; the deadline for 
temporary exclusions to be lifted was originally set at 2003.  
In the midst of this period, financial crisis shook the region, with profound effects on income, 
employment, and thus, demand for automotive products. Vehicle sales dropped by approximately 
two thirds, after continuous growth since the mid-1960s (Table 6-8).  
The financial crisis is important for my analysis for two reasons. Firstly, it has obviously had an 
important knock-on effect in terms of the demand for automotive parts, to the extent that these 
are a function of domestic demand for and production of finished vehicles. Secondly, it has 
contributed to the denationalisation of the industry as struggling Thai firms have been bought up 
or supplanted by foreign – mainly Japanese – competitors. At the same time, both of these 
phenomena have profound implications for any (comparative) analysis of industrial performance 
in Malaysia and Thailand because they have occurred simultaneously with the policy change 
under examination; and have affected each country in different ways. Paradoxically, the crisis 
appears in some respects to have supported Thailand’s efforts to create an efficient supply 
industry in the context of the inevitable elimination of LCRs.  
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Table 6-8: Vehicles sales, thousands of units: Malaysia, Thailand and 'ASEAN 4' 
 
Source: 1996-2007: JAMA (2015); 2008-13: OICA (2015). NB. ASEAN 4 comprises Indonesia and the Philippines in addition to Malaysia 
and Thailand. 
As Busser (2008: 33) observes, 
In part the crisis within the automobile industry was solved by exporting more than before. 
This in itself was only possible because the assembling companies in Thailand were almost all 
Japanese at the time of the crisis. These companies were willing or forced and at the same 
time also able to increase exports from their Thai factories and divide the pain over a larger 
number of their domestic and foreign plants. The same happened with Japanese parts 
suppliers in Thailand.  
According to Wad (2009: 175), ‘normalcy’ – i.e. growth – only returned to the industry in 2000, 
but was very uneven: between 2000 and 2007, vehicle production in Thailand quadrupled while 
Malaysia saw more modest growth of around 40%. The data are considered in the context of 
wider changes to value chain governance structures, and the role of Japanese FDI, below.  
6.3.3.2 The elimination of LCRs 
Prior to the crisis, the Thai government had intended to eliminate LCRs earlier than required by 
the WTO but instead delayed until January 2000 (Natsuda and Thoburn, 2013: 427). Nevertheless, 
Thailand was the first developing country member to eliminate automotive LCRs (Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboon, 2010: 4). At roughly the same time, the government removed other restrictions 
pertaining to equity ownership. As Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (ibid.: 13) note, these aspects of 
liberalisation  
were instrumental in setting the stage for linking the domestic industry to global production 
networks. As discussed, abolition of these restrictions prompted and facilitated MNE 
automakers and part suppliers to set up new affiliates and/or to bring more cutting edge 
technology to the affiliates in Thailand by consolidating their ownership in these firms. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, requested extensions to the standard transition period (WTO 
documents G/C/W/174 and G/C/W/291) ostensibly in order to mitigate the impacts of the 
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financial crisis. According to the initial extension request, the crisis “severely impacted the 
development of the motor vehicle industry in Malaysia. It had set back Malaysia's industrialization 
programme in the automotive sector, which was on track towards achieving economies of scale 
and global competitiveness”. Furthermore, by the time the Thai automotive sector was well on 
the way to recovery, as discussed below, Malaysia submitted a second application for an 
extension, arguing that discontinuation of LCRs would lead to retrenchment of employees and 
closure of plants.  
LCRs were eventually phased out by January 2004, although, as observed by Natsuda et al. (2013: 
125), “other policies were introduced so as to maintain de facto protection” at this stage. In 
particular, while formal requirements to incorporate local parts and components were eliminated, 
the government has continued to provide low interest loans and fiscal advantages (i.e. subsidies) 
to enable the rationalisation of the supply sector. Such policies benefit the national car producers 
and reward local value added (ibid.: 126). In addition, the discretionary use of import permits has 
been maintained.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Malaysia has also been reluctant to engage fully in regional integration in 
the automotive sector; as Wad and Govindaraju (2011: 160) note, the Malaysian parts sectors is 
“unable to compete with its counterpart, Thailand that has well established its parts and 
component manufacturing clusters”. While Thailand (as well as the Philippines and Indonesia) 
removed automotive products from the AFTA exclusion list in 2000, Malaysia delayed their 
inclusion until 2005, and even then did not reduce tariffs to the CEPT rate until 2008. 
Furthermore, the government has responded to its ASEAN commitments by increasing excise 
duties to compensate for tariff reductions, such that local producers are still protected by the 
measures (Natsuda et al., 2013: 126). Clearly, Malaysia has struggled to reform the automotive 
sector, whether as a result of political opposition or difficulty adjusting economically, whereas in 
Thailand liberalisation coincided with macroeconomic conditions and regional market 
development to encourage a wave of Japanese investment in Thai assembly operations that was 
to greatly benefit the supply sector. 
6.3.4 FDI and value chain governance structures 
In 2008, Thailand had a total of 21 assemblers, 16 of which manufactured cars and 5 motorcycles 
(Busser, 2008: 35). At this time, there were 15 car-makers operating in Malaysia; however, unlike 
Thailand, these included the two ‘national’ brands, Proton and Perodua (Wad and Govindaraju, 
2011: 159). Malaysia is the only country in ASEAN in which sales were not dominated by Japanese 
brands, although the national brands were joint ventures with Japanese firms Mitsubishi, and 
Daihatsu and Mitsui, respectively (ibid: 158). Table 6-9, below, shows the distribution of market 
share of the top five firms in 2010.  
Table 6-9: Distribution of market share (vehicles), top five firms: Malaysia and Thailand, 2010. 
Thailand  Malaysia  
Firm % market share Firm % market share 
Toyota 40.7 Perodua 31.2 
Isuzu 19.1 Proton 26.0 
Honda 14.3 Toyota 15.2 
Nissan 6.8 Honda 7.4 
Mitsubishi 4.9 Nissan 5.5 
Others 14.2 Others 14.8 
Source: Natsuda and Thoburn, 2014: 1362.  
Thailand has been a far more attractive location for automotive FDI than neighbouring Malaysia. 
The most significant indication of this fact is the divergence in inward investment flows from 
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Japan. Although data are not available for the automotive or parts sectors specifically, figure 6-12 
below shows inflows into the wider transport sector. These data are in absolute terms and so do 
not take into consideration the size of the economy, but nevertheless the difference is stark. 
Thailand experienced a large spike in investment between 1996 and 1998, and although some 
data are not available for Malaysia during this period, was clearly the preferred location for 
Japanese auto investments. This trend has continued during and post-liberalisation, with Natsuda 
and Thoburn (2014: 1364) commenting that “Thailand attracted approximately 20 times more 
Japanese FDI than Malaysia in the period 2005-2010”.  
The data on US investment tells a similar story. US automotive investment in the region was 
negligible prior to the 2000s, when “the American big three assemblers – Ford, Chrysler and GM – 
decided to establish their own assembly plants in Thailand as regional hubs” followed by 
investments by the US-based multinational parts suppliers Dana, Visteon and Delphi (Natsuda and 
Thoburn, 2013: 427). In contrast, Malaysia attracted very little US inward investment either 
before or after liberalisation, as reflected in the aggregate transport sector data shown in figure 6-
13, below.  
Figure 6-12: Japanese investment in transport sector, millions of constant 1995 USD: Malaysia and Thailand, 1989-2010. 
 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance (2015) data based on international transactions in securities reported by major investors (series 
discontinued in 2004); 2006-10: ASEAN-Japan Centre (2015) data based on balance of payments reports. NB. Omitted data points 
indicate non-availability of data rather than zero investment.  
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Figure 6-13: US investment in transport sector, millions of constant 1995 USD: Malaysia and Thailand, 2002-2012. 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015). Note: missing data for Malaysia, 2003-4 may indicate that data are not available or 
have been suppressed “to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies”. 
A crucial difference between Malaysia and Thailand, which has had profound impacts on the 
entire automotive value chain, is that Thailand has become an assembly hub for successful global 
automakers70 while the Malaysian national car brands have failed to penetrate international 
markets (Natsuda et al., 2013; Rosli and Kari, 2008; Wad, 2011). This had led to the increasing 
ownership and managerial involvement of Japanese MNCs in the management of the Malaysian 
national producers, including the establishment of a majority equity share by Japanese partners in 
Perodua in 2001, which has led to the brand being integrated into the global operations of 
Daihatsu Motors (Natsuda et al., 2013: 128). Proton, meanwhile, continues to struggle to find 
partners willing to engage in meaningful technological cooperation due to the Malaysian 
government’s refusal to permit majority foreign equity (ibid.). By the mid-2000s, Perodua had 
overtaken Proton as the largest brand in Malaysia. Furthermore, other Japanese brands 
manufacturing in Malaysia tend to be geared towards serving domestic demand (Natsuda and 
Thoburn, 2014: 1366).  
These differences in the orientation of production have had profound implications for the extent 
to which assemblers are able and willing to invest in relationships with local suppliers, and for the 
subsequent performance of the latter in terms of local content and trade performance indicators, 
as discussed below.   
For example, Natsuda and Thoburn (2013: 430) report that 95% of Toyota’s suppliers are based in 
Thailand. According to Busser’s case study analysis of three pick-up assemblers (2008: 38), 80% of 
                                                          
70
 Interestingly, Wad (2009) observes that it has been the US investments, not Japanese involvement, that 
have contributed most significantly to Thailand’s status as an export hub: as he reports, “Japanese makers 
controlled 81% of domestic sales and 60% of export in 2001, while American firms had 7% of domestic sales 
but 60% of export production” (p. 185). 
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parts and components by value were sourced locally; what is striking is that this proportion has 
increased over the 10 years in which local content regulations were phased out (1995-2005). 
Making use of the greater availability of trade (compared to production) data, Athukorala and 
Kohpaiboom (2010) estimate the value of imported components per vehicle assembled in 
Thailand to have decreased by approximately two thirds, as shown in figure 6-14, below.  
Figure 6-14: Value of imported parts and components per locally assembled vehicle, constant 1988 USD: Thailand, 1988-
2007. 
 
Source: Athukorala and Kohpaiboom (2010: Figure 6).  
For Malaysia, Ravenhill and Doner (2008: 4-5) analyse data on the locally produced and imported 
content of the domestic market. They note that while production doubled, imports rose 
approximately four-fold between 1996 and 2006. Furthermore, the import share of domestic 
sales has increased sharply in the years following the liberalisation of LCRs, as shown in figure 6-
15, below.  
Figure 6-15: Import share of automotive components market: Malaysia, 1996-2005. 
 
Source: Ravenhill and Doner, 2008: 6. 
In Malaysia, there is a clear distinction between national and global automakers with regards to 
local content. The local content of Proton and Perodua has been estimated as approximately 90% 
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and 60-70% respectively, in contrast to 40-50% for Japanese brands (Natsuda and Thoburn, 2014: 
1360). The authors also provide data on local content ratios of the same (unnamed) Japanese 
MNC assembler, reporting that the Thai subsidiary has managed to achieve local content ratios of 
in excess of 75% while the Malaysian subsidiary reports local content ratios of around 35%, 
importing most parts and components from Thailand and Japan.  
Comprehensive and reliable data on firm concentration levels within the parts and components 
sector – at the correct level of sectoral disaggregation and permitting inter-temporal comparison 
pre- and post-elimination of LCRs – are not available. Nevertheless, available secondary data 
suggests that the consolidation and increased concentration observed globally and discussed in 
chapter 3 are likely to have affected both the Malaysian and Thai auto components sectors.  
Denationalisation appears to be pronounced in both countries. Ownership within the parts and 
components sector has traditionally been similarly diversified in both countries: local firms 
comprise the majority in sheer numbers, with Japanese firms dominating the foreign sector. In 
1998, the percentage of Japanese owned parts and components suppliers in Malaysia and 
Thailand stood at approximately 27% in both countries (Farrell and Findlay, 2001: 45). While 
locally-owned firms are in a numerical majority, foreign firms are over-represented in the 
category of first-tier suppliers. Contributions to the special edition of the Asia Pacific business 
review on Multinationals, Technology and Localization in the Automotive Industry in Asia have 
demonstrated that “foreign firms are also technologically superior and more competitive than 
local firms among suppliers in Thailand and Malaysia” (Rasiah, 2008: 166).  
In Malaysia, as of 2004, local firms continued to dominate parts and components supply for 
Proton, with 79% of firms having majority ownership. However, the findings of Rosli and Kari 
(2008: 115) confirm “the general belief that local suppliers lack the capabilities to compete 
effectively with foreign suppliers”. Proton, having failed to upgrade its suppliers, “switched partly 
to global first-tier suppliers in the 2000s” (Wad and Govindaraju, 2011: 167).  
In Thailand, although the Japanese automakers have achieved impressively high local content 
ratios (as discussed above), this has often occurred ‘at the expense’ of local suppliers. Natsuda 
and Thoburn (2013: 430) report that 64% of Toyota’s suppliers are Japanese firms in Thailand; 
Busser (2008: 38) adds that over 90% of inputs come from these firms. During the course of the 
1990s, local content policies and “the increasing exchange rate cost of imports from Japan, led to 
a series of investments in the ASEAN region from Japanese parts and components manufacturers 
who relocated part of their output to the region to assist their OEM partners” (Farrell and Findlay, 
2001: 23). According to Busser’s qualitative research into the Thai automotive value chain, “this 
development, together with the financial problems during the Asian crisis, has pushed many Thai 
suppliers back from first suppliers to second tier suppliers” while “other Thai companies were 
driven out of the market” (Busser, 2008: 38-9). According to Athukorala and Koipahboon (2010: 
6), “many foreign part suppliers, which had been operating through joint ventures with local 
partners, expanded production capacity following the removal of ownership restriction in 1998, 
by increasing their equity shares and, in some cases, by acquiring full ownership”.  
The longer term impacts of processes of denationalisation and consolidation in the parts and 
components sector have not been analysed in terms of the strategic behaviour of the global 
suppliers, for example with respect to transfer pricing and the suppression of wage demands, and 
this represents an important gap in the empirical literature. However, according to Busser (ibid.), 
technological agreements between Japanese parent firms, their subsidiaries in Thailand, and Thai-
owned partners, provide an opportunity for the former to transfer profit back to Japan. Polio 
(2012) concurs, identifying “two main problems for local auto industry: the first is a substantial 
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technological dependence from foreign assets and the existence of captive linkages between 
foreign assemblers or first tier suppliers and Thai suppliers; the second is a partial transfer 
towards the Triad – mainly Japan – of the value created in the country, which happens through 
technological dependence and trade deficit mechanisms”. 
6.3.5 Summary and conclusions 
6.3.5.1 The contribution of LCRs to performance outcomes (RQ 2) 
Although it is difficult to quantify the precise impact in either case due to the complex interplay of 
location- and ownership-specific advantages and the strategies of MNC automakers, nevertheless 
it seems clear that LCRs have had cumulative effects on subsequent sectoral development and 
that their elimination has given rise to divergent effects. In both LCRs originally established 
networks of local suppliers as well as drawing in foreign firms seeking to access protectionist 
rents. 
However, the nature of cumulative effects has differed hugely, giving rise to increasing 
divergence. In summary, “Thailand’s use of local content requirements, later abolished under 
WTO rules, helped promote local suppliers and did not deter foreign investors” (Natsuda and 
Thoburn, 2013: 413), while in Malaysia, the policies did not have the same substantive effects 
because TRIMs were implemented alongside a package of measures that were unfavourable to 
foreign investment.  
Thailand appears to have set LCRs that were challenging but realistic, and were successfully 
attained by a number of Japanese vehicle manufacturers prior to the fiscal crisis and the 
elimination of LCRs towards the end of the 1990s. In light of such established supply networks, 
which were already characterised by the presence of Japanese suppliers, the effect of 
liberalisation has been to strengthen the position of Thailand as a regional and global export hub 
and has also contributed to the deepening of the supply base and rising levels of local content. 
6.3.5.2 The contribution of the elimination of LCRs to performance outcomes (RQ 3)  
The elimination of LCRs has contributed to an ongoing process of denationalisation, as the 
advantages of multinational firms become ever more apparent in a more open trading 
environment. In Thailand, this had helped to reorient the originally tariff- and LCR-jumping 
investments towards the establishment of a globally competitive industry: “abolition of these 
restrictions prompted and facilitated MNE automakers and part suppliers to set up new affiliates 
and/or to bring more cutting edge technology to the affiliates in Thailand by consolidating their 
ownership in these firms” (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2010: 13). 
In contrast, the Malaysian parts and components sector is “unable to compete with the 
counterpart, Thailand that has well established its parts and component manufacturing clusters” 
(Wad and Govindaraju, 2011: 160). In Malaysia, the success of local suppliers post-liberalisation 
has been curtailed by their partnership with failed national car brands and exacerbated by the 
lack of capabilities required for adaptation and reorientation towards global markets. Thus, in the 
case of Malaysia,  
the very policies that seek to promote the local automotive parts industry have proved to be 
its nemesis. By limiting the access of foreign assemblers to the domestic market and by 
imposing restrictions on foreign investment, the government largely ruled out the possibility 
of Malaysia becoming a regional hub for foreign auto assemblers and for foreign first-tier 
components suppliers, who largely turned to Thailand (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009: 112). 
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As a result, Malaysia has continued to practice protective and discriminatory automotive policies 
in an attempt to maintain the position of its national champion in the face of overwhelming 
difficulties. Unfortunately, “while the Malaysian government insists on retaining majority 
Malaysian local ownership and control, it seems that foreign companies are unwilling to treat 
Proton as one of their own, fully upgrading its (and its vendors’) technology and feeding it into 
their global networks” (Natsuda et al., 2013: 128).    
6.4 ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
6.4.1 Overview 
The comparison between Argentina and Brazil permits exploration of several important 
phenomena in the context of the impact of the elimination of LCRs. In the early 1990s, both 
countries operated mainly autarkic automotive regimes, in which LCRs had led to high levels of 
local content, but very little integration of local firms into global production networks. 
Consequently, LCRs were becoming a burdensome policy instrument at odds with the trajectory 
towards liberalisation and increased competition that characterised the sector during this period.  
Nevertheless, LCRs were reformed as part of a package of efforts to rejuvenate the sector without 
jeopardising the linkages that had emerged during the import substitution era. LCRs mandating 
lower levels of local content were applied in conjunction with trade balancing and export 
incentives that were applied to the assembly sector as a whole, and gave rise to a large increase in 
foreign investment, including in the parts and components sector, especially in Brazil. In 
Argentina, the policies were continued throughout the early 2000s in a more defensive manner, 
serving to “cushion the impact of the 1998–2002 crisis on the auto parts industry” (UNCTAD, 
2007: 36). Thus, it appears that LCRs were not, in the context of their implementation between 
1995 and the early 2000s, overly burdensome and on the contrary, worked alongside 
complementary policies to protect and promote parts and components production in the region.  
The manner in which the elimination of LCRs has occurred in the Mercosur region also raises 
interesting points in the context of this thesis. Performance outcomes, in terms of local content 
and trade performance indicators, are difficult to separate from wider factors. One of the key 
concerns is the extent to which multilateral rules effectively proscribe the use of trade policy to 
shape industrial development. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, this appears not to have been 
the case. Regional integration through Mercosur has substituted national with regional protective 
policies, obscuring the impact of the elimination of LCRs. In the past 20 years, the region has seen 
devastating macroeconomic crisis as well as profound structural change and competitive pressure 
in the automotive sector.  
Notwithstanding this obscuration, the removal of LCRs, and their replacement with regional 
instruments, has certainly contributed to wider processes of denationalisation and regionalisation 
of value chain structures, including technological upgrading but also greater import propensity. 
Nevertheless, local content ratios would arguably have fallen more rapidly in the absence of the 
influx of investment that was stimulated by the use of LCRs in conjunction with investment 
incentives, and both countries have managed to maintain strong export performance. Moving 
beyond similarities, Brazil has clearly been the more attractive location for automotive investment 
in recent years, especially in the parts and components sector, and liberalisation has contributed 
to the diversion of investment from Argentina, notwithstanding the reinstatement of national 
protective (regional trade balancing) policies by Argentina in the context of Mercosur. Thus the 
comparison serves to reinforce the theory that the impacts of LCRs and their elimination lead to 
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divergent outcomes between close competitors operating within regional automotive spaces, 
depending upon the contexts in which reforms have taken place.   
6.4.2 Localisation policies in the historical context of automotive sector development 
6.4.2.1 From import substitution to export promotion: 1950s – 1980s 
In the 1950s, foreign carmakers, originally predominantly US firms, set up ‘stand-alone’ 
subsidiaries to assembly ‘knocked down’ units in order to avoid the prohibitively high tariffs on 
finished vehicles; these were followed by European firms in the 1960s and 1970s as international 
capital competed for control over new markets in a process of ‘multi-domestic 
internationalization’ (Jenkins, 1987: 40-45; Laplane and Sarti, 2004: 121).  
Initially vehicle production was approximately equal in both countries, but the Brazilian market 
soon began to grow at a faster rate until by the mid-1970s the number of vehicles manufactured 
in Brazil was approximately three times that of Argentina (Arza and López, 2008: 14) and over six 
times by 1982 (Jenkins, 1987: 209). This divergence has continued to date as shown in figure 6-19, 
below. 
In the initial stages of development, the sector was highly import intensive in both countries, and 
there were few linkages between the assembly sector and the local economy. In order to remedy 
this, both countries implemented ambitious automotive policies aimed at promoting domestic 
production across the assembly and supply sectors – including local content policies, prohibition 
of the importation of key components, and restrictions on ‘in-house’ components production by 
assemblers (Jenkins, 1987: 63) – throughout the 1960s and ‘70s. As a result, local production of 
vehicles grew steadily while the number of imported vehicles fell to extremely low levels – in 
Argentina, from over 100,000 in 1959 to fewer than 2,000 in the 1970s (Arza and López, 2008: 
60); in Brazil, imports were practically eliminated (ECLAC, 1998: 242). According to ECLAC (1998: 
242), this period was “characterized by a qualitative change in automotive activity, which ceased 
to be an assembly function and became one of true transformation” which succeeded in 
accomplishing levels of national content of around 90% of parts (ibid.), over 50% of total value-
added of finished vehicles (Jenkins, 1987: 72), and “a relatively complete range of suppliers” 
(ibid.: 127) in terms of product coverage by 1970.  
However, despite growth in output and employment and the presence of highly protective trade 
policies, by the early-1970s, both Argentina and Brazil had sizeable trade deficits in the 
automotive sector (Jenkins, 1987).  
I response, the governments of both countries implemented reforms to the automotive industry. 
These reforms took the form of partial liberalisation, promotion of exports, and later, tentative 
moves towards regional integration. In Brazil, the government began to reduce local content 
requirements in the mid-1970s; reforms followed in Argentina, between 1979 and 1982, with the 
government dropping the ban on imported vehicles  (Jenkins, 1987: 207; Arza and López, 2008: 
60). Nevertheless, import tariffs on finished vehicles and stipulated local content levels remained 
high. In Argentina, tariffs on vehicles were reduced from 95 to 55% for cars and 65 to 45% for 
commercial vehicles, while local content requirements were reduced to 88 and 75% for cars and 
commercial vehicles respectively (Jenkins, 1987: 197). Local content requirements of between 78 
and 85% were maintained in Brazil, and basic tariff rates were not significantly reduced.  
However, at this stage preferential fiscal treatment was linked to the attainment of automotive 
exports in both countries; “the main thrust of policy was to renegotiate the form of insertion of 
the local into the global motor industry” (ibid.: 194). These policies were especially prevalent in 
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Brazil, where the government engaged in a sustained process of bargaining with multinational 
assemblers throughout the 1970s and ‘80s (Shapiro, 1994). Trade liberalisation continued to 
proceed throughout the 1980s; by the early-1990s, both countries had reduced applied tariffs on 
transport equipment by approximately 60% of their average value in the mid-1980s.  
During this period, the region was also characterised by political instability and the onset of the 
debt crisis, the impacts of which are difficult to separate from policy and institutional 
developments that occurred simultaneously. In any case, vehicles sales dropped sharply; between 
1981 and 1990, the number of parts suppliers fell from 856 to 580 establishments in Argentina 
(Arza and López, 2008: 61).  According to Jenkins (1987: 213), productivity levels remained fairly 
stagnant over the same period. The situation was slightly more positive in Brazil, which exhibited 
some success in exports, partly in response to stagnation in domestic demand; at this stage, the 
two countries diverged in relation to trade performance. Brazil had established a substantial trade 
surplus in the automotive sector as a whole by the early 1980s, whereas Argentina established a 
deficit.  
6.4.2.2 Liberalisation and modernisation, early- to mid-1990s 
Despite more outward-oriented strategies adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, including some tariff 
liberalisation, other trade barriers remained high – especially in Brazil – and moves towards trade 
liberalisation really began in earnest at the start of the 1990s, and comprised unilateral (national), 
regional and multilateral elements. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations were well 
underway, and looked set to introduce binding restrictions on trade policy, including action on 
TRIMs. Negotiations towards the establishment of Mercosur also began in the early 1990s71. In 
1994, the Oura Preto Protocol detailed the principles of a customs union to be established 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – formally taking effect in January 1995, and 
thus coinciding with the establishment of the WTO. The aims of Mercosur automotive policy were 
to establish complete intra-regional free trade and establish a common external tariff by 2000. As 
it turned out, there were significant differences between national governments with respect to 
the nature of integration and the establishment of full intra-regional free trade, the implications 
of which are discussed further below.  
Nevertheless, in both countries, the impending implementation of regional and multilateral 
integration combined with changes in the political climate and rising consumer demand for 
vehicles, gave rise to a raft of policies aimed at modernising Argentina and Brazil’s respective 
automotive industries. In Brazil, the government committed to reduce tariffs on vehicles from 80 
to 35% between 1990 and 1994. Subsidy programs relating to exports were suspended, while the 
government provided tax incentives for sales of 1000cc ‘popular cars’, in which the region began 
to specialise (Laplane and Sarti, 199672). Argentina implemented similar policies in the early 1990s 
in the midst of the fallout from recession, hyperinflation and rapid trade liberalisation in the 
preceding years. Mirroring developments in Brazil, producers, suppliers, unions and the state 
agreed to measures aimed at reducing the price of cars to consumers by 33%. In both countries, 
local content requirements continued to feature, set at around 60% of parts by value in both 
                                                          
71
 Regional integration of automotive production systems actually preceded the establishment of regional 
institutions in South America. In response to the threat of Japanese competition, integration of Argentinian 
and Brazilian subsidiaries offered opportunities for Western automakers to reduce investment and 
production costs (Laplane and Sarti, 2004: 122). Early examples of integration include cooperation between 
VW and Ford to create Autolatina in the late 1980s (ibid.). 
72
 Laplane and Sarti, 1996: http://gerpisa.org/ancien-gerpisa/actes/20/article3.html.  
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countries; their anti-export bias was mitigated by trade balancing requirements and fiscal 
incentives for assemblers holding trade surpluses (Laplane and Sarti, 1996; UNCTAD, 2007: 18-19).  
As a result of these factors, productivity in both the assembly and parts sectors grew rapidly from 
the early 1990s, as Laplane and Sarti (1996) show for Brazil, and data presented in TRIMs 
extension request (WTO document G/C/W/295) show for Argentina. At the same time, vehicle 
production more than doubled in both countries.  
However, although production increased rapidly, a disproportionate amount of the increased 
demand for vehicles was met by a surge in imports, as shown in tables 6-10 and 6-11, below. 
Imports of vehicles in both countries remained low or non-existent throughout the 1980s but rose 
rapidly in the early 1990s.  
Table 6-10: Imports of transport equipment, million USD: Argentina and Brazil, selected years 
Year 1982 1985 1988 1992 
Argentina 328.9 282.6 237.9 2251 
Brazil 903.6 528.7 541.8 1327.4 
Source: UNCTAD, 1994.  
Table 6-11: Imports of motor vehicles, thousands of units: Argentina and Brazil, selected years 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Argentina 0.4 0.8 22.6 88.5 86.9 135.3 
Brazil - 0.1 11.1 19.8 52.9 155.1 
Source: ECLAC, 1998: Table IV.6. 
In 1993, both countries still maintained high ratios of local content – 73% in Argentina and 87% in 
Brazil, according to calculations based on CEP (2015) and Sindipeças / Abipeças (2011). However, 
these figures had fallen steadily from their previous levels and exports of parts and components 
were not keeping pace with imports. Suppliers were particularly vulnerable to liberalisation, since 
the more visible assembly sector was able to exercise considerable pressure on the government 
to raise protection on vehicles while enabling them to import components in order to make 
domestic production more feasible; as Laplane and Sarti (2008: 158) note, this allowed 
assemblers to squeeze their suppliers profit margins, and made their survival extremely difficult. 
The need to reverse this competitive threat and support local parts production while promoting 
modernisation within the assembly sector, forms the context for the implementation and 
elimination of LCRs in the post-WTO period.  
6.4.3 The elimination of LCRs and other drivers of parts and components sector performance in 
the post-WTO era 
6.4.3.1 LCRs in the context of unilateral automotive policies, regionalisation and economic crisis  
The impacts of the subsequent policy and institutional developments on performance outcomes 
are complex and difficult to untangle. In short, Argentina and Brazil have implemented unilateral 
and regional measures aimed at maintaining their respective positions as viable automotive 
spaces in the face of processes of liberalisation and regionalisation that were well underway by 
the mid-1990s. At the turn of the century, the region was hit by a series of economic crises with 
had severe consequences for automotive sector development. It is in this context that the analysis 
of the effects of LCRs through the 1990s must be situated. Key policy developments are 
summarised in appendix 26, below.  
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There are two main conjunctive factors to discuss in the context of industrial performance and the 
impact of the elimination of LCRs: moves towards an expanded regional market in Mercosur, and 
the occurrence of regional economic crisis between 1997 and 2002.  
A key factor influencing potential market demand is the establishment of an integrated regional 
market. According to Arza (2011: 134), integration within Mercosur has gone through four stages: 
‘no integration’, ‘towards integration’, ‘deepening integration’, and ‘reversing integration’. Prior 
to 1995, each country pursued their own unilateral policies, as described above. Between 1995 
and 2000, Argentina and Brazil moved towards integration with free trade in automotive products 
attenuated by trade balancing clauses; regional content was permitted for the purpose of local 
content requirements. These moves towards regional integration prompted a “sharp change in 
automotive firms’ behaviour regarding Mercosur” and a rapid increase in investment in the 
second half of the 1990s, prior to the economic crisis (Laplane and Sarti, 2004: 125). The key 
feature of the mid-1990s was thus “the consolidation of a regional production platform in line 
with the investment plans of TNCs” (UNCTAD, 2007: 28). Integration has arguably reinvigorated 
production in both countries as national policies have been replaced by regional protection and 
the production systems have been recast on regional lines. This has led to a coherent regional 
market in which there is a strong link between supply and demand and trade is predominantly 
intra-regional: “given the predominantly inward orientation of supply, Mercosur’s relative 
importance within the global motor industry relies mostly on the size and potential of the regional 
market” rather than upon exports (Laplane and Sarti, 2004: 124). 
However, at this stage, unilateral policies were pursued with renewed vigour. In the aftermath of 
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, both Argentina and Brazil scaled up the incentives 
attached to LCRs and other TRIMs. Argentina had already increased tariffs in the early 1990s, and 
Brazil did the same in 1995 and 1996. Each country’s strategies throughout the 1990s represented 
attempts to establish the Mercosur region as a viable automotive space and reverse the huge 
inflows of imports into the region, while preparing for the onset of prospective intra-regional 
competition. Thus, “both unilateral initiatives, the Brazilian regime and the amendment of the 
Argentinean Automotive Regime, took place as pre-emptive measures amidst efforts to put 
together the MERCOSUR Common Automotive Policy” (UNCTAD, 2007: 20). 
In Brazil, LCRs were implemented as part of a package of measures designed primarily to bolster 
the assembly sector. Unilateral liberalisation was already underway when the WTO agreements 
entered into force in 1995, and there were concerns that continued trade liberalisation would 
destroy domestic industry by flooding the country with imported vehicles. Indeed, in response to 
a rapid reduction in tariffs, Brazil experienced a surge in imports and a sharply deteriorating trade 
balance, between 1995 and 1996. In response, tariffs on vehicles were quickly raised from 
approximately 17 to 45%, and tariff quotas were established, with 70% tariffs applied after the 
importation of 47,500 vehicles. At the same time, tariffs on parts and components increased only 
marginally, meaning that the sector was actually subject to negative rates of effective protection. 
Thus, according to Laplane and Sarti (2008: 158), Brazilian policies had favoured the assembly 
sector over parts and components suppliers: “In 1995, after which the new policy has been 
established, not only did protection for cars rose significantly, but protection for components 
became negative... Unequal protection weakened the position of local suppliers more than 
elsewhere”. To counteract this tendency and support domestic parts and components suppliers, a 
raft of fiscal incentives related to local content and export requirements were introduced 
between 1995 and 1997. These policies were designed to promote local production without 
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penalising assemblers and without introducing an anti-export bias in the assembly or parts 
sectors.  
In Argentina, LCRs were continued post-1995 as part of a broader set of policy measures initiated 
in 1991. The aims were similar, although for a number of reasons, discussed shortly, LCRs were 
phased out in different circumstances. Again responding to a bias in favour of assemblers73, in 
1996 Argentina modified its strategy to establish the “so-called automotive parts producer 
regime” with Decree 33/96 (UNCTAD, 2007: 20). The policy74 deliberately sought to tackle a trade 
deficit in automotive parts, counter Brazil’s ‘aggressive’ incentive regime and also to prepare for 
the full entry into force of the Mercosur customs union (ibid.).  
In the end, between 1997 and 2002 – the period in which Argentina and Brazil were scheduled to 
phase out LCRs and move towards closer regional integration – was characterised by a series of 
crises in Argentina and Brazil, with profound implications for sectoral performance outcomes. In 
Brazil, the fall-out from the Asian financial crisis exposed and exacerbated existing structural 
weaknesses and gave rise to large current account and fiscal deficits.  As shown in figure 6-16, the 
impacts of the crisis on GDP growth are apparent, with GDP remaining flat in constant dollars and 
falling in per capita terms between 1997 and 1999.  
The situation in Argentina was even more pronounced. The country was hit by a loss of 
competitiveness caused by Brazil’s devaluation in 1999, and an accumulation of internal problems 
which led to a default on public debt. The crisis was caused, as in the Brazilian case, by a 
combination of two factors: an insufficiently tight fiscal policy and an overvalued exchange rate. 
The economy underwent a considerable contraction in absolute and per capita terms (figure 6-
16).  
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 According to Argentina’s 2001 TRIMs extension request (WTO document G/C/W/295), the automotive 
sector “posted a cumulative deficit of US$20,500 million, chiefly due to the autoparts trade. This occurred 
during the period when the automotive regime granted high effective protection for the assembly sector, 
contrasting with the relatively low protection granted to autoparts manufactures” (p. 6).  
74
 The details of the Decree were to establish trade-balancing requirements alongside LCRs to encourage 
sectoral restructuring.  
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Figure 6-16: GDP per capita growth and GDP in billion constant 2000 USD: Argentina and Brazil, 1990-2009 
 
Source: World Bank (2011).  
The years following this period of crisis have seen sustained growth in both countries up until the 
onset of the global financial crisis in 2008/9. Macroeconomic factors have also given rise to 
dramatic exchange rate shifts which profoundly affect the causal mechanisms through which 
industrial performance occurs. In 1999, the Brazilian devaluation “represented an immediate 
competitiveness gain for the Brazilian economy. The new exchange rate translated into lower 
labour costs in Brazil, which became more attractive for FDI” (UNCTAD, 2007: 29). In this period, 
numerous firms shifted relocated from Argentina to Brazil, as discussed below. The devaluation 
has also driven strong export performance in Brazil throughout the 2000s (Arza, 2011).  
The effects of crisis and recovery can be clearly seen in the vehicles production statistics, 
illustrated in figure 6-17, below. It is very difficult to separate the impacts of these fundamental 
‘drivers’ of parts and components production from wider policy and institutional factors.  
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Figure 6-17: Vehicle production: Argentina and Brazil: 1980-2010 
 
Source: 1980-1998: ECLAC (1998); Argentina, 1999-2006: Arza and López (2008); Argentina, 2007-2011, OICA (2015); Brazil, 1999-2004: 
Laplane and Sarti (2008); Brazil, 2005-11: OICA (2015). 
6.4.3.2 The elimination of LCRs 
The TRIMs implemented by Brazil, as described above, were introduced post-WTO membership, 
despite the fact that signatories are prohibited from introducing new non-compliant measures; 
Brazil did not notify them according to the usual procedure. As such, the policies were challenged 
in dispute cases: consultations were requested by Japan, the US and EU respectively (dispute 
settlement documents DS51, DS52, DS64 and DS81). Although “no dispute panel established and 
no withdrawal or mutually agreed solution”75 was notified, Brazil signed a memorandum of 
understanding and agreed to withdraw the disputed measures by 2000 – consistent with the 
standard five year elimination period. In the meantime, automakers continued to receive 
substantial subsidies, leading to significant levels of investment in the assembly and supply 
subsectors in the years prior to economic crisis, as discussed below.  
In 1999, Argentina requested a six-year extension to the standard five-year elimination period 
mandated by the TRIMs Agreement (WTO document G/C/W/176). The reasons given were that 
the anticipated restructuring of the automotive sector – including parts and components – had 
been disrupted by the impacts of successive economic crises emanating from Mexico (in 1995) 
and Brazil (in 1998). As a result of these factors, it was argued that premature liberalisation of 
LCRs and other prohibited TRIMs would lead to further deterioration of the automotive trade 
balance and would jeopardise regional integration through Mercosur in the context of the 
devaluation of the Brazilian Real. As the direct result of these upheavals, the sector had not 
sufficiently adjusted to the new competitive environment and was “not yet set in its regional 
specialization mode” (ibid. 3). Argentina was granted a two-year extension to eliminate LCRs by 
January 2002, with the possibility of a further two years upon request. In the meantime, 
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 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds52_e.htm.  
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numerous assemblers and suppliers had relocated to Brazil (Argentinian Trade Policy Review, 
2007: 113) and Argentina was hit by its own economic crisis in 2001. The Argentinian government 
requested another extension which was accepted under the condition that LCRs were finally 
withdrawn by the end of 2003.  
In practice, however, local content requirements were effectively maintained for both countries 
in the context of the Mercosur agreement until the end of 2005 (UNCTAD, 2007; Argentinian TPR, 
2007). In line with the third phase of regionalisation – ‘deepening integration’ – in December 
2000, a common external tariff (CET) was imposed, where previously protection had been 
dictated by each separate state. Finished vehicles were subject to a CET of 35% while parts and 
components tariff were approximately half that rate. Tariffs on parts and components not 
available locally were reduced to just 2%. Tariff-free intra-regional trade continued to be subject 
to trade balancing provisions. These arose from Argentinian concerns that without safeguards, 
investment and production would be diverted to Brazil, and indeed, it is likely that such provisions 
have mitigated against the further divergence of industrial performance that would likely have 
occurred between the two locations.  
Most importantly, while local content rules were eliminated during this period, in order to benefit 
from regional free trade, automakers had to satisfy a regional content requirement of 60% by the 
third year of production. This regional content was split by Argentina and Brazil on a fixed basis76; 
as a result, as UNCTAD (2007: 30-31) observe:  
the fact that a good deal of the basic elements contained in the Argentinean automotive 
regime were regionalized through the MERCOSUR Common Automotive Policy offset the 
impact of the phase-out. As a result, there was an extension of the life of the TRIMs under 
regional rules of origin and regional trade balance requirements. Such substitution did not 
eliminate the measures but naturally led to a new scenario more active on a regional than a 
multilateral level 
It is therefore crucial to consider that the elimination of LCRs has been mitigated by regional 
policies which exhibit similar effects but with greater prospects for specialisation and scale in 
parts production than afforded by local content requirements. However, the regional nature of 
content requirements does open the possibility of divergence in performance between the more- 
and less-advantageous locations within the region. As Arza and López observe, “regionalized local 
content agreements for intra-regional exports favoured a shift in demand towards auto parts 
produced in Brazil” (2008: 100). For this reason, Argentina pressed to maintain trade balancing 
and local content provisions within Mercosur, rather than establishing complete intra-regional 
free trade.  
Reflecting Argentinean concerns, the fourth phase of integration, according to Arza (2011), is the 
reversing of moves towards free trade from around 2005. National policies pursues since the 
elimination of LCRs are also important to consider. In 2005, the Argentine government enacted 
legislation designed to assist the struggling parts sector by offering fiscal incentives for the 
purchase of some locally produced parts and components77. Thus, the ‘full’ impacts of regional 
integration have been mitigated by exemptions to and reversals of regional free trade, just as the 
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 According to UNCTAD (2007: 34), “the [Argentinian] government’s decision to carve out a national 
allocation on the regional content requirement is best explained as an acknowledgment of the need to 
reverse the bias against car parts and its potential industrial linkages”. 
77
 These incentives appear to contravene the TRIMs Agreement, but no action has been taken and the 
measures were withdrawn in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2007; Argentina TPR, 2007)  
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full impacts of multilateral liberalisation such as the elimination of LCRs have been mitigated by 
regional protective policies.   
6.4.4 FDI and value chain governance structures 
Both Argentina and Brazil saw a spike in US investment in the broader transport and automotive 
sectors in the years following their respective automotive incentive programmes (figure 6-18, 
below). Investment declined rapidly in the years directly prior to and following the elimination of 
LCRs, although this is difficult to separate from the impacts of the economic crisis that hit the 
region in 1998 and again in 2001. Throughout the entire period, but especially from the mid-
2000s, Brazil has attracted the lion’s share of US investment, suggesting that it has emerged as 
the dominant force in the region, even given the size of each country’s respective automotive 
markets. Another important point to note is the substantial disinvestment reported between 
2001 and 2003 for Argentina.   
Figure 6-18: US investment in transport sector, millions of constant 1995 USD: Argentina and Brazil, 1982-2012. 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015).  
Data from the Brazilian automotive parts and components sector industrial association show a 
large increase in investment over the period that LCRs were in force; this period has seen the 
largest ratio of parts and components sector investment to vehicle production since the early 
1990s (figure 6-19). 
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Figure 6-19: Investment in parts and component sector, millions of constant 1995 USD: Brazil, 1981-2010. 
 
Source: Sindipeças / Abipeças (2011). Data converted to constant USD using World Bank (2011) exchange rate data and U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
As noted above, the Argentinean and Brazilian automotive assembly sectors have traditionally 
been dominated by US and European carmakers, but the parts supply sector has been more 
diversified. This situation has changed dramatically over the past 20 years. As discussed in chapter 
3, factors internal to the automotive value chain have squeezed profit margins and put increasing 
pressure on local parts manufacturers globally. These include a reorganisation of lead firms’ 
strategies and competences such that the technological capabilities, scale and geographical reach 
demanded of parts suppliers have increased dramatically.  
Liberalisation since the 1990s has thus exposed the technological weaknesses of the domestic 
parts and components firms. Investments by the multinational automakers in the region were 
accompanied by ‘follow sourcing’ strategies and a wave of mergers and acquisitions as firms with 
global reach sought to capitalise on the weaknesses of local firms unable to respond to 
liberalisation. The impact of these changes has been greater propensity to export, but also 
increased import penetration, as subsidiaries are integrated into global networks. Foreign firms 
are more likely to operate in the first tier, to forge direct links with assemblers, to import higher 
proportions of inputs, and to export to their ‘home’ region (Arza and Lopez, 2008: 109-10). Thus, 
denationalisation can be seen as a key causal mechanism through which the impacts of 
liberalisation, including the elimination of LCRs and other TRIMs, have been manifested.  
In Brazil, the proportion of firms which were nationally owned fell from 75% in 1995 to 56% in 
2005; more dramatically, the proportion of sales, investment flows, and investment stocks 
attributed to multinationals grew from approximately 50% to 88%, 77% and 79% respectively 
(Laplane and Sarti, 2008: 183). It is also clear that the parts and components sector has become 
significantly more concentrated in the past 20 years; the proportion of sales accounted for by 
large firms has risen from 45% in 1999 to nearly 80% a decade later; the proportion of workers 
employed by small- and medium-sized firms has been declining relative to employment in large 
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firms (Sindipeças / Abipeças, 2011: 15) and output by firms with annual revenue exceeding 
$150,000, as a proportion of total sector output, has grown from 45% in 1999 to 79.5% in 2009 
(ibid.: 22). As Humphrey (2003: 137) notes, it is the Brazilian first tier suppliers that have lost 
ground. In 1995, among the 25 largest suppliers there was an even number of foreign and local 
firms; by 2001, eight of the twelve Brazilian firms had been sold to global suppliers (ibid.).  
In Argentina, too, the sector has become more concentrated with “the disappearance of the 
smaller producers” (Argentinian TPR, 2007: 113) and a significant increase in the proportion of 
those employed by global as opposed to locally-based firms between 1996 and 2005 (Arza and 
Lopez, 2008: 80). “In sum, the changes observed in the last decade and a half have involved a 
concentration and denationalization process in the production of auto parts” (ibid.: 103, 
translation from Spanish original). McDermott and Corredoira (2010) indicate that between 1992 
and 1999, the number of Argentine auto parts manufacturers fell by approximately 50% - 
suggesting that the concentration ratio within the sector has increased substantially, although 
there are no direct data to confirm this. At the same time, there has been a substantial 
denationalisation of ownership, especially within the first tier of supply. In terms of governance-
related implications, McDermott and Corredoira (ibid.: 311) observe that “the technological 
imperative of the auto industry creates a ‘glass ceiling’ for upgrading in lower-tier, mainly 
domestic, firms as it determines the incentives and relationships that contribute to upgrading”; 
the domination of the higher tiers of supply by global firms thus “restricts the access that 
suppliers in the lower tiers have to the new information, knowledge, and development activities 
of the international assemblers and their allied international top-tier suppliers”. Foreign firms 
outperform local firms, as reflected by their greater propensities to supply assemblers directly – 
implying dominance of the first tier of supply – as well as by higher export propensities and more 
advanced technological and organisational capacities. However, even the more advanced global 
suppliers engage only minimally in innovative activities, either in conjunction with assemblers or 
independently.    
Thus, in addition to denationalisation and concentration that occurred in Brazil, “lower labour 
costs induced auto part producers to switch their operations to Brazil… At least 30 auto parts 
manufacturers either shut down their plants, reduced their scale, cancelled investments or moved 
to Brazil between 1999 and 2001” (UNCTAD, 2007: 29). In this context, LCRs – in conjunction with 
other unilateral policies and the delaying of intra-regional free trade78 – were continued with the 
aim of preventing the further loss of parts producers to Brazil (ibid.: 33-34). Despite these efforts, 
outcomes have been uneven across the two countries, with Brazil “winning the regional arm 
wrestling to attract this type of activity to the detriment of the Argentine subsidiaries” (Arza and 
Lopez, 2008: 99).  
Mercosur integration has enabled the establishment of a regional production network in the face 
of intense global competition. Weaknesses arising from suboptimal scale facilities have been 
partly offset through the establishment of production sharing arrangements driven by the 
assemblers, and have reinvigorated investment. Thus, relatively high common external tariff 
alongside stringent rules of origin have essentially allowed Argentina and Brazil to replace 
prohibited LCRs with more effective regional policy instruments. At the same time, integration has 
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 According to UNCTAD (2007: 34), “the effects of the removal of WTO notified TRIMs were partially 
counterbalanced by regionalization under the MERCOSUR automotive policy. The Government’s main tools 
to keep established firms operating within the country had been the high tariff protection level granted by 
MERCOSUR’s CET, the balanced trade requirements laid out by the MERCOSUR automotive policy, and to a 
lesser extent the localisation requirement”.  
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created competition between the two countries. There are clear differences between the two 
countries in terms of the prospects for technological capability development and value chain 
governance leadership (Arza, 2011). Arguably, the divergence between Argentina and Brazil has 
been mitigated by the continuation of trade balancing agreements between the two countries but 
these have not prevented the emergence of Brazil as the dominant regional force. Unfortunately, 
studies pertaining to the governance-related implications of denationalisation and increased 
industrial concentration – in terms of strategic behaviour such as transfer pricing and leveraging 
rivalry between different locations to suppress wage demands – are lacking; this represents an 
important potential area of future enquiry.   
6.4.5 Summary and conclusions 
In the preceding comparison, I have sought to explain parts and components sector performance 
outcomes exhibited during the course of the elimination of LCRs, by examining the most pertinent 
causal conditions and mechanisms. As UNCTAD (2007: 35) observes, it is against a “backdrop of 
profound transformation that the effect of the WTO TRIMs Agreement must be analysed” in 
Mercosur. Profound transformation in both countries has included rapid (but extremely volatile) 
growth in domestic demand, prolonged macroeconomic crisis, ongoing regional institutional 
developments, and broader policy developments.  
6.4.5.1 The contribution of LCRs to performance outcomes (RQ 2) 
From the mid-1990s, LCRs were initially tied to a package of measures that encouraged 
assemblers to make large investments in capacity. There was a huge influx of investment in both 
assembly and parts, as MNCs sought to consolidate market share with productivity 
improvements. This investment spike tailed off rapidly with the onset of macroeconomic crisis in 
the late 1990s, such that a direct comparison of performance pre- and post-elimination of LCRs is 
problematic.  
According to Laplane and Sarti (2008: 166), Brazil’s export drive from 2003 was at least partly 
attributable to investment made in the previous business cycle, under the incentives of the 
automotive regime:  
The significant investment in increased capacity and development of new products and 
production processes, conducted in the second half of the 1990s by automakers in Brazil – 
and to a lesser extent in Argentina – greatly increased the competitiveness of the automotive 
chain. This "shock investment" imposed significant changes in the production chain and 
therefore the relationships between assemblers and suppliers (author’s translation from 
Spanish original). 
Indeed, Brazilian performance recovered to a large extent during the course of the 2000s, buoyed 
by the return of strong growth in demand which occurred in the context of the elimination of 
LCRs. In Argentina, LCRs followed a similar logic but in the context of less advantageous conditions 
than Brazil. Their role changed during the course of the period under examination, from “a set of 
incentives that contributed to the modernization of the industry in the midst of a favourable 
economic context” (UNCTAD, 2007: 35) to an interim measure aimed at cushioning the impact of 
economic meltdown. It seems improbable that parts and components sector output could have 
been maintained to the degree it has been, in the absence of mandatory and incentive based local 
content rules; we cannot disregard the possibility that LCRs have delayed declines and even 
contributed towards the achievement of greater scale economies in both countries.  
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6.4.5.2 The contribution of the elimination of LCRs to performance outcomes (RQ 3)  
Both governments have sought to balance liberalisation with protection, including at the regional 
level. Argentinean automotive regime favoured firms which could export, and therefore 
benefitted MNCs which were affiliated with European and US firms and already integrated into 
global production networks. Indeed, several lead firms “imported” suppliers and this has 
contributed to a large and rapid rise in the imported content of finished vehicles, as the 
multinational suppliers themselves import a larger proportion of inputs and subcomponents (Arza 
and López, 2008: 100). According to Laplane and Sarti, 2008: 158), this has been exacerbated by 
the unequal structure of protection for assembly and parts sectors in the case of Brazil, in which 
the former exploit the more extensive international competition to drive down the costs of 
supply.  
Clearly, the elimination of LCRs has exacerbated tendencies towards greater trade integration, 
and driven a steady increase the imported content of local vehicles, but these tendencies were 
already well underway as a result of liberalisation occurring in the early 1990s. In the absence of 
such policies, MNCs are far less constrained with respect to their sourcing, but rather than 
switching to foreign sources, have responded to incentives to reinforce local supply networks. 
Thus, although investment (and well as output) has picked up after recovery, it also seems that 
elimination of LCRs has contributed to increased trade propensity, favoured the consolidation of 
global suppliers, and led to declining trade balances.  
However, substitution of national for regional policy instruments has also been a key feature of 
Mercosur’s experience. Regional policies establishing a larger market make investment more 
attractive and more amenable to efficient levels of scale, while retaining a high CET and regional 
content requirements protects against extra-Mercosur imports of vehicles and parts respectively. 
However, because an arrangement of regional free trade would disproportionately benefit Brazil, 
Argentina has insisted on exemptions, with the threat of “wiping out Brazil’s preferential access” 
as leverage (UNCTAD, 2007: 35). Ultimately, Mercosur has become an institution which has 
mitigated the decline of regional production but the delayed implementation of free trade has 
also mitigated divergence within the region.  
Thus, the elimination of LCRs has occurred as part of the restructuring of production networks 
along regional, rather than national lines. The main goals for both countries have been to ensure 
the feasibility of vehicle assembly and keep trade deficits to a minimum. MNC assemblers have 
occupied a strong bargaining position, as stringent performance requirements and uncompetitive 
supply jeopardises the viability of the final vehicle sector. In this context, the maintenance of 
strong export performance indicators and relatively high local content levels suggest that the 
elimination of LCRs has contributed to the emergence of parts and components suppliers that are 
significantly more competitive on the world stage. This further suggests that the prohibition of 
LCRs has not been such an important loss, given the possibility of substituting policies promoting 
national linkages with those promoting the establishment of an integrated automotive sector for 
the wider region. These tendencies have favoured the expansion of Brazilian production. 
Recognising – in the absence of national policies such as LCRs – that an arrangement of regional 
free trade would disproportionately benefit Brazil, Argentina has insisted on exemptions, with the 
threat of “wiping out Brazil’s preferential access” as leverage (UNCTAD, 2007: 35). Ultimately, 
Mercosur has become an institution which, via a CET and regional content rules, has mitigated the 
decline of regional production; but the delayed implementation of intra-regional free trade has 
also mitigated divergence within the region. We can tentatively conclude that the elimination of 
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LCRs has contributed to divergence, and would have done more conclusively, in the absence of 
other protective policies and resistance to intra-regional free trade on the part of Argentina.   
6.5 CHINA AND INDIA 
6.5.1 Overview 
Broadly speaking, both the Chinese and Indian automotive sectors, including parts and 
components subsectors, have undergone a “remarkable transformation” over the past few 
decades (Sutton, 2005: 186). This transformation has involved a rapid increase in vehicle 
ownership and production, much greater openness to trade, and the participation of the large 
multinational automakers.  
The restructuring of value chains to which the elimination of LCRs has contributed must be 
considered in the context of wider processes of liberalisation but also, crucially, the extent to 
which the huge and growing markets and opportunities for low cost manufacturing have 
presented incentives for global automakers and suppliers to establish within these markets and 
use them as bases to serve increasingly open market abroad, thus mitigating against the decline 
of local parts and components production and enhancing export performance in both cases.   
While this transformation has coincided with “trade and investment liberalization policies and the 
global expansion of the auto industry” (Humphrey, 2003: 121), the exact role of specific policy 
reforms, such as the elimination of local content requirements, is unclear. As Humphrey observes 
in relation to developing countries in general: 
This looks like a simple story of globalization. Protected national automotive markets were 
opened up to global economic forces. Imports and exports of built-up vehicles increased, and 
the updating of both production facilities and model ranges in developing countries led to 
convergence across markets. Transnational companies extended their influence and 
integrated their global operations. 
However, domestic production has remained remarkably robust in the face of trade competition; 
and the character of governance structures that have emerged depart from those of the previous 
‘closed’ era without fully displacing local actors and institutions. National governments continue 
to influence the trajectory of the sector through a number of interventionist measures, even as 
overt trade barriers fall and in the face of restrictions on national policy such as engendered by 
the TRIMs agreement. As Noble et al. (2005: 2) observe: “WTO accession has not caused China to 
relinquish all instruments of industrial policy for the auto sector; Beijing still maintains a capacity 
to shape the development of the industry”. 
6.5.2 Localisation policies in the historical context of automotive sector development 
6.5.2.1 Import substitution, restrictions on foreign participation, and negligible vehicle production: 
1950s – 1980s 
Both China and India pursued highly restrictive policy stances in the initial stages of automotive 
sector development, even beyond those of Argentina and Brazil; China and India also restricted 
the participation of foreign capital to a much greater extent and the state had a greater role in 
planning and rationing consumption, as it did in the economy more generally. As such, 
automotive production remained at very low levels until the last 20 years or so, during which time 
both countries but especially China have exhibited remarkable sectoral growth rates.  
Unlike many of today’s emerging markets, which originated in import substitution policies in the 
1950s and ‘60s, Chinese automotive production was practically non-existent until the mid-1970s 
(Holweg et al., 2009). In fact, vehicle production was still negligible until the late 1980s, when the 
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transition from central planning to a market economy was already well underway. Until the late 
1970s, the automotive sector comprised “a dispersed collection of autarchic state-owned 
enterprise groups operating under a centralized socialist economy to produce low-quality trucks, 
busses and vans in small lots for sales to government organs” (Doner et al., 2006a: 36). Chinese 
automotive firms were wholly state-owned, with technical assistance initially coming from the 
USSR. In terms of value chain structure, there were many small assemblers, far below the efficient 
scale of modern assembly operations at the time. Supplier relations were characterised by “high 
degree of vertical integration, with most of the production of components taking place within the 
assembly plant itself” (Holweg et al., 2009: 79). Technology was outdated, and “existing facilities 
offered neither the quality nor the diversity of products to satisfy the growing market” (ibid.: 80).   
The reform era gave rise to new sources of demand, as a consequence of which China “imported 
a dozen key production technologies for heavy, light and mini-vehicles” (Sit and Lui, 2000: 663). 
“With the relaxation of planning, there were many more customers and the market for saloons 
and other vehicles increased greatly” (Holweg et al., 2009: 80). However, the policy environment 
was still highly restrictive throughout the 1980s, with central planning, tariffs running at 200%, 
strict import quotas, and limits on foreign participation. In terms of localisation policies, there 
were prohibitive restrictions on the importation of knocked-down kits for domestic assembly.  
The Indian experience was similar. In terms of ownership, the Indian automotive sector was 
dominated by four nationally-owned firms (Hindustan, Premier, Mahindra and Mahindra, and 
Standard) from before independence until the 1980s (Kim, 2004: 249). Initially, these firms were 
privately owned joint ventures with foreign automakers, but were nationalised in the 1950s, at 
which time the government began to pursue a strategy of import substitution, and attempted to 
create an integrated supply sector. Besides high levels of trade protection, the Indian government 
implemented strict controls over ownership of automotive firms as well as the nature of 
production. Foreign ownership was prohibited entirely in the assembly sector and restricted in 
the components sector (Humphrey and Salerno, 2000: 153). Production of passenger cars was 
discouraged in favour of agricultural and commercial vehicles. As part of an overall strategy of 
import substitution, a “significant portion” of local component production was reserved for small, 
locally owned businesses. “Under this policy, from the mid-1960s, auto manufacturers were not 
permitted to expand their internal components-manufacturing capacity, and instead were 
required to purchase a number of components from these small, independent components 
suppliers” (Kumaraswamy et al., 2012: 371).  
Vehicle production remained very modest throughout the 1970s and ‘80s, even accounting for 
low levels of income (see table 6-12, below). In China, “the number of imported cars was higher 
than that of domestically produced cars” by a multiple of almost nine (Sit and Lui, 2000: 659). 
Although accurate data are not accessible, it is likely that black market automotive imports 
exceeded legal imports by the mid-1990s (ibid.). In any case, in both countries, export-oriented 
production was practically non-existent, and the Chinese and Indian auto sectors were behind the 
international technological frontier by orders of magnitude.  
In India, the automobile sector was “very fragmented, with low production volumes, 
predominantly low-skilled labor, low technological intensity and low quality” (Kumaraswamy et 
al., 2012: 371-372). In China, too, technology was outdated, and “existing facilities offered neither 
the quality nor the diversity of products to satisfy the growing market” (ibid.: 80).  
6.5.2.2 Modernisation and foreign technology: 1980s – early-1990s 
The first steps toward modernisation in India began with the establishment of a joint venture 
between a nationalised automaker, Maruti Udyog, and the Japanese firm Suzuki in 1981 (Kim, 
2004: 250), after years of stagnation and technological retardation in which the biggest selling 
passenger vehicle was essentially a 1960s Morris Oxford (Sutton, 2005: 186). Maruti came to 
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dominate the car sector in the coming years, capturing over 70% of car sales by the early 1990s, 
although this share has since declined (Nag, 2011: 115). The firm brought in Japanese technology 
and forms of supply chain governance, working with both independent Indian firms and in-house 
subsidiaries; “in both cases Suzuki-Maruti worked with suppliers to establish international best 
practice and achieve high levels of productivity and quality” (Sutton, 2005: 186). A substantial 
network of suppliers developed around the firm’s base in New Delhi (ibid.; Kumaraswamy et al., 
2012).  
Table 6-12: Production of cars and jeeps (India) and cars and commercial vehicles (China): selected years.  
Year India China 
1970 - 87 
1971 49 - 
1980 46 222 
1983 67 240 
1990 219 509 
1991 209 709 
1992 192 1062 
1993 244 1297 
1994 286 1353 
1995 393 1453 
1996 472 1475 
1997 486 1583 
1998 458 1628 
Source: India: ACMA cited in Humphrey and Salerno (2000: 152); China, 1970: Holweg et al. (2009: Table 3); China 1980-1998: Noble et 
al. (2005: Table 1). 
The first meaningful step towards the development of the modern passenger car sector in China 
began with the approval for the participation of VW in a joint venture in the mid-1980s, which 
was eventually established in 1991; previous joint ventures had largely met with failure (Noble et 
al., 2005: 5-6). Prior to this, in 1988, the government had sanctioned six state-owned assemblers 
to form joint ventures with foreign capital, of which Shanghai-VW was the most successful (Sit 
and Lui, 2000: 662). This restructuring, and the removal of production restrictions, led to an 
increase in the production of cars as a proportion of total vehicles, from 2.4% in 1980 to 31.2% in 
1998 (ibid.).  
6.5.3 The elimination of LCRs and other drivers of parts and components sector performance in 
the post-WTO era 
6.5.3.1 LCRs in the context of ongoing liberalisation: 1990s – early 2000s 
India began the process of automotive liberalisation in earnest in 1991, deregulating the parts and 
components sector, with new firms allowed to establish production and form joint venture in the 
1980s and assemblers licensed to enter into partnerships with local suppliers in 1991 (Kim, 2004: 
250; Kumaraswamy et al., 2012: 372). Liberalisation continued with the delicensing of the 
assembly sector, to which Nag (2011) attributes the entry of “many global players”. In the 
assembly sector, Indian firms Telco (now Tata) and Bajaj Tempo were licensed to enter the 
passenger car markets; this was followed in fairly quick succession by the entry of 10 global 
automakers: Daewoo, Mercedes, Fiat, GM, Ford, Honda, Mitsubishi, Peugeot-Citroen, and Toyota 
(Kim, 2004). Most of these firms established joint ventures with local firms, although this was not 
an explicit requirement. Initially, foreign equity was limited to 51% but this was soon raised to 
100% for approved projects (Indian TPR, 1998: 146). In India, between 1990 and 2001, the market 
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shares of the subsidiaries of global automakers climbed from zero to 27% while those of the 
struggling Indian brands Mahindra and Mahindra, Hindustan Motors and Premier dropped by 
over 30 percentage points to rather negligible levels. Nevertheless, production volumes remained 
low in most of the new entrants, as a result of weak domestic demand (Kim, 2004).  
As well as opening up to foreign capital, India rapidly liberalised its import regime during this 
period. However, sufficiently high tariffs were retained to encourage local production and inward 
investment: India “imposed a punitive tariff rate of 132 per cent on imported cars at the time of 
deregulation, which effectively banned the import of foreign cars and pressed global firms to 
develop their supplier bases in India. The high tariffs on finished automotive components also 
forced these foreign companies to source components from local suppliers” (Kim, 2004: 255). In 
addition, in the early 1990s India did not impose specific localisation targets or LCRs per se, but 
initially banned the importation of ‘knocked down’ kits. Perhaps more importantly than the level 
of tariffs, vehicle imports continued to be subject to discretionary import licensing (Indian Trade 
Policy Review, 1998: 147), while investment projects were subject to discretionary approval 
mechanisms, through which local content was promoted on an ad hoc basis, as discussed below.  
For China, the most significant shift in policy stance came with the implementation of the 
Automotive Industrial Policy (AIP) in 1994. The stated aims of the policy were fourfold: to 
establish large-scale groups of saloon and light truck producers (to replace the small-scale, 
scattered manufacturers); to improve the components industry; to create automotive product 
development capabilities; and to encourage individual car ownership (Holweg et al., 2009).  
It was recognised that foreign participation and modernisation of planning systems were both 
required to achieve these goals. However, in comparison to India’s opening to foreign capital, the 
Chinese approach to liberalisation was more tentative and gradual; the government has engaged 
in reform “which has resulted in a mixed regulation mechanism composed of both market 
competition and legacies of the past command economy” (Sit and Lui, 2000: 653). Whereas in 
India all of the main global automakers established subsidiaries in the early 1990s, China had only 
authorised the entry of one additional assembler, Shanghai-GM, by 1998 (ibid.: 662).  
Towards the turn of the century, China authorised the establishment of numerous additional FDI 
projects   Wang (2003: 291) reports, the vast majority of FDI was subject to a “mandatory equity 
share regulation” as well as vigorous screening process. These have permitted the Chinese state 
to ensure that MNCs were “complementary (but not dominant) sources of capital” (ibid.: 293). 
Alongside joint ventures were private, locally state-owned and centrally state-owned Chinese 
firms. As Thun (2004) discusses, policies and institutions at the local (regional) governmental level 
have also played a crucial role in determining the location of production and FDI inflows. 
Together, these features preserve the idiosyncratically Chinese characteristic of the automotive 
value chain.  
As in India, levels of trade protection were considerably reduced but remained high throughout 
the 1990s. The Automotive Industrial Policy also specified that assemblers adhere to demanding 
local content ratios, enter into mandatory joint ventures with Chinese firms, and transfer 
technology to subsidiaries and partners. Local content requirements were set at 40% in the first 
year, increasing to 60 then 80% in the second and third years respectively.  
Details regarding the vehicle output and local content levels attained by the major Chinese vehicle 
assemblers in 1998 are shown in table 6-13, below. It is apparent that by the mid- to late-1990s, 
most Chinese-manufactured vehicles had achieved the required level of local content, at around 
85% in most cases (Sit and Lui, 2000: 662). Despite serious issues with productivity levels and the 
attainment of quality standards, LCRs “required the carmakers to switch rapidly from reliance on 
imported components to sourcing from local vendors; this in turn gave the carmakers a strong 
incentive to work closely with (first-tier) suppliers to ensure that quality standards were met, 
within an acceptable price” (Sutton, 2005: 186).  
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Table 6-13: Major car assembly plants in China in 1998 
 
Car production Local content of major models 
Shanghai-VW Co. Ltd. 235,000 84.0-91.7 
Tianjin Automobile Plant 100,021 93.3 
Beijing Jeep Co. Ltd. 8,344 82.3 
FAW-VW Co. Ltd. 66,100 84.03 
FAW 15,026 82.2 
Chang’an-Suzuki Co. Ltd. 35,555 85.28 
Shenlong-Citroen Co. Ltd. 36,240 67.5-82.2 
Shanghai-GM Co. Ltd. 
Started commercial 
production in 1999 
N/A 
Guangzhou-Honda Co. Ltd. 345 N/A 
Source: Sit and Lui, 2000: Table 3. Note: Guangzhou-Honda previously Guangzhou-Peugeot before the withdrawal of PSA.  
In India, performance outcomes improved dramatically, and the value of parts and components 
production roughly tripled between 1991 and 1996 (Indian TPR, 1998: 147). There was also some 
modest export success, with the ratio of exports to output reaching over 20% in 1996 (ibid.: 146). 
However, it should be noted that at this stage, such exports “were targeted primarily at the 
lower-quality after-markets” (Kumaraswamy et al., 2012: 373).  
In India too, once foreign ownership was permitted, the structure of the value chain began to 
change. Components production had been carried out predominantly in-house by locally-owned 
subsidiaries or independent firms. There were substantial problems with quality, as in China, and, 
as Veloso and Kumar (2002: 27) note, “it is not surprising to find most foreign automakers to be 
unsatisfied with Indian component manufacturers”. LCRs have contributed to the decisions of 
multinational assemblers and suppliers to invest heavily in the parts and components sector, and 
of local firms to engage in technological upgrading; “leading local firms have established over 200 
technical cooperation agreements with foreign firms to be able to reach international standards” 
(ibid.). Thus, with liberalisation, a more mixed network of suppliers began to emerge, with 
assembler-established joint ventures and global tier-one suppliers joining the established Indian 
firms (Nag, 2011: 106; Sutton, 2005: 186), but local content levels remained high. The injection of 
competition caused by the entry of the global automakers gave rise to further developments in 
the nature of value chain relationships, with a wave of joint ventures as well as wholly-owned 
foreign suppliers being established, putting local manufacturers under greater pressure. “A 
number of components manufacturers with global reach have invested in India to serve their 
assemblers’ local operations” (Kim, 2004: 252). As Kumaraswamy et al. (2012: 373) note,  
aggressive local content requirements meant that MNE auto manufacturers and MNE Tier 1 
firms had to develop local sources for a number of components... To ensure that their global 
standards were met in the Indian market, MNEs had to engage in close interactions and joint 
efforts with local suppliers to improve quality and productivity. Domestic auto manufacturers 
also began establishing closer relationships with their suppliers, in contrast to their earlier 
arm’s length and price-based dealings” (p. 373).  
According to Sutton’s (2005: 187) summary, during the course of the 1990s, in both countries 
the supply chain underwent a major transformation. The new generation of multinationals 
worked closely with local suppliers to achieve high standards of productivity and quality. 
Meanwhile, domestic carmakers faced intense competition for market share. Their response 
was to upgrade productivity and quality levels in their own plants and to look for higher 
quality levels from their (first-tier) suppliers.  
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Thus, it appears that LCRs have been an effective tool – in the context of rapid growth in demand, 
wider processes of liberalisation, and oligopolistic competition between the major automakers – 
for promoting technology transfer and upgrading within automotive parts and components 
suppliers.  
6.5.3.2 The elimination of LCRs 
The strategies described above can be seen as preparation for engagement with the multilateral 
system established by the WTO in 1995. India was a member from the beginning, but did not 
notify its localisation policies under the terms of the TRIMs agreement. As noted above, the 
government originally banned the newly arrived MNC assemblers from importing parts and 
components, including ‘completely knocked down’ (CKD) and ‘semi knocked down’ (SKD) kits, in 
1992. However, this was soon relaxed, in 1995, in favour of individual Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) with MNCs which stipulated local content, trade balancing and production 
volume requirements and “imposed high customs duties on imported CKDs and components until 
MNE entrants fulfilled their commitments” (Kumaraswamy et al., 2012: 373). India and the EU 
initially came to a mutual agreement that the measures would be phased out by the end of 2003. 
Instead, in 1997, these ad hoc agreements were replaced with a uniform policy, comprising local 
content requirements rising from 50 to 70% within five years as well as foreign exchange 
balancing requirements which required exports to compensate for imports (WTO document 
WT/DS146/R).  
This policy was subject to dispute proceedings by the EU and US and Japan starting in October 
1998 (WTO dispute cases DS146 and DS175) on the grounds that the measures contravened the 
TRIMs agreement and other WTO provisions. In a judgement that effectively superseded the 
mutual agreement between the EU and India, India was required to eliminate the current system 
of non-automatic licenses for imports of passenger cars, and chassis and bodies therefor, no later 
than 1 April 2001.  
The Chinese experience was different but resulted in a similar outcome: the elimination of LCRs 
by 2001, at least in formal terms. China was not an original member of the WTO and had had to 
satisfy a number of domestic reform criteria before being permitted to accede, which it finally did 
in November 2001. Regarding LCRs, China was not permitted recourse to the phase-out period 
that applied to other developing countries joining the organisation in 1995, and had to comply 
with additional policy space restrictions to those relating directly to trade (WTO document 
WT/L/432).  
An important factor to consider in the present analysis is that China continued to implement 
prohibited TRIMs for some time after the formal elimination of LCRs, as noted in section 3.5.4. 
The details of the policy and the subsequent dispute case are complex, but basically, China 
imposed fiscal penalties on firms using knocked down kits if the latter were deemed to have the 
“essential characteristics of complete vehicles”. The complaints of the US, EU and other 
complainants were upheld, and China was required to remove the measures in question. Beyond 
this, according to Haley (2012: 28),  
Officially, Chinese law contains no local-content requirements either regionally or nationally 
in any sector. The reality in the auto-parts industry appears somewhat different… Specifically, 
local-content requirements continue unofficially and informally… as undisclosed rules for the 
approval of foreign-investment projects. 
Noble et al. (2005: 15) concur, reporting that foreign investors “perceive that the desire of 
authorities to increase local content colors official response to investment proposals and has 
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amounted to an informal imposition of WTO-outlawed TRIMs”. According to the Haley, such 
informal discretionary mechanisms have met with a degree of success as investors “have 
responded to Chinese persuasion on local content” (2012: 29).  
Besides the fact that China has continued to employ prohibited TRIMs, both formally and 
informally, after its accession to the WTO, there have been a number of similarities in China and 
India’s policy stances. Appendix 27 summarises the main policy developments affecting the 
automotive sector.  
Both countries have courted FDI, engaged in trade liberalisation, and continued to promote the 
automotive sector, but in different ways and with varying degrees of success. Throughout the 
1990s, India continued to implement high tariffs on vehicles – indeed tariffs were increased 
between 1997 and 2002 – as well as taxes that raise the cost of vehicles by between 65 and 75% 
of the manufacturing cost (Indian Trade Policy Review, 2002: 109).  
However, Indian automotive policy changed to a more ‘market-friendly’ variety following the 
period in which LCRs were eliminated. The stated goal of 2002’s Automotive Policy was “to 
develop India as a global hub for small cars and an Asian hub for auto components” 
(Kumaraswamy et al., 2012: 381). The policy focused on incentives for the production of small 
cars, leading to export success by a number of automakers – including the Indian firm, Tata 
Motors – and the Core Group on Automotive Research and Development (CAR) was established to 
identify priority areas for research and development (Nag, 2011: 102). In addition, 100% foreign 
ownership was permitted in both assembly and supply. According to Nag (2011), this policy 
“finally led to the reduction of duties in the auto component sector to a large extent and the 
automobile sector to some extent”. As a result, tariff on vehicles fell from 44.2 to 33.6% between 
2002 and 2007 (Indian Trade Policy Review, 2007: 125). Nevertheless, given the level of such 
tariffs, it remains “likely that much of the FDI in the industry is for "tariff jumping" purposes”, at 
least in the assembly sector (ibid.). Parts and components tariffs have been reduced even more 
dramatically, falling from 35% in 2001 to 12.5% in 2007.  
Notwithstanding the measures described above, China has also gradually and profoundly 
liberalised tariffs. The average applied tariff fell from 30.1% in 2001 to 14.8% in 2005. The Chinese 
state has used the considerable leverage of the domestic market to encourage technology 
transfer and limit denationalisation of ownership through joint venture requirements and other 
means. According to Noble et al. (2005), the government 
moved towards a lighter-handed but more effective form of industrial policy that reduced 
top-down planning while expanding market incentives and scope for managerial freedom. 
Rather than destroying industrial policy for the auto industry, WTO accession constrained 
and disciplined it. 
In 2004, the new Automotive Industrial Policy introduced investment performance requirements 
stipulating that foreign investment projects had to invest at least RMB 500 million in research and 
development, agree to transfer technology to local subsidiaries, and launch new brands in China. 
A 50% foreign equity limit was imposed on all automotive firms; this was eliminated in 2004 for 
parts and components firms but remained in force for the assembly sector. China has fostered its 
own ‘national champions’ by encouraging joint ventures between foreign technology-owners and 
state-owned conglomerates, as well as providing billions of dollars in subsidies and “extensive 
institutional support for the acquisition and development of cutting-edge technology, including 
new energy and green technologies” (Haley, 2012: 1). 
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6.5.4 FDI and value chain governance structures 
The Indian and Chinese automotive sectors have both transitioned from small, backwards 
national concerns to large, modern globalised industries over the past 20-25 years. There have 
been a number of similarities in the manner of their transformations that stand in contrast to the 
experience of other, smaller emerging markets. One obvious commonality is the increased 
involvement of foreign capital and technology – in both wholly-owned foreign enterprises and 
joint ventures – amidst the success of a small number of local firms. In both countries, global 
automakers have committed to integrate local production into their global sourcing strategies, 
encouraging the global suppliers to follow them to the expanding markets. Competitive pressures, 
including the reduction of trade barriers generally and the elimination of LCRs specifically – have 
led to the gradual dominance of the supply sector by foreign capital and greater export 
propensity, but have not significantly reduced levels of local content. At the same time, a 
collection of more capable domestic firms have managed – to a greater or lesser degree – to 
coexist with the multinationals and ultimately, to compete on the world stage, either 
independently or as joint ventures. 
With respect to FDI inflows, figure 6-20 shows that US investment to China and India was initially 
approximately equal but has diverged significantly in more recent years. Looking at Japanese 
investment into the transport sector, shown in figure 6-21, a spike in investment following the 
Chinese AIP of 1994 and the initial wave of liberalisation is clearly visible. In the late 1990s, 
investment levels in China and India converge, before another spike following China’s entry into 
the WTO results in a large divergence. Although data on Japanese transport FDI into India are not 
available beyond 2004, other sources suggest that a large gap in inward investment persists 
throughout the 2000s. 
Figure 6-20: US investment in transport sector, millions of constant 1995 USD: China and India, 1997-2012. 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015). Data converted to constant USD using World Bank WDI exchange rate data and U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Figure 6-21: Japanese investment into the transport sector, millions of constant 1995 USD: China and India, 1992-2004 
 
Source: 1989-2004: Japanese Ministry of Finance (2015) data based on international transactions in securities reported by major 
investors (series discontinued in 2004). Data converted to constant USD using World Bank WDI exchange rate data and U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
As the big multinational automakers have clamoured to gain access to these large and growing 
markets, especially in China, their entry has brought similar levels of investment in the supply 
sector. Liu and Dicken (2006: 1233) analyse FDI into the Chinese auto sector in the years prior to 
and following the AIP of 1994. They observe that initially, the majority of FDI was into the 
assembly subsector. Following the decision in 1994 to limit further assembly operations and 




Figure 6-22: FDI into the Chinese assembly and parts sectors, millions of USD: 1983-2003. 
 
Source: Liu and Dicken, 2006: Figure 1. 
 
As Noble et al. (2005: 7) comment, the main effect of 1994’s AIP was “competitive rush by foreign 
auto assemblers and parts firms to enter the Chinese market and to establish a favorable position 
before China entered the WTO”. China’s strong bargaining position has encouraged these 
automakers to commit to establishing integrated production systems in China, rather than mere 
assembly plants to service the domestic market, in line with the developmental goals of the 
Chinese administration. For example, when China permitted the establishment of a huge joint 
venture between GM and Shanghai automotive, “GM had already proven its commitment to 
China’s long-run development by establishing over a dozen parts plants in China, many of them 
oriented to exports” (ibid.). The influx of competition and the quality standards of the incoming 
foreign automakers encouraged local suppliers to engage in rapid upgrading by licensing 
technology from abroad or themselves engaging in joint ventures with global suppliers.  According 
to Noble et al. (2005: 20), these investments were motivated by “using China as a means to cut 
production costs in their global supply chains” as well as to access the rapidly growing market, the 
size of which, by the mid-2000s, was beginning to permit the exploitation of “economies of scale 
and (particularly around Shanghai) agglomeration”.  
After China’s entry into the WTO in 2002, almost all the remaining global automakers entered 
China, accompanied by global parts suppliers. Cooney (2006: 16-17) observes that “as 
international automakers increase their manufacturing investment and sourcing in China, they 
will be seeking ways to integrate parts supply capacity, from their own operations or from third 
parties, into their global business”. Already by 2005, “more than 70% of the global top 100 
suppliers were operating in China” (Holweg et al., 2009: 98).  
By comparison to their assembly sectors, both India’s and especially China’s parts and 
components sectors are highly fragmented. Holweg et al. (2009) put the number of Chinese parts 
firms at approximately 1700 in 2004, while A. T. Kearney (2008) state the figure as 12,000 
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(presumably due to definitional differences in reported data). Regardless of the exact number, it 
is clear that while both “are still highly fragmented, with large numbers of small competitors… the 
Chinese market is more fragmented overall… the top 10 suppliers in India account for 31 percent 
of the market, in China the top 10 suppliers comprise just 18 percent.” (ibid.: 4). Similarly, Sutton 
reports that the top 10 exporting firms account for 39% of exports in India compared to just 14% 
in China. However, comprehensive data on industry concentration, permitting inter-temporal 
comparison pre- and post-elimination of LCRs, are not available. Similarly, detailed data on the 
governance-related implications of changes in market structure and ownership patterns are 
lacking, presenting an important gap in the literature.  
In China, as demonstrated by Liu and Zhao (2006) and Holweg et al. (2009), foreign-affiliated firms 
were larger in scale, exhibited higher levels of productivity, and dominated the first tiers of 
supply. Having developed a model of production incorporating micro-level (firm) data on scale, 
ownership, and factor inputs, Liu and Zhao (2006) report that productivity rose rapidly between 
1999 and 2004, with foreign-affiliated firms performing at higher levels. However, the authors 
acknowledge that locally-owned private and state-owned firms have also exhibited rapid rates of 
productivity growth by “introducing new technology and advanced management from foreign 
countries” and “through imitation of new technology and innovation” (ibid.: 13). Overall, while it 
appears clear that there has been a substantial denationalisation of ownership, Chinese firms still 
represented the majority of equity ownership in the sector at this stage. Furthermore, according 
to Haley (2012: 8),  
direct and indirect Chinese government ownership or influence remains prevalent. Many of 
the large auto-parts companies have affiliations with the large vehicle-assembly groups that 
local governments partly own. Other unaffiliated auto-parts companies benefit from 
government ownership directly… Most foreign auto-parts companies have entered China 
through JVs with local and regional governments, thereby securing access to government 
equity capital as well as near-guaranteed access to preferential bank loans. 
China has been able to been able to maintain local content through its influence over local 
automakers – whose relationships with existing suppliers grant implicit protection. Thus, some 
indigenous Chinese automotives firms have been as exception to the tendency, in other emerging 
markets, in which domestic firms are either subsumed by MNCs, exit the industry, or drop to 
lower tier production. Thus, as Haley (2012: 2) notes, “a number of Chinese domestic enterprises 
are emerging as world-class competitors”. Due to the lack of data, it is not clear whether the 
industrial structure has become more concentrated over time in the Chinese parts sector, 
although this is likely to have been the case due to the extremely fragmented market structure 
prevailing in the 1990s coupled with an influx in competition.  
The story – of a rapid influx of foreign investment coupled with denationalisation – is similar in 
India, although the size of the market remains small in comparison. A number of global parts and 
components firms had already followed the assemblers to the newly open Indian market in the 
early- to mid-1990s (Humphrey, 2003). As Rasiah and Kumar (2008: 85) show, foreign parts and 
component manufacturers “enjoyed higher labour productivity, wages, and export, technological 
and skills intensities than local firms”. The presence of these firms has therefore contributed to 
the export performance of the supply sector, as well as pressuring the rapid adjustment of the 
indigenous suppliers. As liberalisation continued, especially with the elimination of LCRs in 2001 
and the liberalisation of investment that came with the following year’s Auto Policy, investment in 
the Indian parts and components sectors expanded rapidly, as shown in figure 6-23, below.  
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Figure 6-23: Investment and Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the Indian automotive parts and components sector: 1998-
2009. 
 
Source: Gross Fixed Capital Formation data from UNIDO (2011), investment data from ACMA (various years). Data converted to 
constant USD using World Bank WDI exchange rate data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
In addition, governance structures became increasingly denationalised. As Humphrey (2003: 137-
8) observed in 2003, 
there are clear indications that transnational auto component manufacturers are increasing 
their stakes in their Indian joint ventures. What were once minority stakes are now being 
transformed into majority stakes. Equity tie-ups are increasingly necessary for Indian 
companies wanting access to technology and designs that are essential for gaining contracts, 
but the price for this technology is frequently the ceding of a majority stake to the foreign 
partner.   
A number of local firms left the market while others “such as the TVS Group, the Rane Group and 
the Kalyani Group have successfully forged strong Tier 1 relationships with domestic and MNE 
auto manufacturers, and have become integral parts of the auto industry’s global supply chain” 
(Kumaraswamy et al., 2012: 390). Some Indian suppliers were already exporting unsophisticated 
components to less developed markets, but as liberalisation proceeded and competition 
intensified, “there was a slow but sure shift to exports of quality components to MNE auto 
manufacturers and global Tier 1 components firms” (ibid.: 387). 
Interestingly, although comprehensive longitudinal data are not available, in India the influx of 
foreign investment may have resulted not in consolidation but increased fragmentation of the 
parts and components sector, due to the increased numbers of participants in the assembly 
sector and the follow sourcing strategies of global suppliers79. Thus, analysts such as 
                                                          
79
 According to Humphrey (2003: 137), this phenomenon is well illustrated in the case of brakes suppliers. 
As he observes, “prior to the 1990s two companies dominated the Indian market for this product: Brakes 
India (a joint venture between the UK company, Lucas, and an Indian conglomerate, TVS) and Kalyani 
Brakes…. In the 1990s, at least two other braking companies entered the Indian market… At various times 




Kumaraswamy et al. (2012: 390), drawing a contrast with the fate of Latin American and Eastern 
European supply sectors, “cautiously forecast that several domestic firms will continue to 
compete successfully in the Indian and regional auto components markets alongside MNEs”. 
Nevertheless, as the authors acknowledge, further “consolidation of the industry is likely to occur, 
as competition increases from China and ASEAN countries, and auto manufacturers in India 
further rationalize their respective supply chains” (ibid.). 
6.5.5 Summary and conclusions 
6.5.5.1 The contribution of LCRs to performance outcomes (RQ 2) 
Coming in the context of wider liberalisation (which could have easily threatened local suppliers) 
and simultaneously with large-scale investments in productive capacities of the global 
automakers, Sutton (2005) reports that firms have established local sources of parts and 
components superior in price to the imported alternative, suggesting “development of the local 
supply chain under local-content restrictions in the years before WTO entry has been highly 
successful” (p. 198). There were rapid increases in productivity among local firms alongside a 
wave of investment by global assemblers and suppliers.  
In China, LCRs were implemented in the early phases of sectoral development, which by the 
1990s was characterised by immense potential for growth amidst stagnating mature markets in 
‘the quad’. Foreign auto producers were desperate to gain a foothold in the vast protected 
market, and the Chinese government were able to negotiate local content levels which MNCs 
could only fulfil by establishing mandatory joint ventures or transferring technology directly to 
local firms. As a result, when LCRs were eliminated, foreign MNCs had already established 
production networks in which local firms were integrated. The latter, crucially, were able to 
‘learn-by-doing’ over the course of the decade. Global parts and components manufacturers have 
invested heavily as an export platform China to take advantage of low wages. In India, too, LCRs 
had the desired effect, with a combination of global and local firms rapidly upgrading in order to 
meet the demands of MNCs under intense competitive pressure. However, because the Indian 
market was not poised for such high rates of growth as was China, investment in the supply 
subsector remained at relatively low levels until the early 2000s.  
6.5.5.2 The contribution of the elimination of LCRs to performance outcomes (RQ 3)  
In both countries, elimination of LCRs appears to have contributed to the further 
denationalisation of parts and components supply chains, but also further investment and better 
export performance as local firms reorient to take advantage of global markets, and multinational 
firms continue to integrate their operations into global sourcing strategies. Importantly, local 
content ratios remain extremely high, suggesting that assemblers prefer domestic suppliers either 
due to pure cost advantages or because the costs of switching to foreign suppliers are too high. In 
the latter case, successful and long term indigenisation appears to be at least partly aided by the 
implementation of LCRs in the infant industrial phase.  
It is clear that policies and institutions have continued to play a significant role throughout the 
rapid expansion and upgrading of parts firms in both countries. Trade liberalisation has been 
implemented gradually to allow adjustment to competition, and while FDI has been courted, both 
governments have tried to use their advantages as leverage to encourage local sourcing, 
technology transfer, and joint ventures. China, in particular, has used its vast domestic market to 
bargain with foreign capital:   
By 2003 all of the world's leading automobile producers had established production facilities 
in China in various forms. To varying degrees, therefore, China's automobile industry is 
becoming integrated into the global production networks of transnational corporations. But 
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so far… this has been, to a very considerable degree, on terms dictated by the Chinese 
government (Liu and Dicken, 2006: 1229).  
Denationalisation of the supply chain has occurred, but has been mitigated by the policy and 
institutional environment so that a proportion of domestic firms have emerged as globally-
competitive suppliers. Formal and informal performance requirements have continued after the 
elimination of LCRs – especially in China. It is impossible to discount the possibility that continued 
protection and other supporting policies have mitigated the impacts of the prohibited TRIMs, 
particularly in the Chinese case, as suggested by Noble et al. (2005) and Haley (2012).  
To the extent that the two countries have diverged with respect to trade performance, divergence 
appears fairly modest and largely explained by the obvious difference in market size. China has 
opened up a large trade surplus in parts, but India has emerged as an exporter of finished vehicles 
– including indigenous brands – which contain high proportions of Indian parts and components. 
In conclusion, the elimination of LCRs has been one part of both countries’ sequenced strategies 
to develop globally competitive automotive sectors, has contributed to the surge of investment in 
the 2000s, and has been accomplished without any significant decline in parts and components 





7    SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The purpose of this final, concluding chapter is to summarise the findings of each stage of my 
research individually, synthesise and assess their joint contribution, and discuss the wider 
relevance, applicability and implications of the thesis as a whole.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 7.2.1, I briefly summarise the findings of chapters 5 
(which were already addressed extensively in section 5.5) in relation to RQ 1. In section 7.2.2 I 
synthesise and expand on the findings of chapter 6 by comparing the pairs of cases analysed 
therein with the aim of generalising about the nature of the causal mechanisms driving the impact 
of the elimination of LCRs on performance outcomes. Section 7.2.2 is concerned with addressing 
the substantive concerns of RQs 2 – 3 and the associated sub-questions. Throughout both 
sections, I assess the extent to which the research questions have been adequately and 
comprehensively addressed, the limitations of each method in terms of causal inference, and 
issues of generalising the findings more broadly.  
These issues inform my response to subsequent discussion of research questions concerning the 
methodological and wider theoretical implications of the research. In section 7.3, I assess the joint 
contribution of the mixed method approach, in terms of the relative insights afforded by each 
stage to my overall research problem, and provide a response to RQ 4 and sub-question 4.1. In 
particular, I discuss the methodological difficulties in isolating the phenomenon under 
examination from wider contextual factors affecting performance outcomes which vary at the 
country and regional levels and over time, which ultimately, I have found to be impossible to 
completely overcome. Following from this discussion, I identify a number of ways in which 
alternative methods and empirical approaches could fruitfully contribute to a greater 
understanding of the impacts of the elimination of LCRs.  
Finally, in section 7.4, I discuss the wider implications of my research to wider theoretical debates, 
discuss some tentative policy implications that arise as a result of my findings, and consider 
avenues for future research.  
7.2 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS 
In this section, I briefly summarise the findings of chapters 5 in relation to RQ 1, the research 
question is was designed to address, and synthesise and expand on the findings of chapter 6 by 
comparing the pairs of cases analysed therein. Throughout the discussion, I assess the extent to 
which the research questions have been adequately and comprehensively addressed, which 
informs my response to subsequent discussion of research questions concerning the 
methodological and wider theoretical implications of the research.  
7.2.1 Panel regression 
The research question pertaining to the panel regression stage of analysis was as follows: 
RQ 1. What is the nature and magnitude of the impact of the elimination of LCRs on 
quantitative indicators of industrial performance in the automotive parts and components 
sector? 
The main estimation results showed that while local content levels have fallen as a result of the 
elimination of LCRs, output did not fall significantly, and at the same time, both imports and 
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exports have increased fairly dramatically. The implications are that the elimination of LCRs has 
led to the development of less internally integrated, but more internationally competitive, parts 
and components sectors in the liberalising countries. On balance, given the clear advantages of 
integration into global production networks – as reflected by the stated goals of countries 
pursuing LCRs – it can be confidently stated that the elimination of LCRs has caused an important 
improvement in industrial performance outcomes, against the more pessimistic theoretical 
predictions that liberalisation would cause a rapid influx in imports and the rapid disintegration of 
local supply networks as assemblers source from existing networks or relocate to more 
advantageous locations80. This appears, at face value, to refute structuralist expectations that 
policy space restrictions impose significant costs on developing countries by hampering structural 
transformation, in the instance of the elimination of LCRs. Since LCRs were considered to be an 
important and controversial aspect of policy space, this finding represents an important 
contribution to debates surrounding the developmental effects of policy space restrictions. The 
validity of the finding is enhanced by the incorporation into the fixed effect DID model of 
covariates for market size and industrial capabilities, and, in additional specifications, of 
covariates incorporating the effects of tariff levels, the presence of regional trade institutions, and 
region-specific year effects (to capture the heterogeneous time-varying factors at the regional 
level, such as uneven growth patterns, or financial contagion, for example). Furthermore, I carried 
out analysis on two separate samples – major automotive producers and a wider sample of 
countries for which data were available – and I constructed alternative indicators for each 
variable of industrial performance outcome in which I was interested. The consistency of the 
findings depicted above across the alternative models serves to confirm that the reported results 
are satisfactorily robust.   
Nevertheless, I recognise a number of limitations to the method implemented here, as discussed 
in section 5.5. In principle, and under stringent assumptions, the DID estimator should identify an 
average causal effect. However, there are reasons to believe that these assumptions may not 
pertain. In the presence of time-varying heterogeneity beyond that modelled by the covariates 
described above, such as engendered by potentially cumulative effects of LCRs in the pre-
treatment period, the DID estimator would be biased. Likewise, to the extent that countries differ 
with respect to their policy and institutional regimes, and that these differences vary over time or 
give rise to time-varying heterogeneity, the omission of policy and institutional variables could be 
an important source of bias.  
These limitations should not be overstated. It should be recalled, following the discussion in 
section 5.3, that even if the conditions required to establish a causal effect are not satisfied, the 
presence of large and significant coefficients on the post-treatment dummy variables is still 
substantively interesting if we consider the latter as descriptive estimands. In this sense, they 
simply represent the difference between the outcomes for the treatment and control groups, 
conditional on the covariates in the sample. This is particularly important in circumstances in 
which the sample analysed is large in relation to the population, and when differences in 
treatment status can be interpreted as a arising from qualitative differences in kind between the 
groups, such as in the present case. Thus, the DID estimator clearly depicts a substantial 
                                                          
80
 Of course, this threat can easily be overstated, since there are clear logistical advantages to assemblers of 
maintaining local supply networks even in the absence of trade barriers, especially in the case of parts with 
high weight to value ratios. Nevertheless, the threat is realistic in the case of lighter parts for which 
productive locations are predominantly determined by cost advantages rather than proximity to sources of 
demand.   
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improvement in performance outcomes over time that pertains to the treatment group relative to 
the control. This is an important finding, regardless of the cause, as it provides an empirical basis 
on which to examine the mechanisms through which the elimination of LCRs has indeed caused or 
contributed to the observed outcomes. This was one of the goals of the next stage of my analysis, 
the findings and implications of which I turn to next.     
7.2.2 Case studies 
To recap, there were two overarching research questions pertaining to the case study stage of my 
analysis, relating to an historical institutionalist examination of the periods in which LCRs were in 
force, and in which they have been removed following the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement. 
Although the questions were partially addressed in the summary and conclusions sections of each 
paired comparison, in this section I broaden the comparison to include assessment of the 
similarities and differences between as well as within pairs of cases. As I have previously 
described, the aim of the case studies is to combine within-case comparison – permitting 
analytical generalisation of causal mechanisms that are common across the diverse group of cases 
– with cross-case comparison according to the method of difference, the goal of which is to 
attribute causal relationships between the diverse contexts in which LCRs have been 
implemented and eliminated on the one hand and performance outcomes on the other. Although 
the two forms of comparison are inextricably linked, I consider them separately.   
7.2.2.1 Assessing the contribution of LCRs to performance outcomes and mechanisms 
The research questions and sub-questions pertaining to the periods in which LCRs were in force 
are as follows: 
RQ 2. To what extent and how have LCRs contributed to performance outcomes 
through the causal mechanisms of FDI and developments in value chain governance?  
RQ 2.1. To what extent and how have LCRs contributed to post-liberalisation performance 
outcomes through cumulative processes arising in the LCRs period?  
RQ 2.2. How have the contributions of LCRs differed according to the contexts in which 
they were implemented? 
My aim is to provide an overview of the within-case similarities between the cases, before turning 
to a cross-case comparison in order to draw inferences regarding the diversity of observed 
outcomes.  
The analysis of causal mechanisms, through the examination of secondary data sources, suggests 
that across the case studies, LCRs have had different outcomes depending on the temporal 
contexts and also the manner in which they were implemented. It is difficult to draw any strong 
inferences about the presence and nature of cumulative processes arising from the 
implementation of LCRs due to the confounding factors affecting their outcomes that make 
intertemporal comparison highly problematic.  
Broadly speaking, when they were implemented as part of a package of extremely high levels of 
protection, such as pertained across all of the cases prior to the 1990s, high levels of local content 
were achieved but it is clear that LCRs skewed the incentives of both assemblers and suppliers 
towards serving the domestic market, potentially limiting the attainment of efficient levels of 
scale and the transfer of the most advanced technology, and dampening competitive pressures; 
exports were correspondingly low. They have also given rise to persistent rent-seeking, and, 
sheltered from competitive pressure, investment in modernisation and upgrading remained low. 
These findings are consistent with arguments that LCRs are generally welfare-reducing and have 
hampered integration of emerging markets into global networks, typified for example by Moran 
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(1998). Partial exceptions to this trend are observed in the case of Brazil, where the automotive 
industry had already grown substantially following several decades of import substitution, and the 
combination of LCRs with export and trade balancing requirements contributed to the emergence 
of a number of internationally competitive parts suppliers which became integrated into the 
production networks of the triad automakers in the 1980s and experienced some success 
exporting independently to other emerging markets. The same is true – although to a lesser 
extent – in Thailand, where export incentives were also used in the 1980s.  
On the other hand, in the majority of the cases examined here, where LCRs have been employed 
in conjunction with real and potential market growth and a combination of incentives and 
protection for the assembly sector in order to encourage investment and upgrading in the parts 
and component sector, the effects have been more benign. In the absence of a counterfactual, it 
is difficult to quantify precisely the difference LCRs have made and whether outcomes would have 
been positive in the absence of market growth, but the evidence presented suggests that 
multinational automakers would have sourced from their existing supply networks instead of local 
firms to a greater extent in at least some cases. The evidence suggests that during the 1990s, 
across the range of cases, assemblers have participated in the development of local parts and 
components networks in two ways, by transferring technology to and working with independent 
local firms and by encouraging existing global suppliers to establish subsidiaries. As Sturgeon and 
Lester (2004: 63) put it, global suppliers “most often establish production facilities in developing 
countries at the behest of their customers who have set up final assembly plants and are trying to 
meet local content requirements”. Therefore, the protective effects of LCRs have not been 
confined to local suppliers but also global firms. Because the latter tend to be integrated into 
existing inter- and intra-firm networks, it appears that improvements in export performance 
during this period are largely attributable to the more geographically fragmented global 
operations of these firms.  
Turning to the differences between cases, the extent to which parts and components suppliers 
use the protective rents to engage in capability development, and the willingness (and ability) of 
lead firms to transfer technology and integrate local firms and subsidiaries in their global 
networks, are determined by the conjunction of LCRs with market conditions, manufacturing 
capabilities, and other policies and institutions; in short, if implemented in the context of strong 
locational advantages, LCRs have been accompanied by large influxes of investment in the 
upgrading and modernisation of both the assembly and parts and component sectors, as appears 
to have been the case in Brazil, China, Thailand, and also, to a lesser extent, India. There is also 
evidence of cooperation between assemblers and suppliers during this period. In China and 
Thailand, the countries exhibiting the most remarkable performance outcomes in the post-
liberalisation environment, exports had already begun to increase substantially, albeit from low 
bases, in the second half of the 1990s. This was also the case in Brazil between 1995 and 1997, 
although export performance indicators were already high, and this trend was halted as the 
country fell into recession. On balance, through the mechanisms of increased FDI into the supply 
sector, LCRs have given rise to cumulative processes, the effects of which have influenced 
performance outcomes in the period after LCRs were phased out.  
In contrast, in countries where locational advantages are relatively lacking, such as in Argentina 
compared to Brazil, India compared to China, and Malaysia compared to Thailand, local supply 
has been more exclusively geared towards achieving mandated levels of local content in order to 
obtain protective rents of small domestic vehicle markets. Thus, local suppliers have generally 
failed to make the requisite investments to achieve dynamic learning and scale economies and 
global suppliers have been more reluctant to establish operations. In the case of Argentina and 
Malaysia, global suppliers have preferred to locate in their more advantageous neighbours, from 
which they can serve protected regional markets. In Malaysia especially, local content 
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requirements in conjunction with policies unfavourable to foreign investors have created highly 
inefficient supply networks, contributing to circumstances in which protection has been difficult 
to remove. 
Despite the evidence at the level of the causal mechanisms driving parts and components sector 
outcomes, it is impossible to separate the impacts of LCRs from the conditions of rapid sectoral 
growth in which they were implemented, and from ongoing processes of liberalisation. It is 
important to note that during this period, from the early 1990s, the elimination of LCRs within all 
of the cases examined was imminent, with the possible exception of China, which was still 
negotiating WTO accession at this stage. Furthermore, each of the countries analysed here were 
poised for rapid sectoral growth, as a result of rising income levels and generally low rates of 
vehicle ownership. As a result, the observed influxes of investment, upgrading processes, and 
value chain restructuring may have been predicated on subsequent liberalisation and market 
growth. This complicates the assessment of the impacts of LCRs during this period because it 
introduces ‘leads’ insofar as performance outcomes precede their causes in a temporal sense; 
obviously, large multinational firms engaging strategically in large sunk investments in production 
capacity take a long term view in which future market and non-market developments are taken 
into consideration.  
In fact, that positive outcomes of LCRs were predicated on their subsequent elimination may not 
negate the fact that LCRs were effective, but rather points to a crucial element in their success, 
which is consistent with much of the theoretical justification for trade and industrial policy more 
generally. In sum, it appears the elimination of LCRs in a controlled timescale has enabled 
countries to continue to encourage supplier development as a ‘transitional mechanism’ during a 
period of rapid sectoral development (and structural transformation), ensuring that their trade 
distorting effects on the sector as a whole have not discouraged considerable levels of investment 
in the vehicle assembly sector and may indeed have contributed to waves of inward ‘follow-
sourcing’ investment by global suppliers as well as encouraged technological upgrading within 
local firms.  
What is clear is that in some of the case studies examined here, namely Brazil, China, India and 
Thailand, LCRs have not substantially hindered the integration of implementing countries into 
global production networks, a concern expressed by Brooks et al. (2003). Indeed, my reading of 
the evidence is more consistent with the technological capability approach associated with Lall 
(2004), which suggests that industrial policies such as LCRs are a means to enhance the beneficial 
aspects of integration into MNCs’ supply networks under certain specific conditions. In such a 
view, LCRs should be phased out once market failures have been overcome and domestic 
capabilities have been established, in order to prevent rent-seeking. The scheduled elimination of 
LCRs has enabled governments to resist protectionist and rent-seeking lobbies from significantly 
delaying liberalisation; it has acted like a “built-in sunset clause”, something that Rodrik (2004: 22-
23) views as a crucial design principle for effective industrial policy81. Furthermore, the evidence 
on the effects of LCRs during the 1990s is consistent with the recommendations of the 
proponents of the technological capability approach: that policy should target realistically 
achievable capability gaps in the context of supply and demand conditions. This framework 
explains why LCRs were so much more effective in some contexts – namely those in which there 
was a combination of rapid market growth and openness to FDI – than others.  
                                                          
81
 It should be noted, of course, that the sunset clause argument to which I refer has only pertained in the 
years directly prior to the TRIMs agreement, once the implications of the latter became apparent. 
Previously, LCRs were introduced before it was known (and before it could have been reasonably 
anticipated) that such policies would subsequently be restricted by multilateral rules; indeed, in the 
absence of such constraints, LCRs that were implemented in the 1960s and ‘70s became ‘permanent 
fixtures’ in the policy landscape, encouraged by the rent-seeking behaviour depicted in chapter 3.  
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7.2.2.2 Assessing the contribution of the elimination of LCRs to performance outcomes and 
mechanisms 
The research questions pertaining to the period following the elimination of LCRs are as follows:  
RQ 3. To what extent and how has the elimination of LCRs contributed to performance 
outcomes through the causal mechanisms of FDI and developments in value chain 
governance?  
RQ 3.1. How have the contributions of the elimination of LCRs differed according to the 
contexts in which elimination occurred? 
RQ 3.2. To what extent has the elimination of LCRs precluded the promotion of local parts 
and components production through alternative policy instruments, and what are the 
implications for analyse of the elimination of LCRs?  
In parallel with the previous section, my aims are twofold: firstly, to engage in generalisation of 
within-case insights to the greatest extent possible, and secondly, to engage in cross-case analysis 
of the contextual factors occurring in conjunction with liberalisation across diverse cases, in order 
to draw inferences regarding the contribution of structural factors to the outcomes of the 
elimination of LCRs. Separately, I provide a summary of the varied ways in which the cases 
examined here have continued to promote localisation in the automotive sector, and the ways in 
which this informs the interpretation  of my findings.  
Most of the case studies have exhibited significantly improved export performance and higher 
import propensity in the period following the elimination of LCRs, and have continued to exhibit 
rates of growth in parts and components output roughly in line with increased vehicle production, 
consistent with the findings from the panel regression stage. However, in some countries, local 
content levels have remained approximately constant (China and India), in one they have 
increased (Thailand), while in others they have declined (Argentina, Brazil and Malaysia). Export 
performance trends has also been highly uneven. It is important to consider, therefore, 
explanations of the mechanisms through which reductions in output and widespread dislocation 
have been avoided, increased export performance levels have emerged, and of the divergent 
performance levels between countries and regions.    
In terms of the causal mechanisms driving these outcomes, the evidence from the case studies 
suggests that the reorientation of domestic suppliers towards export markets, firm-level 
upgrading with domestic suppliers and more extensive technology transfer from assemblers to 
suppliers have been relatively insignificant mechanisms in comparison to the contribution of 
inward investment, mergers and acquisitions, and follow sourcing strategies pursued by global 
suppliers. As noted above, these strategies were already underway as part of the value chain 
restructuring at the time LCRs were still in force. Undoubtedly, the elimination of LCRs, as well as 
reduced trade and investment barriers more generally, have increased the flexibility of more 
capable suppliers with respect to their strategic decisions and thus cemented their advantages in 
relation to smaller locally-based firms (Humphrey, 2003; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004). Thus, 
although LCRs appear not to have had dramatic effects on output measured at the national level, 
they have contributed to a significant reduction in output by domestic relative to foreign firms as 
larger, more technologically-capable and globally-integrated multinational suppliers take 
advantage of opportunities for more extensive geographical fragmentation of productive 
activities. Even in the more successful countries such as Thailand as indicated by rising local 
content and export performance indicators, local firms have generally been relegated to less 
valuable tiers of the supply chain or have been acquired by global investors Partial exceptions to 
the tendency of domination by global suppliers are the large protected markets of China and 
India, in which a higher proportion of domestic firms have managed to retain their positions in 
domestic markets, and the more successful among them have even become integrated into the 
global networks of automakers based in the US, Europe and Japan. Yet, in China and India too, the 
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restructuring of automotive value chains has led to considerable denationalisation.  The long term 
impacts of these developments, in terms of indigenous capability development and the potential 
for emerging markets to encounter an “upgrading ‘glass ceiling’” and become “confined to 
peripheral roles in the MNE auto manufacturers’ global supply chain” (Kumaraswamy et al., 2012) 
largely remain to be seen. It has not been possible to observe these phenomena directly in the 
analysis carried out here, pointing to the need for more detailed, firm-level analysis of the 
mechanisms of upgrading and technology transfer, as discussed below.  
Across all cases, it is predominantly global suppliers that are engaging in global integration and 
are driving improvements in export performance, while local firms continue to be oriented 
towards domestic markets. Thus, a causal mechanism operating across the cases – the 
consolidation of the parts and components sector by global suppliers – is observed to explain the 
findings of the panel regression stage, that there has been a large and significant improvement 
across countries eliminating LCRs.  
At the same time, this mechanism can be invoked to explain divergent performance outcomes, 
based on the relocation of global suppliers to the most advantageous locations based on the 
conditions present in the post-liberalisation environment. Export orientation of global suppliers is 
especially pronounced in countries with large and rapidly growing assembly sectors, the presence 
of which are accompanied by industrial agglomerations, enabling global suppliers to achieve 
greater levels of scale and productive efficiency and establish significant export platforms, 
conditions which are largely present in Brazil, China, India and Thailand. In addition, the products 
manufactured by the global suppliers tend to be highly import intensive, and especially so where 
complementary local capabilities to source inputs of the requisite cost and quality are not 
present, conditions which are present in Argentina and Malaysia.  
So, while all of the countries examined here have benefitted from increased foreign investment 
into their parts and components sectors, the outcomes have been uneven. In ASEAN, for example, 
which provides the context for the paired comparison most closely conforming to the ideal type 
method of difference, global suppliers are much more likely to establish productive locations in 
Thailand than Malaysia; but furthermore, the global suppliers that have established facilities in 
Malaysia are more oriented towards the domestic market, and import higher proportions of 
subcomponents from their parent companies. The same is true for Argentinian suppliers, many of 
which are subsidiaries of firms with regional headquarters in Brazil. These insights are suggestive 
of the causal mechanisms through which the elimination of LCRs may have contributed to 
divergence between more- and less-advantageous locations, with relatively large declining and 
widening gaps between exports and imports in the latter, as local firms and subsidiaries are 
incorporated as more peripheral players into the strategies of the global suppliers and lead firms.   
The elimination of LCRs has clearly contributed to shifts in value chain governance that have 
contributed to increases in import propensity and enhanced export performance. However, the 
case studies provide clear evidence that the governments of liberalising countries have continued 
to influence the strategic decisions of lead firms in important ways. These policy and institutional 
developments are interesting because they suggest that opportunities presented for employing 
alternative strategies for promoting local automotive vary considerably both within and across 
the three paired comparisons examined in the thesis. As such, these developments confound the 
evaluation of local content requirements and their elimination.  
Notwithstanding the progressive liberalisation of tariffs, both for finished vehicles and parts, 
starting in the 1980s and ‘90s, all of the countries examined here continue to protect their 
automotive sectors and promote tariff-jumping investments through substantial trade protection 
at the national or regional levels. Even though tariffs have tended to be higher for vehicles than 
for parts, reflecting countries’ priorities in promoting vehicle production and exports, such 
policies naturally influence the development of the parts and components subsector because 
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there are technical and logistical reasons for assemblers to source some components locally even 
in the absence of trade protection. In any case, substantial tariffs remain for parts and 
components too, affording protection to suppliers.  
By establishing a larger market through which to obtain economies of scale and engage in 
regional divisions of labour, regional trade institutions make market-seeking investments into the 
region as a whole more attractive, leading to waves of investment into the ASEAN and Mercosur 
regions in anticipation of closer regional integration. Arguably, regional policies are a compromise 
between liberalisation and protection; that high barriers to extra-regional trade are retained 
suggests that automotive production within ASEAN and Mercosur would be more vulnerable to 
wider global liberalisation. In both cases, parts and components production has been explicitly 
promoted through the establishment of regional content requirements with respect to intra-
regional trade. 
At the same time as protecting regional production as a whole, intra-regional liberalisation 
promotes divergence within regions to the extent that location-specific advantages vary between 
participants in regional integration; Brazil has emerged as the preferred location for parts 
suppliers within Mercosur, and Thailand (as well as the Philippines) within ASEAN. The examples 
of ASEAN and Mercosur show that countries have deviated from and delayed intra-regional free 
trade in the cases of Malaysia and Argentina in order to mitigate against polarisation of 
performance outcomes within regions. These examples offer some tentative support for the idea 
that trade protection, when not effectively targeted towards capability development, can give rise 
to vicious cycles of cumulative causation, in which inefficient producers lobby governments for 
rent-seeking purposes, making the removal of unsuccessful policies politically challenging. In 
contrast, where local producers are in a strong position relative to global and regional 
competitors, such as in the case of Thailand and Brazil, liberalisation will encounter less 
resistance. The case studies examined here are too limited in scope to examine these mechanisms 
in any depth, although this would be an interesting avenue to pursue in future.   
Beyond trade policies, there are a number of other ways in which governments can intervene in 
the automotive sector to promote localisation indirectly which have been employed across the 
cases studied here. These include investment restrictions and performance requirements not 
related to trade, such as foreign equity restrictions and R&D requirements, and targeted fiscal 
policies to promote automotive investment generally or within specific market segments. All 6 
cases have used various forms of fiscal policy to promote automotive investment. Of the cases 
examined here, continentally-sized domestic markets and legacies of state-ownership have 
ensured that the promotion of joint ventures between local and foreign capital has been most 
extensive in China and India.  
Finally, the formal elimination of LCRs has not completely eliminated policies that explicitly 
benefit domestic producers of parts vis-à-vis importers. In response to competitive threats arising 
from liberalisation and regional integration, both Argentina and Malaysia have implemented 
policies – the status of which in relation to the TRIMs Agreement are questionable – attaching 
fiscal benefits to the domestic production of parts. China has penalised automakers importing 
knocked down kits for assembly in measures that were subsequently ruled as inconsistent with 
the TRIMs Agreement; perhaps more importantly, the government has applied informal pressure 
on assemblers through investment licensing procedures in order to promote the establishment of 
local supply networks.  
In sum, examination of the cases studied here suggests that the elimination of explicit LCRs has 
not entailed complete liberalisation of measures designed to promote local content. While in 
general, policies have become more ‘market-friendly’, perhaps most crucially with respect to the 
liberalisation of investment restrictions, liberalisation has not proceeded evenly, and policy and 
institutional regimes have varied significantly across the range of cases examined here.  
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There are two important implications of the preceding discussion, one substantive and one 
methodological. The substantive implication relates to a core concern of the policy space debate – 
the extent to which multilateral rules preclude interventionist strategies – and substantiates the 
observation of Jomo (2001: 5) that “the trends are more contradictory and nuanced than they are 
often made out to be, and many opportunities still exist within the interstices of the emerging 
global environment”. While scholarly attention has often focused, perhaps justifiably, on the 
restrictiveness of WTO rules, this has had the effect of diverting attention away from the 
opportunities that still exist. Examining the ways in which countries have exploited latitude within 
multilateral and regional rules to promote localisation within their respective automotive spaces 
has been a valuable contribution of the historical institutionalist perspective adopted here.  
The methodological implication is that in the presence of such cross-case and inter-temporal 
heterogeneity, drawing inferences about the nature of specific causal effects is much more 
problematic. This insight applies to both the panel regression and case study stages of my 
research.  Simply put, the greater the number of potential sources of divergent outcomes 
between cases, the more difficult it is to secure inferences “against any chance or spurious 
associations” (Abell, 2004, cited in Bennett and Elman, 2006: 458) and the more indeterminate 
our conclusions. This problem is particularly acute within small-n comparisons, due to the 
problem of many variables and few cases (Lieberson, 1992), and exacerbated in the presence of 
conjunctive causation. In sum, performance outcomes have diverged within and between the 
three regional institutional configurations, in ways that are plausibly explained by the causal 
mechanisms discussed previously, but causal inference is confounded by a host of country- and 
region-specific contextual factors. In the context of such complex determinants of industrial 
performance, it is very difficult to draw clear, generalisable inferences about the effect of 
eliminating LCRs. These issues are discussed further below, as I consider the methodological 
research questions, assess the limitations of my findings, and consider ways to overcome them in 
future research. 
7.3 SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS FROM MIXED METHOD APPROACH AND ASSESSMENT OF 
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, I assess the methodological implications of my mixed method approach to 
analysing the impacts of restrictions on LCRs in the automotive sector, and in doing so address the 
following methodological research questions: 
RQ 4. To what extent has the mixed method approach adopted here been able to 
account effectively for the complex determinants of industrial performance outcomes in the 
context of restrictions on the use of LCRs? 
RQ 4.1. What are the relative contributions of case- and variable-oriented approaches in 
this regard? 
In exploring these questions I discuss the limitations of my research in terms of the 
operationalisation of industrial performance and causal mechanisms in light of data availability, 
the indeterminacy of cross-case causal inferences, and the extent to which findings can be 
confidently generalised beyond the empirical contexts in which analysis was conducted. These 
limitations are then discussed in the context of the possibilities for future research.  
The fundamental difficulty tackled in the thesis is separating the impacts of a specific policy 
change from wider confounding variables. Complexity is heightened by the potential for the 
interaction or conjunction of multiple causal conditions, such that isolating the precise cause of an 
outcome, or the outcome of a specific cause, becomes nearly impossible outside the context of 
experimental research designs. The problems of inference are exacerbated by the pertinence of 
timing and sequencing of causes in relation to others: by the prevalence of ‘path dependent’ and 
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cumulative phenomena in the social world. These problems have not been entirely possible to 
overcome, and caution should be taken when drawing conclusions about the developmental 
impact of restricting LCRs and policy space more generally.   
The approach to complexity adopted in this thesis has built on the methodological literature 
reviewed in chapter 4, in which two overarching empirical approaches to causal inference – 
variable- and case-oriented – were examined. Both approaches appeared pertinent to my overall 
research problem, and both offer distinct and complementary insights. As described in chapter 4, 
my thesis has followed a ‘nested’ research design, in which the effects of the elimination of LCRs 
were examined across a large population. Such an approach has enabled me to incorporate a 
large number of observations, in order to secure against important sources of heterogeneity, and 
has enabled me to quantify the magnitude of the causal effect. However, this stage of the 
research in isolation would be incomplete without an accompanying causal explanation, since 
there were many potential mechanisms through which this effect could occur.   
Through the detailed within-case comparison of 6 cases, the case study stage has offered a 
theoretically plausible explanation for the change in performance outcomes for the group as a 
whole, and divergence between them, through mechanisms of FDI and value chain governance. 
Thus, the case studies make a substantial contribution to my overall research goals, and have 
considerably strengthened the panel regression findings. Another way in which the studies have 
complemented the panel regression stage is by examining the possibility that LCRs have given rise 
to cumulative effects, something that was not considered in the panel stage. The evidence on 
causal mechanisms suggests that LCRs have indeed given rise to some cumulative effects although 
it is difficult to assess their magnitude in relation to wider factors and in relation to effects of the 
subsequent elimination of LCRs. Nevertheless, the evidence that LCRs have been successful in 
some instances appends an important note of caution to the finding that restriction of LCRs has 
on balance resulted in improved outcomes. Another caveat is that alongside improved industrial 
performance outcomes measured by indicators of production and trade, the case studies have 
shown that the elimination of LCRs has contributed to substantial denationalisation, the long-
term effects of which are unclear. Finally, to the extent that the case studies uncovered 
substantial complexity with respect to policy and institutional developments during the course of 
the elimination of LCRs, they suggest that further research into the conditions for successful 
industrial performance, such as the role of trade and investment restrictions, is required to 
complement the present analysis.   
Similarly, the panel regression findings have strengthened the validity of the case study findings. 
Based on the case studies alone, it would be impossible to attribute the improvement in 
performance outcomes to the elimination of LCRs as opposed to other factors. In particular, given 
the tendency for automotive markets to increase in size – and, furthermore, for growth rates to 
pick up throughout the 2000s across the sample as a whole – it becomes difficult to determine the 
extent to which production, trade and investment patterns are a response by local and 
multinational suppliers to the possibilities for more efficient scale production afforded by the 
expansion of local demand (and local assembly), or to policy change that makes integration into 
global value chains more attractive. These factors have been further confounded, within the 
paired comparisons for ASEAN and Mercosur, by the effects of huge economic crises that 
occurred broadly over the period in which local content regimes were liberalised. These crises 
have affected investment and trade patterns through impacts on exchange rates. As a result of 
the analysis conducted in the prior panel regression stage, I could be confident that the 
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elimination of LCRs has had a significant causal effect controlling for these factors, and thus use 
the case studies to address different aspects of the research.  
7.3.1 Limitations of and possible improvements to the evaluation of the elimination of LCRs 
Despite the overall effectiveness of my research strategy, some aspects of my research design 
were less successful. In the case studies, I pursued two goals: the within-case examination of 
causal mechanisms linking the implementation and elimination of LCRs with performance 
outcomes, and cross-case analysis aimed at identifying the conjunctive conditions which, in 
association with the implementation and elimination of LCRs, have led to divergent outcomes. 
This has necessitated a compromise to be made between the number of cases examined, and the 
detail of the examination of causal processes within each case. As such, my examination of each 
case has involved the use on macro-level and secondary data. Thus, to the extent that value chain 
governance structures and FDI at the country level are intervening variables between the cause 
(status of content rules) and effect, I have applied process tracing to macro-phenomena rather 
than ‘microprocesses’, which focus on individual decision-making level of analysis (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 211).  As George and Bennett (ibid.) observe, “process tracing provides a strong 
basis for causal inference only if it can establish an uninterrupted causal path linking putative 
causes to observed effects, at the appropriate levels of analysis as specified by the theory being 
tested”. In this sense, my analysis is limited by a lack of primary, firm-level data on the crucial 
causal mechanisms affecting outcomes – decisions relating to investment, trade orientation, 
technological upgrading and cooperation between firms. Instead, I have had to rely on secondary 
data sources, and the judgements about the nature and magnitude of the relationship between 
causes, mechanisms and outcomes therein. 
An alternative strategy, which is employed throughout the global value chain literature, would be 
to collect primary data on firm-level decisions, by interviewing assemblers and suppliers directly 
about their strategic responses to the elimination of LCRs, and how it has affected their activities 
in different countries. This evidence could support and substantiate the evidence examined here; 
following Sturgeon (2001: 10), instead of examining secondary sources to examine 6 cases at the 
national level, I could have engaged in “the painstaking collection of qualitative field data, which, 
when used in combination with macro-level statistics on trade and investment, can lead us to a 
more fine-grained understanding of global-scale economic patterns and trends”. Given pragmatic 
concerns about the feasibility of achieving different research goals, such an approach was not 
feasible alongside the substantial cross-national research presented here, but the collection of 
such primary data comprises one of the main avenues for future research I identify in considering 
the limitations of this thesis.    
Another of my research goals which I have struggled to achieve is in trying to isolate the causes of 
heterogeneous outcomes between more- and less-advantageous locations through cross-case 
analysis, in order to address RQs 2.2 and 3.1. The logic on which such inferences are based at the 
cross-case level assumes that each pair of cases differs with respect to one fundamental 
characteristic: the strength of location-specific advantages. Inferring the presence of conjunctive 
causes is already difficult within small-n comparisons, as the same factors that affect outcomes in 
conjunction with others also affect outcomes independently, which increases the number of 
potential causes and thus the indeterminacy of inferences. In the presence of policy and 
institutional diversity such as observed in the cases here, which increase the number of potential 
causal conditions again, such an assumption – that the source of the difference between the pairs 
of cases was adequately operationalised by ‘advantages’ – seems a gross oversimplification. The 
cases compared on the basis of one advantage actually differ in a large number of ways, any one 
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of which could explain the variation in outcomes independently on in conjunction with others. In 
practice, it is difficult to disentangle the complex interplay of multiple causes, and I have been 
unable to say much about specific conjunctive causes, beyond the strength of advantages at a 
very general level, in this stage of my research. To do so would require cases much more closely 
approximating ideal comparison according to the method of different, which arguably do not exist 
in the group of countries that have eliminated LCRs.  
Despite my characterisation of each paired comparison as comprising an advantageous and 
disadvantageous location, which has enabled inferences to be drawn about the conjunction of 
multiple causes, the cases examined here all had relatively strong advantages in some respects, 
most crucially that they are all middle-income newly industrialised countries which have exhibited 
strong – if uneven – rates of growth in car production and ownership. It is also likely to be the 
case that the countries analysed here are unusually well placed to establish automotive 
production as a result of their size and / or status as partners in large regional projects. This 
severely limits the generalisation of within-case insights from the case studies to countries in 
which such advantages are lacking. In order to overcome this limitation, it would have been useful 
to examine one of the countries in which advantages are more obviously lacking, such as Pakistan 
or Vietnam. My decision to carry out comparison of the pairs of cases according to the method of 
difference has thus reduced the scope of the generalisations that can be drawn from the within-
case analysis, since in all of the countries examined here it could be argued that relatively strong 
advantages have mitigated the potential for negative outcomes to arise.  
The problem of generalisability also pertains to the panel regression findings. While performance 
outcomes may have been significantly improved, on average, across the treatment group, it is 
questionable whether this finding is generalisable beyond the specific historical conditions in 
which LCRs were eliminated, in which the sample of countries exhibit specific characteristics that 
made them well-prepared for liberalisation. In addition, I was unable to account for the potential 
for heterogeneous treatment effects in the panel regression stage, which would have required 
interactions between the post-treatment dummy variable and an appropriate indicator of 
location-specific advantages to be modelled.   
In summary, each stage individually has significant weaknesses, but by combining the strengths of 
quantitative statistical analysis and historical institutionalist case studies, I have been able to 
make a valid contribution to an important empirical topic. However, the fundamental difficulties 
of inference in the presence of profound causal complexity have not been possible to entirely 
overcome. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming relates to my decision to examine the relationship 
between the elimination of LCRs and industrial performance at the macro-comparative level, 
which was an essential component of my research question, but has nevertheless led to my 
forgoing other potentially fruitful lines of enquiry at the firm-level. 
7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR WIDER THEORETICAL DEBATES AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Of course, these substantive findings are more interesting to the extent that they connect to 
wider and more general themes of development. In this final section, I consider the broader 
implications and lessons from the research conducted in this thesis, and discuss the potential for 
the pursuit of a research agenda to complement the findings and further examine the important 
debates.  In doing so, I address my final research questions: 
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RQ 5. To what extent and how does the approach adopted here contribute to wider 
debates about the distribution of the costs and benefits of industrial policies and policy space 
restrictions more generally across structurally diverse countries? 
RQ 5.1. What are the implications of the thesis, if any, with respect to developing 
countries’ pursuit of interventionist trade and industrial policy, and their participation in 
multilateral negotiating fora? 
The elimination of LCRs can be seen to have had a positive average causal impact on industrial 
performance outcomes across the population. This effect has arisen through the mechanisms of 
ongoing shifts in governance structures, as larger, more efficient and more globally integrated 
firms have cooperated with assemblers to drive the relocation of parts and components 
production towards the liberalising countries. At the same time, I have demonstrated that LCRs 
have been implemented with some positive effects in circumstances in which they have not 
discouraged value chain restructuring or deterred inward FDI. Finally, I have shown that effects 
have been heterogeneous on structurally diverse countries, although the isolation of the precise 
nature and extent of this divergence has not been possible.    
In chapter 1, I situated my research problem within a wider debate about the role of the state in 
economic development and the extent to which policy restrictions of the type analysed in this 
thesis can be viewed as an example of ‘kicking away the ladder’. Since the effects of the 
elimination of LCRs have been, on average, positive, does this mean that further restrictions on 
trade policy space should be supported, in order to further promote the integration of developing 
countries into global production networks? Can we conclude that structuralist concerns are 
misguided, and that developing countries would be best served under more liberal regimes? The 
short answer to both questions, in my judgement, is not necessarily; the generalisation of the 
insights of the thesis to other debates surrounding trade policy, or even to other empirical 
contexts beyond the automotive sector, is not warranted.  
 
Despite the numerous positive outcomes associated with the elimination of LCRs in the countries 
examined here, the emergence of significantly negative outcomes as previously protected parts 
and components producers are exposed to greater levels of import competition is likely to have 
been mitigated by unusually buoyant conditions of demand in the cases examined here, and 
possibly by their exploitation of flexible phase out periods in which LCRs continued to be used. 
Crucially, while LCRs were an important policy instrument, their elimination has not equated to 
comprehensive trade liberalisation, and countries have continued to promote local parts and 
components production through various alternative means, including the significant levels of tariff 
protection at the national and regional levels, regional content policies and rules of origin, and 
policies conditioning the entry and activities of foreign investors. In such circumstances, the 
extreme polarisation of performance outcomes hypothesised by structuralist theories regarding 
rapid liberalisation has not occurred in the case of the elimination of LCRs, but it is impossible to 
conclude that it would not have occurred in the absence of mitigating policies and the specific 
contextual circumstances.  
In this respect, it is worth considering that further restrictions on trade and investment policies 
that are being considered in multilateral, regional and bilateral fora undoubtedly restrict policy 
space in a far more comprehensive manner. For example, the ongoing Non-Agricultural Market 
Access (NAMA) negotiations are considerable less flexible with respect to the use of tariffs (Khor 
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and Goh, 2006) and would practically eliminate the levels of protection that continue to shape the 
location of investment in the automotive sectors throughout emerging markets. Perhaps the most 
important threats to developing countries’ policy space come from the proliferation of bilateral 
investment agreements with developed country members (Shadlen, 2005).  
Even if the policies that are being restricted have demonstrably harmful in a number of cases, the 
present thesis provides support for the argument that the impacts of industrial policies are highly 
context specific. In this context, following the arguments of Rodrik (2010), it is important to note 
that experimentation with heterodox policies is an important aspect of the process of identifying 
the correct solution to overcome highly specific market failures. This does not imply that 
developing countries should resist all further multilateral liberalisation or return to the ‘bad old 
days’ of import substitution, but simply, that further restrictions on trade policy space should be 
approached with caution. In my view, a pragmatic and flexible approach to trade and industrial 
policy space appears to be warranted; following Wade (2003: 636), this implies “free trade, 
protection, subsidies, or some combination, depending on a country’s circumstances and level of 
industrialization”.  
7.4.1 Avenues for future research 
In light of the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements which are much more 
comprehensive in terms of the extent of trade and investment policy restrictions between 
participants, as mentioned above, such agreements form an extremely interesting empirical 
context in which to further explore the extent to which policy space restrictions lead to 
polarisation of industrial performance outcomes across structurally diverse economies. If firms 
have complete freedom to invest and trade anywhere within the geographical boundaries of such 
agreements, it is far more likely that polarisation will occur as firms seek to exploit the 
comparative advantages of each location. These conditions comprise a superior empirical context 
in which to examine the validity of structuralist and neoliberal arguments than the global 
elimination of LCRs, which, as I have described, was substantially confounded by the continuation 
of interventionist strategies by liberalising countries. In this regard, there are numerous 
opportunities for empirical work within the regions examined in my case studies, as they 
approach the stage of more comprehensive intra-regional liberalisation. In addition, bilateral 
agreements, for example between the US and individual developing countries, provide abundant 
opportunities for analysis of trade and investment creation and diversion, which could be 
compared with countries in which such bilateral agreements do not exist in order to draw 
inferences about the role of other trade and investment policies in promoting industrial 
development.  
The indicators of industrial performance examined in this thesis were essentially proxies, enabling 
comparison at the macro level, for more important, fundamental variables operating at the firm-
level: the accumulation of technological capabilities, whether through upgrading processes 
internal to firms or through the absorption of technology through inter-firm linkages, and 
ultimately, to higher levels of productivity, earnings and income. Unfortunately, processes of 
dynamic learning and spillovers are extremely difficult to observe empirically at the macro level. 
However, there are several avenues that I argue would provide more detailed and nuanced 
indicators of industrial performance, which I would like to incorporate into any future research. 
Firstly, while I measured industrial performance outcomes at the level of disaggregation that 
seemed most appropriate for the analysis, it may have been possible to measure industrial 
performance at a much more nuanced level, by distinguishing between parts and components 
with different levels of technological sophistication. This would enable examination of the 
possibility that developments in value chain governance in which lead firms exploited the relative 
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technological advantages of different locations were eliciting patterns of specialisation not 
observed at higher levels of aggregation. For example, when two locations demonstrate similar 
levels of parts and components output or exports, this may actually mask significant divergence of 
technological capabilities if one location is producing and exporting low-tech, labour intensive 
goods such as tyres and the other R&D intensive, dynamic products. Using highly disaggregated 
trade data now available, it is now feasible to identify trade patterns for specific products. This 
enables an examination of trade patterns by their implied technological level, such as that 
attempted by Doner et al. (2006b), who “construct a metric that provides a more differentiated 
measure of industry capacity” by breaking exports into “into three categories: high, medium and 
low tech”. It must be acknowledged that the metric is somewhat incomplete, and “at best an 
approximation… based on intuition” regarding the level of sophistication, according to one of the 
creators (John Ravenhill, personal communication, March 2013). Nevertheless, the feasibility of 
constructing such a metric based on more objective measures, such as capital or R&D intensity, is 
an important and interesting avenue for future research.    
Another is the project proposed by Sturgeon and Gereffi (2009), who argue that we need better 
macro-comparative data not just on trade, but on other aspects of value chain activities. As they 
argue, “there is an urgent need to enrich existing metrics with additional data resources and 
measures that allow us to investigate GVCs more directly. In our view, changes in the global 
economy, and especially the rise of GVCs, have created measurement problems that require new 
information and new methods… we propose one possible approach: the collection of economic 
data according to a generic and parsimonious list of business functions”. Such a metric would 
enable the analysis of global value chain developments much more directly than I was able here.  
Finally, the research agenda I have pursued, assessing the empirical effects of the elimination of 
LCRs, would be substantially complemented via a program of firm-level qualitative work on firm 
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Appendix 1: Annex to Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement: Illustrative List 
Annex to Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement: Illustrative List 
1.     TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in 
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under 
domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an 
advantage, and which require: 
(a)     the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic 
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, 
or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; or 
(b)   that an enterprise’s purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related 
to the volume or value of local products that it exports. 
2.     TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are 
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance 
with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict: 
(a)     the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production, 
generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports; 
(b)     the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by 
restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows 
attributable to the enterprise; or 
(c)     the exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms of 
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of 
volume or value of its local production. 




Appendix 2: List of data sources specifying dates for implementation and elimination of LCRs 
Country Data sources specifying dates of implementation and elimination of LCRs 
Argentina TRIMs Notification (G/TRIMS/N/1/ARG/1); Trade Policy Reviews (WT/TPR/S/47 and 
WT/TPR/S/176); TRIMs extension request (G/C/W/295); and responses to questions 
submitted by the United States (G/SCM/Q2/ARG/26). 
Brazil Trade Policy Reviews (WT/TPR/S/21 and WT/TPR/S/75) and dispute case documents 
(DS51, DS52, DS64 and DS81) 
Chile TRIMs Notifications (G/TRIMS/N/1/CHL/1 and G/TRIMS/N/1/CHL/1/Add.1) and Trade 
Policy Review (WT/TPR/S/124). The latter states that local content TRIMs “expired 
automatically in December 1998” although Chile requested an extension for TRIMs 
relating to incentives granted to companies based on intermediate exports, which 
were eventually eliminated in 2003 (p. 50).   
China See footnote 25. 
India Trade Policy Reviews (WT/TPR/S/33; WT/TPR/S/100) and dispute case documents 
(DS146 and DS175). 
Indonesia Following dispute procedures, the Indonesian government committed to phase out 
local content rules by 2000: primary data from Trade Policy Reviews (WT/TPR/S/51 
and WT/TPR/S/117) and dispute case documents (DS54, DS55, DS59 and DS64). 
Malaysia Trade Policy Reviews (C/RM/S/38 and WT/TPR/S/31) and extension requests 
(G/C/W/174 and G/C/W/291/Rev.1) 
Mexico Trade Policy Review (WT/TPR/S/29) and extension requests (G/C/W/171 and 
G/C/W/293). 
Pakistan Trade Policy Reviews (WT/TPR/S/95 and WT/TPR/S/193) and extension request 
(G/C/W/294). 
Philippines Despite local content requirements being due to elapse in 2000, the Philippines 
submitted extension requests (G/L/325; G/L/464; and G/L/502) in the context of 
economic crisis. The 2005 Trade Policy Review (WT/TPR/S/149) specifies that TRIMs 
were removed by June 2003.   
Romania Romania’s TRIMs comprise investment incentives which were phased out in 1999 
according to extension request G/C/W/175; the extension request “concerns only 
the facilities already given to investors” (p. 2) while extension request G/C/W/290 of 
2001 refers only to shipbuilding, not the automotive sector. However, Trade Policy 
Review WT/TPR/S/60 states that fiscal exemptions and reductions last for several 
years (annex table AIII: 10); according to WT/TPR/S/155, the provisions were 
eliminated in 2002, which I take to be the final year in which automotive LCRs were 
in force. 
South Africa South Africa notified automotive TRIMs in 1995 (G/TRIMS/N/1/ZAF/1) but these 
were eliminated later the same year; see Barnes et al. (2004). 
Taiwan Accession documents (WT/L/433 and WT/ACC/TPKM/18) and Trade Policy Review 
WT/TPR/S/165. 
Thailand TRIMs Notification (G/TRIMS/N/1/THA/1) and Trade Policy Reviews (C/RM/G/13; 
WT/TPR/S/9; and WT/TPR/S/63). 
Ukraine The working party report on Ukraine’s accession (WT/ACC/UKR/152) states that LCRs 
were implemented in 1997 and were eliminated in 2001 (p. 66). Although some 
TRIMs-inconsistent policies were introduced in 2004 (and eliminated the following 
year, these do not appear to have had the character of LCRs per se. 





Appendix 3: Mean parts and component sector performance outcomes, by grouping variable: mean motor vehicle 
production per capita 
Grouping variable: motor 








spec. / RCA 
index 
Mean 








of export to 
total trade 
Quartile 1 (countries with mean 
production of 0 - 1 vehicles per 
1000 persons) 
0.21 0.08 0.22 0.31 -0.18 0.19 
Quartile 2 (countries with mean 
production of 1.1 - 12 vehicles 
per 1000 persons) 
0.57 0.62 0.50 0.47 -0.20 0.35 
Quartile 3 (countries with mean 
production of 12.1 -  30 vehicles 
per 1000 persons) 
0.50 1.10 1.09 0.87 -0.15 0.42 
Quartile 4 (countries with mean 
production of 30.1 - 85 vehicles 
per 1000 persons) 
0.54 1.57 1.62 1.16 -0.01 0.54 
Total (all groups) 0.51 1.06 0.86 0.70 -0.14 0.37 
 
Appendix 4: Mean parts and component sector performance outcomes, by grouping variable: mean automotive output 
as a percentage of GDP 
Grouping variable: automotive 









spec. / RCA 
index 
Mean 








of export to 
total trade 
Quartile 1 (countries with mean 
automotive output of 0 - 0.142% 
of GDP) 
0.09 0.01 0.05 0.27 -0.24 0.08 
Quartile 2 (countries with mean 
automotive output of 0.143 - 
0.519% of GDP) 
0.28 0.12 0.14 0.33 -0.21 0.18 
Quartile 3 (countries with mean 
automotive output of 0.524 - 
3.07% of GDP) 
0.41 0.33 0.34 0.38 -0.15 0.29 
Quartile 4 (countries with mean 
automotive output of 3.1 - 
10.78% of GDP) 
0.52 1.38 1.21 0.93 -0.11 0.45 





Appendix 5: Mean parts and component sector performance outcomes, by grouping variable: CIP index 









spec. / RCA 
index 
Mean 








of export to 
total trade 
Quartile 1 (countries with mean 
CIP index of 0.024 - 0.158) 
0.12 0.02 0.05 0.33 -0.29 0.07 
Quartile 2 (countries with mean 
CIP index of 0.159 - 0.247) 
0.22 0.10 0.14 0.30 -0.23 0.14 
Quartile 3 (countries with mean 
CIP index of 0.248 - 0.407) 
0.45 0.63 0.62 0.53 -0.18 0.32 
Quartile 4 (countries with mean 
CIP index of 0.415 - 0.895) 
0.54 1.16 0.89 0.77 -0.05 0.45 
Total (all groups) 0.43 0.70 0.42 0.48 -0.19 0.24 
 
Appendix 6: Estimation results: value-added and gross fixed capital formation variables: fixed effects with cluster robust 
standard errors 
  Large automotive producers 
Wider sample (all countries for which 
data are available) 
          
Dependent variable Log value-added Log GFCF Log value-added Log GFCF 
          
Post-treatment dummy, control group -0.261*** 0.172 0.0741 0.0968 
  (0.0915) (0.256) (0.231) (0.190) 
Post-treatment dummy, treatment group -0.0195 -0.271 -0.246 -0.337 
  (0.147) (0.257) (0.215) (0.292) 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.559*** 0.491***     
  (0.105) (0.163)     
Log automotive output as a proportion 
of GDP 
    0.865*** 0.586** 
      (0.0701) (0.221) 
Interpolated CIP index 7.591*** 5.962** 3.181** 6.091* 
  (2.686) (2.827) (1.422) (3.296) 
Observations 330 276 628 518 
Number of countries 32 25 63 54 
Mean observations per country 10.31 11.04 9.968 9.593 





Appendix 7: Estimation results: local content dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard 
errors: additional policy and institutional variables 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable 
Log local content  Log local content / 
apparent 
consumption 
Log local content  Log local content / 
apparent 
consumption 
          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
0.00354 -0.122 0.286 0.0621 
  (0.130) (0.0896) (0.186) (0.0823) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
-0.385 -0.111 -0.446*** -0.249** 
  (0.258) (0.189) (0.130) (0.102) 
Log vehicle production per capita 1.067*** 0.329**     
  (0.235) (0.144)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
    1.241*** 0.735*** 
      (0.131) (0.192) 
Interpolated CIP index 6.331** 3.676 2.448 -0.0180 
  (2.929) (2.275) (2.062) (1.530) 
Log parts and components tariffs 0.219 0.303 0.0313 0.364* 
 (0.257) (0.223) (0.212) (0.195) 
Time trend for countries with 
regional integration 
0.0482 0.0454 -0.000260 -0.0100 
 (0.0448) (0.0374) (0.0254) (0.0217) 
Observations 246 246 407 407 
Number of countries 26 26 52 52 
Mean observations per country 9.46 9.46 7.83 7.83 





Appendix 8: Estimation results: local content dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard 
errors: region-specific year effects (coefficients not reported) 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable 
Log local content  Log local content / 
apparent 
consumption 
Log local content  Log local content / 
apparent 
consumption 
          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
-0.0762 -0.154 0.228 0.0998 
  (0.206) (0.140) (0.224) (0.122) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
-0.528* -0.315 -0.475** -0.415*** 
  (0.294) (0.195) (0.190) (0.148) 
Log vehicle production per capita 1.068*** 0.376** 
  
  (0.253) (0.175) 
  
Log automotive output as a 





Interpolated CIP index 4.891* 2.149 3.513* 1.150 
  (2.632) (1.963) (2.039) (1.691) 
Observations 257 257 431 431 
Number of countries 26 26 52 52 
Mean observations per country 9.46 9.46 7.83 7.83 





Appendix 9: Estimation results: output dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors: 
additional policy and institutional variables 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  






          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
-0.148* -0.255* 0.0815 0.000276 
  (0.0774) (0.131) (0.140) (0.0823) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
0.0113 0.0891 -0.110 -0.0514 
  (0.171) (0.183) (0.165) (0.123) 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.639*** 0.413***   
  (0.140) (0.124)   
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
  0.800*** 0.755*** 
    (0.131) (0.120) 
Interpolated CIP index 8.053*** 6.555*** 2.691 1.558 
  (2.186) (1.733) (1.967) (1.563) 
Log parts and components tariffs 0.0921 0.129 0.636** 0.577** 
 (0.223) (0.187) (0.309) (0.243) 
Time trend for countries with 
regional integration 
0.0644 0.0553 0.000603 0.00670 
 (0.0446) (0.0366) (0.0231) (0.0202) 
Observations 323 323 613 613 
Number of countries 30 30 62 62 
Mean observations per country 10.77 10.77 9.887 9.887 





Appendix 10: Estimation results: output dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors: 
region-specific year effects (coefficients not reported) 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  






          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
-0.298* 0.0136 0.0243 0.0621 
  (0.157) (0.162) (0.205) (0.135) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
-0.0445 -0.286** -0.217 -0.255 
  (0.189) (0.129) (0.185) (0.175) 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.574*** 0.402***     
  (0.118) (0.0959)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
  0.703*** 0.672*** 
    (0.140) (0.131) 
Interpolated CIP index 6.331*** 4.339*** 1.122 -0.385 
  (1.873) (1.474) (1.568) (1.385) 
Observations 334 334 662 662 
Number of countries 31 31 64 64 
Mean observations per country 10.77 10.77 10.34 10.34 





Appendix 11: Estimation results: export dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors: 
additional policy and institutional variables 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  








          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
-0.107 -0.163* -0.284 -0.243 
  (0.102) (0.0873) (0.196) (0.187) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
0.341** 0.448*** 0.619*** 0.486** 
  (0.147) (0.126) (0.210) (0.190) 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.392*** 0.178***     
  (0.0749) (0.0523)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
  0.0388 -0.0421 
    (0.122) (0.122) 
Interpolated CIP index 7.103*** 5.854*** 6.911** 6.303* 
  (1.113) (1.085) (3.456) (3.218) 
Log parts and components tariffs -0.248* -0.0617 -0.0938 -0.0537 
 (0.128) (0.0887) (0.157) (0.109) 
Time trend for countries with 
regional integration 
0.001 0.0318** 0.000 0.013 
 -0.015 -0.013 -0.029 -0.028 
Observations 465 465 892 888 
Number of countries 31 31 85 85 
Mean observations per country 15 15 10.49 10.45 





Appendix 12: Estimation results: export dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors: 
region-specific year effects (coefficients not reported) 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  








          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
-0.612*** -0.437*** -0.265 -0.104 
  (0.157) (0.132) (0.190) (0.177) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
0.783*** 0.720*** 0.571*** 0.358* 
  (0.123) (0.127) (0.200) (0.184) 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.365*** 0.134**     
  (0.0775) (0.0585)     
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
    0.0437 -0.0185 
      (0.106) (0.103) 
Interpolated CIP index 6.717*** 4.110** 6.047* 5.230* 
  (1.227) (1.547) (3.177) (2.730) 
Observations 480 480 973 969 
Number of countries 32 32 90 90 
Mean observations per country 15 15 10.81 10.77 





Appendix 13: Estimation results: import dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors: 
additional policy and institutional variables 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable Log imports 
Log imports as a 
proportion of GDP 
Log imports 
Log imports as a 
proportion of GDP 
          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
0.0990 0.0495 -0.179 -0.215** 
  (0.122) (0.101) (0.111) (0.0994) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
0.101 0.187 0.456** 0.417*** 
  (0.171) (0.156) (0.186) (0.155) 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.539*** 0.318***   
  (0.0873) (0.0596)   
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
  0.0797 0.0679 
    (0.0671) (0.0642) 
Interpolated CIP index 1.442 0.194 2.932* 1.530 
  (1.179) (1.085) (1.494) (1.350) 
Log parts and components tariffs -0.107 -0.0500 0.0223 0.0115 
 (0.146) (0.0972) (0.0902) (0.0640) 
Time trend for countries with 
regional integration 
-0.0199 -0.0119 0.00390 0.0113 
 (0.0132) (0.0151) (0.0134) (0.0119) 
Observations 465 465 896 896 
Number of countries 31 31 86 86 
Mean observations per country 15 15 10.42 10.42 





Appendix 14: Estimation results: import dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors: 
region-specific year effects (coefficients not reported) 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable Log imports 
Log imports as a 
proportion of GDP 
Log imports 
Log imports as a 
proportion of GDP 
          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
-0.210 0.157 -0.368*** -0.282** 
  (0.253) (0.253) (0.137) (0.124) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
0.471* 0.248 0.593*** 0.443** 
  (0.264) (0.285) (0.204) (0.173) 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.468*** 0.298***   
  (0.0636) (0.0460)   
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
  0.0230 0.0238 
    (0.0709) (0.0654) 
Interpolated CIP index 1.408 -0.126 2.646* 0.950 
  (1.140) (1.465) (1.523) (1.399) 
Observations 480 480 977 977 
Number of countries 32 32 91 91 
Mean observations per country 15 15 10.74 10.74 





Appendix 15: Estimation results: trade balance and export ratio dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster 
robust standard errors: additional policy and institutional variables 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable 
Trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
Exports as a 
proportion of trade 
Trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
Exports as a 
proportion of trade 
          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
0.00515 -0.0403 0.0360 -0.0272 
  (0.0673) (0.0364) (0.0591) (0.0355) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
-0.0880 0.0503* -0.0817 0.0421 
  (0.117) (0.0275) (0.0941) (0.0255) 
Log vehicle production per capita -0.131* -0.0352**   
  (0.0769) (0.0165)   
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
  -0.00345 0.000373 
    (0.0246) (0.0133) 
Interpolated CIP index 5.409*** 1.274*** 1.949* 0.582 
  (0.931) (0.205) (1.008) (0.421) 
Log parts and components tariffs -0.0982 -0.0307 -0.0552* -0.0119 
 (0.0645) (0.0201) (0.0287) (0.0151) 
Time trend for countries with 
regional integration 
0.0174** 0.00490 0.0113 0.00278 
 (0.00801) (0.00310) (0.00822) (0.00365) 
Observations 465 465 892 892 
Number of countries 31 31 85 85 
Mean observations per country 15 15 10.49 10.49 





Appendix 16: Estimation results: trade balance and export ratio dependent variables: two-way fixed effects with cluster 
robust standard errors: region-specific year effects (coefficients not reported) 
  
Large automotive producers Wider sample (all countries for which data 
are available) 
 Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Dependent variable 
Trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
Exports as a 
proportion of trade 
Trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
Exports as a 
proportion of trade 
          
Post-treatment dummy, control 
group 
0.0690 -0.0811** 0.0274 -0.00952 
  (0.138) (0.0354) (0.0584) (0.0349) 
Post-treatment dummy, 
treatment group 
-0.161 0.0586* -0.0760 0.0208 
  (0.111) (0.0335) (0.0951) (0.0279) 
Log vehicle production per capita -0.0910 -0.0215   
  (0.0886) (0.0174)   
Log automotive output as a 
proportion of GDP 
  0.0160 0.0106 
    (0.0236) (0.0110) 
Interpolated CIP index 6.474*** 1.141*** 1.977** 0.499 
  (1.204) (0.243) (0.933) (0.378) 
Observations 480 480 973 973 
Number of countries 32 32 90 90 
Mean observations per country 15 15 10.81 10.81 









































ASEAN                 
Indonesia 213 165 773 0.26 16.3 60 15.5 32.8 
Malaysia 23 94 4006 0.48 8.6 305 2.5 32.3 
Philippines 77 81 1048 0.39 2.8 33 10.7 16.1 
Thailand 63 123 1943 0.40 9.0 140 11.9 39.1 
Vietnam 78 31 402 0.15 1.1 13 18.0 38.3 
EU                 
Romania 22 37 1651 0.31 4.2 194 -10.6 17.0 
Mercosur                 
Argentina 37 284 7696 0.26 12.4 314 13.2 24.3 
Brazil 174 645 3696 0.30 37.4 184 10.6 31.2 
NAFTA                 
Mexico 100 581 5817 0.41 26.9 233 0.0 23.4 
No significant 
regionalisation 
                
Chile 15 79 5145 0.21 2.7 154 11.6 7.6 
China 1263 1198 949 0.40 42.2 29 19.0 29.7 
India 1054 475 450 0.28 17.4 15 11.4 42.0 
Pakistan 145 74 512 0.23 2.0 12 -0.3 62.2 
South Africa 44 133 3020 0.27 7.6 151 2.2 14.6 
Taiwan  N/A  N/A  N/A 0.54   N/A   N/A -4.3 24.9 
Ukraine 49 31 636   N/A 7.0 148 6.6 11.3 
Source: author’s calculations based on data from World Bank (2011), UNIDO (2011), and WITS (2015). Notes: data on vehicle stock 
pertain to the years 2003-2009, but are not comprehensively available for all cross sectional units and years; calculations of mean 




Appendix 18: Comparison of country-specific performance outcomes within and across regional institutional 
configurations 
 







Trade balance as a 
proportion of GDP 
Ratio of exports to 
trade 
 
       
       
         
       
       
         
       
       
         
       
       
         
       
       
         
ASEAN 
          
Indonesia 0.44 0.09 0.39 0.05 0.34 0.23 -0.19 0.25 0.34 0.18 
Malaysia 0.52 -0.12 0.72 0.07 0.14 0.09 -0.33 -0.13 0.31 0.03 
Philippines - - 0.60 - 1.56 0.95 0.77 0.58 0.79 0.19 
Thailand 0.67 0.12 3.07 1.42 0.87 0.66 -0.40 0.48 0.42 0.21 
Vietnam - - - - 0.22 0.21 -0.33 -0.27 0.32 0.20 
EU 
          
Romania 0.43 - 0.89 - 1.87 1.44 0.31 0.34 0.58 0.09 
Mercosur 
          
Argentina 0.53 -0.08 0.94 0.42 0.88 0.03 -0.36 -0.11 0.35 0.06 
Brazil 0.72 -0.01 1.30 0.42 1.15 -0.21 0.03 0.04 0.52 0.03 
NAFTA 
          
Mexico - - 0.65 0.09 2.07 0.59 -0.16 0.47 0.47 0.09 
No significant 
regionalisation           
Chile 0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.00 -0.31 -0.16 0.18 -0.05 
China 0.85 0.03 1.45 0.82 0.42 0.27 -0.04 0.03 0.46 0.13 
India 0.89 0.01 0.72 0.18 0.44 0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.42 0.00 
Pakistan 0.52 - 0.19 - 0.04 0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.08 0.03 
South Africa 
    
0.57 -0.10 -0.07 -0.11 0.44 -0.09 
Taiwan 0.71 - - - - - - - 0.68 0.11 
Ukraine 0.11 - 0.16 - 0.14 -0.07 -0.86 -0.74 0.13 -0.25 
Sources as for panel data analysis. Note:        represents mean outcomes for 2002-2011, except for output specialisation index 
indicator, for which it represents mean outcomes for 2002-2006, due to the availability of data on which to calculate the specialisation 







































as a % of 
GDP 
1995 78.4   301   0.07 0.05 0.21 -223 -0.25 
1996 74.6 -5 370 23 0.06 0.04 0.17 -295 -0.30 
1997 76.6 3 390 5 0.07 0.05 0.16 -313 -0.33 
1998 71.1 -7 111 -72 0.06 0.04 0.39 -40 -0.06 
1999 102 43 188 69 0.08 0.05 0.35 -86 -0.12 
2000 123 21 274 46 0.1 0.06 0.31 -151 -0.18 
2001 115 -7 246 -10 0.1 0.07 0.32 -131 -0.16 
2002 129 12 300 22 0.1 0.07 0.30 -171 -0.20 
2003 193 50 442 47 0.12 0.09 0.30 -249 -0.26 
2004 228 18 518 17 0.13 0.1 0.31 -290 -0.29 
2005 297 30 833 61 0.16 0.12 0.26 -536 -0.48 
2006 330 11 795 -5 0.17 0.13 0.29 -465 -0.38 
2007 414 25 871 10 0.19 0.15 0.32 -457 -0.32 
2008 428 3 942 8 0.2 0.16 0.31 -514 -0.31 
2009 400 -7 894 -5 0.25 0.19 0.31 -494 -0.34 
2010 559 40 1200 34 0.27 0.2 0.32 -641 -0.37 







































as a % of 
GDP 
1995 140   3020   0.12 0.11 0.04 -2880 -1.72 
1996 121 -14 2970 -2 0.1 0.1 0.04 -2849 -1.61 
1997 156 29 1340 -55 0.13 0.13 0.10 -1184 -0.83 
1998 219 40 272 -80 0.18 0.18 0.45 -53 -0.05 
1999 314 43 663 144 0.26 0.25 0.32 -349 -0.31 
2000 450 43 1280 93 0.36 0.33 0.26 -830 -0.76 
2001 431 -4 1320 3 0.36 0.34 0.25 -889 -0.90 
2002 537 25 1520 15 0.42 0.39 0.26 -983 -0.92 
2003 857 60 2130 40 0.55 0.5 0.29 -1273 -1.01 
2004 1150 34 2290 8 0.67 0.63 0.33 -1140 -0.88 
2005 1660 44 2360 3 0.91 0.85 0.41 -700 -0.50 
2006 1900 14 2150 -9 0.97 0.89 0.47 -250 -0.16 
2007 2510 32 2270 6 1.16 1.04 0.53 240 0.13 
2008 2910 16 2630 16 1.34 1.19 0.53 280 0.14 
2009 2140 -26 2210 -16 1.33 1.08 0.49 -70 -0.04 
2010 2920 36 3830 73 1.4 1.07 0.43 -910 -0.41 


















































as a % of 
GDP 
1995 546   868   21 0.48 1.17 0.39 -322 -0.12 
1996 428 -22 1030 19 16 0.37 0.83 0.29 -602 -0.23 
1997 405 -5 1540 50 14 0.34 0.71 0.21 -1135 -0.41 
1998 427 5 1580 3 14 0.36 0.73 0.21 -1153 -0.41 
1999 454 6 975 -38 21 0.37 0.89 0.32 -521 -0.20 
2000 463 2 1030 6 23 0.37 0.88 0.31 -567 -0.22 
2001 367 -21 689 -33 24 0.31 0.71 0.35 -322 -0.14 
2002 365 -1 376 -45 30 0.28 0.7 0.49 -11 -0.01 
2003 440 21 506 35 33 0.28 0.7 0.47 -66 -0.06 
2004 550 25 796 57 31 0.32 0.84 0.41 -246 -0.20 
2005 643 17 1030 29 30 0.35 0.9 0.38 -387 -0.27 
2006 730 14 1370 33 31 0.37 0.96 0.35 -640 -0.40 
2007 856 17 1750 28 32 0.4 0.98 0.33 -894 -0.47 
2008 910 6 2160 23 29 0.42 0.95 0.30 -1250 -0.54 
2009 667 -27 1560 -28 27 0.41 0.92 0.30 -893 -0.41 
2010 909 36 2480 59 30 0.44 0.96 0.27 -1571 -0.61 

















































as a % of 
GDP 
1995 1470   1490   11 1.3 1.42 0.50 -20 0.00 
1996 1520 3 1770 19 12 1.32 1.46 0.46 -250 -0.03 
1997 1690 11 1670 -6 14 1.44 1.48 0.50 20 0.00 
1998 1670 -1 1570 -6 17 1.41 1.48 0.52 100 0.01 
1999 1320 -21 1450 -8 20 1.08 1.26 0.48 -130 -0.02 
2000 1390 5 1460 1 17 1.11 1.27 0.49 -70 -0.01 
2001 1370 -1 1360 -7 21 1.16 1.2 0.50 10 0.00 
2002 1300 -5 1160 -15 21 1.01 1.06 0.53 140 0.03 
2003 1730 33 1330 15 23 1.1 1.12 0.57 400 0.08 
2004 2090 21 1660 25 20 1.22 1.14 0.56 430 0.08 
2005 2650 27 1990 20 18 1.46 1.27 0.57 660 0.10 
2006 3020 14 1900 -5 18 1.55 1.34 0.61 1120 0.14 
2007 2870 -5 2480 31 15 1.33 1.14 0.54 390 0.04 
2008 3420 19 3550 43 17 1.57 1.26 0.49 -130 -0.01 
2009 2220 -35 2620 -26 11 1.38 1.11 0.46 -400 -0.03 
2010 3030 36 3510 34 12 1.45 1.08 0.46 -480 -0.03 


















































as a % of 
GDP 
1995 378   897     0.34 0.11 0.30 -519 -0.07 
1996 372 -2 1070 19   0.32 0.11 0.26 -698 -0.08 
1997 426 15 906 -15 6 0.36 0.11 0.32 -480 -0.05 
1998 498 17 886 -2 6 0.42 0.12 0.36 -388 -0.04 
1999 716 44 1160 31 8 0.58 0.17 0.38 -444 -0.05 
2000 1000 40 1880 62 11 0.79 0.2 0.35 -880 -0.08 
2001 1170 17 2190 16 10 0.99 0.23 0.35 -1020 -0.09 
2002 1570 34 2550 16   1.22 0.24 0.38 -980 -0.08 
2003 2160 38 5550 118 8 1.37 0.23 0.28 -3390 -0.23 
2004 3570 65 5920 7 10 2.09 0.32 0.38 -2350 -0.15 
2005 5170 45 5260 -11 13 2.85 0.38 0.50 -90 0.00 
2006 6750 31 6840 30 13 3.46 0.43 0.50 -90 0.00 
2007 9100 35 7850 15 12 4.2 0.47 0.54 1250 0.05 
2008 10600 16 7880 0 11 4.87 0.54 0.57 2720 0.09 
2009 8310 -22 8850 12 7 5.16 0.53 0.48 -540 -0.02 
2010 11800 42 12600 42   5.64 0.54 0.48 -800 -0.02 


















































as a % of 
GDP 
1995 277   346     0.25 0.4 0.44 -69 -0.02 
1996 270 -3 424 23   0.23 0.37 0.39 -154 -0.04 
1997 239 -11 313 -26 11 0.2 0.32 0.43 -74 -0.02 
1998 207 -13 286 -9 8 0.17 0.28 0.42 -79 -0.02 
1999 231 12 391 37 7 0.19 0.3 0.37 -160 -0.04 
2000 276 19 452 16 9 0.22 0.33 0.38 -176 -0.04 
2001 311 13 350 -23 10 0.26 0.37 0.47 -39 -0.01 
2002 337 8 391 12 9 0.26 0.34 0.46 -54 -0.01 
2003 433 28 560 43 9 0.28 0.35 0.44 -127 -0.02 
2004 573 32 830 48 9 0.33 0.39 0.41 -257 -0.04 
2005 896 56 1030 24 13 0.49 0.51 0.47 -134 -0.02 
2006 1040 16 1080 5 11 0.53 0.52 0.49 -40 -0.01 
2007 1100 6 1360 26 10 0.51 0.47 0.45 -260 -0.03 
2008 1250 14 2130 57 10 0.57 0.47 0.37 -880 -0.10 
2009 894 -28 1760 -17 6 0.56 0.42 0.34 -866 -0.09 
2010 1460 63 2510 43   0.7 0.46 0.37 -1050 -0.09 





Appendix 25: Key policy developments pertaining to the automotive sector: Malaysia and Thailand, 1980s-2010 
Year Malaysian policy reforms Thai policy reforms 
Regional developments affecting 
both countries 
1980s 
High tariffs on finished vehicles 
(140-300%) with preferential rates 
for 'knocked down' kits. Local 
content in assembled vehicles 
enforced through Mandatory 
Deletion Programme (1980). 
National Car Project (implemented 
1983, Proton Saga launched 1985) 
incorporating generous fiscal 
incentives (Pioneer status and 
Investment Tax Allowance, 1986). 
Complementary Vendor 
Development Programme sought 
to enable cooperation between 
Proton and SME parts suppliers.  
High tariffs and import licensing 
restrictions on finished vehicles 
(180-300%) with preferential rates 
for 'knocked down' kits. 
Progressively increasing levels of 
local content required for assembly 
(until 1994). Tariff rebates for 
exporters implemented 1983.  
Brand to Brand Complementation 
(BBC) Scheme implemented 1987.  
1989   
Abolishment of restrictions on 
production levels.  
  
1990   
Tariff reductions (especially large 
for 'knocked-down' kits). 
Replacement of quotas and bans 
with tariffs. Approval of new 
assembly plants.  
  
1991       
1992 
Second National Car project 
(Perodua) implemented 1993. Third 
National Car Project (MTB) 
implemented 1994. Progressive 
increase in required local content 
levels.  
    
1993     
1994 
Expansion of export incentives to 
include exemption of all domestic 
taxes.  
  
1995   
Establishment of WTO, stipulating 
five-year phase period for 
prohibited TRIMs.  
1996   
Implementation of ASEAN 
Industrial Cooperation (AICO) 
Scheme. 
1997 
Increase in tariffs on finished 
vehicles.  
Abolishment of foreign equity limits 
on investments (announced 1993). 
Increase in tariffs on finished 
vehicles.  
Onset of Asian crisis.  
1998       
1999       
2000   
Elimination of local content 
requirements and removal of 
automotive products from AFTA 
exclusion list.  
  
2001       
2002       
2003     
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
comes into force for intra-regional 
automotive trade (implementation 
delayed in Malaysia).    
2004 
Elimination of local content 
requirements and fiscal 
preferences for national firms.  
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Year Malaysian policy reforms Thai policy reforms 
Regional developments affecting 
both countries 
2005 
Removal of automotive products 
from AFTA exclusion list, but level 
not reduced to CEPT level. Tariff 
reductions compensated by 
increases in excise duties. 
  
Australia-ASEAN bilateral trade 
agreement.  
2006 
Implementation of National 
Automotive Policy, including 
informal / discretionary fiscal policy 
favouring (national) firms with high 
local content ratios, and capital 
investment subsidies. 
    
2007       
2008 
Malaysia implements AFTA in full, 
applying CEPT. Tariff reductions 
compensated by increases in excise 
duties. 
    
2009       
2010     ASEAN-India FTA 




Appendix 26: Key policy developments pertaining to the automotive sector: Argentina and Brazil, 1980s-2010 
Year(s) Argentinean national policy reforms Brazilian national policy reforms 
Regional and multilateral policy 
reforms 
1980s 
Prohibitively high trade and 
investment restrictions 
Prohibitively high trade and 
investment restrictions 
No significant regional or multilateral 
developments 
1990    
1991 
Implementation of Argentinean 
Automotive Regime (Decree No. 
2677/91), including local content and 





Implementation of tariff reductions 











Implementation of the Brazilian 
Automotive Regime: large tariff 
increases and quantitative 
restrictions (quotas) on finished 
vehicles. 
Oura Preto Protocol establishing 
Mercosur common market; Uruguay 
Agreement establishing World Trade 
Organisation. 
1996 
Modification of the Argentinean 
Automotive Regime, with further 
incentives for local content and 
export-oriented production. 
Implementation of local content and 
trade-balancing requirements 
attached to fiscal incentives. Dispute 
cases DS51, DS52, DS64 and DS81 
brought to the WTO. ‘Towards integration’: reduction of 
tariffs for intra-regional trade; trade-
balancing clauses retained. 1997 
  
1998 Loss of competitiveness due to 
Brazilian devaluation 





Argentinean crisis; devaluation of the 
Peso in late 2002 
Withdrawal of prohibited TRIMs 
including local content requirements ‘Deepening integration’: 
implementation of common external 
tariff and regional content rules; 
elimination of national incentive 
programmes. Establishment of 
preferential trade agreements with 







2004 Withdrawal of prohibited TRIMs 
 
2005 
Implementation of Incentive Regime 
(Decree No. 774/2005) granting 
(discretionary) cash refunds for 
purchases of locally produced parts 
and components 
 
‘Reversing integration’: re-imposition 









Implementation of the INOVAR-AUTO 
programme, increasing tariffs and 
providing fiscal incentives for 
domestic production. 
 
Trade disputes with Mexico and 
within Mercosur. Protective policies 
reinstated. 
 




Appendix 27: Key policy developments pertaining to the automotive sector: China and India, 1980s-2010 
Year 
Chinese automotive market developments and policy 
reforms 
Indian automotive market developments and policy 
reforms 






Rapid investment liberalisation: licensing of new 
entrants, openness to FDI (with equity limits), and 




Imposition of ad hoc (discretionary) automotive 
investment criteria, including local content 
requirements. 
1994 
Implementation of the Automotive Industrial Policy: 
gradual liberalisation of trade and investment. 







Implementation of Public Notice No. 60, detailing 
mandatory criteria for automotive investments, 
including local content requirements. 
1998 
 






WTO accession (November 2001) and elimination of 
LCRs and other prohibited TRIMs. 
Elimination of LCRs and other prohibited TRIMs 
2002 
 
New Automotive Policy: 100% equity permitted for 
automotive assembler and parts supply; incentives for 
small cars; reductions of tariffs for inputs (e.g. steel); 
establishment of Core Group on Automotive Research 




New Automotive Industrial Policy formalises 
technology transfer and research and development 
performance requirements.  
2005 
Reductions in tariffs: to 25% for finished vehicles and 
10% for parts.  
2006 
Dispute cases DS339, DS340 and DS342, relating to the 
treatment of imported kits as complete vehicles, 
brought to the WTO. 
Automotive Mission Plan continues government’s 








100% foreign ownership permitted in auto parts sector 
(assembly still restricted to 50%). 
Free trade agreement with ASEAN. 





Appendix 28: Panel unit root tests (Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests), with and without linear time trends 
Variable 
p value, unit root test without linear 
trend 
p value, unit root test with linear trend 
Log local content 1.0000 0.0008 
Log local content as a proportion of 
apparent consumption 
0.9997 0.0079 
Log output 1.0000 0.0586 
Log output specialisation index 0.9982 0.8016 
Log exports 0.0930 0.0001 
Log export specialisation (RCA) index 0.0000 0.0000  
Log imports 0.9979 0.0050 
Log imports as a proportion of GDP 0.0000 0.0000  
Trade balance as a percentage of GDP 0.0000 0.0000 
Exports as a proportion of trade 0.0000 0.0000 
Log vehicle production per capita 0.9790 0.0450 
Log automotive output as a proportion of 
GDP 
0.7176 0.2522 
Interpolated CIP index 0.9992 - 
Note: Choi (2001) suggests that the inverse normal Z statistic offers the best trade-off between size and power; this is the statistic for 
which p values are reported here. 
